Tux
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Posts posted by Tux
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1 hour ago, The_Capt said:
Our opponents appear to be ready to make hard decisions while we do everything possible to avoid them or pretend they aren't happening.
What hard decisions are they making which they don’t at least believe they have no choice but to make?
I certainly agree that we generally do everything possible to avoid putting ourselves out on other people’s behalf (witness the many global conflicts that don’t incur the kind of response Ukraine has) but I suspect that so does every society. It’s the nature of large groups of humans, which I think may be one of your points, to be fair.
This actually relates to how I see western support for Ukraine developing in the coming year or so: I think that, if a settlement appears which could be palatable to Ukraine and Russia, western governments will push hard for that solution. We won’t feel the need strongly enough to choose a prolonged effort to try and beat Russia harder. However I think the West will feel the need to not lose this. As long as Russia may be able to claim some victory I think ‘we’ will feel we have no choice but to ratchet up our commitment to Ukraine, even if only to maintain current support levels with new production, for example.
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33 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
I disagree. It highlights my diatribe even better when framed this way. The entitlement and unwillingness to sacrifice that dominated the back end of the 19th century kicked the problem down the road until it came to a point when the sacrifice was no longer discretionary, it became existential.
Pre-WW1 Europe went into that war blind to its realities, refusing to understand what the sacrifices actually meant (“home by Xmas”) and by the time they did it was far too late. That was not “willingness” by 1915, it was Sunk Cost entrapment. The most powerful and richest nations in human history tore themselves apart as war became a fire that ran away with its own consumption.
Failure to sacrifice does not mean immediately raising the “white flag of war” at the first shot. It means that during the competition stage one refuses viable but painful options to get off the spiral. Once you hit bottom it is too late. Sacrifice is going to happen. At that point one can only choose which “bad” to take.
If a nation allows events to slide to the point they are in existential crisis they have already failed in many ways. It is not western unwillingness to send millions of it own to die. It is our unwillingness to make the sacrifices to avoid that very destination ahead of events that concerns me.
Are we sure that the distinction between late-19th century Europe/today’s West and any other human society really stands up to scrutiny, in this respect? Sure, Ukraine are sacrificing but they have no choice. Russia are sacrificing but we are repeatedly reminded that the people there very much believe they have no choice - as far as they’re concerned the government has taken them to war (incidentally fully intending to be done within 3 days, let alone by Xmas) so, like bad weather, they’d better just deal with it.
The entire planet refused countless, relatively cheap and painless opportunities to prevent climate change from becoming an existential problem. It may not quite be a truly existential threat just yet but we are very much already at the point of being forced to choose between bad options to deal with it.
Perhaps I’m speaking out of turn here and what you describe is an established, well-demonstrated phenomenon but I’m honestly struggling to think of any society which has ever voluntarily made this kind of sacrifice without either being forced to, believing the sacrifice would be far smaller than it turned out to be (“home by Xmas”) or believing they had no other choice.
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1 hour ago, The_Capt said:
Ah now we hit upon the most significant issue of this entire war - clearly identified endstates. Both sides have been wrestling with what their exact goal really is. For Russia we clearly see the re-setting of the goal posts pretty much from day one. They now have settled in on Crimea, Donetsk (such that it is) and land bridge. I do not think Putin or Russia realistically see half or all of Ukraine as a strategic goal at this point in time. My bet is they are seeking frozen conflict to buy time for a reload and then coming back to this in ten years or so. However, I also suspect they know that the west will likely establish some binding security arrangements with Ukraine and Putin will likely be dead in ten years.
For Ukraine…? What are the strategic objectives? Independence is an easy one. Free from Russian threats both above and below the waterline? And establishing territorial integrity? But where is that? The objective of “all of pre-2014” territory was pretty ambitious and had no small risks associated with it (see: insurgency debate).
I was talking more about operational-level "goals" but of course this is where the discussion ends up, anyway. We can quibble about how easy it might be for Putin to sell "Crimea, Donetsk and land bridge" as a win within Russia but there's no need and ultimately I agree that's likely where they are now. If they've got their heads screwed on, they'll be looking for a way to freeze things.
