Hortlund
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Posts posted by Hortlund
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Looking at the raw numbers the T-34/85 had more armor at "better" angles from side and rear. (Comparing to M4a2). Same goes for turret front. The only place the Sherman has better armor is hull front really, but there the T-34 has better slope (depending on exactly where you look though).
But I still dont get it. The M4a2 was notorious for its tendancy to brew up. This was improved when the americans started with the wet stowage system. Are you guys saying that the T-34/85 had similar brew up-problems but those never changed?
As for the optics. I have no doubt that the quality of the US optics were good, I was just surprised that the Russians thought they were better than theirs. To my knowledge, US sights were...well...bad.
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These two puzzled me.Originally posted by Grisha:Faster turret traverse and better sights.
Better protected ammunition storage.
I can understand the faster turret, but better sights? US tank sights were very poor, making shots over 800 yards extremely difficult at best (if I remember correctly this had alot to do with the difficulty of estimating range to target through a US sight). Were the soviet optics really that crappy?
Better protected ammunition storage? Better protected than the T-34/85? Either the Russians were talking about wet stowage Shermans or they were talking about T-34/85 who must have carried their ammo on the outside of the tank. I simply dont understand that comment. The Sherman was notorious for its poor survivability if hit. The T-34/85 on the other hand have very good armor protection.
What am I missing here?
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To each his own...
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Nah, I doubt it. The red lines seems to be very consistent with the pre war borders of the time (with the notable exception of Ukraine and Beloirussia as mentioned above). If they were rail lines the logical thing would be to see Berlin and Moscow as great hubs.Originally posted by Michael emrys:I assumed (perhaps mistakenly) that the red lines represent rail lines.
Michael
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Returning to the map...
What are those borders supposed to represent? (The tiny red lines I mean). My first guess would be "borders", but then I saw that (what must be) Belorussia and Ukraine had borders too.
So I became confused.
Why present Ukraine and Belorussia as "countries" or "nations"? In a map from 1941-45 I mean.
[ September 10, 2002, 09:15 AM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]
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Wow...Originally posted by Bastables:I'll get you started mate.
From a report 31 July 1942 Pz regt 33
‘The Panzergranatpatrone 40 is no longer fired by the crew because with each round the shell casing sticks or the shell casing ruptures in the gun. This can only be cleared from outside the Panzer by knocking the shell case back out with cleaning rods. Shell casing ruptures occasionally occur when firing the Panzergranate 38.’(1996 Jentz Pg243).
This is the first I have heard about such problems for the APCR rounds. You learn something new every day
I'm assuming that you are talking about the 50mm version of the pzgr 40 here? Do you know if this problem was limited to the 50mm version of the Pzgr 40, or if the 37mm and 75mm versions had the same problems?
[ September 06, 2002, 05:14 AM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]
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Hey Grisha, nice to see a familiar face around here.Originally posted by Grisha:Well, Hi Hortlund, glad to see you've decided to grace this forum after your tumultuous stay at the Aces High Forum - you usually post in the 'O'Club Forum,' correct? Have you suddenly taken a liking to ground combat simulations? Or, was it perhaps the fact that the Soviets were involved?
Many of your points regarding the Red Army are very similar to those made soon after the war by German Generals like Guderian, von Manstein and von Mellenthin, as well as many other German officers interviewed by the US Army and Air Force in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The weakness of their arguments were in the fact that they did not understand the Red Army, nor operational art, as well as they seemed to. In fact, the US Army didn't really begin to grasp operational art until the 1980s, a full 35 years after WWII. Much of what the German postwar memoirs/interviews interpret as tactical deficiencies were either based on Soviet operational priorities, or generalizations that while existed in the beginning part of the war, no longer was done to any great extent in the latter part of the war. The strength of postwar German accounts is that some of these deficiencies, such as blocking detachments, or penal battalions, did in fact occur all through the war. But, then again, so did German use of such things as penal units. It is a fact, for instance, that the percentage of total German military personnel executed or imprisoned for 'indisciplinary action' by the German military forces was over two and a half times as high (3.3%) as the percentage of Soviet soldiers similarly dealt with by the Red Army (1.25%). If you wish to pursue this fact further I can direct you to Richard Overy's Why the Allies Won, p.304. I leave it to you to judge his sources. So, did the Soviets deal harshly with their own? Yes, they did at times, especially during the darkest hours of their fight for survival in 1941-42. But, this type of treatment wasn't limited to the Soviet Union, you can be certain of that.
