Sailor Malan2
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Posts posted by Sailor Malan2
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6 hours ago, Anthony P. said:
I suppose it's quite possible that they were low on binoculars at this point in the war, much like with men, equipment and food, and so decided to prioritize manufacturing binoculars for other branches. But what I think is strange is that the only Commonwealth units that are issued binoculars ATM at the squad/section level, bar airborne units, are the engineers. Not even scouts get them.
Where did you get the idea the UK was low on any of the above? Food was rationed at a very healthy level, and the armed forces got more anyway. Lend lease and British industry meant that the forces were very comfortable (maybe not to US standards but well above German and Russians). As for men, this is a myth. The Armed service strength was only just peaking. The perceived manpower shortages were relative to continued expansion whilst still generating replacements and running war production and expansion, and without affecting reserved occupations and post war plans. The worst shortages were replacement infantry (much as the US also did a few months later), and were purely a priority choice. Did you know the government report that defined the NHS/welfare state was published in 1942. Secondary education was significantly reformed in 1944. Not exactly the sane options for a country with equipment shortages and no manpower...
As ever, distribution of equipment was uneven, but I have never heard of binos being an issue.
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That sounds more like it. Maybe the 'range test' environment vs a real map is a key factor.
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Thanks Gazmaps. There are several misconceptions of what camouflage is, here. If your camo is 'spottable' in its own right you have screwed up big time. The most likely realistic way this can happen is the use of cut branches/foliage in hot weather that start dying in, say, heat, and don't get replaced often enough. However I deliberately used experienced crew so as to initially avoid that issue for now.
Ideally we need a camo manual from WW2 of the techniques taught, and the testing used to show competence. If, (as I did in cadets when a teen) the exercise was to conceal myself less than 50m from a regular army instructor, with LoS to him, without being spotted, you have a hard data point. As an aside, in order to make sure we weren't cheating he used to call out the locations of everyone he could see anyway (the 'fails'), then he would make a gesture (right arm out for example), and then resume normal pose. He would then ask us left in to stand, and advance on him. You had to say what he had done to show you had LoS to him to pass. Its not as difficult as you think once you have learnt some basic techniques: place yourself in front of terrain/objects never against the sky), do not move, arrange yourself with a natural keyhole to the target(small gap in bush, or natural depression in whatever you are behind. I know I am not 2m square, but neither was i at 1000m! Once trained less than 25% would be spotted - the ones who weren't really interested in cadets (forced in by parents etc), , and that is with (unstressed) green/inexperienced troops. First try I think >2/3 failed straight away.
Assuming we don't have access to a convenient historical source like the above, we need some military guys to tell us what their experience is. Last resort we do experiments. The car at 1000m is a good one (but for photos remember the effects of zoom lenses etc.) A further experiment that might be easier for urban dwellers is to remember you can do this at sub scale: 2m sq at 1000m is the same angle subtended as 20cm sq at 100m. Make some square 'targets' of 20x20cm, and paint them in different finishes. Place them in a hedge or tree line at 100m range, preferably one about 200m long, and ask a friend to spot it. With neutral colours, you can nail it to a tree (in shade but plain sight) and it will take many tens of seconds to spot. Put it in grass of behind a bush, paying attention to break up the outline and it gets even harder. Try it with silver foil and you will be surprised how you can miss those if you are clever at disguising it's outline (and it isn't reflecting straight at the viewer. Finally, remember that this test is pessimistic as the viewer knows the target is there somewhere...
Things that get spotted in those conditions are either things that move, or have failed to conceal a hard edge (there are very few straight edges in nature, and eyes get drawn to them). Finally, shiny glints are a big giveaway.
I maintain that a properly concealed (= emplaced in CM) regular AT gun at 1000m should take well over a minute to detect, but then only a few seconds to identify as a Gun. Maybe spooting the exact type shouldn't happen at all until it fires, or only rarely. I would not like to propose numbers but my gut feel would be 5% chance to spot per minute per spotter (infantry, with binos, and not under fire), which gives something like 2/3 spotted by a single spotter in 20 minutes. After that, identification as a gun should be 10 or 20 seconds, maybe 30 at the outside, if binos are used (30 seconds focussed examination of a specific location is very different from a search of many degrees of arc). Without binos this could be 2 or 3 times longer. Finally there should be a 10% chance per minute of identifying it correctly once located. Firing the gun should pretty much get it spooted straight away by an unengaged infantry observer. These are all gut feel and I will immediately defer to anyone with proper knowledge.
