Ludi1867

The Strategic Command system has some very innovative diplomacy models that can alter the entry of neutrals into the war by causing reactions to excessive or inadequate garrisoning of certain regions by an active nation. While this is innovative, it is often difficult for a player to understand what actions (or inactions) are causing the preparedness for war (PFW) of a neutral to rise. Sometimes the reason is buried somewhere in a script. In SC2PT there are at least two pop-ups mentioning Japanese garrison requirements to avoid undue Russian PFW increases. This pop ups only stay on the screen a short while, and then cannot be found while in the game. Hubert Cater commented in one thread that the pop ups could be found in one of the folders. True enough, they can, but getting out of the game, searching through folders for the information, and then figuring out what to do with it (one of the pop ups is not explicitly clear) is hardly conducive to immersive game play. PFW factors often seem to be a little hard to understand when a new SC variant appears. Over time a rule of thumb or guideline is often posted by players who work through and figure out how to deal with the PFW situations that appear in the game. However, the SC engine does not currently provide a very good method for informing players on how they can avoid (if they want to and/or are able to free the forces) PFW from rising. One option might be to adjust the Diplomacy screen to provide this information. At present the screen provides an indication of current PFW among neutral powers, and options for buying influence chits to affect this PFW. There is quite a bit of room for more information on this screen. A section that might be entitled “Preparedness for War” with a list of “Situations” or “Factors” that would show appropriate information when different neutrals are selected might provide a means of showing garrison or excessive force situations. As a player of all these games I have been frequently frustrated when PFW in a key neutral starts to rise, and it is not clear why. The Diplomacy part of the engine is integral to the SC model, but at present it is far more opaque than it should be. More information needs to be made available to the player, and the occasional pop up is simply not good enough.

The garrison requirements to avoid Russian increased prep for war are really not clear for 1944. The 1941 requirements list 5 cities, and putting units directly in those five cities does seem to work. The 1944 message is NOT as clear, as it identifies two cities - one of which is Russian - that need "additional garrison forces near them". Sounds simple, but of course it is not. The Russian city is Blagovyschensk (Blag), and it is five squares from Tsitsihar (Tsi) by road. So where should the garrison go? Is adjacent to Tsi good enough? Probably not, based on results in my PBEM game so far. I guess I have to march the unit there up the road to...where? Directly south of Blag? SW? Do you need to be adjacent or is within two squares good enough? These may seem like ridiculous questions, but in SC2 WaW update ? it took a LONG time to learn that Italian prep for war was now affected not only by garrisons along the Med but Cairo as well. The point here is that forcing players to go through a trial and error process to figure out what is meant by a vague and ambiguous directive is not really a great idea, but seems to happen in these games. So PLEASE post precise garrison directions, and do NOT use vague directions like "near" when it is not at all clear what is precisely required to be "near".

powergmbh Thanks for your comments. re 2. I agree that the scripts can be changed (and should have thought of that, I guess) but why would not the base game have that script? My sense is that the US and UK are almost excessively penalized by the game system. Historically these two Allies shared much of their R&D (remarkable amounts, really). Yet in the game both have to research everything separately, etc. Lend-lease provides MPPs in the game, but in reality many important weapons were directly provided by the US – Montgomery would have had much more trouble at El Alamein without all the Shermans the US sent directly to the Middle East for the British to use, as just one of thousands of examples. re 3. Well, I am not sure I would use the description not unrealistic historically. Your points are well taken regarding the western hemisphere Vichy experiences. However, the similarity between Iceland and the Azores as strategically important islands should be considered. The US would likely have intervened directly militarily if the Vichy islands in the Caribbean had attempted to directly assist the Axis. The UK moved very quickly to occupy Iceland when Denmark fell. If Portugal, a long standing ally of the British, had been viciously attacked, it is actually difficult to see the Portuguese just handing over the Azores. Even if they did, Allied naval supremacy in the Atlantic makes it hard to see the Axis actually occupying the Azores before the Allies preempted them. The islands are almost 1000 miles into the ocean – Axis air units would have difficulty flying there in an operational capacity (aside from the very few aircraft with that kind of range, such as the FW 200), and it is out of the question that any significant airlift could reach the island. To have an air unit operate into the Azores, as the Axis can now apparently do, is, in my view historically unrealistic – the Allies would have acted to prevent this from happening, as they did in Iceland. Terif Thank you as well for your comments. Your comments and another thread now make it clear what is happening with Italian entry. re 2. As powergmbh noted, this is not historically true for the US and the UK, who did have very effective working relationships prior to US entering the war officially. While your comment may be true in a general sense, the “special relationship” between the US and the UK (and you can argue forever as to how special it really was) really was an important fact in this conflict, one which the current SC system only acknowledges in a very rudimentary way with the lend-lease activation (and that only for MPPs, not for tech, which historically was vital to the success of these two powers). re 3. Again, your comment is generally correct. Perhaps I should rephrase and say there SHOULD be a special script event if the Axis conquer Portugal, and it should be similar to the Denmark conquer then Iceland goes Allied script that now exists. A final overall comment is that the game system provides too many rewards for conquest, and not nearly enough penalties. There is a certain obvious sense to providing a conquering nation with so many MPPs, but many invasions had serious negative consequences that are not reflected in the game. And I am not arguing that only the Axis should suffer negative consequences – the ease with which the Allies can now invade Ireland is an egregious example of the flaws in the current system.

