sross112

This should be a good test for theories. Watch this bridge and see how fast the UA makes it usable for at least light wheeled traffic. If it is quick then it shows that their command was prepared, they intend to keep fighting on the far bank and they had engineering assets prepared for just such an occasion. All point to the theories of the UA being on top of things and wanting to keep a killing ground going on the far side. If we don't see quick action then they either already have alternate crossings in place that their OPSEC hasn't divulged or they aren't as locked on as we want to think. Should also act as a good logistical comparison to the RA engineering.

I don't speak or understand Russian so I have no take on the verbal part. I reviewed it several times and my conclusion is that it is either a training video or a video of a training area. If you look at the ground it is fairly dry and not a single bullet strike is seen. The grass is crushed down along the trails that each individual travels, biggest clue is the trail where the soldier rolls during the ambush. The other thinner trails could be dismissed as game trails, regular patrol routes, etc but the rolling trail clearly shows that the same movement has been done over that ground multiple times. One part that confused me about being a training film or filmed training was the blast from the barrels of the shooting weapons. In the US we had to attach a BFA (blank firing adapter) to the muzzle in order for the M16 to cycle and I didn't see those. Further research shows that apparently the AK blanks will cycle without a BFA or a smaller one that lets most of the gas out where the one we used was basically a plug. So that explains seeing the blast from the firing weapons and no bullet strikes anywhere.

The more I think about the different questions in this thread about the death of the tank, death of maneuver or the ascendance of defense I think it all comes back to ISR. Before hostilities ever kicked off it was pretty obvious that Ukraine had the advantage with 5 eyes and multiple large western intelligence agencies backing it. They knew exactly what the RA had and where. Then after it kicked off the crowd sourced intelligence and recon was definitely in the UA's favor. All this allowed the UA to make a lot of good decisions on the placement and use of their assets and gave them a distinct edge over the invaders. I think the jury may still be out but if and when the UA kicks off an offensive we should have a much better idea on the changes to maneuver and defense on a contemporary battlefield. Right now I'm betting that the ISR advantage leads to an advantage in whatever operation is being conducted; defense or offense. It could almost be classified like control of the skies with deficiency, parity, superiority and supremacy. If you had ISR supremacy your chances of being able to successfully maneuver on the enemy are pretty good as you can see almost everything and they are practically blind. If you are operating in parity or deficiency your ability to maneuver undetected and unchecked is next to nil. Is that what we have seen in Ukraine and a big reason why there haven't been meaningful breakthroughs in the Donbas? I know there are a lot of compounding reasons holding back the RA at this point but I think ISR deficiency is near the top of their list. On another note, Ukraine is LIT UP on FIRMS today: https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@36.3,48.2,8z

