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husky65

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Posts posted by husky65

  1. Originally posted by husky65:

    OK, I have found the problem - for some reason 'Refreshlock' (a refresh rate fix) introduces the pause that I mentioned.

    If I turn it off the game works with no pause.

    Turn it on I get the pause.

    I don't know if this is the case with other refresh rate fixes, but is probably worth looking into at some stage.

    At the moment it is an easy fix, just turn off refreshlock.

  2. Originally posted by Hubert Cater:

    Hi Everyone!

    I am pleased to announce an update to the Gold Demo that now includes DirectX support.

    For info, the DirectX version seems markedly slower when the 'pop up windows' (such as the reinforcement menu, research menu and unit purchase menu are selected) - there is a definite pause before they display now.

    I am running XP pro, with SC run as win 98/ME in compatability mode.

    I will try running it without compatability mode to see if it helps.

  3. Originally posted by Sol Invictus:

    Ahh, capturing Gibraltar and getting the Italian navy into the Atlantic; it is a dream I have.

    Invade England, if you do well Spain will join you, giving you a land path (and a few units) to attack Gib.

    If you defeat England you get Gib anyway.

  4. Originally posted by Massattack:

    "Rubbish", "Fail" "Pathetic", just some of the words used by Husky in his numerous postings throughout this thread.

    When people post rubbish, I'll call it that - grown ups can survive this.

    For example the part of the post that I called rubbish, suggested that the Germans were capable of concentrating a massive force against the Overlord invasion beaches and that the force had been spread because of deception, both aspects of it were rubbish - the German force was spread to cover all possibilities as is standard, deception just delayed the redeployment of the other forces.

    Equally the Germans were incapable of concentrating a force against the initial allied force of 5 inf divs, 3 armoured brigades (each having the same tank strength as an armoured div) and 3 airborne divs.

    German forces were only 6 Inf Divs and 1 x Pz Div (all heavily understrength) within immediate range of the D-Day beaches and were subject to massive NGS plus heavy air attack.

    A further 6 inf Divs and 3 Pz Divs (all understrength) were within 100 miles, but had to cope with massive air attacks, destroyed bridges, partisan attack and the standard german logistic problems of the time.

    Moving anything by day was acknowledged as a way to lose it to Jabos.

    To quote Rommel in a report to Hitler in 1943 re defending the French coastline - 'British and American superiority in the air alone has again been so effective that all movement of major formations has been rendered completely impossible, both at the front and behind it, by day and by night'

    Suggesting that the forces could have made a difference if 'handled better' simply flys in the face of facts.

    [ July 28, 2002, 07:55 PM: Message edited by: husky65 ]

  5. Originally posted by R_Leete:

    Sort of off-topic, but has anyone seen the US enter the war within the demo?

    Yes, the US enters routinely if the UK is invaded, usually their troops are unable to get ashore before you can finish off the brits and they turn back.
  6. Originally posted by Randell Daigre:

    Anyone who thinks that the success of Overlord was a forgone conclusion should visit the National D-Day Museum in New Orleans, Louisiana. One of the displays there is an apology, written on June 5, 1944. This apology takes full responsibility for the failure of the Overlord invasion and the attendant loss of lives and war material. The author of this apology was Gen. Dwight David Eisenhower.

    The fact that Eisenhower prepared for a failure of D-Day does not make it likely, just shows that (as noted above), he lacked all the facts that we now have, and that he was a conscientious leader who planned for the worst case as well as the likely case.
  7. Originally posted by Massattack:

    [QB] Of course its easy to make opinions like Husky's with the benefit of hindsight.

    [QB]

    Agreed, that is why they did so much contingency planning and why they went with such overwhelming force.

