Son of Hamchuck

Probably meant in the context of temperment. The British historicly have been very solid defenders, do not give ground or panic easily. They are typically more cautious on offense, in contrast to the American's, and therefore the two, when used properly, made a good combination in WWII.

Well I guess your source(?) and mine (http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_Cont.htm#toc) will just have to agree to disagree. "Although the 501st had deployed successfully astride the main road east of Bastogne and had developed a sketchy outline of the most advanced German positions, it had not at any time confronted the main German forces. These, the bulk of Panzer Lehr and the two forward regiments of the 26th Volks Grenadier Division, spent most of the day chopping down the American column trapped between Mageret and Longvilly. Kokott apparently had expected to push his two grenadier regiments unopposed through Longvilly, as soon as they were rested, in a circling march to enter Bastogne from the north, but the German corps commander, General Luettwitz, himself took these regiments out of Kokott's hand and thrust them into the battle with the American rear guard at Longvilly-which held there longer than expected-and against the retreating column en route to Mageret. Suffice it to say that the 501st had been effectively debarred from the Longvilly arena by the Panzer Lehr troops holding Neffe, Hill 510, and the stopper position at Mageret. By the evening of the 19th the American troops east of Mageret were in varying stages of tactical dissolution-all but Team Ryerson, still clutching its piece of Mageret village. Luettwitz was elated by this victory over the American armor (which as an old tanker he attributed in large part to the superiority of the Panther tank gun), but he realized that a precious day had been lost and with it the chance of an armored coup de main at Bastogne. "

Would have to disagree( well my source disagrees anyway), if anyone was to blame, it was the XLVII Panzer Corps commander (Luettwitz), who decided to mop up an American pocket, rather than attempt to immediately sieze Bastogne when the opportunity was there. Both Lehr and 2nd pz were heavily involved in the initial attempt to take Bastogne before being ordered to bypass it. Your correct on 7th army, it was intended to be a buffer only.

sgtgoody, Correct me if I'm wrong, but weren't they so far behind schedule that they really had no choice but to hope that follow on units( 7th Army in particular ) could crack the nut left in their rear. If they couldn't reach the Meuse, then the whole effort would be in vain( obviously it was in any event ). simovitch, Good point, I'd read the same thing. Sergei, Feel free to get the thread back on track. I think the Battle of the Budge expert just showed up. J.R., If the panther poster has a swastica on it, then yes, you are a fascist :<).

Kingfish, I agree Antwerp ( or anywhere near it ), would be totally out of the question. IIRC, Model, while totally against the plan from the start, thought that an abreviated thrust in behind the US forces in the Aachen Salient had a chance of being sucessful. The fact that Panzer Lehr had to detach forces for Bastogne, and was delayed ( allowing the British time to defend the Meuse crossings ), gave up any chance for a coup de main. The delay doomed any chance they had to cross the Meuse. To have a chance to cross the Muese, they had to keep reasonably close to their timetable. They couldn't. JasonC, If you'll note, I referred to the mission being both insane and crazy as envisioned by Hitler. That doesn't mean that it wasn't possible for it to achieve limited objectives if certain conditions held. Hanging onto those objectives would have been a whole different matter. My hypothetical musing had nothing to do with what came after, simply how far could the Germans have reached given a couple of realistic what ifs. Then Han's could create some scenarios in good conscience:>).

Not to belabor a hypothetical, but I wonder how close the German's might have got to Antwerp if the American resistance had been just a little less fanatical in some key places. It was an insane gamble of course, but instead of a relatively even distribution of breaks of fortune, what if a couple of them had fallen to the German's. Just two event's would have almost certainly give the German's the Meuse, early capture of Bastogne and Pieper's sucessful capture of an unguarded fuel dump. The first event was well within reasonable probabilities, the second simple anabashed luck. What were the theoretical limits of this battle given the Allies playing a competent but uninspired defense? No way of knowing of course (I read somewhere that some folks had wargamed this out using a pretty sophisticated computer program for the US military. I could never find details of what the outcomes were), but Hitler's crazy scheme had the potential to cause a lot more than the considerable havoc that it did. Maybe some scenarios for west of the Meuse aren't so far fetched.