We've seen Russia, Ukraine and NATO (to varying extents) commit and lose large amounts of their existing weaponry stockpiles. Everyone's warehouses and depots (certainly in Europe) have more moths than shells in them and so we are into the second phase; that of building new equipment based on experience gained. Short term production capacity of existing systems is limited and we don't yet know exactly which 'new' kit we should bet the farm on mass-producing (see recent 'What Drone?' discussions, ect.). So I think, as things stand, Ukraine can maintain a coherent strategy that acknowledges all the above and still focuses on territorial integrity: If they think Russia want to freeze along existing(ish) front lines and if they can get confidence in ongoing Western support and supply of key weapon/ammunition types, then I think it's clear that they should settle down and focus on corroding Russia's entire occupation force on the land bridge from range. Talk to allies and focus all efforts on production of artillery pieces, 155mm ammo, PGMs, drones and ISR.
They might not be able to evict the Russians but they can certainly charge an eye-watering rental fee.
1 hour ago, The_Capt said:For the West….WTF?! We have never presented a coherent set of strategic objectives in this thing. Beyond “free Ukraine” the west has never declare what it wants out of all this. I suspect it is because we are looking at different answers for different people. US wants an international order win to flavour next internal fight. Canada wants international order win because without that international order we are screwed in our current position. Europe? Baltics? Contain Russia? Contract Russia? Regime change? No one has really ever come out and stated “what winning looks like for the West” so we really have no clear idea of what our sacrifice looks like.
Yeah it's because the West is a group of independent nations and not dominated by the USA quite to the extent that it is sometimes portrayed. Ultimately though I think everyone's goal is maintenance of the Rules-Based Order 'platonic ideal' even if each country might be looking at a different projection of it. For example I think the UK likely wants to settle some scores with Russia while appearing to be strong and leadershippy without EU membership and simultaneously setting ourselves up for a long, close friendship with Ukraine after the war (because we need some friends now we don't have EU membership). Those incentives all reflect different facets of the same Rule-Based Order that the US, Canada, Poland and France want to protect, if for different specific reasons.
1 hour ago, The_Capt said:And then there is the rest. China, Iran and India for example. They want western contraction that much is clear. But they do not necessarily want Russian expansion. They likely want a weak Russia and a weak West.
I think China, Iran and India have already 'won' as much as they were ever going to, to be honest. The Rules-Based Order was challenged (*tick*); Russia was weakened and left dependent on them for support (*tick*); clues as to the way conventional near-peer war is evolving are freely available, allowing them to try to sidestep US dominance of traditional warfare domains in their own force designs (*tick*); and there's more. Funnily enough I think that, insofar as they want to affect the war, they might want to err towards prolonging it more than Russia does.
1 hour ago, The_Capt said:Strategy and the Art of War is keeping all these things aligned - Options, Decisions and Effects to Outcomes. What we are not really seeing is a coherent strategy from either side in all this.
Exactly why I think Ukraine may need to stop advancing, since advancing seems like it may soon start to reduce their Option space rather than expand it, simply through force attrition. They should maintain sufficient force coherence at the front such that an advance may still be an Option but instead elect to Decide that Russia can not expand its land bridge, Undecide that Russia can maintain efficient and unmolested control of the land bridge and focus their Effects on the Russians' willingness and ability to sustain the occupation.
That seems to me to be as good a holding pattern as any until they/we can properly solve for offense.
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2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Not sure if they are there yet but they definitely do not want to over-extend to the point that they cannot do this over a longer haul.
They have to have a goal though, right? If they are advancing because, for example, they want to get within x-distance of the coast so that the whole land bridge can be taken under fire then that’s one thing. If they’re advancing because they can but they understand that defensive primacy has re-emerged and they know they have no hope of making major gains then they should stop and put their manpower to more efficient use, no?
I’m sure they do still have a goal but at this point I don’t think it could realistically be very spectacular.
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7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
The realty is that Ukraine is the weaker power here in many ways and will likely benefit from weaker power strategies rather than adopting greater power ones.
Perhaps the best strategy for now is for Ukraine to consolidate their own defences and then concentrate on making Russian Army’s life on the land bridge as uncomfortable as possible. Get back to plinking HQs and logistics nodes with PGMs and put the onus on Russia to come up with a solution.
