I appreciate your point, Broadsword.
I do hope the guide does end up serving the bright intellectual segment of the audience. Considering the widest possible spectrum of players interested in this game, a good number of them probably have enough curiosity to have read deeply about WWII; but one can imagine most of that reading centering on the ETO, or post-Normandy (as was the case for me) without nearly the same solid feel for the unusual combat and events of North Africa. Or some may be so casual in their gaming interests that they wouldn't have bothered with the library card, you're right... I can't imagine that that crew would appreciate this guide, though.
In the end, it's sort of a nuanced discussion to have; but I think it's safe to say Battlefront gamers tend to be on the more serious end of things in their fixation and focus, and well-read. That's who we had in mind for the guide. Anyway, we truly hope SoW feels full enough add heft to the "bookshelf"; it's definitely not trying to replace the other histories altogether.
Regarding El Guettar, have you read the account by John Patterson? http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/1990/OCT_1990/OCT_1990_PAGES_31_34.pdf I'll post over in your design-thread when I have a moment... It sounds like the German commander on March 23rd was trying to inspire awe in green American troops with a frontal attack and (as in the earlier battles driving toward Thala and Tebessa) walked into the teeth of Allied batteries that outranged his own mixed forces. I'm not sure the "hollow square" is relevant as much as the underestimation of the strength of Allied positions... Allied guns are indeed close to being overrun by German infantry but have just enough distance (and timed shells) to hold them at bay. And one has to keep in mind how grave the situation is becoming by this point for the Germans: Rommel has already exited the theatre for good; the loss of 30 more Panzers further dooms an already doomed cause. Maybe this general is trying to play a strong bluff to his advantage (inspiring a rout?) but it seems to have failed badly, and represents a rash, desperate order, where both his troops and tanks end up caught in the open under artillery fire.
I think Rommel's mistakes (at least in February) are more subtle and fateful. He splits his forces too often; there isn't adequate reconnaissance for the left flank with Buelowius; he doesn't account for the length and duration of his armored thrusts with enough fuel and ammo. These are comparatively tiny mistakes that led to catastrophe.