DreDay
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Posts posted by DreDay
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I would like to add my few personal notes in reagrds to this topic, if I may...
I have been following Colonel Cassad (amongst other Russian and Ukranian observers) for quite a while. He is a very intelligent and well informed analyst, but a military expert he is not. He has also never made any effort to hide his pro-Russian (anti-Maidan) agenda, so there is no need to call him out on that. He does have very close ties to anti-Kiev forces in Donbass and Russia proper; so his reporting is definitely notable.
When talking about GRU Spetsnaz, he is refering to DNR GRU (Russian abbreviation for Chief Intelligence Directorate) units; as opposed to Russian spec ops operatives. DNR GRU was created by Colonel Petrovski (aka "callsign Gloomy") who was a Chief of Intelligence for 22nd Spetsnaz GRU Brigade prior to his retirement. He also happens to be a Donetsk native (going back for multiple generations); so he is not exactly an outsider to this conflict. It is very hard to tell how much of the DNR GRU Spetsnaz are Donabass natives vs. how many are Russian nationals... However, there is absolutely no evidence (that I have seen) to suggest that the rebels are Russian troops in most cases. There are some Russian troops there for sure (Cassad would refer to them as "vacationers" or "north wind"); but their size and their role in this winter offensive is highly debatable.
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By some accounts the plan to evacuate Debaltseve was developed in the time before the ceasefire and was implemented perhaps 2 days before the pullout was complete. Clearly Ukraine knew they had to pull out.
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That is correct; some of the Ukrainian units (mainly National Guard) had left it way before the communications were cut-off. The main problem seems to lie with poor communication and coordination that had led to some units withdrawing in good condition (as you correctly state), while others were left on their own with no clear orders and had either surrendered or fought a bloody retreat.
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Absolutely true. However, the term "surrounded" is a technical term that has specific conditions. The Ukrainian forces were not "surrounded". What they were was "cut off", or more specifically "effectively cut off". The difference sometimes means very little, but in this case it meant a lot. What is the difference? You no doubt know this, but I want to be clear.
When a unit is surrounded it means it can only return to friendly lines by first forcing an opening through the surrounding enemy force. If sufficient force is not available, the path is not opened and fleeing forces can not retreat.
When a unit is cut off it usually means its lines of communication are under effective enemy fire more than not and there is no sustainable route for resupply and reinforcement. This does not mean nothing can get in or out, rather it means not enough can get in or out to sustain the unit's mission. That mission could be offensive or defensive.
In the case of the Debaltseve units, they were cut off. Supplies and reinforcements were able to move to and from Debaltseve, but not with enough quantity and certainty to keep the force supplied for fighting back. When the orders were given to withdraw, the vast majority made it back to friendly lines. They did not have to fight through the enemy, they had to evade the enemy's fire. Some units got out with very little shooting involved, others got decimated. If they had been surrounded the entire nature of the withdrawal would have been quite different and probably far worse for Ukraine.
You are absolutely correct, but those are subtle difference that might mean a lot to you and I based on our exposure to operational lingo; but I am not so sure that most laymen would understand or appreciate the difference. Either way it does not look good for the Ukranian government and General Staff if you ask me…
The rearguards always pay the price for the safety of others. Very, very rarely in warfare does a force disengage from the enemy under such a situation without suffering significant losses. Often times the losses are catastrophic. Ilovaisk is an example of how bad it can be. Debaltseve doesn't look anything like Ilovaisk, so I feel it is very important to keep that in mind.
Again, I generally agree; even though we still don’t know the actual numbers of ZSU losses in their retreat from Debaltseve (or their efforts to break through to it), they do not appear to be as bad as what they had suffered at Ilovaisk… But I hope that ZSU command does not use that as a measuring point. Ilovaisk was a complete disaster, so not suffering quite is much as not necessarily something to be particularly proud of.
