dsf
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Posts posted by dsf
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Anyone read Russian? Goncharov's book ОПЕРАЦИЯ «БАГРАТИОН» (ISBN 978-5-9533-5544-5) has tons of information on the battlefield(s), opposing forces, and the course of the operation.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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I suspect the German side was/is more popular because for decades, we never got the Soviet side. We got the American history and the German history and were told that everything the Soviets had or did was crap — they were the enemy. That's changed today. The more one knows about the Eastern Front (even the term is German) the more evident it is that the Soviets pulled a rabbit out of their hat to defeat the Germans by 1945. How they won is more interesting than how the Germans lost.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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Why the Russo-German War 1941-1945?
Well that was where the action was, 6 million Soviets fighting 3 million Germans over a continent 4,000km wide, hundreds of battles, dozens of campaigns lasting 4 years. Huge cities such as Leningrad under siege for 900 days, street fighting in Stalingrad lasting 4 months, everything is on an epic scale. 4 out of 5 German casualties happen on the Eastern Front, this is where the German Army was fought, beaten and destroyed. In the time period of CMRT the Ostheer loses 2 Army Groups destroyed.
In the West you have a 6 week campaign in France in 1940, a small campaign in the Desert, a slightly larger campaign in Tunisia and Italy but the German never commit more than 15 Divisions to these at a time when they have 150+ Divisions in Russia. The only campaign that comes anywhere close to the Great Patriotic War is the Normandy Campaign with its 2 million Allied troops against 1 million Germans but this only lasts June 1944 till April 1945 - 9 months and the German Army had already been gutted and its best troops dead.
From a historiography perspective, there is a lot still to be discovered, the Germans were anything but candid about their experiences in the East - their occupation policies saw to that and the Soviets wanted to hide their own appalling casualty lists, so modern researchers can still discover many new facts and accounts of events. You have to strip away years of Cold War rhetoric as well with propaganda being taken as received wisdom for many things that we read. Some are now hotly debated and some are not, but there is still a great deal to discover.
Well said.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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Der Alte Fritz,
While I very much appreciate your kind deeds in providing me the maps, artillery material and such, I regret to say that not a single one of the maps is displaying as other than an empty white square in the center of which is a tiny blue square with a question mark inside it. I don't know what the problem is, but presently, all I have is your post, in which your artillery table is also missing and shows the dread blue square.
Regards,
John Kettler
I found I had to log in to Google to see the images.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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Hello John and Scott,
I think a lot of us moved over to the RKKA forum over at Armchair General.
Major Lukin appeared in at least two CMBB scenarios based on the Kalinin Raid, one featuring a U shaped road round round a lake and the other was simple a very long narrow map with a road through the forest.
Greetings. BTW, I found another photo ( a fourth) of Lukin's tank, too late for Charles' book, but useful nonetheless. See you there.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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... This is where the great Soviet/Russian revisionist dismissal of Lend Lease value runs into problems.
That's a thing of the past. During the Soviet era, L-L was denigrated or dismissed as unimportant. More recently, there has been considerable research into Soviet archives and "revisionist" historians have done much to put L-L in its proper perspective. Today there are quite a few Russian books on Lend-Lease that detail the equipment that was provided, how it was deployed, and assessments of its impact.
I overstated my point and I think you misunderstood what I meant. And that is the Soviet Union did have to prioritize and in that process they assigned a lower value to protecting their infantry. This is not just a conclusion drawn from the lack of APCs. Quite the contrary. The Soviet doctrine is amazingly consistent in both theory and execution.No big deal. Internet forums are like that. My own opinion is that it had nothing to do with disregard for casualties but rather that it was simply deemed necessary to concentrate limited resources on the production of tanks, before trucks, locomotives, etc. That much is on the record, and evident in procurement policy. The decision was taken in 1941, at a time when Soviet industry had virtually collapsed. If that meant infantry rode tanks instead of trucks, then so be it. It was necessary to win the war, and in that, it succeeded.
As for the rest, I don't know what resources are at your disposal and so should not comment. I do know there is a constant stream of material coming out of Russia and that it takes effort, experience and language skills to stay on top of it. I follow that, collect some of it, and as I said before, I can suggest a number of (Russian) titles that may help to fill in details regarding specific equipment or operations, whatever the case may be. The offer stands.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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The vast majority of Soviet divisions had no motorized transport at all. If they were moved by anything other than foot or rail it was in trucks that were held by higher levels of command.
