Tarquelne
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Posts posted by Tarquelne
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Probably hard to judge, but in your opinion were most of the usefull gadgets issued? Or, maybe more to the point, did you ever happen to find yourself thinking. "Hmm, they really should have issued that gadget. There seems to be an anti-gadget bias operating in the Canadian military."? Or the opposite ("We're techno freaks!")Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:[QB]T - there were plenty of Canadian "gadgets"
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<snip>Originally posted by Pillar:[QB]Regardless of Brians picture, the actual picture, corresponding with his or not, was just posted by JasonC.
Snipped out the message, because Jason actually started comparing Brian's picture with his picture. (Yea, now we're getting somewhere!)
[ June 15, 2002, 12:46 AM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]
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27 out of how many?Originally posted by Berkut:[QB]My understanding of the event was that at Omaha the first wave of tanks, 27 never made it ahsore,
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"Rear Forward Screen Element"?IOW the term "Rear Screen Element" is incorrect IMO."Rear Main Line of Resistance Forward Screen Element"?
The heavy weapons platoon often engaged the enemy's recon elements?What you are actually describing seems to be a classic example of a heavy weapons platoon or company in action
billcarey - what's the appropriate target for the Vlksgrnder squads?
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Ah, thanks Jason.Originally posted by JasonC:"Just like the early years of WW I", "straight ahead infantry attack", "sheer willpower". Uh huh, right.
But "Just like the early years of WW I" refered to the sacking of commanders. And I think the relevent quote was actually "It reminded me, more than anything of the first few years of WWI..."
The "frontal" infantry attack refered to Omaha beach and only Omaha beach. (Brian made that very explicit.)
"Sheer willpower" was a comment on movement through the hedgerows. That's pretty much it. Something a bit more specific than your German accounts gives info on. Allied accounts of lower level commanders useing subtle tactics (or even gadgetry) to handle the bocoge-based defenses would be best here.
I'm assuming Brian doesn't think that US forces _invariably_ used little finesse (tactical or technical) when working through the hedgerows. Just that they didn't use anything other than "willpower" (for which I think we can all read very-straight-forward-tactics, not psionic abilities, right?) often enough. What we really need to counter this is some evidence that the hedgerows were seldom tackled this way.
I think you're looking at the wrong picture. Brian's picture is over here.Is Brian's picture recognizable?
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I do something like that, though not as systematically. I'll often just have some long range weapon - often mortars or machine guns - with a long field of view and NOT placed near other units, and preferably placed somewhere with lots of good cover. (In other words, somewhere where one might like to hide many units.) It won't be hidden at the start of the game. It'll engage the enemy ASP, and hopefully draw some interesting fire and slow down the enemy, too. Placing a Stealth leader near them is good. Not being able to locate the fire for awhile often draws a bigger response.
There are numerous variations: Have the unit "shoot and scoot" (or at least "scoot" as much as a HMG or gun is capable.) Immedietly respond to any return fire with lots of mortars. Force-fire a light calibur gun at a distant target and then hide. Have a concentration of AFVs pop up, fire and hide again near the end of a turn, and then have them all move by covered routes elsewhere.
In bad weather I once fooled someone into thinking fire from a Wespe was the beginning of a barrage (run, infantry, run!), and a spotting round or two was from the Wespe (resulted in the responding Sherman getting Immobilized in the barrage). Ah, that was good. Of course, this was a LAN game, and I was also distracting him and "playing with his mind" at the time, too. Heh heh.
I think of the units I described as "bait," or deceptions. I like the RSE idea, though. I'll have to try it.
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I think the formerly mentioned VT artillery fits your bill.[/qb] -
Hi, Michael D.
Did you realize that out of the 300 or so words in your last two posts only 2 were actually "new text", and both were German?
And I assume they were answers to my "major innovations" question?
I don't know what the Krummlauf is (so I got 1 new word of the 300.), and I think the Maus could easily be simply considered a desperate response to a desperate need. I dunno, though, what the actual thinking was behind the Maus project. Was in begun before Germany was clearly loosing the war? In other words, "Just because" they wanted a super tank. Not because they didn't know how to stop the Allies, and hoped a super tank would do it.