    6 Jun Luftflotte 3 put up a total of 319 sorties, the allies 10,585 sorties - a ratio of 33:1

  8. "Folks,

    If you cant recognize this by now, shame on you. Already shame on me. None of us has made the statement that US, or Western Allies relied solely on finesse, nor that brute strength wasnt used, and used effectively at times. Husky will simply discount any examples you use, carry your examples to ludicrous ends and generally discount any and all sources which dont support his arguement."

    Good move, play the man not the ball - going ad hom does not support your argument, it just points out the weakness of it.

    "I would be more then willing to compare professional credentials. Husky has read many books, and that is admirable. I am not trying to be glib, I do admire the fact you bother to research instead of relying on one book or one source. However, some of us have been cited in books, have National planning experience and have actually come under fire. "

    None of which changes well documented facts, to date I have been presented with a couple of int coups, some tactical examples and Midway as evidence that the allies were masters of finesse.

    All of which are countered by example after example that I have given - look at the Med - we didn't even have a plan for it.

    "The one thing I wont accept, no matter how impassioned your arguement is this casting of the Western Alliance as ignorant brutes while showing the German soldier as some sort of shining Knight on a noble cause and the epitome of tactical finesse."

    The German Generals were frequently better than ours and their troops were frequently better than ours, they were hamstrung by an idiot in charge, a farcical production system, lack of resources, and an inability to play with the big boys when it came to the all important numbers game to name but a few things.

    They (Hitler) willingly took on 3 superpowers simultaneously, they were never going to win.

    " Almost seems some think the wrong side won the war?"

    So if we are not on your side we are neo-nazis?

    Congrats, that is taking ad hom to a new, and genuinely pathetic, level that I have not seen before in years of reading usenet posts.

  9. Originally posted by Bill Macon:

    Snipped bit about how other games have faked it for years - I still have not heard one example from WW2 suggesting that Paras could sieze a 50 mile area.

    "This discussion is getting unprofessional. "

    I'm not getting paid for this discussion, are you?

    "This is a game. It is not real. It is entertainment. SC can expand to accomodate various advanced game features and options that players may select. A compromise solution is possible here for those willing to accept one. I fully expect Hubert to consider airborne at least as an option in some future version,"

    I don't care what Hubert does in a future version, I will decide to buy or not buy SC2, 3 etc on its merits, however, having bought SC1, I will continue to lobby against ANY inclusion of such an absurd idea as Paras at this scale, as is my right.

    " but that's his design decision to make. I suggest we all wait to see what happens and give our attitudes a chance to cool off. [And that includes my own airborne-ranger-infantry hardheaded arrogance. ]"

    As long as anyone is lobbying to include Paras in SC1 I will oppose it, the programming time is better spent on almost any other feature.

  10. Originally posted by David Brown:

    "An effective, good, and dare I say, 'finessed' use of intelligence is good strategy. The Western Allies did not, in the case of Overlord, rely strictly on overwhelming material force to get ashore."

    Of course they did - they used deception to delay the reaction, not to get ashore - they used B17s as decoy ducks for 6 months to get air superiority to get ashore, they used a mass of naval bombardment, air bombardment etc to get ashore - and then in a brilliant piece of strategy, did so in Bocage country that was great defending country...

    " Without the proper use of intelligence, in a strategic sense, I do maintain that Overlord might have failed - it was never a given. You wrote:"

    Overlord was a given, the intelligence delayed the response but frankly it wasn't that big a deal - the allies had the airpower to drop the critical bridges and keep them down, as well as the fighter bombers to decimate AFVs and supporting vehicles on the move to the area.

    "Remember that the landings against Salerno did not have the same success, despite local air and sea superiority:"

    And without anywhere near the commitment of forces and supply that was used in overlord.

    "The Allies failed to break out of the Salerno beachead due to overwhelming enemy numbers and tough German defenses. The American and British forces remained pinned to the coast until the British Eighth Army threatened Kesselring's troops from the south and forced them to withdraw up the peninsula. A week after the Salerno landings the British Eighth Army made contact with the American Fifth Army ending the greatest worries of the Allied leaders."