This is of course possible. However, there is an alternative theory. Poroshenko was forced by France and Germany to agree to the ceasefire under Putin's conditions (no specification of Debaltseve and 3 day delay of the ceasefire). Poroshenko knew the separatists/Russian would fight like crazy for the next 3 days and figured his forces could hold out that long. And they did! After that point he figured one of two things would happen:
1. The separatists/Russians would either cease their attacks or at least revert to a more manageable level of combat.
2. The separatists/Russians would continue fighting full strength after the ceasefire went into effect, which would show that Merkel and Hollande have no credibility to ask anybody to trust Russia's word.
Either way, #1 didn't happen but #2 did. The value of this is still to be determined.
So far we have seen minimum repercussions for Russia that can be tied to the capture of Derebalseve; yet the cost to the Ukrainian side both in human lives, morale, and prestige is quite sizable as we have been discussing it for a past couple of days. My personal take is that Poroshenko had actually trusted his troops to be able to hold Derebaltseve, at least until the Russian regulars had shown up (a-la Illovaisk); but his hopes were in vain. Again, that is my personal guess and I might very well be mistaken.
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They are indeed, but frontline reports from soldiers are only valid as their personal experience. A unit that escaped Debaltseve with 100% of its personnel and 100% of its significant equipment will interview very differently than one that suffered 50% casualties and had to walk out on foot. Both are valid, but neither tell us more than what they experienced first hand. Other sources must be incorporated and that is, of course, a tricky business in any war. In fact, people still have major debates about famous battles in WW2 because even the most well documented battles in modern history are incomplete or contain conflicting information.
Of course, any first-person accounts are highly slanted and cannot be used as a sole (or even primary source of evidence). Yet they are still very relevant (especially in this case where we have no independent reporting from either side)… and many of those reports tell a story of a bloody and disorganized retreat. There are also quite a few videos of roads lined with destroyed Ukrainian (and some rebel) hardware and dead Ukrainian soldiers (it’s quite possible that there were dead rebels there as well, but their bodies would have been retrieved before the filming) which seem to indicate that ZSU escape was far from well-executed. That kind of evidence simply can not be ignored.
No need to call me "sir". I am just some guy
Sorry Steve, old habits die hard… I only mean it as a sign of respect.
Still, the main problem with a fair assessment is that the separatists don't publish reliable or complete numbers and Russia, of course, is not even admitting they are involved. So official Russian sources say their casualties are 0, which is obviously not true.
Yeah, no doubt about it. There is no easy way to gauge rebel losses and Russian losses (however few) are almost impossible to confirm.
I don't see it this way at all. The Ukrainian government never said Debaltseve would hold for all time. They said, at the time, it was held. That was always true when they said it. They were also telling the truth when they said that their forces were not surrounded (see comment below). Did they "sugar coat" the reality of how well they were holding? Sure, but that is what all governments do in time of war. I do not see this as a major problem and so far I do not think the Ukrainian people do either. At least on the whole. Obviously millions of people never speak with the same voice.
I’ll have to go back and to re-examine Porshenko’s statements and Ukrainian news coverage post Minsk-2. My recollection is that he had claimed that Debalseve would remain under Ukranian control, but I might very well be mistaken.
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I was watching a vid regarding Debaltseve where, at 1:44 what appears to me to be an at least Airborne or maybe SpecOps shoulder patch on a separatist's cammies is clearly visible. Could someone please tell me what the patch says and what unit it relates to? Speaking of Debaltseve, it was on Yahoo's front page today in a report of EOD ops there and is in a slew of vids covering the fighting and UKR retreat. If retreat can be humorous, I'd have to say a clip I saw in another vid would qualify. A BTR rolls smartly past the camera heading away from Debaltseve--trailing a several vehicle lengths long strip of heavy gauge clear plastic wrap on the ground from its left side. It reminded me of someone walking around with toilet paper stuck to the shoe sole.
Regards,
John Kettler
My Russian is not stellar, but I believe that it says "Novorussia" on top and "Kupol" (Parachute Canopy) at the bottom. I don't know if there is any particular unit associated with it (obviously the rebels don’t have an Air force, so they would not have any paras either). It might just be a privately purchased patch like those "Polite People" patches with a Russian Soldier and a cat that seem to be so popular with the pro-Russian fighters... Perhaps the native Russian board members can correct me on that?
