squatter
-
Posts
42 -
Joined
-
Last visited
Posts posted by squatter
-
-
Seems like the general feeling on here is that autonomous weapons are the way forward.
No-one here feel like we should be arguing for the abolition of autonomous weapons, or are you all already in the 'well the bad guys are gonna do it, so we should do it first' camp? (ie the 'race to the bottom' scenario)
I'm guessing you all caught this short film by the Future of Life Institute a few years back?
-
1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:
I don't see the frontline moving in any major way in either side's favor. Whatever modest hopes I had for that were dashed last summer.
You are right and the penny needs to drop - this war has reached a brutal stalemate. Neither side can advance short of Western support either massively increasing/decreasing (neither of which scenarios likely).
So the only humanitarian response is stop the violence now and use other means to reach a resolution that favours Ukraine.
-
49 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
So no discussion of the way forward can sidestep the MAGA/Trump/Biden issue, or the '24 election. The rest of the world can have all the opinions it wants but US power (as you argue) is central...then so is US politics, which by definition is how that power is governed. Your own argument boxes that fact right into the discussion, while you try to cite a broader perspective?
I literally don't know where you are going with this any more?
I am saying a) US will be pivotal whatever happens, and b) arguing for ceasefire doesn't make you automatically a MAGA nutjob
These statements shouldn't be fodder for argument, they should be self-evident
-
34 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Right...yet you bring up US power as the solution.
Yes true. But what I mean is, there are plenty of people out there who see negotiations are inevitable, who have nothing to do with MAGA/Trump/Biden.
The US will 100% be instrumental in how this war ends. It's just a case of in which fashion.
Will Trump win the election and cut aid thus forcing Ukraine to the table and give Putin everything he wants?
Will Biden win and force Russia to the table with increased threats of supplies to Ukraine and thus in position of strength?
Will Biden win, not be able to procure enough weapons from Congress, and then Ukraine will be forced to the table in position of weakness cos no better options?
The outcome of the war will be decided now in large part by what the US does or does not do. That's how it goes when you're the global hegemon.
-
27 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Well you might want to sit down and have a conversation with yourself then because these are the exact same lines being used in the MAGA camp right now = "easy button of US power", "vague hand waving on details" and obstinate belief that there is an easy solution in face of obvious counter-facts. Oh, and let's not forget the obstinate refusal to see any viable solution other than your own because of "what you think". FFS we just had FlimFlam or whatever in here doing pretty much exactly what you are.
Look, maybe you are who you say you are and this whole thing is a big miscommunication, but your timing and profile are highly suspicious. You posted once back in 2013 and then disappear for 11 years, only to come back on this specific thread espousing a lot of the same lines we have heard from the US political far right...just after Adiivka. Your problem space is straight out of the MacGregor school of analysis and your solutions are pull straight from the MAGA camp.
Yes I'm not 100% sure what made me decide to post here recently - long time of lurking and just feeling like certain positions (that to me seem obvious) were not being expressed.
Worth reminding yourself that there's a huge spread of opinions out there on how this war might end that exist outside of the MAGA/Biden US-centric paradigm:
https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/global-perspectives-ending-russia-ukraine-war
-
2 minutes ago, buena said:
I believe you when you say you're from the UK beacuse you have no idea how the EU works
That is actually very funny. Good post.
-
14 minutes ago, Kinophile said:
That's a ridiculously large caveat and exactly the kind of handwaving Der Kapitan is describing.
It's completely unrealistic to describe any peace process that does try to take into account US political dynamics.
Everything following after that caveat, and no matter how sensible in isolation, is simply wishing for unicorns. It's not analysis, it's "I think".
You are absolutely right, I posted what I think could lead to an end to the war and negotiations.
It's called an opinion. Much of human interaction and discourse consists of them.
I won't post what I think WILL happen, because that's completely outwith of my powers to predict. Who knows wtf state the USA will be in this time in 12 months.
-
8 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Ok, well now we know which camp you are in, and it definitely is not the "liberal peacenik" one. Hmm, and I wonder which presidential candidate should be best qualified to flex this immense political power and which one is "weak and indecisive"?
It's amazing how confident you are in assessments of others character/motivation/psychology that are so hugely wide of the mark. I am from the UK, vote left-leaning and utterly despise Trump.
