John D Salt
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Posts posted by John D Salt
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?Originally posted by Corvidae:What is ...
</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />"Hardware fetishism"
Honestly, I realy have no clue. </font>
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AIUI the main characteristic favouring good hull-down positions is main gun depression. In this respect the Sherman has a very slight advantage over the German mediums; 10 degrees against 8.Originally posted by bitchen frizzy:Sounds like a bit of uninformed folklore. Height is actually a disadvantage in going hull down.
All the best,
John.
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I'd recommend Charles Messenger's "The Tunisian Campaign", Ian Allan, 1982. It's slightly marred by some dodgy proof-reading (General Fredendall's name is misspelt "Fredenhall" throughout), but is a clear and concise description of who went where and did what in what order. Amazon have cheap second-hand copies available.Originally posted by Bigduke6:I'm looking for:
1) An operational campaign history or two, as non-country-specific. I don't need diplomacy as much as a picture of the terrain, units, operational priorities, etc.
"An Army at Dawn" is good, but much longer, and focused very much on the Americans (and marred for Mr. Picky by the author's bizarre belief that VT fuzes were available in 1943). For an interesting comparison, another book -- though narrower still in focus -- written at the time about the US Army learning on the job is Ralph Ingersoll's "The Battle is the pay-off". As far as I know it has never been re-printed, so good luck finding a copy -- mine cost me quite a bit.
Alan Moorehead's "African Trilogy" is I think still good reading, and the best writer of that period of the war was probably Keith Douglas, whose "Alamein to Zem-Zem" is available in paperback.Originally posted by Bigduke6:2) Commonwealth first-hand accounts, just because I really enjoy the witty British writing style a la Masters, Slim, etc. Usually this is over-educated officers, but I'll read whomever.
All the best,
John.
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Great stuff!Originally posted by kdonahueus:I am the one that posted the "Photograph" website of the knocked out Panzer III L you have debated about.
Well, I heard it from the horses mouth so to speak as I interviewed in 2005 the British Anti-Tank commander who's crews were responsible for knocking it out. All of my findings are going into a book that I am writing. In short, the tank was hit by a British 6 pound ant-tank gun. Yes, it was hit with more rounds to spice up photos for American and British photographers who wanted some action photos.
Did the (apparently) dead crewman in the picture turn out to be posed? Or do we have to wait to buy the book to find out?
It's such a beautifully composed picture that I'm afraid my first thought was that it must be another production from "Chet's Circus" -- lovely photography, but totally fake.
All the best,
John.
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Yes, of course. I doubt there was any field gun in any army in WW2 that didn't.Originally posted by civdiv:I certainly claim to be no expert on the issue. But I did use to be an artillery FO, so I know something about arty. Does a 25 pdr have direct fire sights?
Yes it does. And before it did, the Gunners performed thoroughly effective tank shooting with HE shells, leaving the transport plug in instead of inserting the fuze.Originally posted by civdiv:Plus, due to the uniformity and large size of the holes, I assume they are solid shot. Again, I assume holes from HEAT would be smaller. 25 pdr doesn't have solid shot.
Given the number of well-attested occasions on which 25-pdr regiments engaged tanks with direct fire, it seems odd to discount the possibility; although it had doubtless become rarer by Medenine, it didn't cease until 155 battery's classic stand at Sidi Ndir in February 1943.
All the best,
John.
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I've not read "Pershing", but "Sherman" is superb, and his "Half-track" very good indeed. The reason this author's books don't come cheap is that they are worth the money, and people who have copies are hanging on to them.Originally posted by DonsBoy88:[snips]
Anyway I've not read either book so if you have can you give your views on them.
There is probably always more to say about so prolific a tank as the Sherman, so I would recommend Mark Hayward's "Sherman Firefly" as a very useful supplement on 17-pounder Shermans.
All the best,
John.
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My point was that something that does not follow the method or discipline of OR should not be misrepresented as being an OR study.Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:I’m not sure I understand your first sentence. They are personal observations so they hold less weight? Is that your point?
Oh, doubtless they were. However, that APHE was effective in setting unprotected ammunition on fire does not necessarily imply that AP was less effective, which is the inference you seem to be drawing.Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:Ok, so they added stowage bins and added encased ready racks or whatever. Good idea. But how does this equate to bursting charges being ineffective? If they added storage bins maybe it was because bursting charges were effective?
Yes indeed, I rather fancy I raised this point myself.Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:The British did use a bursting charges in the early version of 2-pdr AP. It's commented upon in one of those bits I quoted from Jentz.
Indeed, but this was a considerable time before the 1941-42 experience on which ammo stowage policy was later based, was it not?Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:In addition, I think you commented earlier upon 3-pdr AP-HE -- I assumed you were refering to the 3pdr tank gun. It seemed to have been used by the Land Service early on.