Another problem is that many people do not understand how the Soviets fought, and by this I mean where the Soviets 'hinged' (to use a friend's term - and a good one at that)in their command structure, as well as the operational, intelligence, and logistical aspects of conducting war. It was at the operational level, a field of military art that was incompletely understood by all other combatant nations in WWII. The use of operations was an outgrowth of WWI, but the theory and practice of conducting operations was a study conducted solely by the Soviets at that time. It was during the period of the 1920s and 1930s that operational art came into being as a distinct level of military art, between strategy and tactics, and this distinction was established by Soviet military theorists. The purges of 1937 undid much of this work, and contributed greatly to the dismal performance of the Red Army in the early years of WWII, but these military concepts were revived, studied, and refined during WWII such that from mid-1943 to war's end the practice of operational art by the Red Army was formidible in effect and elegant in execution. There are many elements to operational art, far too many that I'd want to continue in this thread, and since I'm writing a paper on it at the moment which is intended for the wargamer community, I'll not go any deeper than that. However, if you do wish to understand this vital aspect of the Red Army I suggest you read Glantz, preferably his Frank Cass publications.
So, welcome, Hortlund. And I do look forward to seeing you in battle in CMBB - as Soviet
I've always been a ground pounder first, my odyssey in Aches High had more to do with the lack of new tactical ww2 games at the time. (Im primarily a spwaw-addict by the way). And there is something about the eastern front that has always fascinated me…long and semi-philosophical rant could follow here, but I think I'll spare you
Regarding the Red Army.
I think it would be wrong to talk about "the red army in world war two", since the difference between the early red army (1939-1942/43) and the late army (1943-1945) is enormous.
You talk about the Soviet operational art of war. And I must agree that this is an area where the Soviets were brilliant. I disagree that the Russians were the only ones who mastered this concept though, since I am of the opinion that the Germans too had more than a rudimentary understanding of the concept. I would hold the Soviets first, followed by the Germans, and then a huge gap down to the rest of the combatants in ww2.
I would like to talk about an aspect of this that might explain a lot about the apparent discrepancy between German first hand accounts and post-war research.
One of the key factors in all successful soviet operations were the combination of undetected concentration of forces in a narrow area of the front, followed by an attack on the German positions. The undetected concentration of forces led to a huge numerical superiority for the Russians in that small sector of the front. But that does not translate to a huge numerical superiority for the Russians in the entire sector, or entire front. So while the statistics show that in various periods of time, the total Soviet numerical superiority was as low as 1.5-1 or 2-1 on the whole front, the numerical superiority at the point of attack could be as high as 10 or 20-1 in infantry and 10-1 in tanks.
I think the above has alot to do with German soldiers (or Generals) telling stories about masses of men and tanks charging across no mans land.
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Nice to see you tooOriginally posted by Lindan:Hortlund,
it was nice to see you (not).We had several of your kind here, and they didn't stay for long.
You disqualified yourself pretty much with your first set of posts.
Now go away.
My first set of posts were about the soviet 122mm APBC round and its possibility to penetrate the front armor on the PzV, apparently it was a bad idea to post that...since it "disqualified" me from something.
But I think I'll stay...hope that is ok with you.
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Hi thereOriginally posted by DrAlimantado:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:
Uh, when did I make that assertion?
Are you talking to me here or are you having some kind of inner conversation and giving me the blame for what is said?