-
On 3/3/2024 at 9:57 PM, The_Capt said:
Let’s say “Ok, you guys are right. Ukraine is out of options here. There are no viable way for Ukraine to continue to prosecute this war.” Ok, so what? What would peace negotiations look like? How exactly do you guys see these “peace negotiations” happening. Every time I ask this question I get some hand waving but no one has yet to unpack just how any peace negotiations could end up in anything but weakened western influence and a more vulnerable Ukraine that Russia is going to exploit. What peace negotiation, that Russia is going to accept - while, as we are continually reminded, Russia is still capable of waging offensives to take ground? What possible leverage does the west or Ukraine have in guaranteeing Ukrainian independence and security. Is Russia going to offer reparations? How about war crimes prosecution? Is Russia going to give up an inch of ground it has taken? Are they going to push for recognition of Crimea and Donbas as Russian provinces.
I'll take you up on this.
I firmly believe it's within the power of the USA to end this war pretty much immediately (setting aside the madhouse of US domestic politics.)
I believe Putin has been desperate to freeze this conflict pretty much ever since the Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives raised the specter of total Russian defeat.
For me, the USA has to threaten Putin with massive upscale of support to Ukraine - F16s, more himars/glsdbs/sams/amraams etc - if he doesn't come to the table. The kind of levels of support that would empower Ukraine to attrite RUS forces to such a level that will terrify Putin and his commanders. I believe Putin would take this chance. Once ceasefire is achieved, the West begins process of arming Ukraine to the point that Russian re-opening hostilities would be insane.
In negotiations, West agrees not to take Ukraine into NATO, but accepts into EU, and makes concrete security guarantees to in any case. UN peacekeepers in along border. Russia gets symbolic non-NATO status for Ukraine. No future invasion of Ukraine for Russia.
As for territory - Ukraine will have to accept some loss. Crimea for sure. Perhaps return to 2022 borders, with landbridge as demilitarised zone. This is difficult to accept for Ukraine obviously, but as of 2014, I don't Ukraine was ever going to get Crimea back.
Continued sanctions and pressure on Russia to give up Putin for war crimes tribunal but he'll probably die before that happened I would guess. Reparations claims to go to international arbitration etc (obviously Russia owes immense reparations to Ukraine, but will that ever materialise under whichever circumstances this conflict ends, who knows?)
So while there will have to be difficult concessions made in negotiation, just like in Gaza, I believe the USA has the power to end this conflict whenever it sees fit.
-
On 3/1/2024 at 4:31 PM, The_Capt said:
- Light dispersed forces are doing better than large heavy concentrations of mass.
- Light dispersed forces have had disproportionate effects on the battlefield from previous war. This is likely due to C4ISR and weapons developments.
- Light dispersed forces have a much lower logistical footprint than heavy ones.
I agree with all of this.
On 3/1/2024 at 4:31 PM, The_Capt said:- Russian forces are very thin in places on these fronts based on simple math. They have offset this through mine warfare and other forms of force multiplication.
Genuine question: is this true? Are RUS forces outnumbered/outgunned in Ukraine? Does Ukraine have superior reserves? Analysis of the Avdiivka battle suggests Ukraine is suffering shell hunger. And while UKR has a large head count in its armed forces, average age of their soldier is reported as 43. I don't read this as positive signs for UKR overall strength.
On 3/1/2024 at 4:31 PM, The_Capt said:- We have no reports of massive fortresses or mine belts south of Kherson.
Yes, but if you think that doesn't mean RUS forces in the zone are well fortified, you are bat**** crazy. Do they teach you at Canadian staff college to "assume the enemy is inept and unprepared, and plan accordingly?"
On 3/1/2024 at 4:31 PM, The_Capt said:All of that adds up to an option space down south for a sustained light force effort that may yield operational effects. You keep skipping past the fact that the UA has already demonstrated a proof of concept on this at Kryky.
On 3/1/2024 at 4:50 PM, Battlefront.com said:And you have been continually dodging the central point that Ukraine has had a bridgehead on the left bank for months and Russia, despite massive effort, has failed to dislodge it. Yet you insist that "it can't be done" and yet it is done now, already.
Have you both considered that what the single beleaguered toehold Ukraine has managed to cling onto at Krynky is actually evidence of how hard it is for them to cross this river in any significant force? The fact they have just this one marginal battered bridgehead (at the point of the river that's most suited with overwatching higher bank the friendly side, etc) and not several of them is exactly evidence against what you are proposing, not in favour? If Krynky is going well, where are the other bridgeheads?