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Well, good to know you had a great time here, it`s a big country with some great places to visit
And yes, to put it mildly the our current president is not exactly pro-american (she´s leaving office in December, still is not clear who will win the elections in October), not to Venezuelan levels of rhetoric but close enough, and a big chunk of the political establishment and population aren´t either, the reasons for this are many and complex, but it´s a common occurrence in Latin America in general, politicians play on this all the time
As to the overtures of Russia and China in the region, the thing is that with the level of confrontation with the US and to a lesser extent the EU coupled with economic mismanagement, the options for foreign financing and investment are few, so some governments play again the anti american card and look for money in those countries, whom sometimes are happy to oblige to further their own geopolitical interest.
To what level our politicians truly believe that the Chinese and Russian governments are "Good" and the US government is "Evil", it`s a matter of opinions, personally I think a good measure of cynicism on their part should be assumed. But again, a big part of the electorate it´s happy believing we don´t deal with the US as much, some see through it as a political ploy to get some cash covered in nationalistic rhetoric, some don´t
Sort of back on topic:
Regarding coverage of Ukraine, sadly international news don´t sell that much, so, there are few local journalist dedicated to it, and big news services have very poor coverage that most of the time is limited to translate articles from foreign news services, so you end up with a poor translation of what was originally a poor article written by someone that can't tell a tank from and IFV
While I think most people would have a hard time pointing to Ukraine or Crimea on a map, articles do appear and people who follow the news are aware of it, pro government news services will probably reproduce articles that put Russia and Putin in a better light, while news services more critical of our government will tend to reproduce articles more favorable to Ukraine´s point of view, but it is a far cry from being a hot topic
Thank you for your reply sir. I find it very informative and your analysis is very prudent and rational. BTW, (and I don't want to turn this into a love-fest) but your mastery of English language is terrific as well! But back on topic - it is very interesting to see how other major “non-aligned” countries approach the issue of US/EU/Russia/China relations. Unfortunately we get very little exposure or even acknowledgement of such dynamics over here. I love my country but I don't particularly care for our eagerness to speak of the "free world" that we supposedly represent.
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Oh, one thing that I might argue with is whether that would be fun in a wargame. Might not be fun in a game like CM, which is all about resolving the battle once the forces have joined. But in a higher level operational or grand tactical game it might be great fun to pull off a coup like that.
Oh I completely agree. The only relevant game that comes to my mind is The Operational Art of War that is hopelessly outdated at this point. I would love to see a modern reincarnation of it; but I still fear that you and I will be in a very small pool of die-hard wargamers that enjoy that kind of stuff; evern when compared with the CM seriesl; so I don't know how commercially viable such a project would be... I would love to be proven wrong on that though!
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While you do not in so many worlds claim that morale, initiative, and training can replace material superiority, I get the feeling that you are not far away from claiming that. But I recall that that was the credo of the Imperial Japanese Army, a credo that was rather decisively debunked. Don't get me wrong, as I said earlier, morale, initiative, and training are better to have than to be without. But troops tend to have high morale as long as they are winning. They also get really good training if they stay alive long enough to learn what combat teaches. Both those things can happen if they can destroy their enemies without getting blown up themselves. Good training and good leadership are good things to go into battle with, but it is also good to have equipment that will do the job and can be relied on to do the job. The morale of troops who are seeing their buddies get blown up on both sides of them due to deficient or defective equipment will plummet no matter how good it may have been at the start of battle.
Michael
Michael, please don't take this the wrong way; but you are stating the obvious. It is better to be healthy and rich than sick and poor - we all know that and there is no need to dwell on it. Yes, all the best training and morale and initiative would not help you if your weaponry is incapable of hurting the enemy (as was the case with Japanese Imperial Army AT artillery and armored forces). There is no need to take it to such extreme. That was not my point, and there is no need to debate it based on such assumprtion.
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Yeah, I was just saying there wasn't a fight for either city. Sort of pointless to talk about picked men making up for light firepower when there wasn't really any action to be had.
