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Sailor Malan2

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Posts posted by Sailor Malan2

  1. BFC I suggest this thread is well off topic, and needs a warning prior to lock... I do not want to be on a forum discussing Iraq under the guise of a WW2 eastern front game.

    For the record, the original post was naive and unlikely to produce a useful historical or game discussion, with its implied view that there was a side that was the 'good guys' in Russia 1941 - 45. I think we can all accept that the only good guys on the eastern front were the innocent on both sides, who suffered accordingly.

    At very least this thread should be on a general forum somewhere.

  2. The issue people always miss when discussing things like this is that WW2 was an economic conflict. Given sufficient manpower (and other resources), the issue is how to best spend it to achieve the best military effect. Unless people know enough about the war economy of the USSR to know how much slack there was to change production priorities/amounts to compensate for the lack of Lend Lease, it is hard to discuss the role of Lend Lease in the victory. It is grossly pessimistic to just remove the LL kit from the ORBAT, and the supply from the supplies total, since the Soviets would have compensated. For example, the USSR almost neglected trucks because they got a huge number from USA. They could have reduced armoured vehicle production without a huge effect.

    Conversely it is obviously optimistic to say LL had no effect. My judgment is that the war would not have changed in outcome, but it would have been extended by c6months. Fortunately the Corporal painter would still have made all the mistakes, and the Soviets would have fought like tigers at the key points. I cannot see Moscow falling in 1941 with the absence of LL (not that too much had arrived by then). I also cannot see that Uranus would have been that different without LL - Stalingrad might have fallen, but 6th Army was not going to be able to reinforce the flanks enough to stop the encirclement. Kursk would have been the same.

    Ironically, I think the main effect would have been a slower advance into Europe in 1944/5, due to supply, and a slightly weaker Red Army in the earlier years and hence more ground to make up.

    But, I am not sure I can substantiate my position any more than either extreme I mentioned...

  3. Guys, don't feed the troll. It's Superwoz.

    I haven't got a clue what his motivation is, since most 12 year olds I know have friends to Facebook/tweat. Apparently this one doesn't so he just comes here to wind people up.

    I suggest the most effective and 'nasty' think we can do to Superwoz is just studiously ignore any post he makes... trust me, it will drive him wild.

  4. Sailor Malan 2,

    I wasn't challenging the RAF losses in Gulf 1, I was commenting on its invalidity as a reference for WW2 CAS losses.The RAF were attacking fixed installations with heavy emplaced AA. WW2 CAS is neither. And RAF lost very low rates relative to WW2...

    The low vs medium alt debate is has been well gone over - the RAF could not bomb accurately from medium alt at the start of Gulf1 - they needed to use buddy tactics with Buccaneers to designate for LG bombs. Thus it is a sterile debate. You want low level bombing or nothing?

    As I say, well OT and not useful for WW2.

    BTW, Tornado can now self designate 5 LG bombs in one pass (different targets), a feat unequaled by any a/c IIRC

  5. 3:1, 3:1! As womble so eloquently points out, you need more firepower. Advancing across open terrain you need to think 3:1 (or equivalent). To move against one platoon, in good positions, think 'company' (or seriously reinforced platoon). To attempt anything else is suicide. This holds for more than just SMGs. A decent rifle platoon might just about suppress a defensive platoon, but wont be able to move, and I wouldn't bet on winning the firefight unless something else is in your favour. In my experience, the suppression acquired in moving in to position will mean you lose the fire fight when advancing (barring things like Late US troops vs green Italians)

  6. I think the reason why the 'extra commands' (like LOS button) crowd don't see BFC's reluctance (absolute refusal on occasion) to implement these 'option things that people don't have to use' is that they really do not get a couple of things:

    - every feature you add means something else doesn't get in. So the question isn't 'why not put it in, people don't have to use it', but rather 'what does it go in as a replacement for, when some people wont even use it?' (assuming it's even possible).

    - a large fraction of the current user base will drop CM like a lot brick if it ever shows any sign of dumbing down or going arcade-y. I am here for a reason. There are many mainstream 'wargames' that are not worth the name and have these features. Do not try and turn CM in to one or I am out of here (with immense sadness and regret, but absolutely for all that).

    I liked Steel Panthers for example, for its command system and scope, but got bored because of the tendency for 'scissors/paper/stone' - scout forward, find enemy unit, bring up the appropriate killer, shoot it up, rinse and repeat. This was a function of the old turn based dynamic.