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40 minutes ago, Michael Emrys said:
I disagree. There is an intermediate stage in spotting where you definitely recognize that it is a man made object (i.e., "not a tree") but you need to look at it a while before you start to get a strong enough impression to figure out whether it is a pillbox, a tank, or a large gun. Or even just a farmer's shed.
Michael
But being able to see the camo as a man made object is a symptom of poor camouflage At 1km range, and time to emplace, there is little reason to be spottable quickly. 20 or 30 secs to spot from a standing start is pretty quick. I would challenge you to spot a green car parked under trees that far away that quickly (without knowing where to look). One of the major aims of concealment is to break up the outline. Don't forget that the circumference of circle about you of radius 1km is over 6km. Even if the likely enemy positions are only 120 degrees thats still 2km to look at, and of course no one says the enemy is at 1km. A 120 degree slice from 300 m to 1,5km has an area of 7million sq m
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The spotting times in this test seem to imply that there is little hindrance to detecting the presence of the unit (things are detected in seconds, which means that they are obvious), but there is some delay in deciding what they are. Thus is counterintuitive. The sort of thing that enables detection without identification would be movement in the corner of your eye, or tracks on the ground. Identification relies on 'seeing' the object (you can't deduce the nature of an AT gun via some unexpected flash off a shiny surface).
Thus it seems the concealment of ATs vs detection is working wrong. The detection should be low probability, but if you detect it, it should be quick to ID. In other words, I would expect the concealment to hinder the detection much more than ID (assuming ID is only possible once detected)...
At 1000m, a gun should only be detected if there is an error in its concealment, until it fires IMHO. In other words, competent troops in concealed terrain in a fox hole or trench should not be spotted most of the time. I would think you would need to get to say 300m before detection goes up much.
For non-emplaced guns in trees, I would expect maybe a small detection at 1000m (5 or 10% per minute from a good spotter), which gives 50% chance to see within 6-7 mins, per spotter.
Once an 88 fires, it it likely to be spotted within 1000m pretty much by anyone looking in the right direction (flash/smoke), but smaller guns should be much harder.
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7 hours ago, DasMorbo said:
One idea about different penetration performances in different months:
how about enviromental effects, temperature in particular? Are such physical effects modeled in the game?
Regards
Morbo
Which environmental effects? Air temp? Metal temp of the armour? Not really sure those are significant except in really badly designed tanks in extreme cases...
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1 hour ago, Michael Emrys said:
Sure, aggressively rush into an ambush and get all your men killed. Be my guest.
Michael
That's not what he meant! If you want to get to a spot to take a shot at a known enemy and you are reasonably sure there are no other threats... If you use hunt, you run the risk of a variable number of your forces not turning up. Presenting one target to an enemy can get you just as killed as running several tanks on fast into an ambush
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I agree with not using hunt for multiple vehicles going for a shot on a known target. I would normally use fast to a point where I can just see the target (check los from the destination), and arrange they get to positions widely spaced around the enemy more or less together. Then one may get engaged but the rest should be able to get him...
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If the following tanks have a ? Contact and a shot has been fired close by, isn't that in itself a normal reason to halt immediately? Certainly infantry stop with nothing more than a ? Contact when hunting. The cover arc aspect may be irrelevent
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Tank! is a good read, but is a fictionalised (deliberately and acknowledged) account merging stuff across different people, and occasions. Of his history books, I have only read Falaise (a fine night for tanks). I found that one ok but haven't read it for some years. Of the 2, Tanks! Is the better story, as you would expect...
Of course, if he trained as a Gerontologist as someone said, he may be in touch to assess your score on his advanced mental acuity test!?