    [Dr. Robert M. Browning, Jr]

    I have no idea why you raised Salerno, it was just another continuation of allied lack of strategy - to quote Monty "I have not been told of any master plan for this theater and I must therefore assume that there was none".

    The entire Med theater was done 'off the cuff' and with NO strategy for victory, is it any wonder that an unplanned sideshow of a sideshow theater that had limited US support and was mainly intended to tie down German units was not an immediate huge success?

    However, NGS was very effective against German tanks, at Gela a Col of the HG Div stated that 'naval gunfire forced us to withdraw' - his unit lost 50% of its Tanks in several hours.

    Eisenhower commented in his dispatch on the Sicily campaign that NGS had proved 'so devestating in its effectiveness as to dispose finally of any doubts that naval guns are suitable for shore bombardment'

    and at Salerno von Vietinghoff said 'above all the advancing troops had to endure the most severe heavy fire that had hitherto been experienced; the naval gunfire from ships lying in the roadstead. with astonishing precision and freedom of manouvre, these ships shot at every recognised target with very overwhelming effect'.

    in Overlord according to one SS officer cadet: 'our counter-attack was brought to a standstill mainly by the arty of the invasion fleet. because of this concentrated fire, such as I had never seen before on any european battlefield, both officers and men became demoralised and were forced to dig in'

    (I could add the destruction of the remnants of 4 Pz divs around Mortain on 7 Aug, or 29 Jun - 2 SS Pz Corps or Rundsteadts report that NGS had 'inflicted particularly heavy damage on our assault formations' - suffice to say that NGS and Fighter bombers had the ability of the Germans to counter attack under control)

    "For Overlord itself, there were serious problems at Omaha beach. High seas and shore bluffs greatly reduced naval gunfire accuracy."

    But had no effect on the mass of available fighter bombers.

    " The point is that as significant as naval gunfire can be, it is no guarantee of success."

    It is when combined with massive air superiority.

    "After all, Rommel had 34 divisions under his command to face 5 Allied divisions. Had the Germans handled their forces better, and had they not been spread out due to the Allied deception, Overlord might have been a disaster."

    Rubbish - had the germans concentrated, then the NGS would have had a field day and it would have been an early Xmas for the Typhoons.

    Its also worth noting that most of the German divs were (if full strength) less powerful than an equivalent allied div and none of them were near establishment strength.

    1 Jun 1944 1 and 2 SS Pz Divs reported tank strengths of 88 and 69 respectively - their authorised strengths were 200 tanks and the Germand had aprox 17 replacements available.

    You also ignore the 'sub divisional' units that the allies put in, mostly armoured brigades - in 1st CDN and 2nd Brit armies these were mostly armoured brigades (10 of which went in in Jun/July 44) and each of these Bdes had almost exactly the same tank strength as an Armoured Div.

    The US aslo put in sub div units - tank and tank destroyer Bns, at the end of jul 1944 14 tank and 22 TD bns were in Normandy.

    Tanks committed to normandy Jun/July 1944

    Germans - 1347 tanks + 337 assault guns.

    Allied - Medium 5,083 + Light 1,411 + SP Guns 1,182

    Unlike the German (OKW war diary) figures, the allied figures don't include replacement vehicles, the US was losing about 500 shermans a month in Normandy (and there is no reason to suggest the Brits/Canadians were losing markedly less), so you can tack on about another 2000 allied medium tanks shipped in to the above numbers.

    OB West could call on 45 inf divs, 26 divs were static and many of the others were poorly manned/equipped - by mid 44 their best troops were on the eastern front and had been replaced by 18 year olds, men over 35, men with 3rd degree frostbite etc.

    Army group B (forces nth of the Loire) at the end of Jan 44 had only 170 75mm AT guns and 68 88mms + 4 of its Divs had been stripped of their assault guns (they were sent to bolster the Rumanians in the east).