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3 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:
Russia seems to be gaining a lot of initiative lately, meanwhile the Western support is slowly going away. I kind of suspect this war will not see its second anniversary.
It certainly seems like Ukraine have spent the operational initiative they had after Bakhmut but I’m not sure Russia have gained much (pending the outcome of the Avdiivka operation).
What terms do you think both sides might agree upon within the next three months? It’s not totally inconceivable (but I think it is extremely unlikely) that Ukraine calls exhaustion and offers terms for a freeze but can Putin really accept that? ‘We’ve got a land corridor and there’s no chance in hell the Russian Army can take any more from puny Ukraine so I’ve agreed a ceasefire’…?
Surely Putin would/could only accept that if he thought it was better than continuing to fight, in which case Ukraine would be encouraged to withdraw the offer and get back to the trenches?
In my opinion we have hit a temporary military stalemate but we are far from actual exhaustion on the part of either side.
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1 hour ago, hcrof said:
Close but Anvil still looks too heavy and expensively built, to my eye. Make it half (or less) the weight, hand-launched, use the cheapest possible components and materials for mass production and remove all the networking capabilities.
An effective rf seeker/guidance combo with 10km flight range, enough mass to likely disable whatever it hits and an on/off switch. That’s all I was thinking.
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8 hours ago, JonS said:
The "-ish" is important. By ceding that airspace as no-man's land (no-man's air?) you at least avoid that whole iff dilemma to the engineering simplicity of "if it flies, it dies." Granted, you are still left with the considerable problem of doing the actual swatting.
Ceding the space possibly also opens up techniques that wouldn't be viable for a "theirs, but not ours" approach. (broad spectrum jamming? Fishing drift nets suspended from balloons?)
As I mentioned a few pages back I think this is a good idea for the early years of the drone wars and I think the bestish solution for the next decade would be a cheap ‘fighter drone’ that autonomously homes in on airborne radio emitters and collides with them. That at least forces the enemy to solve the ‘how to make an effective autonomous drone’ problem before they can harass your ground forces again.
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In an attempt to drag us back at least towards the topic: I will be absolutely fascinated to find out (probably in a decade or two’s time) what Russian servicemen think they are fighting for in this war. I think the precise nature of the macro-social narrative which is somehow successfully holding the RA together (or whether it’s actually more of a confluence of thousands of complementary micro-social imperatives) will be important to study.
Any thoughts? What keeps the RA going seems to be the one major gap in the collective understanding of the West and so is almost certainly not being attacked as effectively as it could be?
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3 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:
Oooooo, I get to be disagreeable. Let’s talk about women’s sufferage, and entrance into the workforce en masse.
Several interesting symptoms, across many countries, from Central American Kleptocracies to Western Democracies to everybody else, pretty much:
- As women get educated, less children
- Twice as many workers, and thus many things cost twice as much that have an inelastic supply such as housing
- Fewer meals prepared at home cause no home-maker (otherwise known as the Elizabeth Warren Diet), with the second order effect of less healthy eating habits
- Women are not locked into marriages, and thus a higher divorce rate
- Women prefer not to date down, thus with more women going to school, there are fewer desireable eligible men, hence lower marriage rate
All of these together reduce the number of children being born, which over time will cause major social upheaval. Obviously the ramifications of aging societies haven’t been fully explored yet, but it’s going to be exciting.
Do we not think there is going to be social collapse in at least a few countries?
I can feel Steve glaring even as I write this but I cannot let it stand unchallenged and thereby assume what I would consider an undeserved aura of credibility. So I will just say that, at a glance, I think I count at least one flawed assumption, one bald assertion and three non sequiturs.
In other words I disagree with the above “disagreeable” post.
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21 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
"What most people think they are fighting for" Urban 2 was trying to 1) push back Muslim/Arab encroachment and 2) solidify power in Europe. These are not high morale or righteous objectives. God did not will it, we did. And then used God as cover to get thousands to go die somewhere to try and achieve political -not ideological- aims. History is rife with this dynamic. The Church's use of religion to commit genocide is historical fact, but don't dress it up as anything but a political ploy.