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15 hours ago, Raptorx7 said:
"Engineering disasters: The Sherman tank"
Ironic really; the one thing the Sherman wasn't was an engineering disaster. Reliable, easy to manufacture hence cheap, reasonable to repair. Almost the definition of well engineered. The cats on the other hand... And yet, always this rubbish. The Sherman was victim of a role definition that differed from what happens in combat sometime, coupled with masses jumping on the exceptions. If 4 or 5 Shermans were lost per cat, what happens to the Many thousands that didn't have any cats to meet? Slightly too tall, and outgunned in Normandy etc until 76mm or 17pdr versions were more available. Otherwise, it's all Axis fan boys and a few famous cases oft quoted.
Every German tank must have been very busy driving round frightening tens of thousands of Sherman crew men before finally killing its 4 (or 5) and getting knocked out. Which is odd really given the reliability of most of them...
and then of course there are all the Shermans taken out by the 88's!
I don't know if this site is totally accurate but it does cast the doubt rather well:
ftr.wot-news.com (search for common myths). Sorry, will sort a proper link when on my PC rather rhan phone...
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I think one of the issues here is that no one has said what effect the lack of ATG mobility in game is having. I think the case has been made that fresh troops on reasonable ground can move a Pak 40 (was it?) much faster than in game. But so wha?. What is it that players want to do with these ATGs moving at triple speed in a scenario (i.e. in actual combat)? Does the lack of speed prevent them performing it? I think it might be back to the HT crew exposure debate - people complain about their excessive crew/pax casualties. I have never noticed since never use HT within about 400m of a known enemy, and often don't unbutton even then. I rarely move ATGs in scenarios.
Historic footage is almost aways staged. I am a huge fan of the role of living history in grounding some text based flights of fancy (fantasy?) by academics, however would never take it as a lieral example of what is achieved in combat conditions. The reenactors would have to be at the end of a 3 day camp, with hight stress or little sleep, and be subject to random painful electric shocks if exposed to the 'enemy' before i would take their results literally. They show what is physically possible not what would actually happen..All infantry adopt firing positions and none cower in ditches for the entire battle according to reenactors. As I said, inflict great pain on anyone 'head up' on a random basis, then see what happens and I will apply more credibility to that result.
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Yep. The comparison you want is with an Infantry Gun such as the IG37, not anything else. Then you get:
significantly more mobile
better crew protection,
more ready use ammo
Thats what it's all about...
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9 hours ago, Redmarkus said:
That would only be true if the scenario offers only one 'correct' tactical solution. If I opt to move through woodland instead of riding on the tanks down a road, then my troops will tire more quickly, but that doesn't make moving through the woods 'wrong'.
Ah - there we disagree. Either your method works or it is the wrong one. Only exception is if something totally against the odds occurs that wouldn't happen 9 times out of 10 or something. Scenarios should be open to multiple approaches, but not all approaches.
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Also, the whole premise of this thread is a little odd. If scenarios are tested and balanced, the effects like slow move fatigue build up are covered. If your troops are tiring too fast, you are being excessively cautious maybe.
As to whether it is realistic I am with the "yes" camp... Admittedly I am not in the first flush of youth but I did some outdoor lazer combat a few months ago. Forget short rushes, low crawl is HARD! Even short lateral shuffles to avoid popping up where I went down take it out of you! 16 m of crawl is a reasonable distance.
and as someone said, all tired means is "can't run". Just pause to catch your breath.
Oh, and Hunt too tiring? Do it in bounds! Alternate 2 sections scout teams so one rests. Or if you haven't got a second, hunt the scouts about 50 m, rest while support quick moves to say 10 or 20m behind, rinse and repeat. The hunt team should get a really good spot session while recovering as well.
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On 26 April 2016 at 10:27 PM, JoMc67 said:
Don't bother, since you will be using CMx2, then expect Three-Fold more casualties then Historically was the case. So, the whole 506th should no longer be in existent after the 1st Campaign...Oops, you mean to only use 1x Company (Easy Company), then, I expect this to be done in one Battle.
Joe
You don't think this says more about you (in so many ways) than his idea?