Nor do I. But I should be grateful if anyone who thinks that Jentz is supporting John K's portrayal of APHE as a wonder-weapon could point out where, precisely, Jentz claims that the fires suffered by British tanks when hit were due to the ammunition nature rather than the ammunition stowage policy.Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:And I find no reason to disbelieve master Jentz
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This seems to directly contradict Hogg's statement about the apparent lack of improvement in BAE with the 2-pounder.Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:Moreover discontinued use by the British, as I have already stated, appears to be associated with the ability of AP-solid to perforate more armor than AP-HE.
No, anyone who has spent any time arguing with John K knows perfectly well that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. They also know where that line of reasoning ends up, sooner or later.Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:Regarding Crisp and the like, lack of evidence is now evidence?
If it was as effective as John K claims, then I find it very surprising indeed that it has escaped comment to the degree it apparently has. Or maybe there are such comments, and I've missed them.Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:Nobody mentioned it therefore it's not effective?
Maybe. In which case, one would expect to see figures showing a higher proportion of crew casualties in knocked-out British tanks than German ones knocked out by British shot. If anyone has such figures, I'm all ears.Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:Maybe because the guys that were most effected by a bursting charges weren’t around after the fact to comment upon the effectiveness.
The figures I have on percentage crew casualties from British vehicles do not seem to show significantly higher lethality from penetrations by German ATk guns (most of them presumably firing APCBCHE) than from "Bazooka" (Panzerschreck and Panzerfaust). That may not be a fair analogue to AP, as the HEAT penetrator is going in very much faster than any AP round would. It would be interesting to know if the Germans suffered less than an average of about one killed and one wounded per tank knocked out by solid shot.
That's not all I was doing, I was also pointing out that merely counting fragments disregards their distribution in time and space.Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:All your doing is reiterating that the British had a different philosophy on this subject than the US, Germans, Russians and Italians.
Because the British were the only power to try both natures, and abandoned APHE? As far as I know, everyone else went for APHE all through, although the Russians filled in the BR-240 burster cavity to produce BR-240SP, which suggests to me that they didn't think the burster worth the trouble in 45mm calibre.Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:Why would I be inclined to think the British approach in using solid shot is more valid than any of these other group of folks and their use of AP-shell?
Although British policy on ammunition natures (and other things, too!) looks idiosyncratic, I don't personally think that the behaviour of delay fuzes and bursting charges undergoes enormous changes from one nationality to another. It may be that the 2-pounder APHE was simply a bad design, from which an over-general conclusion was drawn and then never changed (like the British Army's habit of breaking step when crossing bridges, a pointless practice based on a single unpleasant experience). However, given one data point that clearly says APHE was no better than AP, and as far as I can see none that clearly say the reverse, it seems to me obvious what the sceptical observer would conclude.Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:The fact that British experience with AP-shell was poor doesn’t help to bring me to a conclusion that the same is true for US, Russian, German or Italian AP-shell.
As ever, we need more data.
All the best,
John.
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But merely counting the number of effective fragments doesn't give you the whole story. It also matters how they are distributed in space (viz. John K's own example of the poor side-spray from a 20mm round) and in time.Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:To me the math is that simple. Both AP-shot & AP-Shell get fragmentation from perforation of the plate. The AP-shell gets bonus fragmentation if the bursting charge functions. But it is not worth it to me to try and convince anyone of this. Folks are gonna’ believe whatever they want. I mean we all have to find our own way to truth.
As to the time element, according to Nathan Okun's page:
http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-020.htm
...the minimum delay to be expected from a mechanical fuze is of the order of 0.003 sec; I don't know what the actual fuze delays from PzGr39 would have been, but I imagine that a mechanical fuze would not have an extended zone. If anyone has any information, please let me know.
Taking this figure, and assuming a projectile moving at 2,000 feet per second, this corresponds to a distance travelled before detonation of six feet. I find it hard to imagine where, inside a WW2 AFV, one could trace a shotline six feet in length without hitting all sorts fo things.
Of course the residual velocity after penetration could be much less, in fact could be anything down to zero (if it embeds in the armour). Given the reduced distance of travel before detonantion, and the reduced forward throw of the fragment spray, I would expect the relative value of a burster charge to increase as the residual velocity of the projectile fell. We also know that the fragmentation produced by penetration of non-exploding projectiles increases as the square of the velocity. So I would expect both the value of APHE and the need for it to decrease as residual velocity increases. In other words, I would expect that it might have some value in converting marginal cases to kills (viz. Jarret's mention of incomplete performations), but, especially in small calibres, I see no reason to disbelieve Master Gunner Hogg when he says that it isn't worthwhile.
The passages from Jarrett John K seems to have agreed are his source are, let us be clear, not OR studies (MELF stands for Middle East Land Forces, btw, John), they are personal observations. When I read them I took them to be an indication of the need to improve ammunition stowage to prevent "brew-ups", and on re-reading they still seems to say the same. British tank desgners took up a policy to deal with this problem, adding armoured stowage bins and declining to stow ammunition above the turret-ring. If the passages were really intended to convey the message that APHE is a crew-killing wonder-weapon, then I am at a loss to explain why nobody in the OR or tank design communities ever (as far as I know) called for APHE to be adopted for land service, or why the supposedly fearsome destructive qualities of APHE mysteriously escape mention in all the personal recollections of British tank crew members (Joly, Crisp, Tout, Foley, Wilson, Farrell, Hills, Dyson -- there are quite a few of them).
