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Mr. Tittles

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Posts posted by Mr. Tittles

  1. The funny thing is that all the US would only have had to ship over the M36 turrets and they could have field modified Shermans to carry them.

    Its surprising that the US did not get the Soviets to field test weapons against the Germans and feed back info. The Panther and Tiger were both running around the east for over a year by the time the allies invaded France. Plenty of Panthers must have been falling into the Soviets hands and shipping one to England would not have been out of the question.

    [ October 07, 2004, 07:06 AM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

  2. Not really. 90mm AA guns were sitting ducks. Any mobility, given the terrain that was fought in for the majority of the war in europe, would have made this weapon viable. The combined arms use of arty/smoke and tactics such that these weapons could get the drop on the enemy vehicle at 600-1000m would pay benefits.

    I do not see the failure of the early halftrack TDs in open tarrain, using faulty tactics as being relevant to the discussion.

    The germans and others would mount larger weapons in less then heavily armored AFVs just to make a mobile AT asset. The Hornet and Marders were successful stop gaps. The US was prosecuring a war of attacking and any action would draw in enemy armor.

  3. I will again reiterate that you can not just get 17 pdrs out of thin air. The US would need to have set up a factory and get the items overseas. Getting the US tanks refurbished with 17 pdrs would have taken time also. The quickest way would have been a US Achilles (M10) conversion. Theres also training and getting ammo manufactured.

    And still the 17 pdr was not a weapon that could really face down panthers.

  4. The US did mount the 90mm in a sherman as the M36B1. This was a sherman chassis with a M36 turret. Sort of half tank/half TD. But I think these were fielded very late in the war. They certainly WOULD have been welcome in summer 44.

    [ October 06, 2004, 04:10 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

  5. I base my assertion about APDS being unique in each gun due to this report:

    WO 291/762, Accuracy of APCBC/HV shot and AP/DS when fired from the 6-

    Pounder Gun mounted in the Churchill IV

    The variation of "jump" and dispersion between individual tanks is so great that an "accurate" ranging

    rule for applying ranges to the sight for AP/DS shooting is suggested, in effect requiring each gun to be

    "zeroed" individually for AP/DS aiming rather than using the same rule for all. The expected difference

    between the two rules is shown in this table of first-shot hit probabilities:

    Range (yds) Accurate ranging rule Proposed ranging rule

    400 73 45

    800 32 19

    1000 20 14

  6. Originally posted by Soddball:

    </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

    Perhaps not. I read a report that each gun would fire it differently and each gun had to find its own adjustment to using APDS. It also had a poor tracer it seems.

    The APDS was the tungsten round? Even without Tungsten, the 17pdr could deal comfortably with the majority of German tanks at 1km+ IIRC. Since tungsten was a scarce round anyway, that doesn't really impinge on the 90%+ of rounds fired by the 17pdr. </font>
  7. Soddball you need to read closely. I said the APDS was unstable.

    I have several sources. Mycenius for one. WO 291/238, The Importance of Gun Dispersion in AP Shooting.

    WO 291/1263, Firing Trials, 17pdr Sherman

    "Table VI has been constructed which shows the probability of a hit on a target 5' wide by 2' high

    (representing a Panther turret) at various ranges using both types of round."

    Range (yards) APC % AP/DS %

    400 90.5 56.6

    600 73.0 34.2

    800 57.3 21.9

    1000 45.3 14.9

    1500 25.4 7.1

    Comments and corrections

    These assume that the MPI is placed centrally on the target.

    The trace from the AP/DS round was not seen in 73% of cases by a flank observer, and in no case from

    inside the tank.

  8. Originally posted by Soddball:

    </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

    The US M36 Jackson was not available till the Fall of 44 I believe. Any tracked 90mm weapon, even one without a rotating turret, would have been a great AT asset.

    I point you once again to the failure of the 75mm halftrack in the desert, Tunisia 1942/43 and ask why you think a 90mm armed one would have been any more successful. </font>
  9. The 17 pdr with APDS is so innacurate that it can be called unstable. It is accurate with APCBC ammo though.

    I read that 90mm weapons could target individual soldiers out to several hundred meters. One source claiming that a German helmet could be hit at that range.

    Most weapons of this size/barrel length when firing fixed AP ammo could cherry pick the major area regions on a tank type stationary target usually (under 1000m or so). That is, they could target the turret or hull).

    The 90mm AP round could hole the mantlet on a Panther at 1000 yds and penetrate the turret vertical face even further.

  10. Originally posted by Soddball:

    Bear in mind the 75mm gun mounted in a half track that served as a 'tank destroyer' in North Africa. As I'm sure you know their nickname was the 'purple heart box'.