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3 hours ago, Anthony P. said:
No, it assumes that the crew has spotted an enemy tank, and turned to the round that has the best ability to penetrate it. Who in their right mind would assume that they will miss when using a direct fire weapon, and therefore use ammunition that isn't as well suited to the task? In that case you might as well argue that they should fire HE shots first, as it'd be easier to judge where they land.
Careful what you wish for! If the crew doesn't have a good knowledge of the tank and its armour, and always fires the shot with the best chance to kill first, any time you don't have full ammo you won't have any "specials" since they would have been fired.
For most guns HE is no good as a spotting round aince it has a much smaller charge and lower muzzle velocity (you use a different sight graticule).
i still maintain that there is a lot of logic in the current system, and in fact I see specials "wasted" as often now as underused. A lot of the time they are used sensibly as well.
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On 4/26/2016 at 4:50 PM, MikeyD said:
...
there's an old 'down east' joke that I won't bore you with, but the punch line is "You can't get there from here!"
Better version: "If I were you I wouldn't start from here"
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The suggestion to fire APDS first shot also assumes the ATG crew has an encyclopedic knowledge of the tansk, armour and penentration tables, and so could be argued that it should only apply to experienced crews. Where would one stop?
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If this were to be done, I give it 4 quintillianths of a second before someone posts: My ATG had one chance to kill the tank bofore getting fried and wasted it by bouncing a AP off the beast when they had an APDS round. Please fix or summink
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If used properly, you can fight mounted in HT - you just need to make sure the enemy is well suppressed. I typically will recon by fire/bombard likely positions, then advance a platoon close to the position (but no nearer than 150m or so). Dismount and do that last bit on foot, with a couple of tanks in intimate support, say 300 m behind. HT pull back behind the tanks once inf dismount. Just dont drive any vehicle within 100m of positions that might have enemy in (inf AT/MG etc make this very silly). And don't go crew exposed.
Its the same with tanks - I fight buttoned unless I know I am more than say 500m from enemy...
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"3. The riflemen participate in fire combat during the break-in or at nearby worthwile targets and complement the effects of the automatic weapons by throwing egg- (smoke-) hand grenades. Crushing (overrunning) the enemy complements the effects of fire (H.Dv 299/4a, no 42)"
But a grenade lobbed back by the enemy you are overrunning can quite spoil your day! This seems very odd advice. Even a molotov would kill the passengers quite easily
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Somehow I knew I would get this response. I'm sorry but that's not really an argument. You're not actually addressing the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of German half-tracks in WW2, you're flippantly dismissing it while bringing up a single unrelated anecdote from a different war and time period. Nobody in this thread has put up any authoritative source stating that half-tracks were ineffective in combat, and that the Germans always dismounted their mechanized infantry far away from the enemy, never actually using their half-tracks as assault vehicles because they were "useless." The only people I've seen argue this in my searching so far are wargamers on internet forums (not just this one).
All the evidence points otherwise. The Germans seem to have relied on them very heavily, not tucking them away out of sight the moment the shooting started. The main problems the Germans had with them were that there weren't enough of them. As I pointed out before, the Germans even had flamethrower half-tracks intended for assaults at close quarters (range of 40 yards). From what I've read of their flamethrower vehicles, they would operate in platoons behind normal infantry half-tracks. Covered by fire from the other vehicles, the flamethrowers would drive right up to enemy positions and blast them. Trenches would be crossed and engaged from the flank
Why did the Germans train their troops to do this? Because they were stupid? They had years of combat experience. Why did they produce detailed manuals outlining this? For no reason? Mechanized panzergrenadiers were highly specialized units intended to follow closely behind tanks as they break through enemy lines as quickly as possible. The tanks would lead the way. These were shock tactics. They were used en masse, designed to move large numbers of infantry through ground swept by small-arms and shell fire as safely and quickly as possible.