Being new to a community, acting like an idiot is not the best thing to do. Just thought that I should point that out, in case you were not aware of this.
Mattias</font>
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Yeah, I have no problem with letting the subject drop. What I do have a problem with is when people are accusing me of saying things I have never said. Especially when there is a nasty undertone to what they accuse me of saying. When you imply that I am defending what the SS units were doing, I am gonna say "whoa, wait just a minute, Ive never said such a thing."Originally posted by Andreas:Hortlund, I am not putting anything in your mouth, you do that very well yourself. If you want to play semantics games, find yourself somebody else to play with.
If you call this a semantics game, then I suppose we see things differently.
Regards
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Here:Originally posted by Andreas:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:
Uh, when did I make that assertion? </font>
And, oh, here again:Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:[qb] </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />How is that different between hangings and shootings of German deserters? There is an ocean of difference between slaughtering your own men, and executing deserters. If you dont understand that, then I have no idea how to explain it to you either.
Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:
One more time, in case we had not gotten the message, thank you.
Well, strictly speaking, and your quoting of me shows that, Ive never said anyting that could be interpreted as "the flying squads handled soldiers in an even semi-correct way".What I HAVE said was that
"There is an ocean of difference between slaughtering your own men, and executing deserters." (which there is)
Or
"Any soldier found in that area without a very good reason/pass were executed on the spot for desertion or cowardice in front of the enemy." (which is true)
and
ALL armies in ww2 executed their deserters. (which is also true, since you were talking about the CW army, not the British army).
I have never said anyting about how the "flying squads" (?) handled the soldiers they caught for various reasons, other than that most of them were shot/hanged. So please stop putting words in my mouth.
Regards
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Granted.Originally posted by John Kettler:Leutnant Hortlund,
As has been pointed out repeatedly on the CMBO board, the skirt armor was fitted not to defeat HEAT, though it did as an unintended side effect, but to stop the Soviet 14.5mm antitank rifle projectiles. Evidence produced to support this includes eyewitness accounts of the meeting where Hitler issued the orders.
Regards,
John Kettler
I suppose I could have been more clear in my statement. What I meant was that Schurezen had very limited protection effect on "normal claiber" AP rounds (with all the variants) and relatively good protection effect on HEAT rounds.
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Uh, when did I make that assertion?Originally posted by Andreas:Regarding using one book as an example - you have not seen it necessary to show any support for your assertion that the flying squads handled soldiers in an even semi-correct way, or why they differed from blocking detachments. Happy digging.
Are you talking to me here or are you having some kind of inner conversation and giving me the blame for what is said?
[ September 05, 2002, 06:02 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]
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Originally posted by Andreas:
Care to tell me the number of executed deserters in the US and Commonwealth armies? And that in the German army, with a particular subset in January to May 1945?
Well, off the top of my head,
US army...1 (might have been more though, but I know that at least one were executed)
CW army...lots (they were having huge problems with some of the local units in India and Burma early in the war)
German army..I have no idea whatsoever, and I strongly suspect that you dont have a figure either other than some estimation.
Quite apart from that, these men were not deserters, and executions of those with 'good reasons' to be away from the frontline happened. See the example I previously mentioned.
"a good example of how they worked is in 'Panzer Commander' by von Luck"?
Tell me, do you think a reference to a book is a good "example"? Could you perhaps be a bit more specific? Heck, you might even be able to take a minute or two and write down the example you had in mind here on this board?
Drafting 12-year olds and 60-year olds to defend the Heimat - care for the soldiers, the German way... Yeah, sure - the Wehrmacht and the Nazi state were just models of humanity, right up there with the US and the Commonwealth.
?? Who are you talking to now? And on what subject?
And those with noses and ears smell and listen, the rest live in silence and non-smell.There really is precious little left to say. Those with eyes and minds open read and learn, the rest live in ignorance.
[ September 05, 2002, 05:56 PM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]
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I cant get my hypersnap to work, nor can I find any interesting key-combination...