    I am almost certain I am not alone in this view of CM... ;)

    Oh, yes - survey time? Commands are given in L3 or L2, occasionally 4. Battlefield scan in 6/7 (or occasionally 8 if I really want to 'look at the map'). Video replay in mostly 2 and 1 (depends on tanks/buildings etc). Situational awareness (where to look at in L1/2) in 3 or 4 just looking for messages. I watch each video maybe 4-5 times on a medium battle, once from 3/4 and the rest from 1/2...

    Anyone else want to 'fess up?

  7. Gentlemen,

    I am under the impression that currently whether a player is on attack or defense, the point/rarity "cost" of any item (unit or piece of equipment) is the same. The limitation of this approach is that by necessity these values are averages. And I would argue that an attacking formation will have a more-than-average likelihood to get "rare" assault guns, for example; by the same token, an assaulting formation will be more-than-average likely to get heavier assault guns than an attacking one, etc.

    Conversely, a defending formation will have a more-than-average likelihood to get towed guns; if defending in an assault scenario, then there would be a more-than-average likelihood of trenches and bunkers vs foxholes.

    Of course, a lot of players are likely following these guidelines even in the current system, so any potential benefit might simply end up not worth the trouble. However, it seems to me there is some value in applying at least a "rarity" "discount" for some "appropriate" items depending on whether a player is attacking or defending; or in a Probe, Attack, or Assault scenario.

    I would like to read your opinion on the matter!

    Interesting thought. However I have 2 points.

    1) Call me a grog, but we get the ubergear far too often already, and this would only increase that.

    2) Your model only works if you assume assaults only occur as part of an army level assault. This isnt true- an assault can take place as the only active section of a passive sector etc.

  8. Michael Emrys,

    British Jaguar losses against heavily defended Iraqi airfields were the highest, by aircraft type and absolutely, of the war. So high were they that NATO went into a kind of shock, since JP-233 runway busting strikes were planned to be conducted much the same way. Yet again, someone slept through the lessons of (military) history, causing the latest unfortunate students to pay in blood. While we can excuse the lack of knowledge regarding Il-2 strikes on the Eastern Front, there's no excuse for ignoring the savaging the Luftwaffe took from ground fire in executing Operation Bodenplatte.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bodenplatte

    Regards,

    John Kettler

    The Jaguar does not now, and never has had any chance whatsoever of fitting a JP233 underneath it, let alone actually flying with one. You mean Tornado. The Jags took almost no losses IIRC. The Tornado losses were mostly because they were flying into heavy flak areas. The RAF at the time was a specialist bomb force (not having a fighter worth the name). At least 2 of the 6 losses were at medium alt! and most were 1000lb sorties not 233.

    And Tornado on CAS (if it ever did) would not be using JP233 and would not suffer the same issue (assuming your average Battlefield does not have the air defence of a high value airfield or Air Defence site. 1000lb laydown, or loft attacks, or (very quickly in Gulf 1) smart weapons from medium alt. CAS is tricky, and not for fast jets on the whole - interdiction behind the lines is their bag... much more effective and less dangerous.

    I think the Bodenplatte example is bogus - multiple a/c attacking airfields with tragically under trained crews is not the same as a pair or 2 on airfield or similar planned strikes.

    Oh, and Tornado loss rate was 6 from c1400 sorties, or 0.4% - WW2 pilots would dream of such rates...

    [Edit for added content]

  9. Well, started a debate at least.

    I think that a reduction in certainty in a QB set up is a good thing, however I am not a chess player, nor a games tournament player. I play for the experience and the atmosphere. A forlorn defense against superior kit, in which I KO an Ubercat and go down gloriously against heavy odds is as good to me as a straight 'fair' win. In fact I am a simulator rather than a gamer.

    Don't get me wrong, I am not in to playing the first day of the Somme, but I like to be in the mind space of a commander - as I said, uncertainty is fun. I always found the tabletop ancients players who would spend months experimenting with WRG N+1th edition rules 10000pt armies to find the 'unbeatable optimum' rather sad and about as true to war as chess is. Same with QBs.

    Some of these meta features add a degree of realism at probably little coding cost. QB force selection is effectively in a command role above that of the actual force commander in the game, so add a few extra choices at that level... Throw BFC enough ideas and they might like one or run with it and come up with something better. But just fun chatting while we wait.