Yes indeed, there was no real fighting in Gori or Poti, largerly due to the rapid Russian advance of VDV spearheads that had precluded the Georgians from organizing their defensive perimeter. There was some fighting in Tzhinvali, but most of it was done by local defenders who were eventually joined by Russian elements of the two MRR regiments that you had mentioned. However the BTG from 76th VDV division did "fight" their way to Gori (overrunning several supply points, scattering retreating Georgian units, and destroying an AT battery that was guarding a key entrance to the city) - the fact that they were chosen for such role and had performed it successfully (eliminating the need for costly urban combat) speaks to my original argument. Successful maneuver and decisive advances are more important in operation art than the actual battles (that you want to keep to a minimum). That is not something that's well reflected in wargames (as it is not particularly fun to play with), but real-life operational art is based on those principles.
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Ah yes, the old myth of "fighting spirit". Nearly every fighting force has some version of it, and sometimes it even works. It's definitely worth having along if you can manage it. But it seldom serves as a substitute for material advantage and good tactics.
Michael
Please note that I had placed training (which certainly includes tactical skill) on pretty much the same level as high morale and initiative; so I am not exactly sure what you are taking issue with here...
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I´m not from the US but it´s ok, don´t worry, I´m from Argentina
And no, I´m not familiar with politics in Ukraine so it was just speculation
My bad. I do happen to love Argentina, it was actually our honeymoon destination and (for all my other travels) it was still an experience of a lifetime. To keep it on topic - one of the many things that had impressed me about the Argentinians was how politically savvy and worldly they are... Just out of curiosity - I know that your political establishment and especially your president are not exactly pro-American (to put it mildly). I also know that the Russians (including Putin himself) have made many overtures to them lately that seemed to be well received... so what is your local coverage of Ukraine like?
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I know what I'm debating: by time the Russians were able to pour forces through the Roki Tunnel, the Georgians had zero chance to turn things around. That was the point of decision after which the only question was how long and at what cost. There is no realistic string of events that stops the Russian attack or prevents them from eating the Georgian forces wholesale once they are through the tunnel.
I presume the Russians knew this just as well, which is why they sent two combined-arms formations with plenty of ass and firepower to do the job, rather than trusting the Georgians would be the incompetent pushovers they proved to be later.
You definitely have some knowledge of this, I did not mean to suggest otherwise; but I am afraid that you are missing the point of our discussion. The two MRR BTGs that you focus on went into South Ossetian friendly territory first because they were stationed localy (right across the border) and they were designated as first responders. If you really want to get into the specifics of it - they were completely outgunned by the Georgian forces for the first couple days... but that is besides the point... I was referring to the Russian advance into Georgia proper from South Ossetia and Abkhazia that was spearheaded by "light" but highly trained and motivated VDV units that were rushed to the battle zone ahead of other "heavier" formations...
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Well, in the absence of a huge political fallout (of which I know nothing one way or the other, since I don´t follow this issue as close as others here), I would infer that the retreat was either planned and/or executed in good enough order
Either way the Ukranian government/army, while not happy might have already come to terms with the reality on the ground and move on to other things
Of course, is a highly speculative exercise
Well, as you don't follow the Ukrainian political scene (which is perfectly understandable), you are simply not aware of how a "Political Fallout" works in Ukraine... let me just say that it is very different from what we would expect in our country (I am assuming that you are an American, please forgive me if I am wrong). But yeah, their government and military is going to move on to other things (as will the rebels) and the war will unfortunately go on for even longer... Many local experts on both sides predict the next spike up in violence to happen in late March or early April.
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They didn't capture a single major 1st MarDiv objective. They were supposed to take a bridge, but that mission was cancelled when it was decided a bunch of Humvees weren't going to cut it. They weren't even leading the division in most cases; it was only when the opposite LAR (doing the same thing, but in LAV-25s) ran into resistance strong enough to stop them that 1st Recon pulled ahead and led the rest of 1st MarDiv. For the most part the 1st Recon were operating on the alternate route, against zero resistance at all and frequently behind the leading elements of the division. That was intentional; no amount of pluck and gumption makes up for protected firepower. I don't think it takes away from their accomplishments, but credit where credit is due -- the LAVs were generally blazing a trail for the division, not 1st Recon.
