Mr. Tittles

http://www.geocities.com/SouthBeach/9898/spa505.htm Heres some info on the 505. I just finished reading Tigers in the Mud. Its clear that it took luck to get kill ratios for ANY tank when it was attacking rather than defending. This guy Carrius seemed to have some luck doing both (and great combat instincts). On a tank on tank battle against JSIIs and T34s, he and a handful of Tigers mopped up. And he was attacking. He basically did what Wittman did. He charged into a mass of AFVs that were at the head of an attack column and raised hell. After this victory (and they were all afvs, no ATG), he then crosses a water obstacle and shoots up another column of AFVs with tank riders. Part of the Tiger dominance is from the poor 2 man turrets in the early T34s. The author just gets the jump on them and its not modeled in the game. A 5 man tank is described as an organism and the crewmen are just extensions of that organism. So CM with its shared spotting and 'raising the organism to include other tanks that dont have radios or 3 men turrets; is wrong. The book says that Tigers are continually being rotated back and forth from the workshop. In some cases, mortars hole radiators causing the tigers to pull back. Its evident that the cooling systems were exposed to fragments from above. A good read and a real tankers book. [ May 18, 2004, 05:48 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

I am reading Tigers in the mud and Armor battles of the SS right now. A mention is made by the Germans is that when fighting soviet ATGs it is harder than fighting tanks (when attacking of course). The quote stated that PAKs should count twice as much as tanks when tallying. In the forgoing analysis of the second half of 1943 on the eastern front, I would not imagine that the Soviets were bashing away at PAK fronts while the German armor was doing the same against Soviet PAK fronts. That is, since the soviets had the initiative (after Kursk), the German armor would have to be brought to bear to stop the onslaught. Panzerjaeger units, of course, WOULD do this as it is its function. StuG units of all types would have to do this to support the infantry situation. Panzer units, probably the ones least wanting to perform this defensive function, would also be dragged into the fray. [ May 14, 2004, 02:22 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

The Luftwaffe Flak arm was the second largest branch of service, after the infantry, of the entire Wehrmacht, comprising over a million troops (inclusive of teenage Hitler Jugend auxiliaries) organised in 30 Flak Divisions by the war's end. The '88' was its most numerous weapon (successively the 8.8cm Flak 36 L/56 and the higher-velocity 8.8cm Flak 41 L/71) which was produced in enormous quantities (by 1944, 14,000 were in service) and concentrated around key industrial centers such as Schweinfurt. Yet it was never an efficient destroyer of high-flying bombers, an average of 16,000 shells from a Flak 36 or 8,000 from a Flak 41 being required to bring just one down. To tie up so many weapons, men, ammunition and so much production capacity at a time when the Eastern Front in particular was desperately short of high velocity anti-tank artillery, was a major strategic error. Meanwhile, at the local, tactical level the 88's potential in ground combat was appreciated early on, for instance by Rommel at Arras (1940) and Halfaya Pass (1941). Individual battery commanders such as Sepp Prentl pioneered this Sturmflak role: having won the Knight's Cross for knocking out 25 Soviet tanks with his battery in July 1942 and formed a Flakkampfgruppe which supported both infantry and Panzer formations during the debacle following Stalingrad (January - February 1943). Prentl was charged by the renowned commander of Luftflotte 4, von Richthofen, to establish a Flakerdkampfschule to train all the Flak units under his command in ground combat (direct fire against tanks, bunkers etc.), operational from April 1943. The success achieved by the Sturmflakartillerie from 1943 onwards in Italy, Normandy and the East - small Flakkampftrupps of 2-3 guns often causing major casualties and hold-ups to Allied and Soviet armor - indicates the folly of the decision to retain so many 88's in the static anti-aircraft defense of the homeland, although the provision of adequate transport and fuel for mobile operations at the Front would have been a major problem. At the very end of the war, static Flak batteries were time and again forced to engage in ground combat as the front disintegrated and Soviet armor flooded into the German homeland.