John Kettler, Some interesting info, on the CIA website anyway. A few points. Look at the time of year, even a short delay of a few weeks for "peace talks" would have put them right in middle of worst winter in memory. Advantage Russians. Even if this was more than a stall for time on Stalins part, any "peace" wouldn't have been worth more than a brief respite to either side. They were NOT going to co-exist peaceably. Not before the invasion, and certainly not after one side carved a nice chunk out of the other. Stalin made similar feelers as late as middle of 1943. What better way to light a fire under the Western Allies to initiate a second front, then to subtly threaten to cut a deal with Hitler. The guy was crazy like a fox. Information coming out of the former SU has to always be taken with at least a little skeptism, until thouroughly corroborated. There are just too many skeletons in closets,and axes to grind, to do anything else. FFKD

Physim, The static defences ( Maginot Line ) were flanked because the portion of the Ardennes forest adjacent to them was left essentially uncovered. There was no option but to advance across a broad front in Russia, anything else would have invited a flank attack on the extended supply lines. FFKD

JasonC, It would stand to reason that the Russians would face 2-3(or whatever) times the Germans the western allies would, they had an immensely larger front to fight on. The Ardennes offensive was not a particulary good test case one way or another, because of the nature of the terrain, and the poor road network. It was a doomed offensive from the start, even if the weather had remained favorable, and had fuel supplies been adequate. It was really just a testament to the American GI as much as anything. Of course massive amounts of artillery didn't hurt either. The Russians taking a high body count ratio reflects no particular great credit on the Germans. The Russians put little stock in conserving manpower, witness the human wave assaults ( ala the banzai charge ), so high losses were to be expected. When the tide turned, and the Russians became more adept in their tactics the ratio dropped. The Germans simply couldn't afford to be wasteful with their infantry ( not that Hitler particularly cared ). I never said the Germans were brilliant strategists, far from it. As I pointed out earlier, they were quite deficient in that area. In the realm of operations, however, they were generally excellent. Their ability to concieve and execute was unmatched by the Russians until Kursk. In fact they dictated the tempo of the conflict up until that time. Even the Russian breakthru operation at Stalingrad ( Uranus ), was as dependant on surprise due to the lack of good( any? ) intel on the part of the Germans, as anything. For the most part up until July 1943, the Russian knew the Germans were coming, they just couldn't stop them( of course the weather could ). I don't count the attempt to take Stalingrad, because of the nature of the battle which had the Germans deprived of their strengths while playing into the Russians, and was simply a meatgrinder. The German weapons were generally good to excellent, and they were able to get as much out of them as anyone could, thru doctrine and thru modifications of the basic designs. That the Pz-III could remain a mainstay as long as it did, is a testament to that. The improved tanks came too late( and in too few numbers ) to have a chance to make a difference in the outcome. As you pointed out, a major German strength was it's organization at the lower levels of command. Also the ability to improvise, coordinate all-arms teams, and exercise independant initiative were of a high order. In fact the real strength of the German capabilites, was not the technical quality of the weapons systems, but rather their coordinated use as part of combined all-arms teams. The Russian typical unit designations were often times higher in name only, than the Germans. For example, a Russian armored corps would be the rough eqivilant of a full strength panzer division( of course how often were they at full strength?). As for the Germans throwing away their armor by being overly agressive, that was the mentality of Blitzkreig. It's hard to have it both ways. If your overly conservative, you can miss opportunities. Sometimes they were so weak on infantry support, that they had no choice but to chance it. When things were going well, that aggessiveness was generally rewarded. It's hard to break what's ingrained in your training, and took them time to adjust to being on a permanent defensive posture. Sure the German's could have still beaten the French without Sedan ( a "near miracle" in Guderians words ), but it wouldn't have been a romp. And no, the Allies were not "totally outclassed". When it came to organization of armor units, the Germans were better. In combined arms coordination, superior. Weapons systems both qualtitatively and quantitatively, slightly inferior. Give the French a general staff equal to the German's, and they'd have no worse than a draw. The French fought well at Sedan, until the rumor mill and the unceasing pressure broke them ( these were the 2nd line troops ). Prioux's calvary corp inflicted heavy losses on Hoeppner's panzer corps, before retiring on orders. The counter attack at Arras put a real scare in the German high command . Pretty much everywhere there was a straight up battle, the Allies gave a good accounting of themselves. Without the breakthru at Sedan, the Allies have a chance to retreat in relatively good order behind sucessive river lines, to bring up reserves in intelligently instead of piecemeal, and avoid the chaos that jammed the roads in the rear areas. With Dunkirk not needed, the British stay, so Britains home defence fighter force gets commited to the battle. There's more, but the point is they last on the field a lot longer than six weeks. Even if eventually victorious, Hitlers' timetable would have been seriously out of wack, made worse by the Wermacht taking a much higher loss of men and machines. So instead of being ready to invade Russia in 1941, the Russians strike first in middle of 1942 with another year of T-34 production under their belts and a rebuilt officer corps. FFKD

