LUCASWILLEN05
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Posts posted by LUCASWILLEN05
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Just now, Bulletpoint said:
You'd be surprised. Some lefties play wargames too
True - I was thinking more of, let us say, the less intelligent kind
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How about expanding the time frame covered to the period 2003 - near future and, over time, creating new armies eg Turkey, Iraq (Saddam era 2003 and New Iraqi Army), Saudi. Egypt, Iran. Jordan, IDF, Hezbollah etc
This would allow scenario designers to create historical, current,and hypothetical scenarios giving sF the new lease of life it so badly needs
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For CMSF2 there are opportunities here to do a lot miore with the original game. For example
1 Expand the time frame to cover the period to 2003 to the near future allowing gaming of historical conflicts such as the Iraq ar, 2006 Lebanon War, the war in Yemen, the war against ISIS and hypothetical conflicts
2 Add a variety of new armies to support the above eg Iraq 2003, the New Iraqi Army, Turkish, Iranian, Jordanian, Saudi Arabia. Egyptian, IDF. This of course would not have to be done right away - expansions over a period of time would be the way to go.
This I think would give the original CMSF a whole new lease of life. Yeah I kniow the lefties would hate the IDF but they would hate this game anyway. If one is going to be hanged for a lamb....
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A moderns game in the area might have more traction than WW2 though. Korea. India v China and/or Pakistan (not strictly Pacific ). Taiwan
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This seems to be a definite for me (damn you Battlefront
) Am I right in understanding that this is going to be an upgrade for the existing. CMSF? I really hope so
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Interesting news about upgrading CMSF code to Engine 4/ I was under the impression that SF was not going to be upgradable but I am open to pleasant surprises.
Any news about CMBS developments?
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On 1/4/2018 at 8:15 PM, Combatintman said:
She is probably a Lieutenant Colonel.
More likely his mistress!
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10 hours ago, Mord said:
Since the beginning the plan was for four titles; a year for each, starting at the end of the war and moving back toward the start. 44-45, 44-43, 43-42 etc. RT starts in June 44, so if the next title sticks to the plan, it would start in June 43 and go to May 44. Whether or not that will change remains to be seen. BFC is full of surprises and has been known to change their mind.
Mord.
Indeed. There is more than on way to skin a cat. Not that I ever would - so Kitty you are purrfectly safe :-) In all seriousness though I think it makes more sense to start with major offensives eg 2nd Kharkov May 1942, Citadel July 1943. That however means that the previous series would have to tail off with the lull for the Spring Raspuita for 1942 and 1943. Patrols and small scale operations were still likely even at times of major lulls, However Spring 1944 is not a problem as there was considerable major fighting throughout early spring eg the First Soviet Invasion of Romania April/May 1944
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As for the next Russian Front family my vote would be for Kursk although the May 1942 - March 1943 period is also of great interest. However Rd Thunder needs finishing before anything else
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Fr the Russian Front I think they would be better organizing each game in the family into a (roughly one or two year time frame June 1941 - March 1943 (Barbarossa - 3rd Kharkov). May 1943 - May 1944 (Kursk - the first Soviet invasion of Romania) and the current Red Thunder module. Reason being that, while I would like a game dealing with Barbarossa I actually want that game to deal with the early to mid period war period with the Red Army starting to learn the lessons of the early defeats.
There are of course other ways of organizing this but I am thinking of the break in major fighting between 3rd Kharkov and Kursk as a natural break point between families
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Instructive and interesting video series, Maybe a few more videos covering aspects of modern warfare covering the differences between this and WW2 eg ATGMs drones, APS etc
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5 hours ago, Michael Emrys said:
Frankly, I'm not at all sure that I get what you are trying to say. Are you saying that tanks are the more important members of the combined arms team? And are you saying that the infantry does things besides support the tanks?
Michael
No, I am saying that all members of the team are as important with the caveat that this depends on the tactical situation.. For example, in combat i desert or steppe terrain tanks and mechanized infantry are likely to be more important than leg infantry. In urbban terrain leg infantry is likely to be more useful with the tank playing a more supporting role
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14 hours ago, KL2004 said:
The whole analysis treats tanks as infantry support. That's not what they do. It's about full mechanized warfare on large scales and, lately, NBC capacity too. Against fixed defensive infantry tanks have lots of problems. That's why part of the combat team is SPA and nastier things, which hopefully will never be used.