Fair enough sir. I will be the first one to admit that 1st Marine Division opps in 2003 is not my area of expertise. Unfortunately most of my knowledge of it is based on Generation Kill (the book) and some AAR reports that I was able to access relating to it; so I simply don’t know enough about this subject matter to contest your points and I will gladly accept them.
Gori was abandoned two days ahead of the Russian advance and there was nothing substantial defending Poti. The real fight of the war was getting troops through the Roki Tunnel and that fight was led by two MR BTGs, not VDV.
Taking from The Tanks of August:
Almost immediately after the beginning of massive Georgian shelling of South Ossetia, at 0100 on August 8, the Russian General Staff ordered the troops deployed at the training ranges near the Ossetian border to march towards the Roki tunnel. Within half an hour of receiving the orders, the two battalion-size tactical groups of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division’s 693rdand 135th Motorized Rifle Regiments were on the move. At about 0100, the Russian Defense Minister, Anatoliy Serdyukov, was on the phone with President Dmitry Medvedev to report about the beginning of the Georgian offensive. It seems likely that during that phone conversation, the president authorized the Russian Army to cross into South Ossetia. At 0200 on August 8, the first Russian armor of the 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiment’s battalion-size tactical group crossed into South Ossetia. It was soon followed by the battalion tactical group of the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment.Now the war of 8.8.8 is something that I am a little more comfortable discussing… I am glad that you have read The Tanks of August, which is a good (although a bit disjointed) account of that conflict. But I am sorry to say, with all due respect, that you simply don’t have any clue about what you are trying to debate here. The first two units to cross the Roki tunnel were in fact the BTGs from 693rd and 135th MRRs as those local units were designated as an RDF for South Ossetia. Their mission was to join the friendly South Ossetian defense forces in Java and then to rescue the trapped Russian peacekeepers in Tzhinvali. However, by the time that Tzhinvali was cleared and Russian command had issued orders to push into Georgia proper - their spearhead was made up of the BTG from the 76th VDV division (that was flow-in and rushed to the front ahead of other arriving units). This BTG eventually became separated from the 693rd MRR, but yet they had pushed on to Gori and took the key strategic positions around it while destroying Georgian units that stood in their way. Only at that point was Gori abandoned by the Georgian forces despite massive amounts of heavy weaponry that was stored there.
As for Poti – it was far from undefended. It (along with Senaki) was protected by an entire infantry brigade, not to mention smaller army and navy units stationed there… Yet they all ran at a site of single Russian BTG from (as I recall) 7th VDV Division (along with supporting 45th VDV Spetsnaz units) despite Georgian absolute superiority in manpower and heavy weaponry.
As I’ve said - wars are won by initiative, skill, bravery, valor, and superior weaponry (in about that order).
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VDV would be used in 3 types of ways in a war like this, 1) To get to a area first and hold and secure it before bulk of force will arrive, 2) Escorted by SEAD aircraft will land in a area and take out logistics, and Artillery batteries, And support ect, ect. 3) together with the bulk of the motorized forces will attack together with frontline units. VDV can be assigned tanks too but not for roles such as 1 and 2. Imagine it like this, VDV is given the objective to get to a strategic area and used as a behind enemy lines asset and they will be used in surprise can compare to a blitzkrieg, SU-34s and other SEAD aircraft will be used and troops in BMDs and mortar support also btr-mds coming with their respective AA support like Verba for example, They make it to the objective and attack enemy from the rear while also making a defense for the main force for when they arrive. And now you already have a successful front, Now you can assign tanks and attack choppers to the VDV and they can work in combined arms strategy.
On top of that, some of VDV units (i.e. 7th and 76th Divisions are actually Air-Assult capable as well); so they might also be used as a tactical force to capture improtant objectives in heli-borne assaults.
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Bullets usually care more for armor than they do morale. Force Recon went as far as it could against light opposition. They'd have had to stop if the remaining Iraqi armor was in their AO (or at least drive around it and have someone else handle it).
Oh wow, really? You don't say, Captan... well guess what - they didn't stop and they had performed their objectives quicker and "cleaner" than a heavier force that would have been expected to perfom the spearhead role under a more conventinal doctrine. That was exactly the plan of their operational command and it had worked out perfectly. Nothing in war is absolute.. it is all relative. And in this case the relative "human factor" advantage of Marine Recon units was more improtant than the absolute armor thinkness or gun size of their opponents...