  10. I really don't think such "meta" effects would go down well in QBs. One of the biggest (unrealistic, gamey) point of QBs is the selection of your force. To have part of that force gimped or missing just because the opponent spent points would be abhorrent to me, at least. If you want such things, grab a QB map, assign some forces and make the adjustments you want. There are ways, with players who trust one another, to make such arrangements and preserve FoW. It has, IMO, no place in QBs.

    Interesting. You describe the practice of QB points optimisation as games or unrealistic, then reject my (admittedly very outline) suggestion to introduce some counter. Gamey is a good thing?

    Could house rule not to use other than cas for you points accountants.

    Not expecting this to happen, was just a thought for more realism in air support...

  11. I don't know if this has ever been suggested before, but I would love the ability to simulate battlefield air power other than at the 'direct fire' stage. CM has always just done 'on board' air power. I would love the ability to spend points in QBs (or even the editor) to buy deeper interdiction air power. Buy the aircraft, and specify the broad role (on map, transport interdiction, C&C attacks etc). Then, post selection of units and pre-deployment, a quick evaluation of an effect on the enemy could be done. Transport interdiction could have a chance to lower the ammo supplies to the enemy or delay reinforcements. C&C could hit quality of troops (tired due to attacks the night before etc), reduce off board arty support or again delay reinforcement.

    Not hugely important to on map fighting (and the effect could easily be simulated 'outside' the game - lower the permitted points count following a die roll etc), but it would give a lovely feel for air power effects and immersion. Both players trying it at once could have a chance to cancel each other out.

    Would need the effects carefully evaluated not to unbalance or overpower the game, but could be a good 'added re-playability' driver for scenarios or campaigns...

  12. 2 points:

    1) BFC (and numerous others) have been very careful to point out that the new effects are currently BETA ONLY!

    2) I am concerned about the presumption towards flashier and 'flamier' special effects, and them being better. I have seen (RL) muzzle signatures and the impact of everything from small arms to 155mm (including 120mm tank guns). Flames are notable for their absence (or small size). 'Flashier' is not the same as 'better' in my book. Flamethrowers are the exception to this, and I think a suitable image will be hard, but will appear in time.

    I will really enjoy hit decals, but will not (and have not to date) gone for the flashier mods. If you want WW2 as fought in the movies, that is up to you, but I think we should be slow to criticize BFC for 'aged' graphics if only for this reason.

    Call me a Grog, but I have always struggled reconciling this games audience split - half of us will criticize the lack of inclusion of the 'known' tendency of the Pzkw VIIXF2 to fire too far left due to the uncorrected coriolis effect on APC shells manufactured on 23rd Feb 1944 and supplied to the Italian front, and others criticize the graphics for not looking like a Hollywood action movie. I sympathize with BFC and would imagine that their in house definition of stress is 'that feeling brought on by wanting to rant at their customers impossible demands, but having to resist for sound commercial reasons' :)

    Finally, I dare say BFC could have devoted effort to this earlier... which module or update would you like to have sacrificed to get them in? I want more options for year/place before major graphics update... (I'll have the updates as well mind!)

  13. I am not an expert (by any measure), but I guess the last, best hope for mank... AI coding for this type of game will be when other demands in computing cause someone to develop a generic AI engine that can be configured to produce a game AI (as a byproduct). It seems far fetched maybe but for controller modelling for engineering applications such things exist (MatrixX or Simulink for example). A sophisticated GUI lets you string together standard functions, embed your own custom routines, and simulate the result against a model of the plant you are controlling.

    We need the consumer use of robots, or 'intelligent houses' to take off seriously for this to happe I think, but one day. Just compare how games have changed in depth and graphics in the last 15 years...

  14. I am pretty certain Sailor was being ironic/facetious in regard to Superwoz's recent outburst.

    I was, and you got the reason in one as well- I read this thread straight after and just made a (too subtle) allusion to it. Next time I will put a link. Sorry if my little joke was misunderstood. Serious posts rarely put a wink after the text!

    Most definitively wasn't getting at a fair spot on a graphics detail, politely pointed out as this one was.

  15. mikeyd1_zpsdcb6dc1d_tn.jpg

    Mosin rifle bolt is crooked! While it was crooked only for sniper rifles, usual rifles were with straight bolts.

    044-mosin.png

    OMG. This game is BUGGED. A crooked rifle bolt? How do you live with yourselves. Everyone knows that the wrong rifle bolt will completely ruin Soviet tactics.

    Oh... you've fixed it.

    mutter mutter. what's a troll going to do now?