Andreas: Ah! No quotes, but I'm not certain what you're responding to. Maybe "Krummlauf?" is a doctrine question?
But, assuming it's a response to my question too: I did specify _during_ the war. I specified "during the war" because between-wars, I've been told, is when military organizations often invest time in "pre-emptive" innovation.
(I agree that other than that, the German adoption of the BK tactics fits the bill.)
What I'm fishing for, really, is an example of an innovation that began more-or-less for innovation's sake. Because someone had a bright idea and was able to sell it to the organization, not because there was either a well defined problem that needed a solution or poorly defined but overwhelming problem (ie - "We're loosing the war.") to be solved.
Right now I don't think neither the US Army or the German forces showed a pro-or-anti tech/gadget bias. They just responded to different pressures. Or really, one basic force: Necessity. If they _needed_ a new gadget or tech they adopted it, if they didn't need it, they didn't. Sometimes they were good at realizing when they needed something, sometimes they weren't - but no bias.
I wrote "US Army or German forces" above because as little as I know about them, I know less about the British forces. However, from what I've read here recently I'd say they were "pro-gadget", if I were forced to guess. They might make a much better group to compare the US Army to, at least after the US joined the war and Britain's situation didn't look so desperate.
And I think there might be some Canadians posting here... maybe they know something about Canadian gadgets? Canadian vrs. US might be the best comparison of all.
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Bad boy! You bought Regular!I have 8 AT weapon systems plus Fausts.
I think my thoughts are similar to redwolf's and Priest's (and others - many of the configurations are pretty similar.)
All Veteren.
I'd get the Hetzer.
I'd get a 50mm ATG, because I _am_ worried about relying on that lone Hetzer. IIRC, only a Sherman's lower hull would be a problem for the 50mm Pak at 100m.
I'd get a full company of Rifle infantry. Not as powerfull as the better armed infantry, but cheaper means more squads, and that means more 'fausts. (Plus you get that Coco and the 2 HMGs.)
So I'd be feeling pretty good about taking on the enemy armor.
With the remaining points I'd get
1 81mm FO (I'd miss redwolf's 120mm FO)
1 TRP
Which would certainly go some way towards hurting the American infantry.
If the American player bought lots of infantry (2 tanks + 81mm FO + 1 full rifle company + an extra platoon is a possible American force) I might start wishing for redwolf's 3 fixed guns... but I think I'd still rather have my mobile extra 3 squads rather than the immobile guns.
I was not pleased, btw, when I realized the American could afford a 105mm spotter and an 81mm spotter - 100 105 shells and 200 81mm shells. It made me even more keen on avoiding multiple fixed guns.
Huh... I just noticed that my force is even more similar to tools4fools'. (I even considered a Hetzer/Puma/75mm HT combo.) I would get the arty (mortars), since it's a small map I'd be confident about brining in down somewhere good. (But I certainly have a pro-artillery bias.)
I, too, went and looked at what the American player could get, btw. I did this before buying my own force.
[ June 14, 2002, 11:23 AM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]
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I don't think who invented them matter. But it does occur to me that when the US Army adopted them might make a difference. How long did it take for tung. ammo, for example, to be issued to most tanks/TDs?Techie, maybe. But neither of these were US inventions.What, btw, are some major innovations introduced by a army during WWII that weren't responses to an enemy threat or a pressing need? (A complicated, vauge, "big" question, sorry. But I'm an interested person. You're all here to cater to my wants, right? "An instructing role is a serving role.")
Intersting stuff about the sunk DDs...
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How much (material, $$) did the Germans devote to unsuccessfull projects, anyway? I don't think I've ever seen even a guess.Maus
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Utah was planned better it appears, as well as different terrain/defences.
Ok, lets take the lack of highly usefull gadgets at Omaha beach as a given.I was referring to ONE, I'll repeat that, one landing beach.I'm not sure we have enough evidence of some sort of doctrinal bias - or any sort of bias at all - in the US Army against gadgets or tech in general.
It's certainly obvious the US Army wasn't the "techno freak" the German armed forces often seemed to be... but then there's the question of necessity for the Germans. They needed something to make up the material inequailties they faced. I'm not sure if German's quest for the "superweapons" is a sign of technical bias or just desperation.