88mm Flak 18, 36 and 38 1939 183 1940 1130 1941 1872 1942 2876 1943 4416 1944 1933 1945 715 These are the delivery numbers of 88mm to Luftwaffe. In January of 1944 there were 20,625 FLAK guns (7,941 heavy guns and 12,684 light/medium guns) with 6,880 searchlights defending Germany. Stationed on other fronts were another 9,569 anti-aircraft guns and 960 searchlights, these totals do not include Army and Navy FLAK units. By August 1944 10,930 FLAK 18, 36 and FLAK 37 guns were defending the Reich. 279 of the improved FLAK41 were in use by Febuary of '45 in the air defense role. The only Luftwaffe 88s would be in Luftwaffe field divisions/FlakKorp. Here is the experience of a Flakorp in Normandy. http://home.swipnet.se/normandy/gerob/othghq/3flak.html This book: http://www.angelraybooks.com/books/shelf/0002sh.htm Also says the Flak were predominately based away from the front during the war. [ May 12, 2004, 03:15 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

Of course, everyone knows that the Soviets, like the Allies in the West, had a greater proportion of their TWO due to battle causes than the German's did. So Jason's 1.5 gets even harder to defend.

88mm Flak 18 and 36 1941 126 1942 176 1943 296 1944 549 1945 23 These numbers are Army Flak guns delivered. They are not that common considering this is the whole German Army. Most Flak 88 guns go to the Luftwaffe and by 44 there are 10,000 or so defending cities, etc. In 43 4416 go to Luftwaffe compaared to 296 to Army units. So if the PAK/FLAK are taking out the Soviet afvs, then its more likely the PAK40, PAK38 and PAK43/41 (long 88mm) are doing the majority. But PAK in 1943 are being produced at a similar rate than the total Panzer/StuG/PJ vehicles are (approx only counting 75mm and greater for either PAK or AFV)? PAK are usually distributed and dispersed? PAK also have a short shelf life once committed. They are very hard to remove under fire. Seems fishy to me. [ May 11, 2004, 04:07 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

Table 2: Reported Tank Kills along the Eastern Front total kills of enemy armor Eastern Front 1944 January February March April Total comparison: amount of the respective anti-tank weapons supplied to the troops in these four months Jan:4,727 Feb:2,273 Mar:2,663 April:2,878 12,541 total # of killed tanks cause known Jan:3,670 Feb:1,905 Mar:1,031 Apr:1,524 8,130 Total (about 2/3 known) by Faustpatrone / Panzerfaust 58 45 51 110 262 Total Faustpatrone 30 and Panzerfaust 30: 656,300 by Panzerschreck 9 24 29 26 88 Total RPz.Gr. 4322 and 4992: 278,100 by Hafthohlladung 21 13 14 19 67 Total by hand grenade 6 5 5 6 22 Total by Tellermine 20 4 43 11 78 Total These numbers are from Panzerfaust website. Its interesting that the cause is known. I take that as verified. A 1/3 shave it seems. In any case, it is early 44 and LATW are still not great tank killers. Shreck: Initial orders called for 382,000 RPzB.54 to be produced. This order was later reduced, and by July 1944 production ceased with a total number of 289,151 delivered. The process of equipping the fighting forces with Panzerschrecks progressed quite slow, in 1943 comparably few reached frontline units. By January 1944 21,141 had been issued to combat units, while another 39,526 lay unused in the armories. Panzerschreck weapons were produced by the following companies: Enzinger Union in Pfeddersheim, Gebr der Scheffler in Berlin, HASAG in Meuselwitz, J ckel in Freistadt, Fa. Kronprinz in Solingen and Fa. Schricker in F rth-Vach. Faust: Deliveries on the first order of 50,000 began in August 1943 with 6,800 pieces. Production ran until August 1944, then it was switched over to successor, the Panzerfaust 60. The first large quantity of this weapon made available to the Wehrmacht, the German armed forces, was the delivery of 8700 pieces in September 1943. I would say that 43 saw these weapons slowly entering service and probs related to that slowed its use as a AT weapon system. [ May 10, 2004, 03:41 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