Much depends on the timeframe. Soviet combat units did have limited organic transport, but generally, motor transport was organized into independent Transport Brigades which were seconded to combat units as the need arose. The Red Army was chronically short of tractors, so most of the effort went into moving guns and supplies. Once they reached the Front, infantry walked, as they did pretty much everywhere.
The Soviets were the only major combatant in WW2 that did not have a domestic form of armored transport. I think this speaks to the amount of concern the Soviets had for their soldiers.Nonsense. That's like saying GIs were so soft they had to have trucks to ride around in. More to the point, it speaks to how the Soviets chose to utilize their limited industrial resources. The automobile industry was put to work building tanks, first T-60 and T-70s and later the ubiquitous SU-76. They still continued to produce trucks, but in smaller numbers. Many of these ended up in Guards Mortar (Katiusha) regiments, either as weapons platforms or as ammunition carriers, as did many L-L trucks.
The Soviets did receive a decent number of scout cars and halftracks from Lend Lease. It's hard to know exactly how they were utilized, but they were definitely a rare thing on the battlefield.American vehicles of any description were extremely rare before 1944. About 3000 M3A1 Scout Cars were received. As in other armies, they were used primarily in reconnaissance units and as staff vehicles. It was not uncommon to see them hauling 57mm AT guns. Of the 1200 halftracks received, most were used to haul artillery, particularly the 76mm ZiS-3, 85mm 52K AA gun and 100mm BS-3 AT gun.
It's not hard to know how they were utilized, if you know where to look. There has been considerable investigation into the workings of the wartime Red Army in recent years. It is no longer enough to make assumptions and justify them on the basis of "there are no records" because there ARE records, copious records, that spell it all out. I can suggest several books on the topic to whoever it is on your research staff who reads Russian.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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The issue people always miss when discussing things like this is that WW2 was an economic conflict. Given sufficient manpower (and other resources), the issue is how to best spend it to achieve the best military effect. Unless people know enough about the war economy of the USSR to know how much slack there was to change production priorities/amounts to compensate for the lack of Lend Lease, it is hard to discuss the role of Lend Lease in the victory.
That's the most sensible statement posted here. The tanks and airplanes get the headlines, but the most significant contribution Lend-Lease made was to Soviet industry, through provision of scarce metals, additives and chemicals, as well as the transfer of technology in refining, metallurgy, and with machine tools, etc. To put it another way: the fact that Lend-Lease made it possible for Soviet industry to build more Soviet equipment, of better quality, was more important than the American equipment that was sent.
As for whether it was decisive? Certainly not, except in the American history of the war. Lend-Lease has been heavily politicized since the start of the Cold War, and it remains so in western histories. Contemporary Russian historians are at least a decade ahead of western historians in revisiting the history of the German-Soviet War and more recent Russian publications put Lend-Lease in a much more appropriate context. Lend-Lease allowed the Soviets to focus their production on critical sectors, to the exclusion of items that could be shopped from abroad. That meant more tanks and aircraft, Soviet tanks and aircraft, every one of which was needed for victory. Lend-Lease shortened the war my a year, perhaps two, saving millions of Soviet AND AMERICAN (and British) lives. It was selfish altruism, of the best kind.
More to the point, the aid received from the USA, which was most of it, did not start to arrive until 1943. Many historians, including myself, will insist that whatever slim chance Germany had of defeating the Soviet Union was gone after 1941. German victory depended on destroying the Red Army AND toppling the regime within a few weeks of the invasion. Barbarossa failed to achieve those objectives. From that point, it was only a matter of time before the USSR, with the advantages of geography, population and industry, came back to rally, rebuild and drive the Nazis back to Germany. Lend-Lease made it possible for that to happen in 1945. Without Lend-Lease, it would still have happened.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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dsf,
Have tried the link over several days. Shows gray but doesn't load. No other Net issues.
Regards,
John Kettler
My bad. The forum software makes linking difficult.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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Comes out in April...
"Stalin's Favorite: the Combat History of the 2nd Guards Tank Army from Kursk to Berlin: January 1943-June 1944 v. 1"
You might also enjoy this: Tomb of the Panzerwaffe.
The authors are both highly regarded among contemporary Russian historians. I have many of their books in Russian, including this one.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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Contrary to popular belief, simply reading Russian at a basic level is not very difficult; many of the letters are the same in English and Cyrillic, as are many military words:
For instance:
tank = танк
brigade = бригада
corps = корпус
army = армия
front = фронт
general = генерал
etc etc.
Of course reading whole sentences quickly gets more complicated.