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A cat finds it around using (among other things) its whiskers, right?
1st Recon was basically hopping from road net to road net, driving through town after town to determine what level -- if any -- of resistance the rest of the division was going to encounter. If the battalion had run into anything too intense to handle, the division would just take a different route and bypass the presumed strongpoint. They were basically helping the rest of the Marines feel their way around the Iraqis defenses so as to move as rapidly as possible and prevent them from massing combat power against the Marines.
This worked because in 2003 there weren't enough Iraqi formations to cover all the approaches, so some were left empty or near-empty by necessity. On paper it would still work against more competent opposition although, given that 1st Recon was rolling in not-uparmored Humvees, probably not against more numerous or better equipped foes.
Right, I get what you're saying, but that is precisely what a spearhead force is supposed to do. They had not only "probed" enemy defenses, but actually assaulted and captured major objectives... basically fighting "rather than scouting" their way to Baghdad. Of course this trick would not fly against a more competent opponent, but they were exactly the right force to use in 2003 as a spearhead due to their high level of initiative, training, and morale when facing an enemy that was lacking those key traits... In the same vein, Russians had used their VDV BTGs as spearheads in the war of 8.8.8 during their advances on Gori and Poti. Whatever those units were lacking in durability and firepower, they more than made up in morale, initiative, and training... and again their enemies were just not good enough to capitalize on the weaknesses of such light spearheads.
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Re: Spearheads
That's not really what the Marine recon did. It's closer to whiskers on a tiger than the teeth if you will.
I am sorry, I am not sure what you mean by this. Can you please elaborate?
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I'm just going to stop being oblique about it. The only way a VDV regiment would be dropped anywhere is somewhere a little inside the range of whatever ADA/NATO combat air patrol is on station, and the majority of the troopers involved would be falling at terminal velocity.
It is as simple as that. If you're looking for historical parallels, read up on Operation Varsity, which was the last time paratroopers were dropped in anything resembling contested environments. Despite the defenders being generally war weary Germans, relying on optical guidance only ADA assets, with no air cover, significant air, and paratrooper losses still occurred.
Moving forward some 70 years, the chief advances in air dropping are:
1. Transports are faster to arrive at drop zone
2. Precision of drops is much more reliable.
Neither of those overcome the vast leaps and bounds in air defense or fighter aviation. It's still a huge mass of slow, unstealthy planes, that arrive over a spot, slow to speeds that won't kill paratroopers when they leave the plane, or strip chutes off of cargo pallets, and generally present the world's absolutely best target for anything that is designed to kill planes. Expecting this all to fly in the face of the NATO air arm, or ground ADA platforms is just, lawl.
The same standards of course apply to US paratroopers. Which is really getting into another discussion about the utility of paratroopers in the first place.
Re: Spearheads
That's not really what the Marine recon did. It's closer to whiskers on a tiger than the teeth if you will.
I don't get why have even considered being oblique about it. Your point is completely valid. Airborne drops are extremely dangerous now (compared to WW2) due to high sophistication and dense coverage of SAM systems (not to mention enemy AF). Yet there is still a role for them - mainly as a rapid deployment force to third world countries that don't have sophisticated AD net; or as a follow-on to comprehensive SEAD/Jammer assulat on enemy AD network (whcih is very hard to do, but is certainly feasable and viable).
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Yeah, but given a narrow front like the Ukraine, where are they going to insert from? It's going to be airspace that's dangerous to be a small high performance fighter, let alone a transport. Unless they're going to drop outside Warsaw because YOLO, seems doubtful given the concentration of air defense.
In theory, dropping a VDV regiment somewhere between Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkov could have huge strategic impact, as the roadways connecting those two regions are responsible for majority of Ukrainian industrial transportation and are fairly lightly guarded. But in practice, if the Russians were to invade (which I don't see happening for now); VDV would probably be used as a spearhead force for their advancing formations due to their high training, morale, and initiative. Much the same way that 1st USMC Recon Battalion was used as a preached for US invasion of Iraq.