JasonC, I would agree with you in the context of what *actually* happened the Russian's were the "cavalry". They did ( most ) of the dirty work against the Germans, while the US did ( most ) of the dirty work against the Japanese. We were discussing hypotheticals about what might happen if the Russian's had to face a fully mobilized,total war effort from the German's from day one of the invasion. And conceding that very real possiblility that they would have lost signifigantly more territory than they actually did, with the accompaning impact on their supply,recruiting, and manufacturing capabilities. The Germans weren't "supermen", and Blitzkreig wasn't concieved for a protracted large theater conflict. They had their share of superior weapons, but didn't/couldn't produce enough of them, and wasted effort on too many designs. Their tactics were very good, as was their operational abilities. Logisticly they were average. In reality, they were extremely lucky to have defeated France. Imagine what would have happened if the French had advanced even a token force into the Ardennes, and made an effort to bomb the c**p out of the armored spearheads before they hit the Meuse. The Germans faced abysmal generalship in France, and decapitated generalship in Russia initially. They had a good run of luck, but couldn't overcome the odds against them. I didn't quite get the comment about facing half their force for a month. Were you referring to the Battle of the Bulge? If so, then your right it was no picnic, but if you ever needed a demostration of the grit of the American fighting man, that was it. FFKD

Just a followup on the peace feelers. As should be obvious ANY agreement between Stalin and Hitler would have been totally worthless.

BJPII, It would be a hard life certainly, but could it be worse than Leningrad was for nearly three years? Also, it wouldn't be a given that they would be pushed back all the way to the Urals ( though they're base of production would have to be there ). The western Allies would probably have forgone an invasion of the European continent, in favor of smashing Japan first, and opening up supply lines thru China, and Russia's eastern ports. Supply thru the middle east although difficult, would have been possible. As it was, the Russian lost the Ukraine anyway ( a major source of their food supply ). Regarding hypotheticals ( well this whole thread is just that ), I have a hard time envisioning the Allies just surrendering all of Europe to the Nazi, just because the Germans occupied European Russia. Can you perhaps explain why they would do that? Also knowing that England would be in mortal danger from German V weapons carrying at some point WMD, and eventually the US would be in range as well ( In fact the Germans had a heavy bomber prototype that could reach the US ). They were dealing with a mad man, and knew full well the consequenses of not stopping him and his followers. John Kettler, I'm aware of the peace feelers, but not the details of them( share them with us if you do). My hasty inclination would be that they were an attempt to stall for time. The Russian knew they were in trouble, and also knew they were not in a position at that time to retake the lost territory. If they could keep the Germans locked in place via an armistice, they would allow themselves time to rebuild their forces for an eventual attempt at retaking the lost areas. They also knew the Germans were fighting the clock by embarking on a two front war. As for Stalin nearly abandoning Moscow, so what if he had? A prestige loss, sure. But it certainly wasn't going to change things signifigantly one way or another, as the factories and other important parts had already been evacuated.

JasonC, We seem to have deviated a bit from the original question, which was "How could Germany have defeated the SU during Barbarossa?" Well I think it's been pretty well established that they would not have been able to defeat (as in force capitulation ) the SU during Barbarossa ( the blitzkreig period of June-Nov or 1941 ), even with an early total war commitment. This hinges in my view, on the Russians at some point during the initial period adopt a trading space for time strategy, in the face of a recognizably and markedly superior force both qualitatively and possibly even numericly( in the operational areas at least), and using their strategic depth to the utmost. This would be somewhat similar to the strategy they eventually adopted during Napoleon's invasion. Utilizing "scorched earth" methods as they retreated, would leave the Germans little to "inherit". It would take years to develop anything beyond a rudimentary infrastrucure. Moving along to the post-blitzkrieg period, you actually made a very salient analogy for my point by mentioning China. China didn't have to defeat the Japanese, they had the Americans ( and the rest of the Allies ), for that. All China ( and Russia ) had to do was at a minimum survive, and wait for the cavalry. Anything beyond that would be gravy. The totalitarian regimes of Germany and Japan sowed the seeds for their own destruction in large part because they allowed for only for total victory ( and virtual slavery or death for the defeated ). Because they couldn't declare victory and go home( or even be relatively beneign rulers ), they' ensured that the subjegated populaces could never be anything but hostile to them, and that any resisting troops in the field were for the most part better off fighting to the death. If you remove atomic weapons in 1945 (or soon thereafter) from the above scenario, then the war drags on for some time. Germany dominates Europe, at least until Japan is defeated, and the Allies can focus entirely on retaking the continent from all directions. The war lasts maybe another 3-5 years beyond 1945. It would be total victory or total defeat, aside from the Allies foresworn commitment to defeat the Axis, they could never allow Germany to aquire weapons of mass destruction. Germany was going down whatever the outcome from Barbarossa. The only good news for Germany ( if they succeeding in occupying European Russia), would be that the American's would be shoulder to shoulder with the Russians when they hit Berlin. That's my thesis. FFKD