WaW seems to have introduced a number of minor changes in scripts. Others have asked about this, but no clear reply has been forthcoming beyond the general claim that WaW follows roughly along the lines of SC2. This may be true, but it certainly seems that there are some new oddities. In addition, there are some strange results that are, well, dubious or ahistorical. The following are issues that I am confused by. There may well be others, or there may be simple explanations. In either case, I would appreciate knowing about other issues, and even better explanations as to what is happening here. 1. Italy joining the Axis. In SC2 vanilla, Italy seldom joined the Axis unless the Allies moved land units in the Mediterranean littoral or German units approached Paris. Neither criterion seems to apply in WaW, where Italy regularly joins the Axis in late 1939 or January 1940. What causes Italy to join the Axis so soon and so regularly now? 2. USN units cannot gain re-supply from Newfoundland before the US enters the war. This may be a game engine issue, but it certainly is ahistorical. Not only did the USN establish a port and airbase in Newfoundland well before Pearl Harbor, but the USN was even given operational command of Allied naval forces in the western Atlantic in the summer of 1941 (yes, well before Pearl Harbor). The USN retained this command role until May 1943, despite the majority of USN forces in the NW Atlantic departing in the wake of Pearl Harbor. Why cannot USN units gain re-supply from Newfoundland (at least – should probably be any British port) before the US enters the war? 3. If the Axis conquers Portugal prior to the Azores being leased to the Allies, the Azores become Axis occuppied. Is this automatic? It is hard to see this happening automatically in reality, where an Iceland like event seems historically more likely. Is there a script for this? Is this deliberate, or just an oversight?

A234 There is a class of literature out there that would make you think that German scientists invented almost everything during the war, and only the lack of vision of Hitler prevented this or that secret weapon from winning the war. The scholarly literature is not quite as exciting to read. However, after reading a variety of sources, I am not convinced that it is as easy to develop ballistic rockets as some have suggested in this thread. The A-4/V-2 was an amazing accomplishment, and orders of magnitude more capable than other contemporary rockets. Looking at programs by those such as Goddard, etc simply reinforces how much the German design teams achieved. If you read just one scholarly work, the one by Neufeld, I would suggest you might be less inclined to argue that a ‘little more vision’ by Hitler would have changed things. If anything, the Germans invested far too many resources in rockets. The result is, in some ways, not all that different than the usual result in WaW, as Lars is experimenting with. The aspect that I continue to disagree with is tactical impacts. Lars pointed to the Remagen bridge (specifically, the 325 M Ludendorff bridge over the Rhine there). 11 V-2s were launched at this large stationary target in March 1945, and the CLOSEST one fell 300 yards from the bridge (about 500 yards from the aim point). So less than 10 percent of rockets launched, at a well known stationary target, came even mildly close, within a quarter of a mile. There are all kinds of problems with this example, small sample size, etc, but the basic point remains that even late in the war, aiming at large stationary targets, the V-2 was not very good. So to have strategic rockets in WaW do damage to ships, etc, is ludicrous. Wicky Interesting post – I was not aware of this particular experiment. However, the small rocket that they attempted to use here was comparable to the ‘state of the art’ in that period, and is simply not in any way close to the A-4/V-2. Suggesting that you just have to ‘increase the size of everything a bit’ from the Scottish postal rocket to get a useful Ballistic Missile is rather similar to saying a Sopwith Camel could be a Spitfire with a few improvements – true if you ignore all the technical problems. Lars Interesting experiment. You certainly have better luck with R&D than I do, but it is clearly a drain of scarce German resources in WaW to follow the path you are on. Again, my main gripe is the tactical effectiveness of this weapon.