But back to the US Army...
Normandy: The high turnover rate for commanders is more sign that the higher-ups were out of touch with the realities of the situation, not that they - or anyone - had some sort of bias against gadgetry. I think what's needed to demonstrate that anti-gadget bias is examples of rejected techs. Esp. techs that the Commonwealth was using. There seems to be good examples of this for Omaha beach... so, how about examples for Normandy? (I wonder if this will quickly become an examination of tactics, not techs.)
And remember, I'm not an expert, nor am I telepathic - it may be obvious to others, but not to me. (That's why I'm asking, eh?)
Tanks and Tank destroyers: Bigger guns and thicker armor certainly would have been nice. However, the US Army did have:
Bazookas (They pre-dated a successfull 'shreck design, didn't they?)
Tac. bombers, and good coordination with them
Tungsten and other advanced ammo.
Wet storage
Designated TDs (something like an 88 or a really-long 75/6 on the TDs would have been great - but, combined with the advanced ammo, I thought they were actually rather successfull. Is that incorrect?)
As examples of "techie" things.
And then there's the fact that the Allies were, in fact, winning. Thus no "neccessity" to respond to. Bigger guns/thicker armor would have cost more $$ and some time... Not introducing a Tiger or Panther equivilent certainly shows the lack of a pro-gadget/tech bias, but, from what I've seen so far, it doesn't seem to indicate an anti-tech bias.
I think what might be needed to show an anti-tech bias is a consistent record of rejecting new technologies when those technologies were needed, or at least obviously worth the time and (especially) money they'd cost. A small research and development budget would be a good indicator too.
I really would like more examples. I used to think that the US had missed the U-boat, tech wise, but in recent years I've come accross what seemed to be many examples of US technical innovation in other branches, some in the Army... but mostly a greater appreciation of how well the Army's rather boring tech did compared to the flashy German stuff.The Army on the otherhand, seems particularly in WWII to have been rather hidebound and conservative in its outlook, to a certain extent
This is a bit of a oversimplification, but it might clarify things: Maybe the US Army only seems to have been hidebound when compared to the German armed forces. The questionable record of the German advanced weapons, furthermore, implies that even if the US policy wasn't the correct one, it was in no way obviously incorrect.
[ June 14, 2002, 08:46 AM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]
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Actually, Jason, I think you'll find that his contention is simply that they were relieved for lack of progress. An atypical turnover in commanders during the period in question should be easy to prove or disprove, for those who know which records to look at, I'd think.Originally posted by JasonC:"It reminded me, more than anything of the first few years of WWI, when British commanders were relieved for the inability of their men to overcome the German defences on the Western Front"
Because they didn't have... funnies. Praise be to the funnies. I don't have to make these things up. Your statements are sillier than the silliest straw man I could construct.
Why the troops were making insufficient progress (or not, that's debatable too) is a completely different question. I'm afraid, Jason, that your position on this issue isn't very clear in your last response. Why do you think the commanders were being relieved? Or do you deny that commanders were relieved in unusual numbers during (early?) Normandy?
(We all agree that Jason was simply being unclear, right? Not just willfully misintrepreting Brian's post, or demonstrating grammer-school level reading comprehension.)
[ June 13, 2002, 07:03 PM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]
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(Yes, that's what I meant - "sheer fantasy.")Yes, a fantasy created by Jason, I think you'll find Tarqulene.
Was that explicit? (ie, "I sacked so-and-so because he didn't push his men hard enough.")In the eyes of the higher-ups, it was the fault of the commanders that they had failed to press their men to advance,
Do you (or anyone else) know if the lower ranks/ enlisted pressed for more gadgetry? I'd gotten the impression somewhere that the guys on the line, at least, were all for new gadgets.
Sorry, I'm neither anywhere near an expert nor am I telepathic...As to Omaha being a frontal assault, without any effort to make use of "gadgetry" to achieve its objective, I'd have thought it was rather obvious.
The whole US Army? They weren't used at Utah either, then? Weren't needed at Utah?The commander of that beach reluctantly took some DDs but only when pressed to do so by Eisenhower, as I understand it. The US Army refused any of the other "funnies".