The only real things that I see as going "right" for Ukraine is the early intel/ISR support from the west and the weapons pipeline getting into place prior to hostilities. The ISR support is probably the biggest game changer and advantage that they had going into this. I don't see where anything special went right for the UA on the tactical/operational side so much as their successes and tactics were just the net result of everything bad the RA did. Their overall operational plan. = Too many axis of advance, UA able to fight separate fingers instead of whole fist. Fail to black out comms. = Ukrainian crowd sourced recon and intel. Fail to control information. = Ukrainian government able to garner large amounts of international support by controlling the narrative. Didn't gain air supremacy. = UAF still hitting back, uninhibited UA logistics and no strikes beyond FEBA anymore. Failed logistics chain. = Reduced RA operational tempo, tons of abandoned equipment, low RA morale all result in giving the UA more time and better chances for defense. Failure to implement combined arms. = Easier defense for UA with higher losses to the RA. Poor force structure/lack of infantry. = UA and TD able to operate with lots of freedom behind the lines attacking logistics. Unescorted armor easier pickings. Timing. = Weather and ground conditions prevented RA from maneuvering off hardened roads making all movements predictable. Kill lists/atrocities/war crimes. = Steeled Ukrainian resolve, concreted international support for Ukraine. Corruption. = Lack of top tier kit, undermanned units, under trained units, cobbled together units, patronage based promotions, etc that resulted in the paper bear of the RA. So really it boils down to the greatest advantage was that they were attacked by Russia and not someone with their poop in a pile. This also bleeds into the "Could the US have done better?", "How does this change western doctrine?" and "Does this war mean the death of the tank?" type questions that we see pop up from time to time in the MSM. It is really apples to oranges and the only big thing I can see coming out of this is the UAV numbers/usage/doctrine/etc. If you swapped out the Russian forces for US forces you would have pretty much the entire US army and couple Marine Divisions equaling less than 100 battalions or "btg" equivalents. Could the US defeat the UA? Absolutely. This scenario is completely upside down from the list above. Ukraine doesn't get the ISR advantage and is under the microscope itself. 8 out of 10 above suddenly don't apply, we can leave timing and operational plan in place. Apply basically a Desert Storm format with an air campaign that leaves no UAF and mitigated AA with UA units pounded for 30 days or more before ground forces go. Then that degraded force has to fight a real army with real training, top tier gear, effective logistics, good leadership and bunches of planes with JDAMs just waiting for targets. Oh, and pretty much every piece of equipment the UA operates is no longer competitive in range, accuracy or precision. I'm not saying it would be bloodless and I'm sure the remnants of the UA would fight like hell, but in the end there is no doubt to the outcome militarily. So is the tank dead and western doctrine outdated? No, Russia just sucks. Could the US military complete the political objectives of the Kremlin? Absolutely not. As it has been pointed out here any army looking to occupy Ukraine would need millions of boots on the ground and it would still make Iraq 2006 look like a happy quinceanera on a warm summer day. I'm sure this war will be studied and picked apart for a long time and there will be a lot of lessons learned, but I see the majority of those lessons will be the what not to do's given to us by the RA.

Agree. Just because a society or country is casualty averse or conscious doesn't mean that it is not willing to sacrifice for the right reasons. Ukraine is a good example of this. They have suffered 10's of thousands of casualties and are willing to pay the bill until Russia is out of Ukraine. On the flip side, they had UA troops in Iraq for several years and I'm sure the public would have reacted way differently to the same butcher's bill if it came out of there.

This is a real concern, but it should be a catalyst for action in Europe. I'm not sure if the message from the far right in the US is isolationist or self sufficiency, depends on how you read it, but the results could be the same. So hypothetically in 2 years the US aid stops. Does Germany and the rest of western Europe want to kowtow to Russia or do they want to be in a position to stand on their own? Without rapid and decisive action, especially on the economic/energy dependence front, they really are subject to the whims of Russia. Rebuilding their militaries to the point where they don't need to fear Russia also puts them in a position where they don't need to worry so much about the state of US politics. Energy independence is so important to national security and economies but seems to be something that isn't taken seriously enough by a lot of countries. Renewable energy is actually very beneficial in this but it is rarely promoted that way. Germany has been looked at as the leader and the voice of the EU for awhile now. A lot of the other countries and a lot of the people in their own country want more support for Ukraine, more visible, tangible military type support. They don't see it from the leader but they see it from the smaller and "less capable" countries and start questioning why they don't see more from the leader. Few factor in the Russian gun to the head of the leader in the form of their energy. Tough spot to be in. So does Germany act rapidly and decisively now and take the pain or does it shuffle along and end up forever under the Russian gun? It's a catch 22 when the right choice leads to lots of pain, probably the downfall of political careers, huge pressures from business, suffering of the people, etc even though the end product is the best result. Don't envy the German leadership in this one. I think a lot of the criticisms out there are based upon false assumptions. Most average joe people in the world think of Germany as a world and military power. When they think of a military power they think of the US or China (102 days ago I would have put Russia on the list too ). They don't understand how militarily weak most countries are. Germany has a grand total of 2 panzer divisions and a rapid deployment division. That's it. I'd bet 99% of the people in the world would be surprised to learn that. So their commitment of 12 or so Pzh2000s is pretty much the same percentage wise as the 100 or so M777s from the US. Doesn't seem like enough from Germany but that is due to the perception that they have a large war machine when they don't. Same pretty much goes for most of the other European nations. Then couple that with the amount of support everyone sees from Poland, Sweden, Czech, UK, Canada, Australia, Spain, the Baltics, etc. Perspective of these countries, other than probably the UK, is that they are smaller, militarily weaker or much further away and yet they appear to be doing more. Saying all that, I do think that Germany could be doing more. Especially with the old cold war stuff in storage. Besides, how could Russia spin Leopard 1A5's into any sort of an escalation against their super tanks?