    This post was brought to you on Remember a Troll day, to commemorate all the trolls who have given their time to P*** BFC off and annoy the rest of you.;)

  16. Ever since CMBN came out some posters have been decrying the unnatural 'natural' coloring and lobbying for 'Saving Private Ryan', 'Band of Brothers', 'The 300' atmospheric war movie coloring. So you've been given the option of either seeing the game as it ought to be seen, or seeing it like a war movie/newsreel. Bill's AAR screenshots look just like 'movie mode' on my machine without adjustments.

    Ah - the old 'this is not how it was in the war - the war was in black and white' syndrome. Got bad news for you guys. The war was in 'natural colour', with bright colours and everything ;)

  17. I am sorry, I obviously didn't make myself clear. I am still using my original source cited earlier (Blitzkrieg Legend, Frieser. Naval Institute Press 2012, but avaloable in German in the mid 90's)

    And I usually do not ask for (or even quote myself) sources. In this case, the debate had got to stalemate with people giving opposite opinions to JasonC. I thought that people would be interested in a few facts, and provided sources to substantiate my position. However, the myth of German universal military professionalism is so all pervading that I am obviously not achieving anything. I will duck out.

  18. Yeah you.re dead wrong Malan, sorry.

    The Germans purposefully got around the Versailles Treaty a number of ways. First of all was creating fictitious organizations within the TruppenAmt. They also had a 'black Reichswehr' that operated in Russia, and in Germany. This was fairly small but significant nonetheless. They nationalized the airlines, and ordered airline routes over exercise areas to get troops used to planes around. Obviously everyone knows about the glider schools, and former pilots from WW1 were obviously flying those airliners over the exercises.

    This mostly relates to LW pilots not Army. The cooperation with Russia only lasted from the early 20's to 1933 (Hitler stopped it)

    Though they officially couldnt have tanks, they still conducted exercises with fake ones, the tank crews using bicycles with wood sides (painted to look like tanks) etc.

    Indeed they did - how does this affect the NUMBER of troops trained?

    All of this was great and not even the crux of Von Seeckts workaround which was first cross training of two sorts - a lot of people learned some about other specialties, and in general everyone was supposed to be able to conduct their immediate superior's job if needed. This would be a huge boon when the nation mobilized obviously.

    See above

    Second, as stated above many troops were allowed to retire somewhat early. IIRC the enlistment minimum was like 10 or 12 years and many were allowed to leave at 7 years and become 'reserves'. Of course reserves were officially verboten but they were added to secret lists.

    Do the maths. Even if the entire army did 1 year and was replaced, between 1919 and 1935 you can have 1.6million men trained. The oldest of which are nearly 40 by the start of the war (assuming age 18 in 1920). In reality you can't do anything like this number (who is doing the training?) A more reasonable figure would be less than half this. In fact the figure I have indicate the following reservists from each age group.

    birth year reservists and active troops in 1939

    1901-1905 <10000 per year group

    1906-8 10-15000 each year group

    1909-1914 50,000 in 1909 group, rising by approx 50000 per year group until the 1914 group has c320k reservists and troops still in the army in 1939 (the current army figure from this group is c 40k). The 1914 group is c 90% military experienced, as they were the first hit by conscription.

    This gives the following breakdown of numbers in 1939

    active duty units 1.3m (great bulk fully trained)

    recent released reserves 647k (these count as recent experience/fully trained)

    1.2m ex WW1 experience, but by definition born before 1900, i.e. 40+

    808k classified as untrained

    total army strength 4.1m men, 1.95m of which fully trained and <40 (or 48%)

    I freely admit that by May 1940 most of the untrained 800k above will have completed personal training, however in the mean time Germany raised another 43 divisions, which will not have trained at the unit/command level.

    I am not saying the German army was bad. Just not as monolithic and good as popular myth. Panzergruppe Kleist had no equals in effectiveness (literally), and the initial follow up units were also good, but after that you hit rather less good. If the French had not fallen for the sucker punch, the quality of the troops of the 2 armies that were engaged would have been a lot less different. The quality of the command systems however is a completely different point.

    The Germans were hugely concerned during the 1920s, it wasnt necessarily a nefarious plan to make the Wehrmacht you see in WW2 - the armor doctrine, Blitzkrieg stuff really comes in the 1930s. But you see the massive expansion in size of what becomes the Wehrmacht in the 1920s, with the clever ways around Versailles. The French incursion in 1923 had some demanded a 'Peoples War', much like the Francs Tireurs they complained so much about in 1914, but on a more massive scale. More prudent voices won the day. There was also a static warfare movement, but it is much to the secret general staff's credit (TruppenAmt) that they foresaw the next war to be a war of movement. So they planned the beginnings of the Blitzkrieg doctrine, and then built the weapons around it. Or planned them anyways.