So if the Germans had 3800 TWO and we use your 1.5 multiplier, then we get less than a third of the Soviet reported TWO being caused by the TOTAL panzer (Panzer III, Panzer IV, Panther, TigerI)and panzerjaeger (Marder and Nashorn and Elephant)and StuG units (afvs in infantry divisions and independent brigades as well as Panzer/PG units)? You are basically saying that Towed-PAK/FLAK/Planes/Mines/LATW/ARTY did the rest? Mind you, mines and arty, while capable of rendering a short term KO, usually do not TWO a AFV. LATW were in its infancy and not much more than last ditch defense measures. Planes were not that great a tank killer despite claims. So its the tubes of the PAK and FLAK that get most of this 70% of the TWOs? [ May 10, 2004, 01:01 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

PAK? Why not organic StuGs in infantry divisions and SPs? Also Sturmartlillerie Bigades? T34/85: These were introduced in March 44? I imagine they were first sent to Guards units? I am not saying they werent fielded during Bagration, just that the Panther to 85mm and greater Soviet AFV ratio was at a zenith for the Germans. Panzerfaust Website: Deliveries on the first order of 50,000 began in August 1943 with 6,800 pieces. Production ran until August 1944, then it was switched over to successor, the Panzerfaust 60. The first large quantity of this weapon made available to the Wehrmacht, the german armed forces, was the delivery of 8700 pieces in September 1943. Panzerfaust 60: It replaced the Panzerfaust 30 m, production started in September 1944. Early production plans for the Panzerfaust called for 400,000 pieces per month. This figure was not met until October 1944. By then the request had been increased in September to 1.5 million per month, this was almost achieved in December 1944 with close to 1.3 million produced. A large number of different companies produced the Panzerfaust, the major contributor was the HASAG Hugo Schneider AG Lampenfabrik in Leipzig. The two cut n pastes are from the Panzerfaust website. My main thought is that the Panzerfaust 30 models were all that were available at the time of Bagration. It is such a close ranged weapon compared to bazookas or shrecks. Was it that common a weapon to take out a AFV? If Bagration was such a bum rush hit, how come they had such a poor trade in armor? Was German armor not committed to this battle? [ May 09, 2004, 07:35 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

They are typically part of a trench system.

But the Soviets don't shave thier own numbers when reporting thier own losses? Care to comment on that? The claims German would make are at greater battlefield range than the soviets typically. So they are actually claiming damaged vehicles that will be repaired and cycled back into units. Example: A lone Tiger faces a Soviet tank Bn. the Soviets send 10 tanks to deal with the Tiger. So the Tiger tank whacks 10 tanks. Tiger pulls back because he is alone. He reports 10 victories. But what of the 10? 4 are burnt out. 4 are short term repaired by using two others (which are write-offs or possibly long term repairs) and are available for the next battle the following week. The remaining 2 are put in long term repair for major subsystems (need motors/turrets/etc). In CM short view terms, he whacked 10 tanks. He had tactical victory and he reported the 'kills'. In RL he killed possibly 5. The 4 he burned and one of the salvage tanks that is not long term repairable. The German command face the same battalion and they are at full strength (not 2/3). The initial Soviet tank company has recieved replacements and repaired the 'ghost-tanks' that have come back to life. [ May 09, 2004, 02:54 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

I just saw a website the other day that had a good interior and exterior shot of a German wood bunker. The MG34 was used with the bipod at the halfway point (not at the muzzle). This bipod was sitting between two flat boards for stability. There was a shelf with stick grenades, pistol, etc. A point about log bunkers is that you want two rows of logs. The outside logs sit so they are wedged between the inside logs weak points. This way, a bullet always has to go through a minimum of one log diameter or more. Most log bunkers also have built in trenches or space below ground for protection. They are not built like little houses above ground. They are quite small targets.