Anyone serious about reading Russian military books is well advised to get hold of the Alford dictionaries, two volumes:
There are military terms as well as vocabulary from many other disciplines.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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What are some more good sources of hard data for OOB and strength and equipment for units on both sides in Bagration (particularly in the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division sector where the Soviet campaign will be located)?
In my online searches the ones that come up most often are Glantz's translation of the Soviet general staff study on Bagration, the Soviet Blitzkrieg book, and the Zaloga campaign book on Bagration in the Osprey series.
So I have a pretty good roster of the units that would have been there, down to regimental level, but still really no idea of what men and weapons they actually had to fight with on, say, 24 June.
The accounts all say that units on both sides were way below their paper TO&E, and that the 78 Sturm Division was the largest and most powerful formation in Army Group Centre. But I haven't found anything beyond those generalities.
I'm fine with just using the data of a well-regarded and well-researched wargame on Bagration. Does anyone own Minsk '44 (Noob, i'll bet you do) and are you able to extract any OOB/weapon/strength data for this sector? If so, please PM me. There's also an ASL expansion in this sector called Onslaught to Orsha, although it's super tactical so I don't know how much info it would have about the numbers and kit up to company, battalion, regiment and division.
[Maybe I'll get more response if I say why I'm looking for this info: Some of us are working on a Cyberboard scenario for Bagration to the boardgame Panzer Command (Victory Games, 1986). The map will correspond exactly to the master map(s) for the Soviet campaign in RT, so it will give players the ability to play at division/corps level with company-sized counters, then use the situations to stage battles anywhere for RT by just slicing off the part of the campaign master map they need. My plan is to share the scenario on the Repository and elsewhere to give more players the chance to enjoy the operational-tactical experience.]
Try anad find V.L.Goncharov's book on Bagration ISBN 978-5-9533-5544-5 It is in Russian, but is an excellent single-volume source on Bagration. I don't know where 1gv.msd was fighting --- information that would help -- but there is info in it on 1gv.sd as part of 11 Gv Army, 3rd Belorussian Front.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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dsf,
Good stuff! Are you aware of any Russian WW II work on or fielding of APDS? If not, I wonder where the data came from below the penetration tables for Russian tank guns I cited?
I note you show no round with "SP" as the suffix, yet I've shown clear evidence of such nomenclature from what I deem credible sources. Am interested in your thoughts on this.
Speaking of your tome's author, he apparently wrote an earlier book on German guns called The God of the Third Reich War (2002). (Digs some) Never mind that. This guy's a prolific writer on military subjects.
http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Shirokorad
Regards,
John Kettler
His book on German weapons is online.
http://lib.rus.ec/b/347378/read#t15
Enjoy
Scott Fraser
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dsf, thanks for that link, but what kind of info/data does that book cover?
Just tables of loss data? To what level of detail?
It has way too much detail, like reading actuarial data. Losses are listed for both civilian and military casualties, broken out by cause and age and so on. There are lots of tables.
Here's a link to his follow-on book, which is expanded to cover Soviet/Russian loses in the XX Century. You will be able to see what I mean.
http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW/poteri.txt#w06.htm-_Toc536603358
Regards
Scott Fraser
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Fair enough, but one thing I've learned about Soviet military history is that some things aren't set in stone. From personal experience, for instance, I've seen countless so-called facts about the Mosin-Nagant and SVT firearms turned upside down in recent years. It wouldn't surprise me, then, to see something about P-63 usage in the West show up somewhere down the road.
I think it unlikely. I know from working alongside them that the Soviets were meticulous in maintaining their paperwork, something deeply rooted in their system. At this point, there has been enough time for their records to be thoroughly investigated, as is the case with the ground forces. My own area of interest is Soviet armour, so I haven't kept up with the literature regarding aviation, but from what I have seen, VVS archives have been explored as thoroughly as have those of the Active Army. Anything as controversial as the clandestine use of P-63s would be public now. There have been more embarrassing revelations.
That, and the Russian archives may be open, but the access isn't entirely unfettered.No, but that's deliberate. Not just anyone gets to go into government archives anywhere. It's the same with Kubinka, which is a museum but also an active military base. There is a process, but legitimate researchers can get through the red tape.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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There is a very interesting chapter on Soviet war losses by John Erickson in Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, edited by Erickson and David Dilks (Edinburgh, 1994). It is a bit old now, and may well have been superseded by more recent research, but it does illustrate just how difficult and complex this subject is.