    I don't agree with your assertion that a 90mm gun on any platform would have been as useful as, for example, a Sherman Firefly or Achilles.

    Perhaps a better solution whilst the 90mm gun became available was for the Americans to manufacture the 17pdr under licence and fit it to more Shermans.

    The war in Europe lasted less than a year. By the time the allies got ashore and the US realized that they forgot to bring a worthy AT weapon, it did not leave enough time to start manufacturing 17 pdrs in the US and getting them across the ocean in any form.

    The US did have 90mm anti aircraft guns and they were more powerful and accurate than 17 pdrs. To get them behind any armor so that they could back up the US tank battalions would have been worthwhile.

    The US M36 Jackson was not available till the Fall of 44 I believe. Any tracked 90mm weapon, even one without a rotating turret, would have been a great AT asset.

  11. After the D Day landings and the early encounters with Panthers, the US should have realized that the only weapon that could deal with them was the 90mm. Test shoots showed the short comings off most 75-76mm weapons against the front.

    The US 90mm using solid shot could penetrate the hull at 600m or so and the turret much further out.

    The 90mm weapon should have been field modified into AFV in any way possible. Even something like a fixed mount in a converted M7 Priest would have been better than nothing.

  12. The 17 pdr with APDS had its problems also. The ammo was extremely sensitive to each guns characteristics. That is, each barrel seemed to fire the ammo differently.

    The 17 pdr ammo was also very heavy. I believe it weighed (full cartridge) twice as much as 76mm HVAP).

    Little known is that the tracer was extremely difficult to see. Even an observer outside the vehicle had problems observing it.

    The US 76mm also had problems besides poor penetration (even the HVAP was marginal). The gun is described as poorly balanced and after each firing would be way off the mark. The blast and smoke made shot observation impossible under good conditions. The later use of a muzzle brake was as much for reduced blast effects as recoil.

  13. The chin mantlet appears to be a little over 100mm thick in the most likely areas to get hit, and the irregular thickness areas may be very limited in size. The Germans tested the chin mantlet by firing a 50mm round at it, and a 100mm thickness would be consistent with the test requirements for 100mm cast armor (50mm Pzgr 39 O.K., without cap).

    Are you saying that they fired a 50mmL60 it it so that it would penetrate or so that it would ricochet? It would seem that a test on this improved mantlet shape would want to bounce rounds off it so as to check that indeed, the rounds are not bouncing down.

  14. Originally posted by lorrin:

    The past discussions centered on the following pro and con issues (StuG IIIG and PzKpfw IV generally carry face-hardened armor on front):

    A. British firing tests against 32mm/30mm layered (in contact) face-hardened armor on PzKpfw IIIH front with 37mm thru 75mm AP and APCBC results in an effective single plate resistance of 69mm for the two plates.

    B. American tests with 37mm thru 90mm APCBC against 30mm/50mm layered (in contact) face-hardened armor on front of PzKpfw IV shows that best test resistance is much greater than a single 80mm plate would provide

    C. Standard 76mm APBC from T34 would penetrate about 82mm face-hardened at 100m and 75mm at 500m.

    Since StuG IIIG and PzKpfw IVH carried single plate thicknesses of 80mm face-hardened or layered armor with resistance above 80mm, penetrations at 500m should be rare

    D. Russians had super hardened, limited availability 76mm APBC round for T34 and field guns that penetrated 90mm face-hardened at 100m and 82mm at 500m, which matches 500m penetration range quoted by JasonC

    E. Russians also had solid shot uncapped AP designed to kill Tigers from side, which penetrated about 74mm face-hardened at 500m

    F. Upper superstructure armor on StuG IIIG is highly sloped but thin, 50mm at 51 degrees from vertical and 30mm at 68 degrees from vertical, where the thinner plates which might be vulnerable to 76mm APBC at 500m despite large impact angles (APBC is very good against sloped armor due to flat nose, which cancels many of the ricochet forces that plague sharp or rounded nose ammo).

    G. Near vertical 30mm/50mm armor on front of StuG IIIG has large bolts and openings through it, is made up of limited size plate and probably would suffer from edge effects on many hits(lowered resistance when hits land near free ends), making it vulnerable to T34 76.2 APBC.

    H. Tests and combat results from various sources confirm that 2 pdr AP was not very effective against 32mm/30mm on PzKpfw IIIH front

    I. Combat results with 25 pdr AP against PzKpfw IIIH front suggest resistance equal to 62mm face-hardened and maybe more

    J. Two homogeneous plates in contact resist penetration with less than the total thickness, because homogeneous armor has less resistance at the surface and there are four surfaces with two plates in contact versus two with one plate.