I get the impression that there is two sorts of shading being discussed. They are 1) LOS-shading, which would highlight all the areas your selected unit can see 1b) some peoples variant of the above, in which all the areas that can be seen from any spot on the map are shaded, regardless of whether you have a unit there or not 2) cast-shadow shading. This is the kind of difference in brightness and shadow you see on any day, and is due to sunlight not falling evenly on all surfaces. You also see it reproduced on good quality topo maps as an aid to reading the map. Regards Jon </font>

These demonstrate cast shadow terrain and contour lines. http://mac.usgs.gov/mac/isb/pubs/booklets/symbols/reading.html [ May 09, 2004, 12:37 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

The game can be made better (read more enjoyable and less tedious) but its not to the exclusion of of realistic gaming. Some kind of map general elevation representation, be it an overhead type psuedo-topo, or a super-sweet-eye-treat, is needed to quickly situate the player to the field. This is NOT an LOS aid and its purpose should NOT be confused as such. Whether this is generic or presented to the player in realistic levels (that would be set through FOW) is just further enhancement to the game. I tried to share information about actual maps and the level of precision and detail that may be present on them earlier in this thread. Fly-Over Restrictions: Or actually restrictions on how low-you-can-go when NOT over a friendly (or near a friendly) are meant to combat Gamey-Surveying. Gamey Surveying is when you eyeball every square meter after selecting an enemy unit. As I said before, the highlighted selection rectangle is visible through terrain. The bottom line is you can tell if that enemy unit has LOS to terrain that you are nowhere near. Its gamey. Its almost like you are pulling an LOS check line FROM that enemy unit. This could, by the way, be eliminated easily from the present system if the enemy unit just did not have a rectangle highlighting it. Theres no point in it and it leads to gamey results. Terrain FOW: Players are so used to flying over and getting absolute terrain info that this is viewed as a much more radical departure. They expect knowing what all vegetation terrain is before getting there. They also want to know where every small dip is behind the enmy hill in front of them. True LOS aids: I mentioned a dynamic covered arc LOS command and other games have absolute terrain highlighting (where every area a LOS line COULD reach is highlighted). The present LOS line and graphics are the real problem. Its almost impossible to play the game without messing around at different levels and whipping the line around. Its a headache to use. [ May 09, 2004, 12:54 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

That book is written with too much detail in general. I think the author takes poetic license in all aspects. Its like a comic book without drawings.

I doubt Jason will return but I would like to contin ue the point I made earlier regarding 6000 German AFV being destroyed from the begin of July43 to the end of 43. The German Panzer strength is well known (PanzerIV, Tiger, Stug mostly with dwindling Panzer III) and the fleet size and operational tank numbers do NOT catastrophically drop during this time. The non-panzer unit StuGs/PJ fleet size would also have to be known but its possibly 1000? It would also have to fall off the cliff to support this 6000 and it is well known that at this time the stug was a VERY effective tank killer (soviets declining combat with them). PJ were never produced or fielded in large numbers by the way. In any case, even if ALL the tanks/AG/SP produced during this time were sent to the eastern front AND lost; the numbers can not support losing 6000 afv. The trade ratios above also do not show losing afvs at this rate. So Jasons birds-eye thesis does not stand up to close examination. As far as 33:1 or even 50:1 kill ratios, I dont believe it. If any weapon system could maintain such effectiveness, a nation would be a fool not to put more resources into fielding more of them. Tiger tank crewmen were very competitive and even bet on who would reach certain numbers first. They also belittled each others victorys if they were against turkeys like a SU122 (on the t34 chassis). [ May 08, 2004, 07:57 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzZZZ **huh?* Hey, keep that music down I'm trying to sleep here. Somebody wake me up at a quarter to page 10 or so.