Have you stepped back and considered whether it might be your cognitive bias that is turning Krynky into evidence of exactly what it is not?
On 3/1/2024 at 4:31 PM, The_Capt said:However, when one arrives with an ulterior agenda that is when alarm bells go off. By your own admission, you do not want a southern light option to be workable - it counters your central theme - "this war has gone on too long and should be ended".
You are absolutely wrong on this point. Total word twisting. I mean get real: when did I ever "admit that I don't want a southern option to be workable?" You really ought to retract that crap. I don't want RUS to win this war. I revile Putin and his regime. My belief the war should be ended now comes from my analysis that neither side can meaningfully advance anymore, and that now we are into permanent static/attritional war. Not the other way round.
Your cod psychological profiling and personal defamation/denigration of those who disagree with you is copium that allows you to write off their views as being invalid.
On 3/1/2024 at 4:31 PM, The_Capt said:You have presented no evidence or even analysis...only assessment based on "what you think". As I tell my students: "Rule # 4 - no one cares what you think. They care what you can prove." If you admire my posts, then you will note that I always try to ground my assessments on facts and evidence. I tried again here and you have dismissed them. I tried outlining force density on the ground..."whatever". I tried to outline what light forces could do..."uh uh". In short you are pitching a problem that does not want a solution. Then go all alligator tears and huffy with indignity when you are called out.
You want respect for your analysis, well go do some research and come back with something that holds water. Do an UA options analysis that stands up to scrutiny and we have a start point for discussion. I have tried to present counter-factuals to your position but none are good enough because none will ever be good enough for someone whose position is pretty obviously unassailable.
"Rule # 4 - no one cares what you think. They care what you can prove." This is not a debate in which anyone can 'prove' anything. We can just speculate. And when your 'evidence' includes links to George Washington crossing the Delaware, or D-Day, that is just laughable
My 'evidence' is the thousands of videos we've seen of how drones / modern ISR has utterly transformed the battlefield, and how precise munitions can be directed to any place on the battlefield in a short amount of time. How to move is to be seen, and to be seen is to be killed. And how one of the most easily seen movements is that across water on boats/pontoons whatever. Meaning that of all the military maneuvres/operations that is now lightyears more difficult and dangerous than it was before this war, open water crossings/bridgehead sustaining on rivers as large as the Dniepr is among the worst.
That's my view. This is a perfectly reasonable argument to make, and one which has a good chance of being correct, as I'm sure many on here will agree.
Yet you turn the debate into a series of personal denigrations/defamations - "you're a Russian stooge, you're a ****ing idiot, you're a bull****ter, you are illogical." Its a pattern. Have a look a yourself mate, take a moment to reflect.
On 3/1/2024 at 4:50 PM, Battlefront.com said:When Ukraine tried to use NATO style mechanized combined arms it got trounced. It gained almost no ground and suffered some significant losses trying. So what happened? Ukraine largely switched to light forces again and despite VASTLY dense and well prepared lines, Ukraine gained ground. Russia has to pour vast amounts of resources to hold the line.
Sorry - which ground that Ukraine gained with light forces this year are you referring to?
On 3/1/2024 at 4:31 PM, The_Capt said:So like the others who have come through on the same train you are on: why are you here? To convince us all is lost and we should call out political leadership to sue for any peace we can get? I mean the UA has no hope down at Kherson. No hope at Zaporizhzhia. No hope in the Donbas. So what is the point of even doing military analysis and assessment, the outcome is clearly already decided? What are you here to learn?
Is this a forum for only those who blindly believe in inevitable Ukrainian victory, no matter what their eyes tell them? (And again, please don't mistake a belief that Ukraine can no longer 'win' this war by recapturing its lost territory with a hope that Ukraine cannot win this war. Don't insult me with that one again please.)
-
3 hours ago, The_Capt said:
Kinda looks like you have constructed a fortress of opinion. As I noted, almost every major military water crossing in history has been led by lighter forces establishing a bridgehead:
So the ability to push light forces across a water obstacle and support them is not new or novel. Nor are commando raids. Combining these two into sustained effect is the question - again, I assess as not only possible but plausible.