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Well its either that, or the person I'm trying to explain something to isnt really open to information.
By the tone in your post its pretty obviuous that you have already made your mind up, and I see little reason trying to argue with you. I have had my share of arguing with brick walls on other forums.
Let me just say this.
If you send your own men unarmed against machine guns, or if you send your men in waves against the enemy with every second or third wave without arms, that is nothing short of murder.
Picture if you will a modern US army commander applying that tactic against some Afghan cave...it simply wouldnt happen.
To issue such an order you would have to have such a complete disregard for the lifes of your men, that it is hard to comprehend. And if you not only send your men to their deaths like that, but order other units to advance behind the first poor sods, and to gun down anyone in the first waves who tries to take cover or tries to retreat...well, as I said, it is hard for us to even imagine such "tactics".
The above has nothing to do with situations where soldiers who have abandoned their units have gotten caught and were executed...nothing. ALL armies in ww2 executed their deserters.
Now, if you dont see the difference between those two examples, then you have such a different thought pattern from me, that I cannot possibly explain that difference. I simply would not know where to start.
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Really? That the executioners were Aryans, maybe?</font>Originally posted by argie:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:
There still is a difference.
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Oh, no there were no blocking units at Seelowe, at least not to my knowledge. I thought you were asking for examples of situations where soviet commanders sent their troops running towards the German MG's in pointless human wave attacks.
As for the "summary justice" and the executions in the end of the war. Basically there were SS units roaming the areas behind the frontlines. Any soldier found in that area without a very good reason/pass were executed on the spot for desertion or cowardice in front of the enemy.
There still is a difference.
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Originally posted by Denizen:
The Spaced armor on the front hull and turret was indeed better at resisting the 122mm soviet APBC than the sloped armor of the panther's front. Soviet gun tests during and after the war would show that while the 122mm APBC could penetrate and travel all the way through the Panther from the front, it would barely harm the Pzr III.
First, the spaced armor on the PzIII might have been better at resisting the Soviet 122mm APBC round on a mm by mm penetration-calculation-basis. But this does not translate to PzIIIs being more surviveable on the battlefield. The PzV has very sloped front armor, the effect of such high angles is not only that enemy shells have more armor to penetrate, it also increases the probability that the enemy shell will richoshet (sp) either completely (i e deflecting away from the tank), or partially (i e some kinetic energy is spent when the impact force changes direction).
Second, I would love to see your sources on that penetration data. I hope you are not using the "Report on the results of testing of the 100mm and the 122mm tank guns at the KUBINKA proving grounds" from 1944? Because if you do, you should know that the Panther tank used as target was of poor quality, and the test results are dubious at best. If the results actually happened, then the Panther tank used as target had armor defective enough to be only 85% of "normal" armor.
Consider the source...suppose you are on the staff of the armaments production facility, what report is more likely to get your butt shipped to a Gulag?
"Yes comrade Stalin, our armamnets are seriously deficient and this is probably why we are suffing sometimes 10 to 1 losses to Facsists"
or
"Yes comrade Stalin, our tanks are clearly superior to the Fascists and able to kill them to nearly the limit of their effective range. The losses at the front must be do to poor tactics in the untrained ranks."
Having said that, the 122mm APBC round was the best AT round the Soviets used in ww2. Lets do a test fire against a PzV. The PzV front had 80mm armor at 55 degrees slope. First, armor penetration is not a step function where penetration fails if you are a mm short and is not assured if you are a mm over. It can occure anywhere down to .85 pen/armor and can fail up to 1.15 pen/armor ratio.
So how do you get the armor ratio? The actual "effective armor is a function of thickness to diameter ratio and the above estimates of effective thickeness are based on the (base/(cos(angle))^1.4) estimate.
The PzV glacis is 85/55 of varying quality. This means a variance from a bit over 200mm equivalent to 150 or so for a T/D ratio of .7.