Soviet losses are documented in Krivosheev's book Великая Отечественная без грифа секретности. Книга потерь, which has just been republished. There is lots of detail. It may be online, too. It has become a standard reference on the Red Army.
http://www.ozon.ru/context/detail/id/25614968/
Regards
Scott Fraser
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A canny developer would integrate an air sim into the ground sim. Nowadays games are played online by 'clans', so why not put a dozen 'pilots' together with a dozen 'tankers'?
Regards
Scott Fraser
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AFAIK, the best single (English) source on the VVS is still Von Hardesty's Red Phoenix (Smithsonian, 1982), which has recently been updated and reprinted as Red Phoenix Rising (Uof Kansas). I haven't read it in a while, but there is some information in there on the development of VVS close-support tactics.
http://www.amazon.com/Red-Phoenix-Rising-Soviet-Studies/dp/0700618287
Regards
Scott Fraser
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"Officially" being the operative word there, because there are accounts that they were in fact encountered by the Germans. In one case a German flak leader was certain his battery encountered P-63s and not P-39s, because he was able to note the visual differences between the two types.
There are many cases of airmen claiming to shoot down aircraft that were not in theatre. One of the most famous is Finnish ace Oiva Tuominen, who claimed to have shot down a Soviet Spitfire when there wasn't a Spitfire within a thousand miles.
P-63s were kept in reserve until spring 1945, when they were assigned to VVS-PVO (Anti-aircraft Defense) regiments, along with Spitfire Mk.IXe and the La-7. Like the Soviet Spitfires delivered in 1944, they never saw combat. The first unit to receive them was 28 IAP VVs-PVO stationed at Vnukovo, outside Moscow. Other units to receive the aircraft were 39 IAP, 17 IAP and 21 IAP, all PVO units. Apart from that, they were used to reequip the 12 Air Army in the Far East, based at Choibalsan and later Ulan-Ude. The only combat recorded was on August 15, when two aircraft of the 117 IAP (190 IAD) downed a Ki.27 and Ki.43.
Talk of the P-63 being "secretly" used against the Germans is just that --- talk. There are no "secrets" anymore. Such use could not be conducted without the sanction of VVS headquarters, which means a paper trail, nor could it continue without logistics, which would involve another paper trail. There is no paper trail. The archives have been open for twenty years. In that period, numerous researchers have been through the files and so far have not mentioned any such use. The circumstances are unusual enough that if it had happened, it would be known and written up loudly in recent Russian publication. So far, nothing.
P-63 units: 17, 21, 28, 39, 781, 821, 888, 940 IAP VVS-PVO and 6 IAP VVS-VMF (Pacific Fleet).
Regards
Scott Fraser
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White Phosphorous,
The ZIS-3 is the exact same gun as is on the SU-76M. The picture painted by the data presented on RussianBattlefield.ru, Valeriy Potapov's site (Potapov was a key contributor to CMBB), is hardly that of an ineffective weapon. Remember, by the time of CMRT, the days of crummy Russian ammo are over. Arrowhead/APCR/HVAP/PzGr40 is available, but the real surprise is that there may also be APDS! The latter is reported in German firing trials below the tables and is clearly distinguished from the Arrowhead type projectiles. Since there's very little information online, my current best guess is that UBR-354V is Arrowhead and UBR-354SP may well be APDS. I strongly suspect "SP" is an acronym for something like "special projectile," which APDS would assuredly be.
Specification and Armor Penetration of the Soviet Tank Guns
http://english.battlefield.ru/specification-and-armor-penetration.html
(goes off to do some digging)
It turns out that my conclusion re UBR-354V is correct. According to Watertown Arsenal Report METALLURGICAL EXAMINATION OF SOVIET 76MM APHE PROJECTILE, MOD. BR-354B, last page before distro, there is indeed an HVAP round, designated BR-354P. I believe this "P" is a typo. Therefore, the complete round should be designated, per Potapov's specs, as UBR-354V. This item is over on Scribd. 33860621.
Confusing the situation is a translated Albanian pub, The Munitions Handbook: Specifications and Informations for the Use of Munitions Albania 1983. On Scribd as 118025517.
Page 81 has the rundown on 76mm ammo for the ZIS-3 type weapons. There, UBR-354SP is listed as "round with solid AP," yet mysteriously weighs the same as the equivalent APHE projectile, while the UBR-354P (there it is again, not Potapov's "V") is listed as AP shell, sub-caliber; it is both significantly lighter and somewhat shorter UBR-354B.