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Wouldn`t a local commander be subject to a martial court or at least sacked for retreating from such a position without, at least, tacit approval from the higher levels of the chain of command?
I understand that politics can obscure the subject, and the local officer may be punished anyway to save face, but any consequence to the lower officer would be, in principle, and indication of the higher officers intents and orders
In theory, that would certainly be the case; but things get much less "black and white" when you don't have a clear command structure and your communications are disrupted. At that point every commander is out for himself (and his men)...
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One ambush in a long series of battles isn't important. Yes, I am quite familiar with that ambush and have, unfortunately, seen the videos gleefully uploaded showing the scattered body parts of the VDV soldiers who were caught in it. IIRC it was a platoon sized force. Even "elite" units have bad things happen to them. Something the76th Pskov VDV can attest to as well.
Oh sure, I did not intend to dishonor the memory Ukrainian soldiers that gave their lives in that battle by any means. My only point was that the control of Shakhtersk was not nearly as contested as you seemed to imply; but rather it was decided in the opening rounds of the battle due to the unfortunate tactical choices made by the 25th VDV brigade.
As for Russian military involvement at this point, it started in very early August on a very small scale. Perhaps 2-3 battalions inserted along this vital route to Donetsk. Russia of course knew that if the supply line between Izvarino and Donetsk was cut then the war was effectively over until it could reestablish it. So it would be SHOCKING to find that no Russian units were involved in the fight along that axis. That would require an assumption of great incompetence of Russian military strategists and I, for one, do not think they are incompetent.
Things went pretty logically from what I can see. Russia kept its direct military presence in Ukraine to a minimum at first. Advisors, specialists, special forces, etc. were pretty much the only forces present from Spring until July. Equipment, both quantity and lethality, increased as Ukraine began to get more aggressive.
I agree. And I would also like to add that apperantly there were a couple of Russian (not sure if organic or improvised) BTGs clearing the routes around Snezhoye at the same time.
After the Ukrainians went on the offensive and started taking back large amounts of territory Russia was faced with the inevitable conclusion that even sending in tanks for the separatists to use wasn't going to cut it. So they initially tried to put a very small military footprint in Ukraine to see if they could trip up Ukraine's offensive enough to avoid a larger intervention. This had very limited effect, but it was enough to stall the offensive that was going to cut off Donetsk from the south. Artillery was used for cross border strikes in other locations instead of sending in ground forces.
But this also failed to stop the offensive, which was now coming in from the north as well as the south. In particular from what became the Debaltseve salient. Which meant the success of the Southern Cauldron wasn't sufficient to change the strategic picture. So Russia had a decision to make... stay with the existing plan and fairly quickly see a military collapse of its proxy fighters, or make a larger investment to bail them out. And around the 10-12th of August that was when we saw significant Russian armed forces entering Ukraine, with a noticeable impact on the fighting starting around the 15th.
Again, I agree with you 100% here.
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I will look and see what I can dig up. But for the record, this is the first time I've seen someone claim the slaughter was excusable because of something the Ukrainians did to violate the conditions of withdrawal.
It might be new to you sir due to a lack of good English language source on this, but it has been a known claim by Ukrainian survivors for quite a while.
Yes, because it's totally false. Girkin's force was initially 100% non-Ukrainian. So they weren't fighting for "their land" in any legitimate sense. For sure by the time they left Slavyansk there was a local component, but again the bulk of Girkin's forces were from Russia and therefore they were a foreign invasion force taking land from a neighboring country.
I would like to respectfully caution you from making such strong definite statements on a very conspicuous and secretive conreversial subject matter. Strelkov (or Girkin if you prefer) had entered Salvyansk with about 50-60 fighters. About half of them were Russian nationals, while the rest were either Crimeans or anti-Maidan activist from other regions in South- East Ukraine. The major reason for his choice of Slavyansk (according to Strelkov himself) was the fact that there was already a very strong separatist network there that was ready supports them. As he had built up his forces there, they were joined by both Russian (National) volunteers and local supporters. I have no idea what the actual break down of one vs the other was, but it is significant to note that his retreat convoys from Slavyansk had included hundreds of families of local fighters… so they were far from just a foreign invasion force.