Same mechanism is happening in Russia right now. But instead of "God", insert whatever Putin is selling.
I agree (hence the admittedly late edit to my previous post), with perhaps two minor tweaks:
1. There is no meaningful difference between what people fight for and what people think they are fighting for. Ask them both questions and see if you get a different response. Perhaps we’re just getting tangled in semantics here but, to me, what a person fights for is what they think/believe they are fighting for, by definition. Why the war is actually being fought at all is the different question.
2. Religion is still very much part of what Putin is selling the Russian people at the moment. Not as much as it would have been 200 years ago but it’s still there.
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Perhaps the distinction to be drawn between The_Capt’s and chuckdyke’s perceptions here is that between “why most wars are fought” and “what most people fight for”.
It seems clear that religion (and, latterly nationalism) has more influence on a widespread micro-social basis than secular government structures have ever had. It is therefore the perfect tool for converting a ruling elite’s micro-social incentive to war into a macro-social narrative which auto-resolves into new and powerful micro-social incentives for almost everyone else.
People fight for what they believe they are fighting for. The reality of the cause and whether it is related to the original reason for the war doesn’t come into it.
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1 hour ago, Aragorn2002 said:
What is left of 'The West' anyway? Discussing about whether childeren have the right to chose their gender and emptying our churches, so they can be turned into mosques. And as one of the commentators so rightly put it, only interested in our wallet and the size of our car. We're in a Cold War, a collision of systems and ideals. What happens in the Middle East is peanuts compared to the war in the East. Part of Vlad's masterplan to divide and conquer. And it works, because of our stupidity and lack of focus.
I get that you might be having a bad day but there is so much unwarranted angst in this post: absolutely nobody in “The West” argues that children should have the right to choose their gender. No-one is emptying our churches (though there are many fewer people heading in) and less than nobody is “emptying churches so they can be turned into mosques”.
Reconsider the merits of whatever media source has told you these things. You rightly identify that we are in a collision of systems but make no mistake: it is the enemies of our Western system who promote misinformation such as what you posted above in order to foster the very division you warn against. Seeing through that, being less angry about things that aren’t happening and therefore being a part of a secure Western system is the best way to maintain focus and win.
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40 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
I can definitely see this working for small attacks with limited objectives, especially in a terrorism scenario, but I don't think it is economically viable for a large scale conventional war unit we get to nano.
And since nobody has doom spoke about the future of the future... someone can create the ultimate anti-drone strategy for all of the close future systems that exist and have it all not matter one iota when tech moves to nano. On the other hand, I think we'll be back to living in caves before that happens so all "good" there?
Steve
I can see your point, economically-speaking. However I think that strengthens an argument for pressing the vast majority of whatever economic capacity you do have for producing drones into the production of effective drone killers.
We are clearly at the beginning of the drone revolution that we all regularly discuss but we have only just got past duct-taping hand grenades to Mavic 3 Pros. There is a hell of a long way to go before this domain resolves properly and we are able to clearly see what we need and how to use it. There will almost certainly be a catalogue of false-start designs and dead-ends which sap countries production resources to little benefit (think multi-turreted tanks, turreted fighter aircraft, etc.).
My argument is that, while the above situation is ongoing, a smart country will absolutely engage in the general melee of drone and doctrine development (especially China, the US and anyone else for whom economic capacity isn’t such an issue) but will meanwhile maintain laser focus on a dirt-cheap design to hunt down and kill any small, airborne rf-emitter within 10km.
As has been noted by many already, if you lose the drone war in a future symmetrical, conventional conflict, you likely lose the war. An efficient ‘drone fighter’ intended purely for area denial to all drones (except its own kind and until proper discrimination is practical) goes a long way towards mitigating that risk.
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8 minutes ago, chrisl said:
The Dalek approach to a defined area crossed my mind while I was writing, but I didn't address it. As you point out, it has some rather spectacular failure/spoof modes.
If you don't solve the IFF problem, could end up with the "baby spider" situation, where they all just eat each other until there are one or two left, without regard for whose side they're on.