Lars I guess we will have to disagree. My experience was as a naval officer, and it was mainly with evolutionary designs, and even there the discrepancy between promise and delivery could be quite spectacular. (sometimes things actually came together as expected – this was not all that common.) My reading of the history of the V-2 is that it was a revolutionary step because it was dramatically different than any weapon before and pretty much all ballistic systems since owes something to the V-2. No country was close to achieving what von Braun and his team, with the protection and pressure provided by General Dornberger assisting him, managed. Reading the history also makes it clear that there were a signficant number of times when debates on the right way forward caused problems and sidetracked advancement along what proved, in the end, to be the workable track. You appear to have much greater faith in ‘some smart guys pulling it all together’ than I do – and I think history has many more examples of failure than many perhaps realize (the successes are what tend to be highlighted). The ‘applying more resources will make things happen sooner’ school of thought is somewhat akin to the ‘enough monkeys typing long enough will eventually come up with the complete works of Shakespeare’ belief: possibly true, but not really relevant. The problem with really different systems is that it is hard to see the evolution. Rockets are somewhat simple in concept, but ballistic weapon class rockets require advances in many things that shorter range rockets have no need of whatsoever. Simply adding more engineers and scientists does not always equal progress in that scenario – there are a remarkably large number of ways for extra resources to not help when the problem is hard to define. So it comes down to that you are an optimist about technological development, while I am more pessimistic (I would say realist, but that might not be fair) Tomb Quote from the WaW Expansion notes (the manual.pdf file in WaW folder) “Both sides worked on developing various types of surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, air-to-surface and air-to-air rocket technology. Launched from bases in Holland, the V-1 and V-2 rockets developed by Germany proved to be quite devastating to cities like London. While the V-1 was mostly a nuisance, the V-2 presented a potentially serious threat. Fortunately for the Allies, the V-2 program suffered from many of the common problems Germany faced in the later war years, such as material and fuel shortages as well as disrupted production. Each level of Rockets research improves the strategic attack, and strike range values for all Rockets. It also increases the chance by 10% that a rocket attack against a resource occupied by a defender will inflict a hit on that defending unit. However, Rocket units are unique in that their attack values decrease by a percentage with increasing range. This decrease in effectiveness represents the inherent inaccuracy of WWII rockets at extended range. Production and reinforcement costs of Rockets increase by 10% with each achievement.” end quote This suggests strongly that the main aspect modeled with strategic rockets in WaW is the V-2, as does the fact that AA has no impact on strategic rockets. Allied AA systems dramatically decreased the impact of the V-1 assault, which is probably (I did not write the above, so this is conjecture) why the notes say the “V-1 was mostly a nuisance’. So I think the main thrust of the strategic rocket unit reasonably equates with the V-2. It was a unique, and dramatically different, weapon in the war in that there was simply no defence once it was launched.

Lars I read through your web page. There are no quotes from Hitler in there. The guidance methodology is reasonably described, and you will note that the optical method discussed does NOT involve TV technology (ie the HS 293 and Fritz-X were not early versions of some Maverick variants). So I still do not know your source, you still have not described a feasible terminal guidance system for the V-2, and even the rather optimistic CEP figures you give in your latest post are problematic in many ways – what are accuracy results in operational use, for example? A number of V-2’s were launched at large stationary targets known as bridges (the ones over the Rhine). None hit that I am aware of. Depots, etc, require accurate location knowledge and even with that accurate knowledge, the V-2 remained an inaccurate weapon. I really think it is pretty optimistic to even discuss the V-2 as a tactical weapon in any sense whatsoever. When you say “the historical record is pretty clear that they would have had an effective weapon system”, I am clearly in disagreement with you. I have provided a valid scholarly source that is pretty persuasive that it was very unlikely, for technological DEVELOPMENT reasons, for the V-2 to be fielded much earlier than it actually was. What is your source for your sweeping generalization? I have extensive historical experience researching technological advances, and my studies invariably indicate it is very difficult to retrospectively suggest that more resources can definitely secure revolutionary advances (its usually more a matter of sudden intuitive insights – more resources can sometimes lead to pouring immense effort into blind alleys because the resources make them possible, and its “better” to do something than wait for, basically, inspiration, to strike). I also was involved in weapons R&D in a previous period, and real life sure suggested that guessing when designers could actually deliver what they SAID they could deliver is pretty damn difficult. So I neither share your amazing optimism nor your interpretation of the historical record. Scook Well, I suppose I cannot really disagree with most of your points. It’s really only the tactical use of strategic rockets that I find unsupportable. Nebelwerfers are not a strategic system, and I would suggest that it’s more appropriate to look at them as one of the advances you can research for Artillery. But three rockets for Germany, etc, all seems sensible, if it were restricted to strategic damage. Minty You clearly have not had ships sunk by V-2s in WaW. I have, and I found it strange in the extreme. However, as you suggest, for the most part a German effort in rockets usually results in weaknesses in other areas that the Allied player can exploit. Again, it’s only the tactical effectiveness of strategic rockets that I really cannot support.