As for the Ukrainians, if they weren't interested in retaining parts of their own country under their own control, then why are they fighting and dying for it? Because it is their land.
Ummm, yeah… Common John… last thing that I want is to sound condescending to you, but we are talking the basics of seperatists vs. federal forces struggle here. That paradigm has been played out a million times over already and the conflict in Donbass is not that different (if not for the involvement of major world powers in it)
Both sides in a war, even in a true civil war (which this absolutely is not), can not view every single inch of soil as being worth dying for in all circumstances all the time. Ukraine held onto Debaltseve for 5+ months because it was a part of their country and a strategic location. When they gave it up it was because they were militarily obligated to. Losing it is not a crushing blow to the cause of retaking
Donbas because at that level it is an insignificant piece of it. Losing it, however, does have strategic implications for that effort.
I mostly agree, except for two (perhaps minor) point. A) You have absolutely no authority to deny this being a civil war with 100% conviction. I can see why you will question it, but that’s as far as I am willing to let you get away with it. Please don’t take it the wrong way, but I find those kinds of statements beneath your well deserved reputation for thoughtful analysis
Rebels efforts to take control of Debltseve had started during this “winter offensive” (i.e. mid Jan) – I have no idea where you get the 5+ month figure from.So I say again, the piece of territory as a piece of territory has far more significance to the separatist/Russian side of the fighting than it does for Ukraine. They can afford to lose it, though they for sure would have preferred to keep it.
100%. No disagreement here sir.
I only brought it up because I felt it was a counter to the charge of "humiliation". When one side claims they are superior AND can't dislodge the enemy for 5 months AND couldn't destroy the enemy's force during withdrawal despite having it nearly surrounded, I do not think "humiliation" is appropriate.
I understand what you’re saying, but I am not sure where you are getting the 5 month figure from, nor do I understand why you are so eager to give the Ukranians the credit for skillful withal.
To be quite honest, the disparity in manpower and firepower between the ZSU and the rebels is so one-sided (even with all the Russian support), that I consider any major battle loss to be humiliating for the Ukrainian side…
And yes, of course the Ukrainians say a lot of bad things about the separatists. They also have some harsh words about each other, especially higher command. They also have acknowledged that fighting Russian armed forces is not easy at all. In fact, when Ukrainian fighters are asked how they know they are fighting Russian armed forces and not separatists, the simple answer "because Russians know how to fight, so when the enemy force suddenly starts fighting effectively we know it's not the separatists".
Well yeah, that’s pretty much implicit; although I do not except the simple notion that Russian forces are involved in fighting whenever the ZSU faces stiff opposition… of course I don’t dispute certain level of Russian involvement either…
Yet Russian artillery was striking these areas from Russian soil and quick drives over the border and back again. It was even caught on video more than once, and IIRC some satellite photos were also released. So easy or not, it was done and it had a significant impact on the viability of the force there. It was a long, long route for resupply under even the best of circumstances, so it wouldn't take much to make it unviable. Air resupply was also made impossible due to the prolific supply of anti-air weapons to the separatists.
No arguments here sir.
Yes, the "southern cauldron" was a major victory for the largely separatist forces and a major defeat for Ukraine. No question about it. Ukraine allowed its forces to be overextended and overestimated how quickly they could seize the border area with their existing force. This, BTW, I would classify as a "humiliating defeat" for the Ukrainians.
Perhaps, the only thing that I will add to this is that Ukranian political (more so than military) command had underestimated Russian resolve to get involved in clearing out their border with Donbass at the time that Sector D was created.
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Again please discard. Sorry for the confusion.
Rebels efforts to take control of Debltseve had started during this “winter offensive” (i.e. mid Jan) – I have no idea where you get the 5+ month figure from.
Uh so has Debaltseve fallen?
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Steve, while I generally agree with your points here. I would be curious to know whom you consider to be the credible historians on this subject matter (as someone who had done a ton of valuable research for CM: Afghanistan)... Again, I am not challenging you on this, just curious what sources you had used...