The early 122mm had a penetration (50% probability or deformation of backing plate vs BHN 250 RHA) of about 189mm. The later model of the 122mm was improved to about 206mm.
This all means that the PzV glacis was potentially vulnerable anywhere from 0 to about 1200m range when being shot at by a 122mm gun using APBC ammo. (the 0 figure above indicates that in some instances, the 122mm gun could not penetrate PzV front armor from any range).
(source:Bird and Livingston, WW2 Ballistics)
Now, I dont have the numbers for the PzIII armor readily avaliable here, so I cant make the same calculations for the PzIII.
Strictly speaking, this does not make the PzIII a threat to "all existing Soviet tanks", it only makes the PzIII a less threat to its own crew. And Schurzen doesnt really help that much against AP or APBC ammo. Schurzen was designed to detonate HEAT rounds outside the main armor. The effects on AP or APBC rounds are slim.[...] since combat records indicated that the later variants of the Pzr III were still very much a threat to all exsisting soviet tanks by virtue of the spaced armor as well as the schurzen protection enveloping the hull and turret.Where availible, tungsten ammunition providied the 50mm gun of the Pzr III with all of the anti-armor performance of the Panther in a smaller, cheaper, and more efficient package.
First, the key phrase here seems to be "where avaliable". Tungsten rounds became increasingly scarce in Germany from 1942 on. After the loss of the Donbass region (the area around Dniepropetrovsk), Germany had extremely limited access to rare minerals, and those they could get their hands on were often used in other parts of the German war industry. The most likely scenario would involve a PzIII entering the battlefield with one or two rounds of APCR max, and the rest being normal AP. Best case scenario would see that same PzIII with 4-7 APCR. If you want to do a fair comparrison you should compare the standard AP of the 75mm KwK 42 L/70, with the standard AP for the 50mm KwK 39 L/60.
(Standard AP for 50mm at 100m=67mm)
(Standard AP for 75mm at 100m=138mm)
or, why not compare APCR penetrations, just for fun...
(standard APCR for 50mm at 100m=130mm)
(Standard APCR for 75mm at 100m=194mm)
These figures speak for themselves.
Lets just say that I question this conclusion.in terms of overall performance and efficiency, it,[PzIII] and not the Panther, was perhaps the superlative AFV of the Axis forces, as realized by the Russians who fought them.[ September 05, 2002, 09:30 AM: Message edited by: Leutnant Hortlund ]
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Well, and when was the last time that was used? Care to explain to me how that was different from the random hangings and shooting on the spot that went on in the German army during the last few weeks of the war?Originally posted by Andreas:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:
What about sending troops in to attack in waves, and having every second or third wave attack without weapons (the idea being that they could pick up weapons from those fallen in the first waves).
To keep the units motivated, throw in a "blocking unit" behind the attackers with orders to gun down anyone moving in the wrong direction.
Care for the troops...the Soviet way?
Hanging from a lamp-post with a sign around your neck 'Ich bin ein Deserteur' or being shot in a backyard after some flying judgement detail determined you were a deserter - the German way of caring for their troops?</font>
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What about sending troops in to attack in waves, and having every second or third wave attack without weapons (the idea being that they could pick up weapons from those fallen in the first waves).
To keep the units motivated, throw in a "blocking unit" behind the attackers with orders to gun down anyone moving in the wrong direction.
Care for the troops...the Soviet way?
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I like this idea. And such a campaign is definitively something I would like to play in.
A suggestion would be to start with one battle first. One interesting, well know, and well balanced battle... not too big, not too small. (My choice would be something like the battle(s) for Mozhaisk in october 1941)
If you can get that to work with 4-6 players on both sides, then we can start making plans for the big one. I thinkn it would be best to focus on the real operations. It would be very interesting to play a large operation with 10-20 players on each side, with a CO on both sides giving orders and allocating reserves etc...Kursk anyone?
Lend Lease, and giving the Sherman its due
in Combat Mission Archive #4 (2002)
Posted
All the best,
John.</font>