German vs. Soviet AFV losses - 1941-45. Period: Ratio: Period: Ratio: 06/41-02/42 1:5.0 12/43-06/44 1:1.4 03/42-05/42 1:6.6 07/44 1:4.0 06/42-10/42 1:7.9 08/44 1:2.0 11/42-03/43 1:1.3 09/44 1:1.0 04/43-08/43 1:5.7 10/43-11/44 1:1.3 09/43-11/43 1:2.5 - - http://www.achtungpanzer.com/prod.htm The ratios above can show some trends in afv battles. Note that its just a ratio and it is not saying that afvs were even fighting afvs. Except for the drop around 11/42-03/43 (Stalingrad writeoffs?) The general trend was a 'trade' that was over 5:1. Even as late as Kursk, the Germans were giving better than they took. The general trend after is that the Russians narrowed this trade but it takes a jump in july 44 (intro of LATW in numbers? Russians pushing relentlessly? Panthers seen in larger numbers before T34/85 is fielded?). The Kursk numbers are good 5.7:1 and the rest of 43 is even 2.5:1. This and my previous post (that JasonC probably wont address) shows that you must be very front/time/vehicle specific when analyzing this topic.

German StuGs made some big claims also. In the second half of 1943, when facing T34/76 and defending, they would be formidible. Thats another reason that I am trying to get JasonC to come down from the birds eye view. He has to commit to some theatre and harder numbers. He cant stay at the factory with his calculator.

Being Seanachai is surely torture enough.

I will never return to that Peng thing till that Pig o' the Poconos sends me a frikkin turn already.

I never said that one unit LOST 18K. I was showing that the loss rate was high and could not be reasonably maintained. So after Kursk in 43 is about a half year? 18000 afv (i will stipulate MBT/SP) in 183 days? 98 tanks a day? Thats close to 3000 a month? This during a period when LATW was in its infancy? Leys say that the German AFV force (basically Panzers and SturmArty and PanzerJaeger) only gets half of these. 1500 a month. That means the infantry PAK/LATW plus the FLAK and Arty and Mines/etc. gets half also (I think thats generous). So thats 9000 for the German AFVs. According to JasonCLong, we should be able to divide by the exchange ratio. Lets say it 1.5 according to him. That means the Germans TWO is 6000 afv for second half of 43. Is this reasonable? Its known what the German available/on-hand is at July (for Panzer units but SurmArty Stugs and PJ Marders needs to be known) for the months after till the end of the year. Its also known what the production rates for German AFV is during these months. [ May 07, 2004, 12:22 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

I would say that JasonC is waving his calculator in the air as much as anyone else. In the earlier mixed Bn data, note that the data shows the Bn composition basically stays the same over time (a mixed force of stugs/panzerIVLong) but the data does show that the kill ratio decreases as the Soviets field better equipment. I think my concern here is that someones 'logic' is as follows: 1. I can divide the production number of Panzer X into possible number of kills and therefore, whenever Panzer X is simulated in a game, it should be expected to perform similarly. What data shows is that Panzer IV longs and StuG longs COULD have a higher kill ratio depending on time frame/front/defending/attacking/etc/etc. The StuG, at one time, being one of the most heavily armored and armed system in the German ranks. So the birds-eye mathematics are too diluted and need to be taken with a grain of intelligence. My own opinion about over-reported claims, as I have said before, is that many non-brew ups (which are probables at best) are reported as 'kills'. In CM terms, they are abandoned vehicles or vehicles with gun damage/track damage. They are tactical victorys. So even before Jason'sLong posts, I brought up this point. They are a burden on the repair crews and they deny the enemy TankWorkDays. That is, those rare days when armor is employed, the tank has called in sick! In many cases, lighter afv such as halftracks, armored cars, even trucks may be mistaken as 'kills' if the distance is great and there is smoke/confusion going on. The Soviet data shows a good idea of lighter afv to MBT by the way. Future CM games should award possesion for abandoned vehicles. They are just too valuable.

I think that a fuzzy logic 'fit' could be applied to Canadian retardation.