According to the Osprey book on the Sdkfz 251, "The tactics employed by the Panzer Divisions were well thought out, and efficiently executed under the best of circumstances - good preparation, the element of surprise, and sufficient armoured infantry in SPWs to exploit the gains won by the tanks. More importantly, for much of the war these tactics were sufficiently flexible and effective that they usually worked under less-than-ideal conditions, and occasionally succeeded under appalling circumstances. Where they failed the cause was usually massive enemy opposition especially co-ordinated air cover - which caused such heavy attrition in men and material that the Panzer Division no longer had sufficient forces to carry out their assigned tasks."
That book even went so far as to describe in detail the distances and frontages the vehicles kept from each other while rolling over the enemy line. It's just not believable to me that the Germans conducted their famous rapid mechanized attacks by dismounting all of their infantry and then hiding their vehicles out of sight, while maybe having a guy in the turret plink away at the enemy from 1000m away.
I found another interesting picture. Most pictures of half-tracks have the men hanging way out of the cabin, on a road march. This one has the men sitting in the back mostly obscured, with just the tops of some of their helmets peeking out. If they were under fire, I would imagine it would be very difficult to cause casualties to the men inside with just small-arms fire if they had their heads down.
In CM, the passengers are so vulnerable with all their heads right next to each other at the same height, sitting like mannequins. I've seen three men get hit by one bullet.
1. OK, a flamethrower in a half track is a lot less vulnerable than a man carried one, and it is a lot more mobile, spending less time exposed. Flamethrowers are specialised weapons for use on very hard targets that cannot easily be destroyed by small arms, but which have been suppressed already (unless you want to die, HT of no HT). Thus the HT example is a bad one. The allies used armoured flame throwers with MUCH more armour (read tank conversions). Was this for fun?
2 "Mechanized panzergrenadiers were highly specialized units intended to follow closely behind tanks as they break through enemy lines as quickly as possible." This does not imply they were used for assault, this implies they were available and used for exploitation of a breakthrough. In CM terms they drive across the map as the scenario finishes and cover 10km or something before the enemy command knows it lost that scenario.
3 "That book even went so far as to describe in detail the distances and frontages the vehicles kept from each other while rolling over the enemy line. It's just not believable to me that the Germans conducted their famous rapid mechanized attacks by dismounting all of their infantry and then hiding their vehicles out of sight, while maybe having a guy in the turret plink away at the enemy from 1000m away". You are mixing drinks in a similar way to point 2. A mechanised advance is not the same as the break in phase... In true ideal strategic style, an assault infantry unit would break in, and then the Panzer div would exploit, taking its infantry with it in HTs to hold the ground taken, protect the tanks at night, and generally add to combat flexibilty of the div.
No evidence of HTs as assault vehicles here...
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We could of course look at the modern Infantry Fighting Vehicle. Pretty much invented by the Russians, who had some experience with fighting the German Half track. Fully enclosed, rather better armoured, fully wheeled or fully tracked, and definitely not open topped. Others have followed (M113 and Fv432, Marder then Bradley and Warrior). Now, given the well known Russian habit of over engineering crew/passenger comfort and massively compromising fighting effectiveness for luxury (After all, I think the T62 was described as an excellent tank for robotic dwarfs), I am kind of assuming that half tracks (even German ones) just didn't hack it in the assault role.
They are for advancing behind the battle though the mortar harassment, or keeping up with tanks cross country on the breakout, not driving right up to defended locales. If used carefully (well behind the advancing infantry I use them for fire support, but the infantry have to have basic fire superiority first and then the HT add insult to injury.
How come British infantry sections don't have binoculars?
in Combat Mission Battle for Normandy
Posted
Well, it is on topic because the suggestion was made that the British army was short of food, equipment and men and this might be an explanation of why CMBN didn't give them many binos. I am challenging that assertion.
The army in later stages of Normandy amalgamated divisions (not just regiments) because it had over expanded relative to be available manpower, not because there was a shortage. There was not a significant change in call up rules in UK as there was progressively in say Germany, even late war. The Home Guard was disbanded before the end of the war without drafting any of its members into the regular Army.
Did the US army have a manpower shortage when it remustered many USAAF recruits into the infantry later in the same year?
ok, undeniably back on topic: is this WAD for a start (bino numbers) and has BF said why? I suspect it might be an error, or we are missing something.