No realistic situation for the USA will involve tanks operating under hostile air superiority. At worst if that happens, the attrition rate for aircraft will be higher than that of the tanks. They aren't that easy to find, and tanks can "go to ground" and hide in ways that aircraft can't.
The whole error is in an original assumption that a tank is supposed to be a monster in a pitched battle. That's not what they are about. They are challenging to deal with in a pitched fight but that's not what they do. They mobilize firepower enormously along with the whole rest of their division as part of a team.
As old as Guderian.
Airpower has it's own sphere too which is getting bigger. But it needs to be considered with all the support it requires too.
"Tanks" or "Fighter Bombers" or any weapon like that needs to be considered as part of the team.
The team *is* the weapon. Not just one type of machine.
imho. <3
Arguably tanks are more part of the combined arms team. Infantry supporting tanks is part of that. but it would be more accurate to say this is only one facet of the job
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This should, by and large, please the tankies
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Looks interesting Maybe a slightly larger map on the Ukrainian side allowing for a possible armoured counter attack
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2 hours ago, Sgt.Squarehead said:
Just trying to chill things out, maybe salvage some actual content from the thread.
BTW have you noticed how OP's military-technology threads have a tendency to randomly explode, usually catching all manner of bystanders in the frag-pattern!
I seem to have inadvertently started WW3 through starting this thread. Apologies.
However being part Swiss I shall remain neutral; and sell arms to both sides making hug profits which I shall keep in my secret bank account - while, like Dr Blofeld stroking my cat - who is not a white Persian by the way
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8 hours ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:
Re: Flaming Abrams
There were a few issues with the early models. One of the big problems I already mentioned was the fuel and smoke generator not cooperating.
As a possible correction, it might have been a JP8 problem though. Again keep in mind I was 7 for the 1991 conflict, so a lot of the early Abrams stuff is just what I've read/stories from my crustier counterparts. Having talked to a few dinosaur tankers recently, it appears the US Army used diesel with the Abrams not at all infrequently in the 1980's to no special ill effects. With that said, the JP8 we use now has a higher ignition threshold, so unlike the diesel which would smolder on the smoke generator, the JP8 would just splash onto the heating element and slosh around, which could have been a hazard at a later date.
As to the case of 500 fires, doubtless some of them were constructive losses, but the high number can be deceiving. Or basically the system for tracking automotive incidents doesn't have a "small fire" or "big fire" box, it has a "fire" option. Like one of my tanks caught fire, but it was an electrical short the fire suppression system handled it, and the tank would have been mission capable had it happened in combat. But because there was a fire, it was treated much the same as if the tank had actually burned (but not burned to destruction).
The Thunder Run Abrams that burned took a recoiless rifle hit to the aft. This did not disable the tank automotively, but it did result in an extensive fuel leak that dumped fuel onto the very hot engine surfaces. The fire suppression system knocked out the fire, but it couldn't cool off the engine, or stop the leak, and repeated efforts to stem the fuel leak failed (although the fire was "put out" several times over, only to reignite). The choice was made to abandon the tank to keep the rest of the element from getting fixed in place and massed on, and it proved as is common with the Abrams, frustratingly hard to destroy.
The implication is that there is a big weak spot in that region. My instructors, and subordinates pulled no punches about places on the Abrams that were weaknesses and to be kept away from the enemy, or to be aware of. I know people who've lost crewmen or tanks. The "weak spot" you mentioned has never came up again, outside of internet speculation. Maybe the armor there is actually weak, but the small practical side of the low armor area is just hard to actually get at. I don't know, but again, there's just no "evidence" there's an especially weak area in that region, and the Abrams has been pretty extensively destructively tested in multiple settings.
As to "not really caring" about low intensity, I'm sorry but clearly you're not paying attention to armor operations.
a. The most likely setting for most tanks to be employed will be in a situation short of "full spectrum" conflicts. How well an AFV performs in a asymmetrical conflict is profoundly important.
b. Even an enemy who's less capable, but very motivated to kill you will find a way to test your systems. Just because a test set doesn't exactly mirror what you're looking for, doesn't mean discarding it is a wise choice.