My point to you here is to throw in the bin all your examples of amphibious crossings from previous wars, because what the last two years have shown is that war has changed immensely (as you of all people know). You may as well dig out examples of fall of France and Barbarossa to try justifying an argument for massive armoured schwerpunkts as a viable strategy in the current environment
It's not called 'a fortress of opinion', it's called drawing conclusions from what we are seeing play out on the battlefield. You on the other hand are bringing obsolete examples as evidence to the table.
3 hours ago, The_Capt said:As to UA light forces “buzzing around RU LOCs = fanciful”, they have already demonstrated this on repeated occasions in this war. First at Kyiv and then later at Kharkiv and Kherson.
At risk of boring everyone else with constant back and fourth, I've got no doubt what light forces can achieve against an overextended poorly organised attacker (Kyiv) or a depleted, unprepared, unentrenched defender (Kharkiv). Again, I say these are poorly selected examples for the discussion at hand.
3 hours ago, The_Capt said:You are not here to discuss the viability or pros and cons of a possible UA operation.
Sorrywhatpardon?! I must be fantasising this discussion then!
3 hours ago, The_Capt said:You are instead here to promote the futility of Ukraine continuing this war and are instead pushing the idea that due to that futility they should sue for peace.
That is close to my position, yes. I do believe the time to close down hostilities has arrived. If anything I am concerned that Ukraine's position will only deteriorate from here (unless Western supply delivery ramps up massively, which doesn't seem likely currently). I think the West will continue to do enough to keep Ukraine in the war, but will not supply enough to kick the Russians out.
But arriving at this position is the product of drawing conclusions from observing how this war is playing out, not the other way round.
3 hours ago, The_Capt said:You have already answered that question and locked the cognitive door.
3 hours ago, The_Capt said:However, on this “all is lost Ukraine, beg for peace” (which is a pro-Russian narrative),
3 hours ago, The_Capt said:Well no point discussing because you have already made up your mind in support of you larger argument…
I've been an admirer of a great many of your posts as a long time lurker here, but you do have a propensity to go ad-hominem with people who don't agree with your opinions. But going below the belt in an argument is not a good look for your position. You seem to believe anyone who disagrees with you is either a f*cking idiot, or a Russian stooge.
I reject both accusations - I am a very stable genius!
-
3 hours ago, hcrof said:
I don't disagree about the 1916 analogy but how do you think the warring sides would have made peace in 1916? Under what terms? And who would enforce them?
I don't mean to suggest that there was a peace settlement in reach in 1916, but there could be one today.
3 hours ago, hcrof said:Edit: and wasn't the war being fought in french and russian territory in 1916 due to rapid early advances by the central powers? And who won in the end?
Er, yes, and it was won by the Allies of course, but not sure your point here?
-
On 2/28/2024 at 12:21 PM, The_Capt said:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington's_crossing_of_the_Delaware_River
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Plunder
And of course the big one: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Overlord
And let’s pull some doctrine in: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-90-12/fm3-90-12.pdf
So adding this all up, essentially it has and can be done but there are a lot of caveats.
Well I'm not sure that a bunch of musketmen successfully crossing a river is a helpful analogue to attempting to cross in a modern near-pear environment observed by drones, attacked by FPVs, PGMs, glide bombs etc. Neither are the WW2 comparisons where the crossing points were more or less unmolested because the enemy didn't have the means to interdict.
I would say "adding this all up" it hasnt and can't be done. Of course the 'cant' can be argued over but this is precisely our point of difference. You believe it can, I disagree.
On 2/28/2024 at 12:21 PM, The_Capt said:Ok, so this one opens up the question of how well prepared are the RA forces on the other side? Light forces have proven pretty important in this war. They were critical in the first month pretty much everywhere and at Kharkiv constituted the breakout force. If the RA has built a heavy line of defence as you seem to indicate then you may be correct. But have they?
I think we have to assume RUS has built sufficient defences to handle light forces. They have been there two years now. Yes 'russia sux' but if you're banking on them being unprepared for what you're describing, you're most likely walking into a trap.
On 2/28/2024 at 12:21 PM, The_Capt said:That is exactly the objective of a bunch of light forces running rampant in the backfield.
It's this idea that UKR can get a bunch of WW2 SAS type flying columns buzzing around RUS LoCs that I find totally fanciful. Anything moving on this battlefield is subject to any number of lethal threats. To be seen is to be killed. In any case, likelihood is anything light that gets across will very quickly bump up against fortifications they will be unable to pass. Comparisons to the Kharkiv counteroffensive are unrealistic cos completely different circumstances (RUS forces depleted, not dug in, etc).