(btw - I've seen *actual Daleks* patrolling the new Economy Parking garage at LAX. You have to be really careful getting to the shuttle)
The more I think about it, isn’t producing a cheap, mass-producible “dalek” drone actually the top priority, at this point? If all else fails a fleet of daleks at least lets you wipe the sky clear altogether. You could then even resurrect a few tanks and go all manoeuvrey again, if you wanted.
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18 hours ago, chrisl said:
Yeah, I'm very aware of that, and I suppose that's a cue for getting a little into why we don't have anti-drone drones.
There are two parts to the anti-drone drone: detection and attack. The detection is the hard part. Destruction is easy - we already have no end of systems that can very accurately destroy anything that you give them coordinates of. We can accurately fire projectiles, exploding projectiles, exploding projectiles full of razor sharp hoops, high energy beams of photons, rings with chains on them, rings with strings on them, giant wads of gooey stuff, or anything you want to take out a drone. But you have to detect it.
For an anti-drone drone, there are sort of two categories of drone you're targeting: open loop (no comm back to the sender) and closed loop (some comm back to the sender, whether full two-way control, occasional updates, or whatever).
Detection of the first type (no comm), which includes Shaheds, is tricky - unlike the F-35, these *start* with the radar cross section of a goose* and then you can make that even smaller. These things are all small on visual and radar cross sections because you can paint them and they don't have a lot of metal. You're going to track them with frustrating "visual" algorithms, where "visual" can mean different things in the optical vs. radar wavelengths, but you're still trying to pick out changes in the scene to decide where the thing is. I'm not going to spend much time on it, other than to say that unless you have really high signal to noise and high resolution (both of which the target is trying to reduce), it's a lot harder than you think, and in general you're not going to get there with simple image differencing. And this problem exists for commless drones whether you're using another drone, a gun, or a death ray to take them down. Shaheds at least have a very characteristic sound that you can probably use for detection and targeting once they're within audible range.
Detection of the second type (active comm) is easy. It's transmitting, and transmitting enough to get clear signal back to its operator, who is farther away than you are if it's attacking you. Triangulation is old technology. Piece of cake: you lock onto the frequency, have some kind of sensor so you know your own orientation relative to the sensor, and just maneuver in a way to make the signal from the drone stronger until you hit it and destroy it with whatever mechanism you prefer. Or have a few sensors that are networked to give you the position (helloooo MLAT) and shoot it with your favorite method of action-at-a-distance.
Except for one problem: whose drone did you just destroy?
In the Ukraine environment, IFF is the hard part of doing radio based anti-drone systems. There are tons of things flying around, as evidenced by the daily releases of yet another view of every bit of ground combat we ever see. It's not quite Diamond Age concentrations of them, but they're working on it. And they're all sorts of random drones, including commercial drones, custom drones made with commercial off the shelf parts, custom drones with a mix of commercial and special mil parts, totally custom mil drones, and who knows what else. And they're all using similar frequencies, because the combination of physics and the atmosphere force you to the same frequencies if you want a particular range and data rate at powers that you can reasonably supply to both the ground operator and drone with batteries. If you don't sort out the IFF thing and you set an autonomous anti-radiation based anti-drone system loose, it's just as likely to attack its allied drones as the enemy drones, because it has no way to tell them apart. That means you have to have your complete drone ecosystem integrated (ring that cash register over at Lockheed/Northrop Grumman/Raytheon!!) or you're just going to be attacking your own stuff.
And part of why we aren't seeing even rudimentary versions of it in Ukraine is that it's not a function that people were already spending much effort on for commercial/hobbyist drones. You can't just pop over to Robotshop.com or Alibaba and order tunable RF sensor kits (or a few thousand of them) the way you can other types of sensor, or actuators for operating your 3D printed grenade dropper. It's possible to get relatively inexpensive software-defined radio modules that are small (that's what feeds ADSBExchange so you can see who's flying around Ukraine), but the environment is so variable, along with the need to confirm what drone you're attacking, that at least for now you're going to need a human in the loop, even if you can semi-automate your remote control drone sensor. And even with a human in the loop, nobody is painting national flags on their drones, so unless you know "this is one that our side makes" after you get up close to it (assuming you're doing that, rather than sending a death ray at it from 5 km), you really don't know who you're shooting down. So the basic tech isn't all that hard, but because it's not just point and shoot or point and drop, it's a lot more dependent on integration of the whole system to be usable.