    "You wrote much earlier, "the allies didn't use finesse". I don't think that anyone is disagreeing with you that the Allies certainly did use their material superiority to win the war, but I, amongst others, are simply claiming that there were indeed cases where the Allies did show good strategic planning and execution sometimes (as well as showing poor strategic planning and execution sometimes). You asked for examples of finesse: I gave Midway as an example. Your response was to claim the whole Pacific war was mishandled. Even if that is true (and I don't intend to argue it), that doesn't invalidate the Midway example."

    So you are claiming that because the allies did it once that invalidates the fact that they had a track record that covered rest of the war?

    "I'm still going to read Ellis as I earlier offered to do, and perhaps he'll convince me of your case better than you. My main contention is simple: as important as Allied material superiority during the war was (and it was important), it did not, in and of itself, predestine Allied victory. The Allies had to fight. Did they fight as well as the Germans? Perhaps, and perhaps not, but in the end they fought well enough."

    Of course they had to fight and they did so without finesse, by simple brute force, but the factories predetermined the outcome.

    [ July 27, 2002, 05:39 AM: Message edited by: husky65 ]

  11. Originally posted by Bill Macon:

    "Unless Hubert's changed his mind since April 21st and categorically ruled out airborne for future enhancements, I'd say it's still on the table for consideration and the general concensus appears to be that it should at least be included as an option."

    So now you are trying to apply Huberts quote in relation to a possible SC2 to SC1?

    Fail, Paras have been ruled out of SC1.

    " [Except for at least one individual who thinks it's a stupid idea regardless, but he doesn't have to click on the stupid option if he doesn't want to."

    But is still going to push to have Hubert not waste his time on a ridiculous feature.

    Thats the funny part, you see it as being perfectly valid for you to push for this one, absurd feature (taking up limited programming time) - yet don't see it as being valid for others to push for it to be ignored so that bug fixing/useful improvements can be made.

    See, it isn't 'just a switch that you don't have to select', it means some other feature wont get done.

    "Whenever Hubert gets around to looking at this again, here's a proposal: Airborne corps units should be like regular 10-factor corps units, but triple the build cost and triple the transport cost for airdrops. Airdrops should start in or adjacent to a city, have a range of 6 hexes, be vulnerable to air interception but also able to be escorted, and be eligible for a surprise bonus but subject to landing losses."

    Great so they can be dropped 250 miles behind enemy lines in one lift and the enemy has no chance to rebase fighters to take advantage of the ongoing turkey shoot that such an ongoing armarda would provide.

    " Unlike sea transport, airborne would have to load/move/unload all in the same turn. You obviously could not land on top of an enemy unit."

    Why not? historically they always landed within 50 miles of an enemy?

    " No special supply rules should apply except for supply/readiness requirements to make the airdrop. Once on the ground, airborne acts like regular infantry corps for combat and movement, "

    So what happens to the thousands of C-47s that dropped them, are they scrapped post jump?

    "This would give players the capability to perform expensive and risky airborne operations if the stategic situation presents opportunities to do so. Players would have to decide if it's worth it. This abstraction for airborne operations has been successful in Third Reich, World in Flames, Clash of Steel and other games at this scale,"

    No, it has been a farce, but airborne gaming zealots simply refuse to accept that and have continued to pretend it works, in spite of the obvious.

    " so should work fine in some future version of Strategic Command. "

    Good plan, continue the failures of others 'because they got away with it'.

  12. Originally posted by David Brown:

    " I think Midway was a fine example of finesse in action. "

    The entire Pacific war was a perfect example of a blundering colossus - the US fought 2 wars in the Pacific, had they only fought one they would have defeated Japan a year earlier.

    In fact you could also ask why they fought either of the two wars in the Pac they fought -

    they could have grabbed Java and Borneo (cut off the oil that the Japs needed) and then build subs to strangle Japan of other resources, base bombers and troops out of China, but no - they bludgeoned their way north along two seperate paths.