On 2/28/2024 at 12:21 PM, The_Capt said:Because the RA will have to pull these (shrinking) assets from somewhere else. This is the minimum objective by the way. If the RA cannot or does not have “reserves” then an opportunity to redraw the lines south of Kherson presents itself.
Considering cross-river operations as a way of extending the front and testing the size of RUS reserves is an interesting point to raise. Genuine question: which side UKR or RUS would benefit most from extending the battle front? ie which side has greater reserves?
On 2/28/2024 at 12:21 PM, The_Capt said:So the real question is not in your response or reasoning. They are not “can it be done” or “will it do anything?” The real question is: does the UA have the forces and capabilities to do it at scale? This we do not know and will have to simply wait and see.
Ultimately I think you are engaging in semantics here. The question absolutely is 'can it be done', because 'it' is 'crossing the river at scale', exactly what we have been debating.
But you are right we will see. My position is that it is copium to imagine that UKR has the ability to make significant advances in any sector of the front (short of significant change in balance of forces via either Western supplies or ongoing attrition taking effect in ways it hasn't yet produced), Dniepr or otherwise. I get that folks want to be positive about UKR's position in the war, but I think that's leading some to dream impossible dreams.
And that's why I think we need to bring about an end to this carnage because we are well and truly into 1916 territory in terms of senseless slaughter over minimal gains.
-
16 hours ago, The_Capt said:
And you are basing this on...?
The RUS situation at Kherson was having mech forces on the wrong side of a river with a single LOC, that got blown up. Now, I think it is possible but will take a lot of force generation and support to do it. And some of what we are talking about has never been tried before. But at this point it may be time to try something new because simply sitting back and letting Russia slowly grind away does not seem like the better option.
Frankly, I assess that Ukraine has a lower bar to go over for this sort of sustained light effort at Kherson than to try to do heavy-mech breaches further up the line.
Well, I'm basing this on my belief that sustaining any scale of operations across a massive water obstacle with no permanent crossings in a near-peer environment is effectively impossible.
As long as the RUS have sufficient drones and artillery and aviation, I don't believe UKR light forces would be finding themselves at the advantage trying to push inwards from the left bank, but at a huge disadvantage. These light forces would be bumping up again RUS fortifications, they would be vulnerable to everything from AK47 upwards, they would have extreme difficulty receiving resupply without serious interdiction, and they would have no fortifications, no armour support. They would have almost no CASevac and would know that they are on a near suicide mission.
And what would they actually meaningfully do in their 4x4 buggies and on foot other than spot for fires (something drones are doing anyway)?
Even if some kind of 'shock and awe' multiple crossing and heavy fires assault as put forward elsewhere was mounted successfully, I don't see how it ends up in anything other than a reverse Kherson as experienced by the RUS.
UKR troops cross Dniepr in shock and awe assault > UKR light forces penetrate 10/20/30kms into RUS LOCs > RUS regroup, reassign reserves to the zone, pile on the drone/artillery/aviation support > UKR forces running low on supply/support and reinforcement with river crossings under constant attack and any vehicles trying to run supplies from river to the front under drone assault > RUS start turning bridgehead into the next Bakhmut/Avdiivka only here the defenders aren't fortified and have extreme difficulty in receiving resupply/reinforcement and have no armour support > UKR forced to retreat back to Dniepr having lost large numbers of crack troops and with national morale depleted
You of course will probably have a more positive vision for the outcome from UKR point of view, and I understand the impulse in searching for a better way than smashing one's head against RUS fortifications elsewhere along the front. But I don't think there's anyway UKR can successfully prosecute an operational offensive any more (without huge change in facts on the ground - ie massive RUS attrition or huge injection of advanced western weapons for UKR).
Which is why if we were both in the room back at UKR high command, I'd be making this argument lest out of desperation we launch the next Market Garden, or Dien Bien Phu.
-
1 hour ago, kimbosbread said:
To elaborate on why Kryki is a great spot for another Russian phyrric victory: Obviously it’s a pain for Russian logistics, but it’s hard to get their artillery in range without getting hit with all of Magyar’s pain/HIMARS. Because of this, glide bombs. But apparently roaming Patriot/whatever batteries are a thing in this area, hence all the losses we see. So they have to use meat, which unsupported, in a nasty slushy marsh isn’t going to do so well.