And offer for the "funnies" was on the table well before the landings? There would have been time to train with them?
Doctrine, the US, and gadgets: How about Marines in the Pacific and gadgets?
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I love "racing the clock" in strategy games - it's a great way to balance almost any game.What happened was I just didn't get there in time.Have you ever tried "bidding" on the number of turns in a QB or scenario? Given certain map characteristics and force ratios (4000 attacker vrs. 1500 defender, for example) you and your opponent bid on the number of turns necessary to take all the flags (if you design/alter the map yourself) or defeat the enemy. The low bidder plays as the attacker. (Or the high bidder the defender - either way works.)
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There are obviously many people concerned with the date of CMBB's release. Frankly, I think BTS is just spoiling your fun. But you don't _need_ BTS to give you a date. I suggest you just pick June 22nd as the day it's supposed to come out.
For the next couple of weeks you can discuss how happy you are that the game's finally going to come out, and how much you're anticipating ordering/getting the game on the 22nd. Then, when the game doesn't come out on the 22nd, you can immedietly start complaining about the game not coming out, laying the blame, argueing about whether they should have relased it on time or keep working on it, etc. etc. See? No need for BTS to be involved at all.
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The part where Brain pretended "everything else" was "Somme revisited"? I agree, sheer fantasy.Pretending everything else was mindless first day of Somme revisited, however, is beyond strawman, it is sheer fantasy.
I assumed, Brian, that you were in touch with JasonC via e-mail, and he was simply responding to your arguments here. It seems that this is not, in fact, the case.
So, Brain, what is your argument, the support for your statements?
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FWIW: In a recent game, either through brilliant thinking on my part, or gross stupidity (I'm not telling), an M10 and a platoon of my Heer infantry ended a turn with the infantry surrounding the M10, each squad 10-20m from the M10.Originally posted by Silvio Manuel:[QB]Some ppl say that you're better off NOT manually targeting your squads on the AFV you want your 'fausts to hit...I agree with that though I don't have much exp. so who knows.
During the orders phase I had each squad target the M10. The first second of the next turn every squad fired and hit with 'fausts, causing the M10 to brew up. (I laughed and laughed and laughed....) So in this case manually targeting the AFV worked.
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Did I ever mention that I think reading the terrain is the most important skill? Well, I meant to.the most important thing posted on this thread was that it depends on the map. + 
What I was thinking is that someone could post a well-landmarked map file.Unfortunatly even a view 8 map would not suffice or I would paste one to work from,]
Hmm... this is sounding like fun... units could be placed via the editor, and discussion could be helped along by screen shots showing specific LOSs, ATG placement, brew-ups
, etc.Anyone want to suggest a map/scenario that'd be good for discussion? (I don't have any suggestions.)
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As a matter of fact, SARMV was run under the same budget as the BVT (Ballistic Vodka Tuber) project. They shared a number of the same facilities, until the voles ate all the mashed potatoes, which scuttled BVT. (It probably wasn't an accident. BVT's administrator was a considered a Trotskyite.)For current state of the art in this type of weaponry, see this page![/QB]On a slightly different subject, I was re-reading R.K. Findminder's _The Mammals of War_ and it mentioned that the Soviet's planned to have paratroopers drop with several cows using double-paras. Supposedly the cows would be used either as mounts, food, or bombs. Anyone know anything else about this? I know the Sovs. didn't really get into airborne operations... The book doesn't give details.
[ June 03, 2002, 11:29 PM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]
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That's very true.the problem is not the MG42. the problem is the 1/4" armor on the HT. technically in theory, all it takes is a Mauser 98k to kill an M3/M3A1 HT.In fact, the Russians were experimenting with using sufficiently accelerated red meadow voles in the late 1930s. AP ammo was pretty difficult to manufacture, and rodents were seen as a possible cheap alternative for use against lightly armored targets.
They key concept was the creation of a sort of crude discarding sabot effect. A tapered barrel was used to increase velocity. This also squeezed and heated the flesh. This would loosen it, and the flesh would quickly fall away in flight, leaving the sharply pointed skull to strike the target.
They also tried augmenting the voles, of course. The most succesfull was probably the "penetrating suppository" (I forget the Russian term) applied to the animal just before firing. But they were almost as expensive as a normal AT bullet, and very unpopular with the troops, who at first misunderstood how they were to be used.