A234 The actual production model of the A-4 had a nominal range of 270 Km/156 miles. Some experimental versions were tested out to 385 km / 239 miles in late 1944. (Neufeld, pp 281-282). Those figures mean that the V-2 results that were provided in SC2 Vanilla were broadly accurate, as level 5 strategic rockets could reach out 5 squares, or 250 miles. SC2 WaW almost doubles these figures, which is only mildly defensible from a game design perspective. The WaW effort to curtail effectiveness at long range is not very effective because in most cases, by the time a competent player reaches higher effectiveness levels, he will have ensured that his strategic rocket unit is highly experienced. The usual result in practise is that the game penalties for long range shots are more or less offset by the experience bonus. And rockets gain experience comparitively easily, as they can operate in all weather, and should be difficult to attack if the owning player uses AA units and other features of WaW effectively. The overall result is that strategic rockets in WaW can be substantially more effective than the historical record supports, and are definitely much cheaper to research and build. In game terms this makes for more variety, but it’s difficult to argue that the game results in WaW are anywhere close to history in this particular area. I take your point about most players hoping they can produce more rational results than Hitler. However, there are also limits to what one can actually hope to achieve. Looking back it is perhaps too easy to underestimate the remarkable achievement of von Braun and his team. The introduction of the first ballistic missile required a wide variety of important leaps, and was by no means a sure thing. The fuel, metallurgy and engine design considerations were extraordinarily complex, and control problems almost ended the project a number of times. Technological progress is actually rarely the linear progression that those managing resources would like. Breakthroughs – and the V-2 should be seen as a breakthrough, and served as the basis of both the US and USSR’s post war rocket programs – are generally impossible to schedule. So there is a limit to what rationality alone can achieve. That said I ALWAYS organize my R&D as rationally as possible, as I know this is only a game!

Lars Since you have done a little research, I guess you deserve an answer. I will hold off on the crow for now, though, as your reference is, at best, misleading. Your quote from Hitler (what source, btw?) is interesting, but political leaders are seldom the best authorities on technical issues. The best description that might be applied to this quotation comes from Michael J. Neufeld’s The Rocket and the Reich (1996, Harvard U Press), page 139: “The Fuhrer’s comments were an interesting mixture of perceptiveness and absurdity.” (He is actually referring to Hitler’s comments 21 August, 1941, but they apply equally to your quote, and its just a great line.) The reason that your quote is perceptive is that if Hitler had really had large numbers of working V-2s in 1939 then things may have been completely different. The reason his comment is absurd is because there was simply no way that there could have been working V-2s in 1939. (Well, short of having Harry Turtledove write an alternative history….) A second point that you confuse with your post is that the high priority decision in July 1943 that you are referring to is the decision for high priority for mass production. There is a very good reason that Hitler had not given this priority before this – he did not know if the weapon would actually work. Developmental priority for the A-4/V-2 had always been extremely high (actually, determining priorities in Nazi Germany is very complex due to the way in which Hitler deliberately kept decisions like this to himself – an important Allied strength was a rational system for deciding priorities). The first successful launch of an A-4 prototype did not happen until 3 October 1942, after a couple of spectacular failures. And this initial success was far from complete proof of success, as a number of failures happened subsequently. So Hitler’s reluctance is really not unreasonable, and his musing that if had had V-2s in 1939 is just political hyperbole, divorced from reality. So an interesting effort, but you have done little to undermine my main argument that SC2WaW makes strategic rocket development easier and faster than the historical record supports. I would not say that the design decision to do this is wrong – in game terms. But it’s certainly a clear deviation from the historical record. The guidance issue is a little more complex, but I still cannot understand why you support the use of strategic rockets in a tactical role. The radio guidance you discuss was only from the launch site, and allowed better control of the point that rocket burn ended. This did allow somewhat improved accuracy, but overall the V-2 was wildly inaccurate. I do not have figures that compare those that had radio control of end burn with gyro controlled end burn, but the overall accuracy figure for the campaign (p 220 Neufeld) was an AVERAGE error of 20 kilometers. To me the addition of artillery units, which better represent tactical rocket systems such as Katyushas, etc, would mean that there is even less of a game design rationale for tactical effects by strategic rockets. The ONLY effect from these weapons that makes sense is strategic bombardment.

SeaMonkey I am not sure what your concern is here – my main concern is the tactical impact of these weapons. I agree completely that this weapon could be – and was - a significant terror weapon. Why that should allow them to sink naval ships and (as Scook notes) chew up tank units, etc, is what I fail to understand. I am a little concerned that the lower R&D costs facilitate a very early use of these weapons in the game, but that is not a really big issue. In reality there was very little chance that the Germans could have been able to launch any V-2 attacks before 1943 at the earliest, assuming the same very high priority assigned to this project (remarkably high in terms of resources and available engineering talent). There was no significant Allied interference before the Peenemunde raid of August 1943, which did slow deployment. But the real problem was technical, and what von Braun and his team achieved was little short of incredible. It is honestly difficult to see how they could have accelerated the rate of innovation they did achieve. Yet in WaW it is now reasonably feasible to bombard London fairly early in the war. And the chance of the ranges now possible in SC2WaW being achieved usefully in the actual war was slight, so I think that the current bombardment affects of strategic rockets are perhaps a little high with respect to range. But, again, the main thrust of my concern is the tactical impact of these rockets, which is simply not supportable by the historical record. That these weapons could seriously damage cities in a strategic sense is NOT something I am disputing, as the biggest impact was not their warhead but the intangibles you correctly identify.