I think it would have to be a UN operation and not a NATO one. Escorts could come from non NATO nations, especially ones that have a direct interest in the grain. Egypt comes to mind, but maybe some South American, Asian and Indian vessels could be used. Just like the land force peacekeeping forces for the UN but for a designated sea lane. The UN has a legitimate reason to do it to help all those countries that depend on Ukrainian grain and the countries providing security don't have a dog in the fight. Russia would look even worse to the world if they didn't accept that sort of deal or tried to stop/board/sink any of the shipments.

You put forth this idea quite a ways back in this thread and it does have it's merits. This definitely works, but it is a long drawn out process and time is a double edged sword. I think most of us agree that time is against the RA but the longer it takes to defeat them the longer they get to pound the UA with their arty and air. That seems to be the biggest threat to the UA personnel and a war of attrition, even though in the end the UA wins, it means a lot more losses for them as well. Plus it basically just pushes them back to their borders instead of destroying them. If the UA can even do smaller pockets on the RA the results can be exponentially better for the same commitment of power. The Kremlin can spin a lot of things but the wholesale destruction or capture of a couple brigades would be priceless for the UA and could be the chance at stimulating a collapse.

Firms has lit up in the south just north and west of Kherson. Sounds like sources from both sides saying the UA making progress in Severdonetsk, taking back significant portions of the city. Couple small successful pushes around Popasna area by the RA but overall pretty stable. Rumors of UA pushes on the line south of Donetsk. In the economic news the last couple days a large Russian train car manufacturer has shut down due to lack of ball bearings. The Kremlin is mad at Taiwan as they won't provide them with micro chips or the machinery to make their own micro chips. The Russian sales tax (VT?) for April 2021 was 740 million and April 2022 is 420 million, so a significant reduction in consumption from the sanctions. Lots of stuff going on these past couple days. The economic struggles in Russia are becoming more and more real as time goes on and stocks of sanctioned goods are running out. The next couple months might prove fairly catastrophic to their production and manufacturing sectors as more and more industry grinds to a halt. Increasing unemployment will result, which further curtails spending and diminishes the revenue to the government. The snowball is growing. It kind of looks like a little snowball for the military side too. The UA is seeming to add a little more push back at a time in different areas which I take as a good sign for their logistics and maybe a budding offensive capability. Nothing big yet but if it gets rolling could snowball into real trouble for the RA in their degraded state.

Modern suppressors don't negatively affect bullet velocity. With a really good chronometer you will actually see a very slight increase in velocity. The "hitting power" of the bullet is a direct result of the velocity at which it is traveling, so there is no reduction in energy as there is no reduction in velocity. They generally reduce recoil and give a more stable weapon platform. The downside is the extra weight on the end of the barrel but is doesn't take long to become accustomed to it. They do help with concealment as the reduction in noise and reduction of flash make it harder to locate the shooter, however my opinion is the more important part is the better ability to communicate. Gunfights are very loud. Gunfights in enclosed environments are stupid loud. I think most of us would agree the most important factor tying everything else together is communication and suppressors make that immensely easier, especially in an environment where not every shooter is connected with bone mics and ear pieces.