Apparently the program was going well, but when the war broke out they lost access to more of the voles, which are native to France. They then tried using desert hyraxes and several types of Siberian muskrat, but they never really worked out (the smell mostly, IIRC) and the program was abandoned.
There were a number of practical trials, though. They're rare, but you can still sometimes see modified Winter War AT rifles with the underslung "Rat Chucker" attachement.
[ June 03, 2002, 11:54 AM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]
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I like the idea of a tank tactics thread... I was about to start one, but I think it'd be much more usefull if someone less lazy than I posted a map and an OoB to "hang" the discussion on.Yes, we could go round and round with example, counter-example etc all day long.(I think that's why the discussion has tended to be unsatisfying for some people when to gets down to the practical specifics. So many variables, so many counters. Priest - to pick someone completely at random - has done a fine job of presenting what he'd do, but pretty much neglected all the counter-tactics and qualifiers. I think that's OK, because it'd take for-bloody-ever to get into them all.
Unless I'm looking at a specific map and OOB, I don't even like to "discuss" tactics. I like seeing techniques described, and discussing general principles, but I think that's all that you can do constructively without refering to a specific situation.)
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Here's what I say to that:Originally posted by Sir Uber General:[QB]Priest - what do you say to the arguement that gun-for-tank exchanges will favour the defender,
1) Artillery (both HE and smoke) and infantry. (In other words, try to avoid playing the gun-for-tank game.)
2) Local superiority. The tanks are moblie, the AT guns aren't. (Good overlapping fields of ATG fire is a nightmare, though. My response to _that_ is generally "What happened to all my tanks?")
I think gun-for-tank exchanges favoring the defender are not a general principle, but simply an example of what happens when the defender is smarter than the attacker.
Hopefully an attacker can use 1 and 2 above to create a favorable ratio. However, an unfavorable ratio still isn't necessarily a Bad Thing for the attacker. If the attacker is parked on the objectives at the end of the battle, and didn't take _too_ many losses: bully!
I feel _very_ satisfied if I can beat an ATG defense and never give some of the guns the opportunity to fire at a tank. I might loose 3 tanks for every ATG - but if I only face off against 1 ATG, I'm still ahead of the game. (Assuming I've got well over 3 tanks total, of course.)
[ June 03, 2002, 11:00 AM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]
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My "It's because of early experiences with armor." theory of CM attack/defense difficulty:A unit of 2 or 4 single items that die on single shots each is extremly fragile.Beginning players tend to start with smaller QBs and scenarios.
Such players will tend to loose a _lot_ of armor to "bad luck." (It's hard for a beginer to manufacture the opportunities that lead to good luck.)
Chance, being a numbers game, will favor the player with the highest # of armor units - generally the _attacker_.
Thus, (the theory goes) beginning players will often get the impression that defending is harder than attacking, since the armored battle so often goes to the attacker.
Now, I don't think that all (or any of) the people here who think defending is easier are beginners, but I do think that early impressions often last a long time.* Esp. in this case: Early troubles with defending armor may cause a player to loose faith in it's effectiveness (echos of the "mental attitude" debate), and fail to fully exploit it even after "beginner" status is lost.
As #s increase offense is generally more important than defense. (True in many games.) And the Big Cats greatest's improvement over the PzIVs is armor, IMO.As a side note, I find it interesting that Priest is voluntarily using Pz IV, they rock, but few people believe it.
OTOH, I seem to NEED for a significant fraction of the hits against my tanks to fail in order to get anywhere.
I really need to practice finding elevation based cover. *I cite the fact that the X-Files lasted longer than 4 seasons.
WWII doctrines
in Combat Mission Archive #4 (2002)
Posted
I guess what I'm trying to get at is the bare fact that there was a high turnover rate doesn't really matter. It's certainly interesting, and lends support to your argument, but I don't think you can stand on it alone.
What do you have to say about the "bigger hammer" of the American artillery? Jasons post certainly certainly doesn't _rule out_ the possibility that many American commanders weren't using it properly, but I found it more persuasive than the bare fact that many commanders were sacked.