    Yes, the Germans were very concerned in the 1920's. But this was not fixed by training the youngsters particularly. They viewed their 100,000 man army as the cadre round which they would recall the ww1 veterans, who would only have been 20-35 at the time.

    And, lest we (I!) forget, the whole point of this is to compare 1940 German army to 1944. There was a view that 1940 was undoubtably better. I put it to you that this is not a forgone conclusion...

    Is it too much to hope that people dont repeat popular wisdom on this thread and use sources? I have cited my main one.

  19. Except that the Reichswehr was accepting men, training them for two years, and then releasing them back into the civilian sector, thus creating an unofficial reserve of trained soldiers who were among the first to be called up once conscription was reintroduced. They formed the cadres of the new divisions. Privates became NCOs and sergeants became commissioned company grade officers.

    Michael

    You need to do the maths to work out how significant that was(n't)...

  20. On what grounds do you assume that? Why not assume that divisions were raised with soldiers who had at least completed personal training, and possibly platoon and company level as well?

    You need to read both my posts. The later wave division were raised from older men, who specifically had not had prior traning, i.e. men born between 1901 (too young for ww1), and 1913 (too old to be conscripted in 1935 on). From 1919 to 1935 the German army was limited to 100000 men with no conscription. There is a severe limit on the number of men who can have military experience with an army that size.

    Remember, most of these men, at least the younger ones, had been through the Hitler Jugend and/or similar paramilitary organizations, so were physically fit, were experienced in basic fieldcraft, were accustomed to military discipline, etc., and may have had some weapons training even before they joined the army per se.

    The HJ had negigable effect prior to the introduction of conscription - onlt 25000 members by 1930, vs. the millions of people in that age group. Also, the graduates of the HJ would often have been the right age for conscription to hit them, and so these numbers are already in the 'trained men' category.

    ...

    More or less the militaries of the entire world. The German army certainly regarded them as a formidable opponent that they would rather not fight just yet. Hitler had to virtually drive them to fight.

    I am well aware of this. The remark was in reaction to an accusation of my only citing one source. It draws attention to the absence of sources in the counter post. And my second point is it doesn't matter who considered what pre 1940 - when the test came the French high command was found wanting on many (if not all) levels.

    That certainly became obvious once battle had joined, but who knew it before hand? Not many SFAIK.

    Michael

    Yes, but the success of the French campaign is (partly) attributable to the execrable actual performance of the French high command, and who thought what before hand is not really relevant. I mean, the RAF thought the Defiant was a good idea before 1940. The LW didnt read that opinion, and caused them to be withdrawn from day combat in less than 4 months with a rather bad loss rate...

  21. I am struggling with your point here. You seem to be saying we must be factual about the performance of the Italian military, and accept its performance was 'flat-out horrible'. OK, in general it was. However I think there are isolated instances where performance was at least creditable (albeit small and infrequent). The reason why I think these distinctions are relevant is that (for me), an understanding of the underlying reasons why the military did so badly is at least as interesting as the bare story of the disasters. By studying the slight glimmers of success we can see a little of the causes for the rest. Also, the performance of 55th Infantry Div at Sedan May 1940 (for example) was just as poor. Why is this? Is it connected to Italian failings? If not why not. Etc.

    In addition, you imply that the failings of the Italian military are down to Mussolini and the fascists ("...any desire not to be offended about the failing of notorious tyrannies of the past"). Yet you also say "One who wants to sugar coat that into how hard they tried and how noble it was to face up to such adversity and all that rot - is not [a healthy person]". So, which is it; the Italian military was a disaster because of Mussolini, or it was a disaster full stop [period], with no features even worthy of discussion?

    I maintain that the whole nation of Italy was managed appallingly by Mussolini (not just the military), and never had the infrastucture to fight in WW2, especially ouside Italy. However there are some very significant failings elsewhere in the military leadership that could (and occasionally were) overcome. Studying the pure performance of the organisation without taking account of these is pointless and boring.

    I do not now, nor have I ever had in my family tree (back to c1840) have any connection to Italy whatsoever (barring a couple of trips to the place). I work with them a lot, and they drive me to distraction sometimes. I am merely a seeker of truth in all its forms. Generalisations rarely shed much light on anything.

    Oh, and even if you are right, I still wish to have no part in attacks on Italy or the character of its people.

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