Genuine question: why is RUS artillery more vulnerable supporting Kryki than any other sector of the front?
If a SPG is firing 40km from the front, what makes one 40kms more dangerous than the next?
-
2 hours ago, The_Capt said:
You guys are dancing around the central reason of why a UA action in this area would matter - it is where the RA is weakest and least prepared. The Krynki bridgehead has really been a proof of concept, not easy but the UA can sustain a light force against opposition on the other side of a river.
Yes, well I was just addressing some specific points made by the other poster.
My main point is/was that I disagree with yourself/Steve/others who believe an operationally/strategically significant cross-river operation could be possible this year, as I can't see that as leading to anything other than heavy Ukrainian losses and retreat (RUS Kherson situation in reverse).
Yes, I could see some small scale harrass/distract operations that may require some RUS force allocation (current bridgehead example of this), but any significant attempt to put large forces across is surely madness.
I feel like without a near total breakdown in one side or other's will/ability to continue the fight (caused by grinding attrition) that this war is going to end along pretty much along the line of contact as it stands. The only question is how many more dead, maimed, traumatised people will be added to the butcher's bill, and how much more economic, environmental and social damage will be done between now and then.
I pray for less rather than more.
-
20 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:
1. The Krynki bridgehead remains after 4+ months, in spite of nonstop attacks by Russian heavy forces + VDV. And that's a zone the Russians can actually supply via a major highway. It's hell for the Uke marines who are there, indeed, but they and their support forces are also giving better than they get, by plastering the RU attacks and LOCs.
Thanks for engaging with my post.
I have no privileged information about what's going on around Krynki and the Dniepr front (I get most my info from here and various of the better-known podcasts) but I question several of your assertions, such as the two points in bold above. "non-stop attacks" and "giving better than they get"? Maybe this is true, but I question the data on this, given the first-hand accounts we've seen from the battered UKR marines.
20 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:2. The further you get down the delta (past the Kherson bridge), the harder it is for the Ivans to deploy and sustain heavy forces -- AFVs, shells, in that boggy, poorly roaded area. I'd actually argue that their logistical challenge out there is WORSE than the Ukrainian one.
20 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:3. On the other hand, there's plenty of space in those bayou lands for savvy crack troops to spread out and minimise the damage from glide bombs. Drone airlift/medevac and drone ships can keep Ranger battalions supplied indefinitely; heavy forces, no, but they're not useful here.
I think the first point to make is that if the Dniepr marsh/delta/peninsula area is so disadvantageous to Russian operations, and advantageous to UKR operations as you say, why are we not already seeing the UKR exploit this?
I think that's probably because having some of UKR's best SOFs wading around in the marsh with nothing to shoot while RUS sit in their fortifications the dry land the other side of it doesn't really achieve much.
20 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:4. The RU aircraft and helos are going to need to make attack runs from the southeast, given that the Western Black Sea is quickly becoming a Ukrainian lake....
I may be ignorant, but looking at the map I don't see how aviation attacking lobbing glide bombs at this zone of the front is any more difficult than any other zone? And I don't see how the BSF being in port changes that equation either? RUS aircraft will be lobbing bombs from somewhere over Crimea, presumably? Also see reports elsewhere on this thread of the horrendous bombing the current bridgehead is experiencing.
20 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:5. In spite of being marshlands, Kinburn spit east to Oleshky sands is probably the most essential strategic territory for Ukraine to recover, as the Russians can be expected to build another Sebastopol there in a cease fire situation so as to menace the entire Kherson-Mykolaiv-Odesa portion of Ukraine. I'd actually argue that this is a must have!
Given how vulnerable Sebastopol has proven to deep strike missiles/drones, I really don't see the RUS wanting to build any major naval facilities much closer to UKR as would just be a sitting duck, no? I would have thought the whole Kinburn spit/Marshland area is a strategic backwater. You can't build on marshland - you can hardly dig a trench or a dugout - you can't deploy armour there, and you can't (especially if you're UKR) supply it easily. If there's a ceasfire and further conflict in years to come, it will be naval drones (launched from anywhere on the Crimea) that the RUS will use to shut down UKR shipping out of Odessa.