JasonC, Stalin wouldn't need to raise a million men a month to hold the Urals( or the vast areas between them and the Volga). Why would the Germans expend the effort to go after the Russians, when a lengthy period consolidating their gains would be the most immediate need ( think the supply line to Moscow was long, it's roughly half of the distance required to reach the Urals. ). All the while, the Russians supply line shortens while the Germans lengthens. Even IF the Germans pursued they would be extremely out of their element in the mountainous country, which would afford numerous advantages to the defender. The Soviet's would probably not have commited as many men to "meatgrinder" attacks for as long as they did, if they didn't see attrition as making a signifigant dent in the German side. In that case, one would expect that they would have fought more delaying actions giving up space for time. The fact that these attacks had an signifigant effect, and the knowledge that their "human capital" account was larger than the Germans made them the method of choice All the Russians had to do was survive, knowing that eventually the weight of the US would make the difference, and in the meantime they would rebuild their forces. Their limited objective would be to conduct spoiling attacks from their redoubt, and tie up German forces, which could not be strong everywhere. The Russians had extensive experience conducting operations thruout their remote hinterland, in and shifting forces back and forth between their far eastern regions, and the west during their civil war. Operating in the Urals would be difficult, but not unmanegable, certainly given the generally low level of infrastructure they were used to dealing with prior to the invasion. The occupying force still has a hostile populace to contend with, and an unbelievably huge area to garrison even if it's only the country west of the Volga. The Germans picked the wrong country to invade, but the right time to do it ( well sort of, as it turned out they would have been better off having a never ending Octoberfest ), and made a pretty good run of it for a time. Fix all of Hitlers mistakes, and the Russians wind up in the vicinity of the Urals, probably, bowed but unbroken. So in the end the Russians don't capitulate, the Germans still have a two front war, and baring the attainment of nuclear weapons first ( unlikely ), go on to defeat by end of 1945. FFKD

JasonC, Moving from blitkrieg to total war economy sooner ( say at Barbarossa's start' to avoid tipping off Stalin) would have most likely given the Germans at least a stalemate and relative control of European Russia, but it would not have been a given that the SU would have capitulated during Barbarossa ( or quickly thereafter ). Stalin & company were quite prepared to take the show to the Ural's and fight from that base. Now, doubtless given the fact that Germany would have survived to fight a longer war against the Allies, and developed an infrastrucure in Russia ( starting from the ground up would have taken years ), and brought the advanced weapons in development online, you would have a whole different scenario. So, yes in the end Germany could have prevailed, just not during Barbarossa. FFKD

Assuming that the only reason Hitler failed to convert to a total war footing before 1943 is because of the political cost ( hardships for German civilians,etc. ), is to say he totally misunderstood his relationship with the German people. For a politician of his abilities, that seems unlikely, not impossible, but unlikely. What then might be another reason? Every action has a cost, could he have done more, sooner towards a TWF, absolutely. The question then is how much, and not incur other difficulties. Also, the way the Germans operated in general wasn't particulary efficent ( lot's of private fiefdoms, turf wars,etc. ), and Hitler was loath to get inbetween those actors. Remember, his rise to power was a divide and conquor strategy, united only on the surface. Only when the specter of defeat loomed large( Russian reverses and the Allied invasion threats forthcoming ), was Speer given a free hand. It was Speers "genious" that was able to churn out the prodigious rates of production that otherwise would have seemed quite ordinary. One final thought, assuming all that increased "early" production materialized, there's still the problem of getting it to an ever lengthening front along what is mostly dirt track roads, and a less than efficient rail system, against a backdrop of scorched earth and a growing partisan threat. The Soviets should have given up after the hammer blows inflicted on them, that they didn't indicates to me that they would have to have been annihilated completely. This was what the Germans hadn't counted on. Something as titanic a struggle as this was, rarely turns on just one aspect, I think that is the case here. It's nice to hash out in comfort from one's easy chair, but we'll never know for certain.