    Two face-hardened armor plates in contact present two separate face-hardened layers which have a total combined thickness greater than a single plate with same overall thickness, first face-hardened layer removes armor piercing cap or blunts uncapped AP reducing effectiveness against second face-hardened layer

    K. Germans gave up on 32mm/30mm face-hardened on front of PzKpfw IIIH and went with single 50mm plates on PzKpfw IIIJ, suggesting 32mm/30mm about the same as one 50mm plate. Germans switch from 32mm/30mm because two bolted plates in contact became a maintenance headache, angled hits tended to shear or bend bolts loosening connections

    GERMAN RESEARCH

    WORLD WAR II

    LESLIE E. SIMON

    Major General, Ordnance Department

    U.S. Army, Retired

    Former Director, the Ballistic Research Laboratories

    Far more extensive and more fundamental work was done at

    TAL during the period 1939-1944. Staff members conducted firing

    experiments against both flat and corrugated plate; they

    studied the way in which the ogive (the tapering head of the projectile)

    broke up and the manner in which the plate was penetrated.

    Various types of projectiles with different head shapes

    and of different heat treatments, different steels, and different body

    lengths were studied. Projectiles were fired both against single

    pieces of armor plate and spaced armor plate consisting of two

    or three pieces of armor plate with varying spaces between them.

    Studies were made both from the viewpoint of the defeat of the

    projectile by the armor plate and from the viewpoint of the defeat

    of the armor plate by the projectile. They studied the nature of

    the entry and the exit of the projectile when the plate was defeated

    and of the break-up of the projectile when the projectile was

    defeated. The movement and bending of the plate during penetration

    were carefully recorded and considered in connection with

    the mechanism of penetration.

    The use of spaced armor on the decks of battleships for resisting

    penetration by armor-piercing bombs was studied in miniature.

    The experimental work was carefully correlated with theoretical

    work. A theory of penetration was worked out which accounted

    for the loss of energy as a function of penetration, and

    which gave the force on the projectile, the friction, the force on

    the plate, and the effect of ring tension around the projectile as

    functions of the distance of penetration. For larger calibers, experimental

    and computed values of energy loss agreed to the order

    of S or 10 per cent. The results are of value in the design of

    fuzes, projectiles, and armor plate. Similar studies were made

    on the penetration of safety-glass armor plate by small bullets

    with steel cores. The mechanism of breaking in the successive

    layers of glass was studied by means of spark cinematographs.

    This work was applicable to the glass covers of vision slits in tanks

    and combat vehicles.

  15. This is the report that rexford often cites. Notice that even the report throws out the two least accurate tanks.

    A unique thing is that the report suggests that each 57mm gun be zeroed or matched to APDS. That is, each gun fires the rounds differently! Even if the APDS is matched ammo, the way it leaves each gun is sufficient different that only trial and error can reveal that.

  16. WO 291/762, Accuracy of APCBC/HV shot and AP/DS when fired from the 6-

    Pounder Gun mounted in the Churchill IV

    Trial shoots were conducted against a target 5' wide by 2' high representing a Panther turret. 5 tanks

    were used; the 2 with the least consistent guns are not included in the results for "3 tanks". The

    probability given is the hit probability of any round when the MPI is at the centre of the target.

    Range (yds) AP/DS (3 tanks) APCBC/HV (3 tanks) APCBC/HV (5 tanks)

    500 74 89 74

    800 50 84 73

    1000 37 81 62

    1500 20 62 42

    The variation of "jump" and dispersion between individual tanks is so great that an "accurate" ranging

    rule for applying ranges to the sight for AP/DS shooting is suggested, in effect requiring each gun to be

    "zeroed" individually for AP/DS aiming rather than using the same rule for all. The expected difference

    between the two rules is shown in this table of first-shot hit probabilities:

    Range (yds) Accurate ranging rule Proposed ranging rule

    400 73 45

    800 32 19

    1000 20 14

    Comments and corrections

    The paper assumes that a 50% chance of a hit with any round is the minimum engagement criterion, and

    therefore recommends that the maximum enagagement range with AP/DS be 800 yards, and with

    APCBC/HV about 1000 yards.

  17. Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

    stuh_er.jpg

    The lighting here clearly shows that there would be a path to the very back armor behind the gun (50mm) on these box mantlet StuGs. Its a small area but still a weakness.

    Edit: That area is actually part of the mantlet! Behind it is the front fighting coompartment wall (also 50mm). The main potential weakness would be the front of the mantlet box. Behind it may be the gun itself and a path to the interior. The pigs head mantlet would eliminate this weakness.

    I just want to show the updated edit again.
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