How does the first round of conscription fit into having available bodies for the reconstitution of units? I understand it is supposed to be illegal to send them but it doesn't seem like the Kremlin has played by that rule very tight. Or have they been able to get any significant number of them to sign contracts? Haven't heard much about the spring call up for awhile here. Certainly not enough to totally replace their losses but maybe enough to fill out several units.

He goes on to tell how the RA had been terrorizing, raping and plundering in the village for a couple weeks and didn't want to describe the details of what he had seen and heard. I know two wrongs don't make a right, but if I was on the jury I'd have a pretty hard time convicting anyone in that circumstance. Then again I'm still waiting for the government to defund the police so we can reinstate frontier justice. So maybe I'm a little biased towards you reap what you sow, an eye for an eye, etc. Of course they didn't steal their stuff, torture and rape the Russians before killing them, so it was only a tooth for an eye, but good enough I reckon.

For Steve:

A couple times in the past someone posted graphs of daily missile strikes and air sorties by Russia. Haven't seen one in awhile and was wondering how their operational tempo compared. Anyone know where to find said graphs? Thanks.

This, to me, is the big thing that a lot of people are overlooking in the MSM assessment of the different weapon system deliveries. 100 M777's sounds like a lot but the front is 800 km long. The guns will be concentrated for effect and will give new capability in a localized area but they aren't going to be a miracle weapon that can effect the entire front simultaneously. Same with the MRLS systems that come in. They will be useful and add capability but won't be a huge game changer unless way bigger numbers are pushed in. Let's think about the overall numbers. The UA started with 200,000ish troops in 17 brigades. They now state they have 700,000ish troops. Each brigade has an artillery group (based on pre-war TO&Es) consisting of 36 tubes and 18 MRLS. Pre war they needed 600ish tubes and 300ish MRLS. So just to give their regular pre war brigades the upgraded capabilities they need a lot more guns and rocket trucks than what is being sent now. All the mishmash of self propelled guns might be able to update a single brigade at this point. If the west announced 300 M777s, 300 Pzh2000s and 300 HIMARS that would be a "game changer" as the RA would be out matched along the entire line. And even that still depends on the ammunition types provided for the systems. The capabilities of each have a wide range that totally depends on what types and quantities of ammo are provided. This also bleeds over into the question of why we haven't seen several new UA formations appearing on the battlefield. They have pushed a few TD brigades to the front with varying degrees of success but reports say that they didn't have the heavy equipment they need to be front line brigades. Why? Because the UA doesn't have it. Reports since the beginning of the war, even for regular units, were of crowd funding a lot of basic equipment. UAV's, body armor, optics, medical supplies, etc. If they need crowd funding for regular units they definitely don't have the gear for the newly mobilized ones. I keep thinking of the US army doing exercises with mock tanks and support weapons prior to entry into WW2. Of course it all boils down to time or complete commitment to support. The best example is probably the US. They have committed to giving a large amount of support in the form of the equipment we have seen so far and the $40 billion package. The US military could conceivably send everything the UA needs to be a modern force, but that totally strips them. I'm talking from boots to body armor to personal weapons to trucks to support weapons to IFVs and tanks to air power. They could send everything needed but they would have to strip a very large percentage of their own forces in order to do so, or the UA has to wait until the new gear can be built and sent. It is a tough choice and what is the magic number that can be given while still maintaining their own capabilities? I personally say strip all 10 National Guard Divisions of everything they have and send it. Back fill them with new production. If China or North Korea pops off in the interim the active forces will just have to make due, but I'm not in charge so that probably isn't going to happen. The current equipment transfers, except from probably Poland, seem to be a trickle when it seems to me that if we want to change the game we need to open the hydrant.