    "The Allied deception regarding Overlord (convincing the Germans that they were going to land in the Pas de Calais rather than Normandy) was an excellent example of finesse."

    But not strategic finesse, it was intelligence finesse.

    " Remember that despite overwhelming air superiority during the Overlord landings the Allies still only landed five divisions, nowhere near overwhelming ground superiority."

    The allies relied on overwhelming air superiority and fire superiority (both an example of 'mass production warfare').

    " Had the Germans concentrated forces at the landing sites they would have had a very good chance to throw the Allies back into the sea."

    None whatsoever, tanks do not fare well against BB and CA main guns.

    "The Overlord deception was an excellent example of finesse."

    Just not strategic finesse.

    "After the horrors of the trenches in WWI, the Western Allies were determined to defeat the Axis with material rather than human lives. This does not seem to me to be a particularly bad thing. It can lead to mistakes - but of course the Axis powers made huge errors as well."

    I don't recall saying it was a bad thing strategically.

  13. Originally posted by Marc:

    "I will try once again. Since Husky hasnt read the book in question, how can he make blanket statements?"

    Because Husky has read hundreds of books on the subject and one or two that purport to prove (in spite of the well documented facts) that the US was a shining example of strategic finesse are not going to change the overwhelming balance of evidence.

    "Did the US make use of its industrial might and production? OF COURSE. You play to your strengths and minimize the enemies weaknesses. Blunt force, properly applied, is very effective. The US had an excellent system for called fire. So the US didnt use outstanding small unit tactics to try and maneuver German units out of a particular position. Rather they could call on overwhelming firepower to flatten a position and then occupy it."

    Are you on your side of this argument or mine?

    Explain again about the strategic finesse of relying on overwhelming arty preperation and how that isn't just a production numbers game?

    By implication that would make the Somme in WW1 an example of finesse for both sides...

    "As to finesse, I am sure Huskey will tell you about Sgt Poole, and AMERICAN tank ace. Ah, wont you? Using the mobility of the Sherman he was well known in the western theater for knocking out numerous German tanks and assault guns, vehicles which had better armor, a better gun, and the advantage of being on the defensive."

    You are rather grabbing at straws here citing an individual tank commander as an example of US strategic finesse.

    " We hear of Whitman, why not Poole?"

    Because M. Wittmann killed 138 tanks and many of his opponents were not virtually immobilised by poor logistics and fear of air attack?, because Wittmann didn't have virtually unlimited logistic, air and arty support?, because Wittmann fought much of the war on the eastern front which made the western front look like a picnic?, because Wittmann was routinely heavily outnumbered by enemy tanks?,

    or perhaps it was for such achievements as destroying 6 Soviet tanks in one engagement - whilst in command of a Stug III ausf A

    "I will repeat, to continue the myth that the only reason the Western allies won the war is they threw massive amounts of equipment and manpower at the enemy simply isnt true."

    Yes it is, it has been well documented and well proven.

    "I served this country proudly for 25 years, my father, who passed away last year, landed at Omaha beach ON D-Day."

    None of which makes your arguments any more credible and is a pretty transparent appeal to emotion.

    " To make blanket claims which paint the American military as hulking Neanderthal's who use mass and human life in place of tactics, strategy, and finesse is simply a canard."

    The American military (and as I pointed out, the entire western allies) were hulking neanderthals that used mass in place of strategy - tell me again about how well run the Huertgen forest battles were and how strategicly vital that area was to winning the war?

    " And, as to "running away" I could see where this was going, since some are convinced they have the only "truth".

    You have yet to give anything except a tactical examples and then pretended that they apply to strategy.

  14. Originally posted by Fubarno:

    What is the definition of finess being discussed here? If it means snatching victories in the face of superior opposition on a shoe-string budget, well the U.S. certainly had finess in the pacific theatre. The ETO was given priority and so the commanders in the pacific had to definetly use alot of finess to pick and choose where they would commit their limited resources and still achieve victory, especially in the early part of the war. Examples: Coral sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, Burma, breaking the Japanese naval code, etc..