musings on this excellent but maybe winding down thread: 1. Hitler may have really believed that his wonder weapons ( V series rockets,heavy water experiments,jet aircraft, etc. ) would come on line in time to save Germany whatever transpired in the field. This COULD have been reality if he had an extra couple of years. 2. Hitler really could have belived he had a thousand year Reich ahead of him, and was destined by divine(?) right to win come what may. 3. Hitler could never rest until he outdid Napolean and actually conquered Russia ( megalomanics are very competitive ) . 4. Or he believed none of the above, and used it merely for propaganda purposes. He was a lunatic, and he's dead, we'll never know for sure. 5. The German general staff had no great strategic brains, they had a number of excellent operational minds, but the grand strategy was left to Hitler ( for better and worse ). This left a vacumm with no counterweight to Hitler's uneven thinking. 6. Germany lacked strategic depth ( both in resources, and territory ), that the Russians ( and the Allies in general ) possessed. When advancing into Russia she fought on lengthening supply lines, while the Russians fought conversely on shrinking supply lines. The greater the German success, the greater the strain on supply and the higher risk the operation became. 7. Blitzkreig was an excellent tool for winning short campaigns/operations but not total war against an enemy with sufficient strategic depth. Against weak & small countries it worked very well, but it's shortcomings became evident in Russia. 8. If Hitler had been a colonel instead of a corporal, things might have turned out VERY differently. The above doesn't address the original posters question directly. I'll give it a crack. I don't belive the SU could have been defeated in the Barbarossa timeframe ( Spring - Winter 0f 1941 ). My reasons in no particular order: 1. The extremely long supply/comm lines required just to maintain forces in European Russia. 2. Lack of a definative objective GUARANTEED to force the SU to capitulate. 3. Lack of adequate SU rail guage compliant transport ( as pointed out earlier, locomotives primarily). 4. Ruthlessness/determination of Soviets ( Stalin ) to survive. Compare this with France for example. 5. Ability of the Russian people to bear extreme burdens unflinchingly, and the soldiers to defend like demons. Devotion to "Mother Russia" carried a lot of weight with these folks. 6. The lack of adequate frontline repair facilities for the mechanized forces ( shipping tanks back to Germany for heavy repair was the norm ). 7. Lack of trucks/halftracks for the infantry divisions ( what were they thinking? ) 8. Lack of appreciation for the wear and tear on vehicles that even if not previously engauged in Balkans campaign would need downtime for refit. 9. Winter of 1941 being one of the worst in recorded history wasn't a good way to end it ( Barbarossa ) coupled with "General Mud". Some of the above, but not all could have been addressed by moving to a total war footing earlier ( if started after invasion, would have had small impact in limited Barbarossa timeframe ).

I guess it's a question of do you get them while their hot ( and pay full freight ), or wait for them to show up in the bargain bin. No different from any other game. I realize the need to support the small developers by paying full freight, and will continue to do so, while also taking advantage of the bargain bin when it's available. Call it dollar cost averaging, I think everyone wins in the end.

iirc its because of laws in Germany so they cannot refer to the SS and other Nazi terminology. CDV distribute the game there. </font>

Thanks for the replies. I think I'll buy the retail version and save the difference for the nextgen games. Guess I'll have to make an archive copy of the disk to be on the safe side. That's pretty funny about the "SS" references being deleted from the retail version, was this a sop to the PC censors? FK

Can anyone tell me the differences if any between the retail version of CMAK ( around $20 US at some online stores ), and the version from Battlefronts store ( $35 US )? If there's no appreciable difference, I'll save myself the 50%. FK

Thanks for the feedback, I was just curious if anyone had run across this before. I was pretty thorough in my checking ( IMO ), and of course I could have missed something. I had show all move/targets on, and that showed only one LOS from my units, a SP gun pointed nearly 90 degrees away from JS-1 in question . Too bad there's no slowmo for playback, damned refs can never get the call right:). Would also be a nice feature to have a way to save a turn as a file for a future post mortem. But I nitpick, this is a really fantastic sim, very impressive, my only real complaint is it takes up way too much of my free time. Thanks again for all for your suggestions and input, this forum matches the game in quality! Jeff

Hi, Been playing with the AI for a few weeks to get the hang of the sim, and had a strange occurance I can't seem to sort out. My worthy opponents' JS-1 tank took a knockout from an unknown source. It being an all armor scenario ( my design ), it would seem easy to find the culprit. However, replaying numerous times, and checking rounds present for my guys before/after the kill turns up a big zero. Whatever it is, it's very high velocity as there is no evidence of a round in flight during replay, just the crack of a phantom gun and a delay of a second or so. I appreciate the overwatch, but whoever this guy is, he's in another zip code:). Anyone run across a similar event, or have an idea as to what I might be missing? Thanks, Jeff