As to "neglecting modern threats" not so much. It might have been the case closer to 2011-2012, but the last few years have seen a renewed focus on what the Army calls "full spectrum" conflicts (basically a recognition of Russian hybrid warfare, the entire range from unconventional/terrorist type fighters working on the same battlefield or in conjunction with near-peer adversary forces). There's a certain understanding and much discussion of Russian capabilities.
Basically when you do a training rotation (tabletop/computer to NTC/JRTC/YTC type rotations), you're facing a fictional version of the Russians that literally have all the advantages. All their stuff works exactly as advertised. They have effectively infinite logistics, can afford to lose 70% of every airframe, tank, naval asset without suffering any political repercussions etc.
You get to show up, and you'll get your teeth kicked in over and over again until you've ironed out all the kinks. It's a profoundly frustrating experience, but it's a lot of learning to be done.
In technical terms, we're cooking up some interesting stuff. A lot of it isn't the kind of stuff you put on a parade and need to tow off when it breaks down, but there's a recognition of Russian strengths and weaknesses, and our deterrence options have evolved accordingly. Some of that might be the fairly modest stuff about better recognizing Russian influence/unconventional conflict indicators, and adapting law enforcement behaviors accordingly, some of that is crazy weirdo over the horizon stuff that if it was Russian would have been furiously masturbated over by that lame James May knockoff they use for their RT programming.
As already discussed, the big fuel suck isn't tanks and tanks alone, it's mechanized/motorized unit on a whole. If your logistics cannot support mechanized/motorized units, then yeah maybe skip out on the M1. Or the Leo 2. Or just tanks in general. But in practice the Bradley and M1 both required about the same amount of logistics push on the march to Baghdad, which opens interesting questions about just how relevant the on-paper fuel consumption/testing circumstances are.
Apparently the Iraqis lost a fair number of M1A1tamks but those would have been the export models lacking the fancy gear http://www.janes.com/article/39550/iraqi-abrams-losses-revealed
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4 hours ago, MikeyD said:
Just for fun, here's the American 'Armata' circa 2002. based on the Abrams. Crew-in-hull, overhead gun, autoloader. It looks like the ammo was still stored in-hull and God knows what it was using for optics.
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15 hours ago, cool breeze said:
Meanwhile Germany continues to impress the world with their level of commitment to a united defense. Wait is Lucas really german or am I thinking of someone else
Half Swiss on my late Father's side actually. Which means I stay neutral, sell arms to both sides and make huge profits. And gt vry offended if you call me GERMAN!
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I found the issues around lack of training/experience in high intensity warfare most interesting Then the EW challenge.
Finally confirmation, at least in terms of leg infantry units the deficiency in AA capability. If these problems also exist in 82nd Airborne, 101st Airmobile then, given these are the Rapid Deployment forces the US military may face a "nasty little Kasserine" in the event of war with Russia or even a second rate army like North Korea.
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Obviously, against ground vehicles good hull down positions behind hill crests are best.Note the new hull down command
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I recall a very unfortunate incident in one of my early games where I rushed most of a combat team across a large open area without first deploying stinger teams to cover the move. Sure enough the company was caught in flagrante delicto
by a pair of Russian Hinds. With ugly results as you might expect!
Needless to say I learned a valuabl tactical lesson from that one
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This probably applies more to light infantry units like 173rd airborne than to heavy forces although some issues raised in the article may well apply there. In the real world complacency in peace time will be paid for in blood in war
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/02/army-study-173rd-airborne-brigade-europe-russia-242273
In game terms perhaps scenario designers will have to consider downgrading thE troop quality of at least some US units to take account of relative inexperience in high tech conventional warfare, skills that may have atrophied over years of COIN. Maybe we should be more regularly giving the Russians an EW advantage over US forces early in the war. We can assume that over the opening weeks US forces will learn lessons (at a significant cost) and rduce or remov these penalties later
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The fuel hog issue is a well known one. There were also some interesting remarks in the letters section The defensemedianetwork link may be more useful. As usual though it will probably b decided by the bean counters
https://www.defensetech.org/2013/12/20/army-to-review-m1-engine-upgrades/
Combat Mission: Pacific Storm
in Combat Mission - General Discussion
Posted
Fulda Gap or modern Asia. Yes. WW2 Pacific probably not