    I wish it were the case, breaking the codes was useful but once again the allies (US mostly) swamped the Japanese - Guadalcanal was a stunning lack of finesse, when urged to assault Guadalcanal on Aug 1, Ghormley (with MacArthurs support) delayed, turning it into a protracted campaign.

    When the Japanese were largely defeated and the survivors pushed into a corner of the island, inadequate patrolling on land sea and air allowed over 13,000 Japanese troops to be evacuated without a single ship being attacked.

    Midway was a combination of reading the enemys op plan, having an enemy that went for an over complicated plan and some luck.

    Burma, In the final march on Rangoon the allies had aprox 260,000 men V 20,000 Japs and 4,600 combat a/c V 66

    The allies in the Pacific were lower on the supply priority list than Europe, but the production superiority was such that in 1943 the US built 65 x CV, CVL or CVEs, in 1944 they built 45 x CV, CVL or CVEs - in the entire war the Japs built 17 x CV, CVL or CVEs.

    Total a/c production - 1939 to 45 USA = 324,750 - Japan = 76,320.

    Once again the allies used their massive production advantage and swamped the axis.

  15. Originally posted by Sol Invictus:

    The short front does present problems but this models the Quattara Depression fairly well. I think that the first time I play the Axis my main stategy after the fall of France will be a Malta then Suez push. I find that to be one of the most tantalizing what-ifs of WW2. It all depends on what the probabilities of an aggressive Russia are and whether there will be time to complete it before Russia stirs.

    I'm tempted to have the Germans go for GB, then attack USSR from the East and the Italians take the Med and try a southern attack on the USSR.

    Lots of other possibilities.

  16. Originally posted by Sol Invictus:

    Randell, I wasnt saying the American Military is and always has been completely incompetent. We have almost always had the luxury of almost unlimited resources and have been glad to throw them at anyone who has opposed us. Nothing wrong with that, if you can afford it; and America can. The Germans called it Materialschlacht.

    Exactly, when finesse fails it can fail VERY badly, suppose in WW2 Europe the 'single drive for Berlin' strategy (rather than the 'broad front' strategy) had been used, certainly precise application of force and an example of finesse - but if the enemy managed to cut off the salient - then we would have lost entire armies.

    Quite a few individual attacks on the broad front were stopped or only partly successful - but none of those defeats/delays threatened the eventual victory of the allies.

  17. Originally posted by Randell Daigre:

    " Patton was busy outflanking and encircling the German forces in Northwestern France (an encirclment the Canadian Army let the Germans slip out of)."

    Patton did well until he met the enemy, then he ground to a halt just like almost all the other allied commanders, he has been refered to as being one of the best traffic cops of the war.

    The outflanking and encircling bit is an example of the power of good PR and Hollywood - most of his German opponents were able to slip away from him.

    Re Falaise, Bradley ordered Patton not to close the bag, there is plenty of blame to go around for the failure to close the falaise pocket and half of it has to go to the US.

  18. Originally posted by Marc:

    I wish to apologize for wasting everyone's time. It is very evident Husky doesnt wish to discuss facts. I sited but one of many sources. Another is Weinberg's A World at Arms. I will know better in the future then to try to discuss with Husky or be baited by his posts. Once again my apologies to the rest of the list

    Cheers

    Marc

    Its good to see an attempt to put the boot in before running away disguised as an apology.

    Read John Ellis 'Brute Force', then you will understand - the allies didn't use finesse, in most cases this was a good idea, as sheer overwhelming force may not be as fast as finesse, but it also will not fail as badly if it goes wrong.

    BTW, since you haven't given ANY examples to support your contention that the US army (a force renowned for its lack of finesse and massive application of firepower) used finesse rather than production to solve its problems, so your self righteous posturing is a little unconvincing to say the least.