Yes, I could see special forces wading around conducting nuisance strikes and skirmishing, but much more than that I fail to see a) how it could be achieved, and b) what good it would achieve.
Your position seems to be 1: The marshes west of Oleshky to the K spit are of the highest strategic value. 2 That the terrain favours the UKR over the RUS forces. 3 Therefore UKR should engage in large scale light INF operations in this area.
I disagree with all three points, but I guess the next 12 months or whatever will prove the point either way.
-
23 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
The most likely place for Ukraine to do something significant this year is in Kherson. Not only has Russia repeatedly failed to eliminate a fairly small bridgehead, they have repeatedly lost ground (even if very small amounts) over the many months of struggle there. Russian forces committed to this area haven't been their better units (I use that term very relatively!), but that doesn't fully explain their weakness. In any case, the units there now remain in poor condition.
I can easily picture an operation where Ukraine engages in a "shock and awe" operation where artillery, drones, and airstrikes smash Russian frontline and real logistics in the immediate area, land a fairly modest amount of fresh forces (1-2 battalions), then push to expand away from the river (primary) as well as expanding their hold of the left bank (secondary). As this happens more forces are brought over, including heavier stuff, in order to keep up the momentum. A couple more battalions would make a big impact.
I feel like the idea of a major UKR operation across the Dniepr river that yourself / the Captain and others are imagining is just fantasy land I'm afraid.
Sending anything sizeable across is just going to be creating a huge vulnerability for the Ukrainians, and a great opportunity for the Russians.
You're going to be sending forces into relatively confined bridgeheads of unfortified territory where they will be battered by glide bombs and artillery. The unfortified aspect is particularly important, as we've seen in this war. Losses in the bridgeheads and crossings would be immense.
They'll have to be supplied by boats and pontoons (all of which will be constantly attacked) and after a few firefights local fuel and ammo will be constrained.
You guys are arguing that UKR should deliberately put itself into the situation from which RUS forces were forced to withdraw from under duress when they were the other side of the river. I think the RUS would lick their lips at this. Wouldn't be surprised this explains why RUS has allowed a small bridgehead to develop already.
Even if there was some kind of breakout, the bigger the breakout, the bigger the strain put on cross-river logistics, the bigger the opportunity for RUS forces to crush/pocket UKR forces. You're imagining UKR amour pontooning across the river, driving 10s of kms into zones of exploitation - they would be absolutely smashed by drones/ATGM/helicopter aviation. Getting supplies up to the front would be a nightmare.
A sizeable operation across the Dniepr under current conditions is surely a complete fantasy? A catastrophe in the waiting.
Neither side is going to be able make any further sizeable breakthroughs/maneuvers in the south of Ukraine, unless massive attrition/collapse in the other's ability to field drones/artillery has already occurred. Which isn't looking likely any time soon.
The only way to end this war is continuing and horrendous grinding attrition to the point one side can no longer continue, or negotiation.
-
Long time lurker here with first post since the war began.
First up – kudos for some of the analysis and opinion that’s been shared here. Right from the start there was nowhere else that I was aware of in MSM or elsewhere that so quickly at the outset of the war in 2022 identified that the Russians were going to suffer such a catastrophic initial defeat. It took most of the world – me included – much longer to come to that realisation. So kudos.
But more recently, as the front lines have hardened and solidified throughout 2023, I’m surprised at the almost total absence of an argument I’m going to make now:
This war is now looking pretty much unwinnable on the battlefield by any side – short of a massive uptick in US/NATO arms supplies (or a complete stop in those supplies). So surely the time has come for this horrendous, insane war to stop.
The path to some kind of operational victory on the battlefield looks gone. First the Russian offensive at Bakhmut, then the Ukrainian summer offensive demonstrated that under the new paradigm of drone proliferation, no one is going to achieve a significant mobile breakthrough in this conflict.
This time last year pundits were drawing fantasy lines of advance on maps towards Melitopol and the Crimean isthmus cutting the land bridge, but does anyone here now seriously believe anything like that kind of breakthrough is going to be possible in the coming years? I would say it’s pretty much impossible to see a breakthrough on the battlefield now.
Then came the hope of an attritional victory, or a corrosive victory, or however you want to term it. That always seemed like the more plausible option to me, but given the production levels by the Russians of cheap counters such as FPVs, ATGMs, glide bombs, etc, together with other mitigations and adaptations to PGMs, it doesn’t look like the Russians are anywhere nearer operational or strategic collapse than the Ukrainians are currently.