*geese, like all waterfowl, are incredibly mean and probably deserve to die. That's why there's a book entitled "Ducks and how to make them pay". If we can do an autonomous system for drones, it should probably be immediately applied to geese and ducks.
First of all this was really interesting and clearly-written. Thank you.
Secondly, while solving the IFF issue will clearly confer an advantage, I’m not sure it’s necessary for early-generation drone fleets. Instead I imagine a world where a fleet of Anti-Drone Drones (ADDs) is released to ‘purge’ the sky over a battlefield at a set time on a set date, designed to catch as many enemy drones in action as possible. Orders to ground all friendly drones will ensure that the vast majority of ‘kills’ are of enemy drones. All the ADDs need to be able to do is to tell ‘an ADD’ (so one specific image) from ‘not an ADD’ (nADDs?).
This could obviously lead to all sorts of efforts to spoof the enemy into deploying their observation/FPV drones en mass so that you get a solid opportunity to “hit them in the nADDs” and hopefully achieve a short period of drone superiority for your own forces.In that world IFF lends a significant advantage, enabling you to go for full drone supremacy over the battlefield, but it’s not absolutely necessary.
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27 minutes ago, Vanir Ausf B said:
Current US production is around 350,000. Russian production is estimated to be near 2 million
Wow. This is a much larger deficit than I had assumed. I can’t imagine that the US and European countries don’t already have a plan underway to reverse the above ratio over the next year or so, though.
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22 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
More likely this guy with his tail singed :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bobak_marmot
Good eating among the hill folk. And you can make a hat out of its fur!
Whelp, that’s it. We have officially run out of things to talk about.
Looks like a coypu to me. Maybe part of the softly, softly Dniepr crossing operation?
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19 minutes ago, JonS said:
I wonder how safe, predictable, and reliable NK ammo is. Chauvanistically I lean toward 'not very', but I don't really have anything to base that on beside second or third order indicators.
If we know anything about North Korean engineering that indicates their tolerances and standards are lacking vs western equivalents, that’s all we need to reasonably propose that their ammo will be less safe, predictable and reliable than western ammo, at least.
Having said that I can’t recall having seen any examples which prove that, myself.
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21 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
Probably more than those wooden dolls
With Russia firmly in the "rogue state" category now, there's all kinds of things that Putin won't have a problem sharing with NK now. Nuclear tech is probably on the table, but I'd be shocked if ballistic missile tech isn't already part of the deal. Russia has nothing to lose and only things to gain by such a deal. And for the cost of some new artillery shell production, I think NK comes out way ahead.
Steve
The fact that North Korea will also recognise the above means they have an unholy amount of leverage in that ‘relationship’. If we’re right (obviously we’re all speculating so far) and they can turn off the ammo tap at a moment’s notice to throw the RA into an almost immediate starvation situation… wow. Just wow. I mean, to be honest I start to ask myself how long Russian nationalists would tolerate such a situation before Putin starts to be seen as weak for allowing it to continue.
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2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
1. Russia's intake of North Korean artillery ammo is likely sufficient for meeting its current usage rates for at least the next year. This is many, many times lower than what was used last year (as much as 800% reduction), however still enough to be militarily impactful on the battlefield. Therefore, Ukraine is better off than last year but not really at some sort of advantage going forward. ISW stresses the most important factor is if Ukraine can keep meet it's needs, which of course has a lot to do with the West's ability to supply it.
Although it doesn’t specify, I assume the report means that North Korean production rates + Russian production rates will keep up with Russia’s current usage? In which case I think I would back US + Ukrainian + other allies’ to exceed such a rate and leave the UA better off, in the long run at least. If that’s not what they meant then ISW must be making the assumption that North Korea are willing to run down their own stocks of artillery ammunition which… I dunno… doesn’t sound like a very North Korean thing to do, to me.
It would be great to know what Kim is getting in return. I think it might tell us a lot about all sorts of things.