Having hacked my way through a lot of material, I think either Potapov made a mistake, or we're looking at incomplete data. This ammo table for Soviet divisional guns shows both rounds, there's not a "V" suffix to be seen, and it also shows the UBR-354SP to be solid shot. I see no APDS at all. I believe the UBR-354SP is what we'd fully term SHOT,APCBC-T, featuring a square nose under the cap to bite into the armor and prevent ricochet.
It's late, and that's about all the damage I can do right now.
Regards,
John Kettler
The rounds available for the ZIS-3 were:
UOF-354M (УОФ-354М) - steel HE fragmentation round OF-350; 6.2kg, 680m/s, direct range 820m, (indirect 13,290m).
OU-354AM (УО-354АМ) - cast iron HE fragmentation round O-350A
UBR-354A (УБР-354А) - a/p tracer round BR-350A; 6.5 kg, 655 m/s, eff. range 780m.
UBR-354B (УБР-354Б) - a/p tracer round BR-350B
UBR-354P (УБР-354П) - sub-caliber HVAPDS a/p tracer round BP-354P (arrowhead form); 3.2 kg, 950m/s, eff. range 940m.
UBR-354N (УБР-354Н) - sub-caliber HVAPDS a/p tracer round BR-354N (aerodynamic form)
UBR-354 (УБР-354) - a/ tracer round BR-354 (improved armour-piercing)
UD-354 (УД-354) - smoke round
ROF: to 25 shots/minute.
There are tables in Shirokorad's book for effective distances and thickness of armour. Suffice to say, there are also many photos of Panthers and Tigers with holes in the side and turret from the ZIS-3.
There are also photos of holes caused by the 57mm ZIS-2, which had better a/p characteristics than the F-34 of the T-34-76. Effective range against the side or turret of a Tiger I was 500m for the 57mm, 800m for the 76mm.
The bottom line is that the Red Army had tens of thousands of guns that were capable of taking out German tanks, even the Panther and Tiger. It is wrong to think the only effective counter they had to the Panther and Tiger were the heavy assault guns.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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Serviceability rates for Panther's and PIV were comparable as by 44 the main weak point was the poor quality metal in final drives which affected both veh's. Check Jentz, his books show Operational rate are similar between the so called reliable Medium PIV and the so called unreliable Heavy Panther.
Serviceability rates are what they are. Both the Germans and Soviets struggled with production quality at different times and in each case it had an adverse affect on their combat capabilities. Why are you defending the Panther? It was just another German tank, complete with its own set of strengths and weaknesses.
What is all this bull**** about changing production rates, I've posted the produced tank figures that show more Panthers in 44 and 45 were built than PIV's, the changing production rates was PIV being downgraded in favour of self propelled guns while Panther production rose.What about production rates? In the beginning, they built more Pz.IV than Panthers, because they didn't build Panthers. By the end of the war, they were building more Panthers than Panzer IVs, by a small margin. So what? Now Panthers are the main enemy on the battlefield? I think not, since all the StuGs and JgPz. are also around.
My point, you may recall, was that equipment on the battlefield did not necessarily mirror production, unless you assume 100% losses every time you build a division. That's not how it happened. By mid-1944, the Soviets were building more T-34-85s than T-34-76s, by a large margin, but there were still thousands of T-34-76s on the battlefield.
Saying heavy vehicles are not comparable to lighter ones due to their weight which are heavier due to larger guns, ammunition and armour seems to be a specious argument.ROFLMAO! No disrespect,, but any argument based on classifying tanks as "light", "medium" and "heavy" is specious. The definitions changed as the war went on and there is no common criteria in how they are labelled. Consider the IS-2, the Panther and the M26. They are each very close to the same size and weight. One is a "medium", one is a "heavy" and the last started out classed as a "heavy" and then became a "medium". Go figger.
One could argue that the Germans were silly in comparing their lighter PIII and P38T verses the heavier T34's and KV.Exactly. In 1939, both the Pz.38 and Pz.35 were perfectly acceptable "medium" tanks, by the Wehrmacht definitions of the time, but by 1943 they lightweghts. The goalposts had changed, and they kept changing throughout the war. Making it more problematic, not everyone was using the same terms for various tanks. Where does a "cruiser" or "cavalry" tank fit in?
Your argument is fallacious...My argument, you may recall, was that to focus on how awesome the Panther was ignores the reality of the situation vis-a-vis how well the Red Army was able to dispatch enemy armour, and vice versa. My point was that the ZIS-3 was a very capable weapon, and should not be ignored. There were thousands of them in Red Army regiments: organic, in AT brigades and on SU-76s, as well as the guns in T-34s and KV-1s. To think that only large-caliber guns mattered, that the Panther was the only German tank around, or that German infantry all rode in halftracks is pure fantasy. I suppose that's okay on a gaming forum, but I am an historian, and that's not how it was.