  19. Originally posted by Immer Etwas:

    "I would agree, and go so far as to suggest that in a future SC, we are provided another unit -- Mobile Artillery Detachment, on the order of the SiG or Wespe. Tech affected or not. Range could be 2, and cost appropriate to prevent abuse."

    The SiG was a direct fire 150mm and the Wespe an indirect fire 105mm, neither would reach halfway across the hex they are in, let alone reach 2 hexes.

  20. Originally posted by gunnergoz:

    Anybody consider the fact that thousands of paras need hundreds of transport aircraft and the air superiority fighters to go with them? ..

    Already been mentioned, as has the inability at this scale of simulating supply efforts, the lack of an opportunity for the defender to attack such supply efforts (because of the scale), the limited number of troops who will volunteer for such ops (the allied airborne army involved in Market Garden was only about 35,000 troops, and still the allies lacked enough Tpt a/c to move them in one lift), Paras don't sieze areas - they sieze critical objectives (that are not in the game because of the scale) and no one has given any examples of where they have worked on this scale.

    Paras have been ruled out by Hubert with good reason.

  21. Originally posted by Marc:

    "I didnt say production played no part."

    Production was the key factor.

    " But the myth that it was just sheer numbers which prevailed is not only false but an insult to the western allies who fought in Europe. "

    Oh, dear the tired old defence that the truth is an insult to etc..

    Fail.

    I have great respect for the poor bastards who were sent up in B17s to be clay pigeons and later decoy ducks for the luftwaffe, I'd have diverted to Sweden and sat the war out, I have great respect for men sent up against Panthers in Shermans - no matter how many Shermans we had, and led by people like Patton (for whom I have no respect at all) against people like Rommel and Rundstedt - but pretending that the allies did it with finesse is simply untrue.

    "Once again, I humbly suggest the book by Doubler that I listed for insight into just how much finesse the US could manage."

    I've already seen how much finesse the US could manage, it was done in factories on a vast scale.

  22. Originally posted by Bill Macon:

    "By your reasoning, paras should not work in Third Reich (with 3-month seasonal turns) or in World in Flames (with 2-month turns) or other similar games at the SC scale with 50-mile hexes; however (surprise!), they seem to have worked very well in those games for many years with no uproar for their complete removal from gameplay. "

    The fact that they have been unrealistically implemented for years is no reason to continue the practice.

    They haven't worked well, its just airborne enthusiasts have been unwilling to admit that they shouldn't have been there in the first place.

    I'm still waiting for any historical examples that justify their inclusion.

    Bueller... Bueller...

  23. Originally posted by Bill Macon:

    My comments are intended to influence future enhancements as well - at this scale Paras don't work and I have given a heap of reasons why they don't work (and will continue to provide them as neccessary).

    If SC2 or 3 is smaller scale then Paras may fit and I will drop my objections, but as long as the current scale is maintained adding them detracts from the game and also takes time away from Hubert either-

    1. bug hunting,

    2. adding real enhancements, or

    3. rolling about in his new found wealth cackling insanely.

    all of which are more productive than him wasting time trying to hammer the square 'para peg' into the SC round hole...

  24. Originally posted by commi18:

    all this is true, but i would never use them to go to like warsaw or some location that is unreachable in like a turn or two, the reason to use these guys is to either cap and hold afew MPP

    's for a turn or so, or use them like a distraction and then punch a hole in the enemy line to get to your paratroopers

    Use them like a distraction? you do know that Paras are volunteers don't you?

    IRL you tell an airborne Bn, 'men we are dropping you 300 miles behind enemy lines, do what damage you can until you are wiped out' and just watch the Maroon Berets pile up as they unvolunteer at you.

    Reachable in 'a turn or two' is a week to two months depending on season, hardly an amount of time you can expect Paras to hold.

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