The parallels with WW1 are increasingly glaring and not just a casual observation based on the digging of trenches. Defence is king. Advances are counted in the 100s of meters, not 100s of miles. Look at the images: men getting blasted to hell by high-explosives for the sake of a farmer’s field, a treeline or a shattered hamlet. It’s a lunar hellscape across 100s of km of front. Towns and villages erased and rendered probably never again inhabitable.
Like in 1916, how many more 100s and 1000s of young men on either side are going to be killed before one side has to accept it is exhausted and cannot continue? How many more will be maimed, traumatised, brutalised, displaced if we continue into 2024 or 2025? How many families grieving, how many lives ruined? How much economic damage will be mounted on what’s already done? I mean what kind of state is the Ukraine economy right now? It must be utterly shattered? Let alone what it might be in two years time.
Not to mention the ongoing impacts globally – higher energy prices and increased grain prices which feed into increased cost of living around the world. Now, I’m less worried about interruption to comfortable middle class lifestyles in the West here, as I am with the impacts on the global south and developing world, where increases in food prices can be ruinous.
As others have pointed out here recently, Russia has already suffered a catastrophic defeat. 100s of 1000s of casualties (and sorry these are mostly terrified and bewildered young men, not ‘Orcs’ (the rapists and torturers excluded)). Its military is severely weakened, its economy now with a grim, baked-in demographic nightmare ahead. Its reputation sullied. NATO strengthened and expanded. And all it has to show is a sliver of territory on the land bridge.
And even if some kind of attritional victory against Russia was to be achieved, what might that look like? That would assumably result in some kind of operational collapse leading to a wider collapse in morale resulting in mutiny or coup or similar – which many observers believe would result in even more hardline forces taking control from Putin. Then you are into fragmentation of Russia scenarios, nuclear proliferation, desperate use of nukes to prevent fall of Crimea etc. Potentially catastrophic not only for Russia but Ukraine also.
So I say: stop the goddamn war. Continue supporting Ukraine to the extent that any resumption of hostilities by Russia would be futile. Continue sanctions. Prosecute Putin as a war criminal. Encourage liberal opposition in Russia and create a set of strict conditions under which it could be accepted again as a partner of the West (such as free and fair democratic elections, prosecution of other war criminals, reparations to Ukraine, etc).
And while reforms in Russia may be fanciful in the short term, the alternative is facing a couple more years of horrendous, ruinous grind, only inevitably having to face the realities of stalemate and the conclusion of the paragraph above anyway.
-
Still looking for that game... anyone?
-
Hey DasMorbo
sure - drop me a PM when you've upgraded, I'm sure I'll still be looking for opposition in a few weeks. I'm good with all your preferences.
As for now - still looking for oppo...
-
All very useful, thank you. While we are on the topic of organising forums/online materials - I find the repository very badly organised. When I go there, I want to search for, say, the most highest rated campaigns, yet I can't order the files using either 'highest rated' or 'campaigns'. Given the lack of packaged scenarios in the CM 2.0 games I think BF could do more to drive players towards the best of the user generated material.
Saying that, any of you fancy a game?
-
Hello all
I'm looking for a PBEM game CMBN 2.0. Please PM me if you're interested.
By the way - is posting on this forum the only way to search for opponents? Seems a little strange there's no multiplayer forum/lobby, or am I missing something?
Cheers
-
Hello all
Looking for opponents for CMFI. I'm happy to play any side on a QB of medium size.
I'd say I'm a pretty good player, and would be looking for a pretty high tempo game - ie: at least one turn per day.
PM me if you're interested...
Cheers
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
Yes of course that is true. But unmanned does not equal autonomous. And yes, of course autonomous weapons will offer huge advantages to those who employ them, but at what cost (see video I linked to above.)? Due to the cheapness and ease of manufacture of autonomous killer drones (once the tech has been developed), the implications of their use by bad actors are horrendous.
The world did manage to get some level of control over nuclear proliferation (somewhat latterly and post-hoc) - should we not at aspire to learn the lessons from the successes and failures of nuclear non-proliferation and at least attempt to limit autonomous weapon development?
If we don't then we are heading into an utterly terrifying world, and one most on here seem to have just shrugged and set off down the road towards at the first fork in the road.