Hubert Thank you for your reply. I still consider strategic weapons far too powerful in a tactical role, and would still recommend a strength of zero at anything beyond range 1, but I understand your intent (I just disagree in this case!). Lars Your comments indicate a substantial lack of knowledge of the history of this technology – or that you have been overindulging in beer – so I am not sure it is worth the effort to continue to point out your fallacies, but I can assure you that you are mostly wrong on all your points in your latest post. The development of nuclear weapons small enough to be ballistically delivered did reduce the degree of accuracy required, but a requirement for accuracy far greater than was possible with V-2s remained. Nuclear weapons have a substantial blast radius, and can produce fallout causing signficant damage over a large area, but the requirement to place the weapon within a fairly small CEP remained – and proved a very challenging technical requirement to overcome. Your TV idea is actually not practical in any sense. First, the line of sight problem is far more difficult than you suggest – you need more than a highflying bomber, you need transmitters, receivers and controls that can be influenced remotely. None of this was practical in the V-2 design. Indeed, no current ballistic missile uses this technology today. If you actually think your way through the problem, you might start to understand why. Long range telemetric control of what were essentially cruise missiles was developed in the 50s, and this (very, very roughly – I am being generous here) corresponds to your airy suggestion that the HX-293 guidance approach could be easily adapted to strategic weapons. But cruise missiles are a very different weapon than a ballistic missile, and are far more susceptible to counter-measures. The main attraction of cruise missiles using guidance similar to HX-293 is that they travel at speeds and have control systems amenable to adjustment by remote control. (Try using a joystick to control a missile going 15,000 mph on terminal descent!) In short, saying it should “not have been out of the realm of the possible” may sound good, but you really should do some research before making assertions that are both physically next to impossible, and completely impossible to conceive in historical context. I will not post further replies to you unless you actually ground your comments on reasonable historical references and refrain from flights of fancy.

Lars Your link is to strictly tactical weapons. Fine, that is where they were hoping to go with strategic weapons, but it was many years after the Second World War before anything like this precision in terminal homing was possible. My comments are strictly concerning STRATEGIC rockets. Your link is appropriate to upgrading tactical bombers and strategic bombers for naval warfare in terms of SC2WaW. In terms of Strategic Rockets in SC2WaW it is fantasy. The only effective long range terminal homing system developed for a one way weapon in WW II was the kamikaze, and that was not a reasonable choice in the ETO. The number one problem that any strategically launched rocket had in WW II was terminal homing. Tactical weapons could overcome this with line of sight technology. However, these primitive terminal homing systems could be directly countered - and shortly after introduction they often were. The historical facts that I am referring to are clear in the literature. The terminal guidance of V-2s, which the manual makes clear in SC2 WaW is the weapon associated with German strategic rockets, was very poor. That is the reason that British deception ops could succeed. V-1s were also highly susceptible to countermeasures, which became increasingly effective as the bombardment of the UK with those weapons continued. So strategic rockets really only refers to V-2s, not HX-283, Fritx's or V-1s. In short, Lars, your comment on my first comment is completely irrelevant to the matter at hand.