In line with your thoughts, how about facilitating or actually producing munitions for existing systems like Vilkha: Vilkha M MLRS design and features Vilkha M system is based on the Soviet-era BM-30 Smerch heavy MLRS. Each system is manned by a crew of four and is capable of firing missiles in single or salvo modes. The launch mass of each 300mm Vilkha missile is 800kg. The MLRS is capable of destroying the enemy targets located at a distance of 130km. The system can fire 12 missiles in 45 seconds and engage the targets with a circular error probability (CEP) of less than 30m. Ukraine apparently developed this improved version for the Smerch a couple years ago and it is produced by the company Luch in Ukraine. How possible is it to produce these in other countries and ship them in or give them everything they need to increase production/mass produce these themselves? Probably a stupid question but I was wondering about is re-barreling existing platforms. Artillery barrels wear out (I think way earlier in the thread one of our learned artillerists advised about 1750 rounds per barrel) and the facilities and technicians have to be in place to change out barrels as part of maintenance. How difficult or would it be impossible to switch the UA existing SP arty from 152 to 155 as they wear out barrels?

I'd just like to say thank you to Long Left Flank for sifting through a lot of different sites and feeds and bringing good stuff to this conversation every day. Your time and effort is very much appreciated sir, please keep up the contributions!!

Has anyone reached out to the Taliban to see if they would be willing to part with some of billions of dollars worth of weapons systems left lying around their country a few months ago? Asking for a friend..... On a serious note, does anyone know what happened to the almost 1000 M109's that were replaced by the Pzh2000 systems in the European armies? If there is a significant number of them in storage they would be a good option to get moving to the UA to help them ween off the 152mm before their ammo reserves get critical. I think most of them were A2's and A3's but those should be really comparable to what the UA is running now so no real loss in capability. They also would have the ability to be upgraded significantly as time went on.

Hypothetical question: The straits are closed by Turkey to all warships. So if Ukraine took the Crimea what would happen to the Black Sea Fleet? Would it be interned for the duration of the Special Military Operation in Turkey?

I believe the 150th MRD was the main force attacking Mariupol from the east. They were able to push up to but not into the Azovstal complex. I guess it is possible that they had a couple weeks out of the line and absorbed some reinforcements but I doubt their frontline units are in very good shape. Good chance that the supporting units are still somewhat intact and can bring a lot of influence into that area though.

I agree they should avoid the city fight as much as possible. The bridge near Kherson is on the eastern outskirts and that's why I thought push straight for that instead. They would only need to clear a very small portion of the city itself to get to the bridge entrance and maybe nothing at all to take it under fire.

It is like our modern day socialists/communists, they look at all the times it was tried and failed in the past and yet still think it will work. "Those other guys just didn't do it right!!" They will probably break out the medium girder and bailey bridges pretty soon as it has to be the fault of the pontoons.

I think the best plan for Kherson, if the UA has the striking power that people are saying, is to go straight for the bridge on the east side of Kherson. Short distance of maybe 30km so if the RA isn't defending in depth it is very possible to get there quick. Then push east for the other bridge/dam. While doing this they should livestream from the lead vehicles on telegram and other Russian social media outlets. Let everyone in the RA on the Kherson side of the Dnepr panic and run for those bridges, viola, highways of death!! As far as the bridges themselves, the UA should just push up to them and not cross. Even if the RA doesn't have them wired and blow them that way, they become a primary target to get dropped if the RA is pocketed or collapses around Kherson. No sense in pushing troops across and increasing your own logistical nightmare unless you are ready to play the Siversky Donets game. Better to do as you say. Clear the Kherson side and shift forces to the area north of Melitopol for the next push. If the UA has the forces that are claimed they should be able to free Kherson pretty quickly I'd think.

I saw this map on John Helin's twitter and thought it would be a valuable reference for the topography around Popasna. If the RA controls those heights the MSR for Severodonetsk is compromised and it might be time to pull out of there to the other side of the Siversk. Maybe the UA has sufficient forces to hold and/or take back Popasna or some to the area around it but it doesn't look like very good tank country. Maybe that works in the UA's favor? I was hoping for a armored counter offensive to cut off and destroy Wagner and others around there but it doesn't look very promising. Who knows though, the next few days should solve this dilemma one way or another.

For the EU experts: Why has France been so quiet or have I just missed it? I thought that predictions were that after the election was over we would hear a lot more support for Ukraine out of them?