For those who read Russian, seek out Shirokorad's opus on Soviet Artillery, Энциклопедия Отечественной Артиллерии ("Harvest", Minsk 2000) There are descriptions of each weapon as well as tables for performance with different ranges, angles and ammunition. Red Army made rather a science from studying holes in tanks, and the results are included. So is everything else you ever wanted to know about Russian artillery, 1400 pages. It is definitive.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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Ignoring that StuG's and Jadgpz tended to be issued to Artillery men or infantry in the StuG units and the Pak coy of infantry units, and that as the war wound down Panthers were equipping small mono type battalions were as PIV battalions had to be adultrated with Jdpz's.
One can only generalize. There is a timeline that runs through all of this. The composition of various armoured formations, both Soviet and German, was changing constantly to reflect operational experience. Production rates likewise changed throughout the period. Those theoretical numbers were affected by losses and production shortfalls, and more important, by serviceability rates.
Anyway, by late 1944, the Germans had several tiers of formations, with different levels of equipment. The top-heavy equipment complement that Das Reich or Grossdeutschland enjoyed was hardly typical of the situation. As late as February 1945, an example, the 21 Pz.Div. was rebuilt per the 1944 tables, with two companies of Panthers and another two of Pz.IV, with seventeen tanks in each unit, plus a Flak.Pz troop. When the StuGs and tank destroyers of the infantry regiments accompanying the PzDiv are included, the percentage of Panthers drops off. The 76mm F-34 and ZIS-3 were still extremely effective weapons against the majority of AFVs it may engage, including the Panther and Tiger from the side or rear. That weapon was very common, both towed and mounted in the SU-76 or in tanks, and should not be discounted. That was my main point.
"Heavies" are not exactly thin on the ground here, escalating the picture does not show heavies as a minor or irrelevant part of the forces faced by the allies.I'm not suggesting that. The Panther was a dangerous opponent. It was as big as an IS-2, btw, not really a "Medium" tank like the Sherman or Pz.IV or T-34. It was feared by Allied tankers, much like the Tiger, so they had an impact greater, perhaps, than their numbers warrant. That is their legend.
Anyway, to focus on "Panther vs T-34-85" denies the reality of the war. There were scads of lighter vehicles around, particularly with the Germans, who relied more and more on cheaper assault guns to replace tanks. Moreover, tanks are only the most glamorous element of ground warfare. Wars are still won by infantry.
Regards
Scott Fraser
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Hi
Why is it that battlefront have decided to do Eastern front from 1944 onwards?
Path of least resistance, and probably clamour from the marketing gurus.
Surely 1941, the winter campaign, 1942 the push to the don, late 42-early 43 the Stalingrad campaigns and the 43 the Kursk campaign...Does battlefront see the war in the East as only important from 44 to 45 :-(
I'll wager that there will be a KURSK module, a STALINGRAD module and a BARBAROSSA module.
I'll also wager that each will be another $60.
Patience, grasshopper.
Scott Fraser
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With Wiki why did I even "hand count" the figures in Jentz
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_armored_fighting_vehicle_production_during_World_War_II
Built
1944 Panthers: 3,777
1944 PIV: 3,126
1944 StuG III/IV: 3,849/1,006
1945 Panther: 507
1945 PIV: 385
1945 StuG III/IV: 1,038/105
There are more StuG's than Panthers, but less PIV than Panthers floating around being issued to units.
For comparison the PIII the tank the Panther replaced had a production high in 1942 with 2608 built (apparently J's L's M's and including conversions of existing PIII's to 450 N's).
I appreciate what you are saying, but Pz.Kpfw.IV / StuG IV / Jagd.Pz. IV production still exceeded Panther and Tiger production right up to May 1945. Moreover the complement of individual units did not necessarily reflect production ratios. Strength returns from different units varied widely.
The essential point is that the notion that the Panzertruppen were mainly equipped with Panthers and Tigers is a myth --- the most numerous vehicles right up to the end of the war remained the StuG/Jagd.Pz IV and Pz.Kpfw.IV.
Regards
Scott Fraser
East Front literature!
in Combat Mission Red Thunder
Posted
I get my books from a private party. Send me a PM on ACG. I found the book listed here:
http://www.labirint.ru/books/275336/
I have some other books in the series (1418 days), which is excellent.
Regards