Lars

Historical ‘Clangers’ In SC2 WaW. SC2 is a wargame, and the emphasis has – probably correctly – been placed on the game aspects. It only roughly approximates history, and certain systems – R&D, diplomacy – are deliberately designed to allow some notable variations from the actual path of history. That said, the overall intent does seem to be to not deviate too spectacularly from history. By and large the approach does succeed. However, there are at least a few aspects which might be questioned as diverging rather far from the actual events of the war. Here are two examples I have noted. I am sure there are others. (And I am excluding aspects which are clearly ‘best compromises’, such as the convoy attack model built into the game. This is a compromise because actually finding a convoy was a major challenge for the wolfpacks, and convoys – when threatened – rarely followed the routes depicted on the game map. The routes shown are those the convoys followed when no opposition was expected or when very heavily escorted. When threats were known convoy diversions were usually ordered, and in 1941 – as an example - are estimated to have saved 1.5 million tons of shipping from being sunk. But I cannot think of a better way of doing the shipping war, so I cannot really criticize the system in place at present.) 1. Strategic rocketry – WaW has generously enhanced the impact of positive R&D results for strategic rockets. I can only guess that this was done to make the choice of rocket R&D more profitable in game terms. It has succeeded there, as now level 2 rockets can bombard London from the continent. This means that rockets can be employed for strategic bombardment very early in the game (early 1941 is certainly possible) with a little luck and the appropriate investment. This change highlights the problems with strategic rocketry as modeled in SC overall. The two greatest weaknesses are the potentially dramatic tactical impact of these strategic weapons, and the relatively low cost of actually using rockets. The problems are also somewhat inter-related. Low cost, first. The reason that rockets, as depicted, are low cost is that there really is seldom any damage to the launcher by its own action. Yet in the war each launch, whether successful or not, eliminated 90% or more of the system – these were one way weapons. In game terms there is a very important side effect to these low losses – strategic rockets gain experience relatively quickly. This experience means that, even with their poor naval and land unit attack rating, they can often successfully inflict a significant amount of tactical damage. Yet I defy anyone to name one naval ship hit by a V-2 in the war (well, any strategic rocket aside from a kamikaze guided one.) Can these issues be addressed in the SC2 model without making rockets worthless? I think that is a possibility. The tactical effectiveness of these weapons should be reduced to “0”. Perhaps retain a “1” level of attack AT RANGE ONE ONLY. But these weapons were spectacularly inaccurate – they really had a very hard time hitting a major city the size of London. Any tactical impacts were sheer chance. The cost and experience issue might be addressed by having a 50% chance of a one strength point loss and a 25% chance of a 2 strength point loss every time they are used – in other words, any use has a 75% chance of depleting the weapon system. Seems reasonable in that 90% of the system (or more) is lost with every launch. This would then cost the user, and rebuilding the unit would limit the experience build up. And, frankly, experience is misleading for these units. A key aspect of the actual effective use of these weapons was learning how accurate the attacks were. This depended not on the unit itself but on German intelligence. In reality German intelligence was pretty poor in the latter part of the war, which actually REDUCED the effectiveness of the weapon as time went on (British intelligence ran a deception op to suggest that most weapons hit in NW London, suggesting that the rockets were travelling too far. So the aim point was shifted SE…and fewer rockets hit London). So it would be more sensible (but probably impractical in game terms) to link experience with intelligence level. 2. Western European ports under Axis control NOT being reduced to zero when captured. A major challenge the Allies faced when they managed to capture major ports in France and Belgium, was that German demolition and mining efforts reduced some of these ports to uselessness for various lengths of time, up to many weeks. This did not happen in every case – Marseilles and Toulon were captured essentially intact, vindicating the US insistence on ANVIL – but it proved a major problem for the Allies in the fall of 1944. Yet in SC2, western Allied players always get a relatively intact port (unless they have damaged it themselves, and it usually is a strength 5 port). In game terms this makes it much easier for the western Allies to land than happened in the war. A possible fix might be to make damage to the port probabilistic. As a possible rule of thumb, 50% of the time the port is captured intact, 25% of the time it goes to zero, and 25% of the time it is reduced to 3. This would certainly complicate Allied landing planning, but this is precisely why the Germans did this. In fact, this was one of Hitler’s better ideas – and he pushed the concept of starving any Allied landing by destrying or denying ports to the Allies very hard. Hitler may have had his problems, but not all his ideas were unsound.

This naval model is a significant improvement. In game terms there is no real reason to change the model, as changing tactics from hunting with DDs to blockades can achieve reasonable kills on U-boats eventually. This is a game solution, however, which does not really reflect how things actually went in the Battle of the Atlantic (I really think discussion of the Pacific War is not worthwhile here, as it was a very different conflict). Accepting that things could be left as they are, however, does leave open the question of what might be done to perhaps give the Allied player more pro-active options, as opposed to the much more passive set up a blockade and wait (hope) the U-boats will run into it. Part of the problem is that the convoy lines themselves are a ‘fudge’. This change has both advantages and disadvantages for U-boats in the game. A U-boat now only has to sit on the lines to do damage and gain experience. DDs can only gain experience through combat with other units. This will often mean that DDs will have an experience disadvantage against U-boats. Improving readiness is best done in harbour, but – even given the substantial and welcome increase in the number of harbours – this can be a problem for the Allied player. So perhaps leaving DDs in a convoy ‘box’ linked to a specific convoy line could reduce the MPP damage done if a U-boat pack starts attacking(by 10% per DD unit? 20%?), and would allow a DD to gain experience? This is a ‘passive’ option in one sense, although arguably it is somewhat like the commitment of escorts groups to convoy routes. Maybe there would also be the possibility of a DD inflicting a point or two of damage on a U-boat in this circumstance? This actually starts to set up an attritional situational somewhat similar to many parts of the Battle of the Atlantic. Another option might be to give DD units a two hex spotting range against U-boats. This would allow active searches to be undertaken, but any search would be slow if an ambush were to be avoided. This is gamey, but so is the two hex evasion rule. (Type VIIC U-boats, by far the most common type in the campaign, had submerged ranges of 80 to 130 miles. This rarely meant in a straight line, and few U-boats ever went anywhere near that distance when trying to evade. In short a one hex evasion is perhaps historical, but the whole discussion is rather detached from historical reality). The starting level of DDs might also be adjusted up – the RN and USN both started with basically effective antisubmarine sensors and weapons. It’s not until three years into the war that much improvement in equipment occurs for Allied ASW, so DDs arguably should start at level 1 ASW. These are just points to ponder – as SeaMonkey argues you can effectively work around the game constraints to achieve results.