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1 hour ago, Offshoot said:
The ISW touched on this a few weeks ago ( https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2023 )
Thanks for the reminder. I knew I’d seen something along those lines somewhere.
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2 minutes ago, hcrof said:
I would not be surprised if RF logistics are being throttled enough near Tokmak that Russia cannot support more than X number of vehicles and guns, but overall they have supplies to spare. In that scenario they can be starved near Tokmak but also have enough for a reasonable push in the east.
Fair point, in which case maybe infantry would be a more reliable indicator?
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55 minutes ago, TheVulture said:
With the Russian attacks on Avdiivka, I can imagine two main scenarios:
* Russia feels comfortable with their defensive situation around Tokmak so they can afford the forces for the attack
* Russia's position around Tokmak is precarious and this is an attempt to relieve pressure by either faking the idea they have sufficient reserves, or Hitler-esque belief in the decisive nature of offensive action to solve problems.
I think there's a third one:
* Internal/domestic politics demands that Russia are seen to be making progress - the Army has therefore been instructed to attack and take a named settlement for Russian media to draw big red arrows around and then stick a
flag in.
55 minutes ago, TheVulture said:What are the key bits of evidence to look for in the coming days that might indicate one way or the other?
Love this question. Imo it's a variety of things:
- Russian media/propaganda messaging: Do they start showing maps with gains around Avdiivka as evidence that Russia has 'retaken the initiative'? Do they simply stop talking about the 'Tokmak front' and focus on Avdiivka as if that's the new nexus of the war effort? Both might suggest the offensive is a planned media distraction.
- Artillery and infantry employment at Avdiivka: all else being equal I think evidence of truly heavy Russian artillery and infantry deployment on the offensive with no apparent reduction around Tokmak would suggest your first option. Both resources are apparently in short supply overall so, if that's the case, we shouldn't expect Russia to be able to mass them at Avdiivka without seriously starving themselves elsewhere.
- Duration and/or escalation profile of the Avdiivka offensive: If the offensive fizzles out after an intial spike in activity, or if it flares up in fits and starts over the coming days and weeks while Ukraine continue the grind towards Tokmak I think that would suggest the Russians are struggling to keep up the pretense or are not happy with the level of distraction they are forcing upon Ukraine.
- Diplomatic activity: any changes in diplomatic tune could, as one example, be evidence that Russia are trying to snatch at a stronger bargaining position on the ground around Avdiivka before ringing the bell for ceasefire negotiations to start.
Those are the ones that leap to mind, anyway. I'm very interested to know what other tea leaves people think we could look out for.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
Yeah I've got you both and I think we are basically agreeing with each other. Perhaps where we might differ is that I look at certain societies' ability to generate and accept sacrifice as a sign of their overall weakness: I think most, if not all human beings will avoid sacrifice as long as that makes them feel more secure. They/we will then choose sacrifice once we hit a certain threshold of insecurity or at least once we believe said sacrifice will offer us significantly more security.
Some social systems are better at offering and generating a sense of security to their citizens, which results in a relative reticence to make sacrifices. In the context of whether that's suitable for winning wars it can be seen as a weakness but overall it's a good thing. Living in a society which can be slow to react to wars is better than living in a society which is so angst-ridden that it starts the things. At worst history seems to demonstrate that, even though relatively secure populations (e.g. today's western democracies) are slow to commit to warfare, they tend to do quite well once they do get there. Small sample size maybe, but it is what it is.
Which circles back to this:
I fully agree with every word here, except the concern about western resolve. I think that, when it matters enough to 'the West' the resolve will be there.
On a personal level it grieves me that Ukraine's pain doesn't hit our threshold for full commitment more readily but we are not dealing in personal dynamics here, we are talking about populations. Rational persuasion takes generations to move populations (if it does so at all), that's why those who see these things coming appear to be 'ignored'. I know that's not new to anybody here but I think remembering such important context might help us not become those "panicked over societal decline" that Randall Munroe warns about.
We will pay heavily for our slowness and we will retrospectively castigate whichever Chamberlain-figure we decide to scapegoat after the fact but ultimately I don't think it will be the West who come out worst.