It is quite erroneous to compare US submarine activity in the Pacific with U-boat activity in the Atlantic. This is easily seen if the ASW doctrine and equipment of the IJN is compared with the RN (or USN or pick a major Allied Navy in the battle of the Atlantic). US submarines had significant successes against Japanese escorts because of their flawed ASW doctrine and relatively poor equipment. This significantly aided the US attack on shipping in the Pacific, which would have been truly devastating early in the war if the torpedoes had worked. ASW was not even seen as an important role for Japanese escorts, and relatively few Japanese escorts were produced for this role, even well into the war. This flaw may seem astonishing in light of Japanese aims and the vital importance of shipping resources to Japan, and war resources to the front, but that indeed was the case. The Allied navies had generally effective ASW doctrine (if the very brief phase of sending out carriers in hunting groups is overlooked), and paid remarkable attention to improving and adapting this doctrine throughout the war. Allied equipment was reasonable at the beginning, and became extremely good by mid-1943. The reason you will not find a U-boat equivalent of the HARDER is NOT because German submariners were less aggressive (although BdU policy recommended avoiding engagement with escorts until the deliberate adoption of an anti-escort first policy briefly in September 1943), but simply because they could not have succeeded with such a tactic in the Atlantic.

Even with an open mind I disagree with the 'ambush' advantage that U-boats have against DDs. I can accept the ambush advantage for U-boats against all other vessels, but it does not make sense to me for DDs. A well placed U-boat cannot (or should not) be found in one turn. This U-boat inflicted two turns of 20 MPP losses per turn. Then it diverted a major proportion of the RN, inflicted heavy losses on the hunting forces (very close to the cost of a U-boat) and survived. And it ambushed DDs TWICE in the same turn...I guess I am not as broadminded as you.

Lars I can assure you that the losses I experienced are totally unrealistic. British and Commonwealth escorts (destroyers, frigates and corvettes) were lost to U-boat attack – but far more U-boats were destroyed in return. In the early part of the war it was in fact rather unusual for U-boats to attack escorts. This was logical, as escorts are small, usually moving at a good rate of speed, and maneuver evasively as a matter of course. In addition, an attack on an escort all too often led to a fatal counterattack. In late summer 1943 the U-boats introduced acoustic homing torpedoes and – for the first time in the war – deliberately targeted escorts as a matter of tactical policy. In one battle a minor tactical success was achieved, where three Allied escorts were sunk and one badly damaged. In return the escorts only definitely killed one U-boat (credit for a second U-boat kill is undetermined to this day, while a third fell victim to a VLR Liberator). After this one success the Allies introduced countermeasures that again significantly reduced the chance of a successful U-boat attack on escorts. This is not to suggest that escorts did not suffer losses, as they certainly did, but the majority of these losses were not at the hands of U-boats, and in almost all circumstances – the battle of ON 202/ONS 18 noted above being one unusual exception – U-boats suffered significant losses when they attempted to engage concentrations of escorts. Using the figures from your website, German U-boats destroyed 33 RN destroyers (just over 21% of all DD losses). In return Allied naval forces (this is not broken out further on the website you indicate) destroyed 275 U-boats. In short, DD losses were about 12% of that they inflicted on U-boats. I do not really like statistics – there is lots of wiggle room in the stat I use above – but the overall point will remain valid even if a lot more research was done and much more detail introduced: many, many more U-boats were sunk by escorts than vice versa. This is currently not reflected in SC2 WaW. U-boats can – and do – inflict more damage on escorts (ie the DD unit) than is anywhere near realistic in WaW at present.

Hubert, in one of the earlier replies you noted that you could not comment on DD damage caused by ‘surprise’ without more details. In a recent PBEM game I again encountered what I really believe is a flaw in naval warfare in the WaW system with regards to U-boats. This was fairly early in the game, so my DD were not improved from the standard provided in the 1939 full war campaign. I suspect my opponent had not improved his U-boats, either, although I did not confirm. I found a U-boat on the Egypt convoy route the ‘traditional’ way, by running into it with a DD. The full strength U-boat lost one point in damage – and inflicted 8 points of damage on the DD. The DD was at supply level 8, readiness 58 and morale 96. While the readiness was a bit low, everything else was not bad. I next moved a not quite full strength carrier up to attack the U-boat. The U-boat dived and moved out of sight. A second full strength DD (same supply and essentially same readiness and morale) conducted a search routine and was ambushed again (this is still the same turn, still the same U-boat). The U-boat lost another single point of damage, and inflicted yet 8 more points of damage on a second DD. A second carrier – again less than full strength moved up and attacked successfully, a third DD unit moved up and inflicted more damage, leaving the U-boat with one point remaining. A cruiser group moved up and the U-boat dove and vanished. I cannot easily determine the supply, readiness, etc of the U-boat as it was out of contact at the end of the turn, but it had been raiding for a couple of turns previous, so probably supply level 8, pretty good morale and readiness. In one turn the Royal Navy used a significant proportion of its strength to attack one U-boat. Two of its full strength U-boat hunting specialized groups were crippled – suffered 8 points damge out of their full strength 10 points. In return the U-boat was crippled (9 points damage out of 10), but survived and is again undetected. The U-boat’s survival is understandable, but the massive damage suffered by units designed to hunt U-boat’s seems quite ridiculous.

First, I would like to thank Hubert for his prompt replies, as well as the other commentators who have made this a very interesting thread for me to review. I would also like to endorse the modification that Hubert has proposed. There is some merit to Lars counter-proposal, but my view is that Lars amendment would perhaps make U-boats too challenging/powerful. Another possibility that might be a middle road would be to enable a move away for diving subs in hunting mode, but limit the move away to one hex (as opposed to the two it is, I believe, now). The bottom line is that it really is difficult to emulate the shipping war in a game of this nature. Too many changes start to impact the overall balance of other parts of the game. Overall I think the option that Hubert proposes probably does address the balance issue best within the present overall design.

Hubert, Thank you for the clarification regarding U-boats now having the ability to pass by all except destroyers freely. I am not much in favour of this feature, but at least I now realize it is intentional, and can adjust my play accordingly. You did not comment on the significant damage suffered in many cases by destroyers that encounter U-boats by chance. This is an even more serious issue now that U-boats can more easily evade containment, as 'chance' encounters remains the only effective way to search for human controlled U-boats (the AI is not as consistently evasive and this sometimes allows effective air search, but humans certainly are). Is there any intention to make destroyers less susceptible to damage when they first encounter U-boats, or is this another feature?

I am a long time SC and SC2 player who has lurked these boards for years. For me WaW is a fascinating addition to the SC2 world. Overall its many nuances make it a deeper game, and how best to employ the new options is keeping me very busy. The aspect that I am having perhaps the most difficulty with is grasping the changes in the shipping war. Portraying the U-boat versus shipping battle during the Second World War is, of course, very difficult. The SC concepts of convoy lanes, U-boats with some optional modes and various allied ships and aircraft is overall a creditable effort. The changes introduced in WaW do add more choices, especially breaking off the smaller ships used for the majority of ASW into ‘Destroyer flotillas (DD)’. The U-boats have been given a better chance of evasion as well, with a possibility of diving when attacked and apparently ‘re-surfacing’ randomly somewhere within a two square radius of where they dived from. This greatly enhances U-boat survivability, even if it can result in some unusual locations for U-boats when they ‘teleport’. These are my assessments of how the new features are supposed to work after playing a little, as it is difficult (I think impossible, but have not tried to parse the rules completely) to gain this understanding from the manual. While these changes are generally improvements, there are some questionable aspects that are perhaps serious enough to unduly unbalance the game, and perhaps they do so inadvertently. One event that has confused me is that on two occasions in PBEM games a U-boat has passed right by (once through) a square in which a BB was located. The U-boat started its move outside spotting range of the BB (which had been carefully placed as part of a ‘containment’ deployment around a U-boat to prevent its escape). If this is a feature, it certainly complicates sub-hunting the game. Is it? If not, it perhaps should be squashed as a bug. Another feature is the massive damage all ships are potentially liable to when they unexpectedly encounter a U-boat or submarine. In general this is consistent with the damage that can be expected when “ambushed”. For almost all classes of ships this is reasonable and defensible. This is not the case for the DD unit. To have these units suffer serious losses to a U-boat ambush is not sensible, and makes hunting U-boats perhaps more difficult than it should be in game terms. Historically it is also at odds with how events happened at sea, where successful U-boat attacks on escorts on the scale portrayed in the game, without commensurate loss to the U-boats, simply did not happen. Small escorts (destroyers and smaller) were lost to U-boats, of course, but generally U-boats avoided attacking hunting groups of small ships because they were difficult to attack and all too prone to use the attack as an invitation to hunt the ambusher to extinction. The best way to address this problem, in my view, is to make DD units immune to ambush attacks by U-boats or submarines. This still makes ASW much more difficult than it was because only DD units would be effective at initial detection, and using other units in that role would risk serious damage to more expensive units. Perhaps a ‘mode’ option for DDs could be considered, but it is hard to see what mode, aside from hunting, that these units would be used for in WaW terms. (Things were of course different in the real world, but that level of complexity is not a reasonable option for a game like SC2) In any event, those are my views. As it stands my initial assessment is that U-boats are now a little bit too much advantaged, because of the massive damage they can inflict on their primary threat. Fighting the AI with the new rules as they are is not overly difficult, but against human players the advantages now found with U-boats is perhaps excessive, and it would be better balanced to give their hunter a reasonable chance in surprise encounters.