All the best,
John.
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Well, yes, if you believe that fuzes are ordered into production without checking that they function properly. It would be nice to think that British defence procurement didn't do things like that, but...Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:My point in going back to WWI is only that the ability to produce a base fuze says nothing about whether or not the device was capable of functioning properly.
Nope, I'm afraid the Hogg piece I quoted is my only source for this (and he doesn't specifically say "trials", although I can't imagine where else "experience" would come from).Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:My question is more specific to source material regarding side-by-side testing of behind armor effects of 2pdr solid shot and 2pdr APHE.
You indicated in one of your posts above:
“Trials with the 2-pdr found not a ha'porth of difference between AP and APHE rounds, so the APHE was never ordered into full production.”
I’m not disagreeing with you (nor am I agreeing with you for that matter). I’m simply interested in a cite for the original report\reports that detail the effectiveness of solid 2-pdr AP vs. 2-pdr AP-HE. Can this be found in a WO report? If so do you by chance have the number\numbers?
There are a couple of things in the WO32 series that look as if they might be helpful, and I'll try to remember to take a peek at them next time I'm at the PRO, but that will probably not be for quite a while.
All the best,
John.
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So would I listen, if I could hear what he has to say in his own words.Originally posted by John Kettler:The guy was where he was to identify and solve ordnance problems, and he and those working with him literally risked death to do so. If he tells you that German APHE could wreck a tank and crew without even a full penetration, I'd listen.
All the best,
John.
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Partly, but not entirely, it would appear. The following is quoted verbatim from the description of 2-pdr ammunition on page 75 of Ian Hogg's "British and American Artillery of World War 2", A&AP, 1978:Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:Interesting disscussion. I'd be interested in the source or a cite for side-by side testing reports conducted during this period for behind armor (armour) effects of solid shot vs. APHE. I know the British were not so keen on APHE, but was this a function of developing a reliable base fuze?
"Shell, AP, Mk. 1. This shell was part of the original specification for the gun, and was a piercing projectile with a tiny filling of Lyddite and the Base Fuze No. 281, which carried a tracer. Experience revealed that on impact, the fuze tended to part company with the shell and thus fail to initiate the filling. Moreover, even when it worked correctly it appeared to do no more damage than a plain steel shot, which was easier to manufacture. As a result, the AP shell was withdrawn."
Recall also that the British Army had already had an APHE round in service with the 3-pdr, so I doubt that they were not used because British industry was incapable of manufacturing them.
All the best,
John.
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Excellent find.Originally posted by michael kenny:Jarrett was a US officer and later curator at APG.
http://www.army.mil/CMH/books/wwii/Beachhd_Btlefrnt/ChapterII.html
Now, is this the source document John K had in mind? If so, I can't find anything in it to justify his remarks about HE bursters. If not, it looks as if we are once again left waiting for an accurate reference.
All the best,
John.
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Excellent questions. I believe that an expectation of about one dead and one wounded per tank knocked out remains fairly constant over a considerable period of military history. If John K can recall a reference to his source, I'll check it out when I'm next at the PRO. I assume it was a MELF paper, whereas almost all the OR papers I have seen were from 21AG, and it is not unheard of for different OR groups to disagree; but the only OR paper I've seen on estimating BAE neglects burster charges entirely, and merely calculates the weight of metal shot into the tank.Originally posted by jwatts:As to the Western Desert fighting, it appears my assumption was correct, in that 2pdr AP is so undermodelled in game. Now, I'm not so much disputing Mr Kettler's claim that German AP killed far more crew than 2pdr AP as amazed by it. In my reading of the 1RTR book, casualties in the desert seem rather light. Usually when it lists a tank destroyed, or lit up rather, one, possibly two crew members are wounded, in extreme cases a KIA. Was this survivability negated by later German introductions in the theatre (88mm flak, early Tigers)? If so, why are the listed casualties of the 1RTR so low?
Three main reasons, I think. First, in the initial stages of the invasion 21AG had almost all the armoured divisions (and tank brigades) in the Allied line-up. Second, knocking off the "hinge" at Caen was for a long time seen as the Allied main effort. Third, the Brits are simply closer to where a lot of the German armour reinforcements are coming from, and given the difficulties of mobility the Germans had, it might be not so easy to drive over and thump the Americans even if you want to. As an example of this, consider how German armour intended to go and nip off the Cobra breakout was sucked into the battle of Periers ridge in the final stages of Operation Bluecoat.Originally posted by jwatts:In regards to the high number of Ubercats facing the CW forces in France, it is a litle clearer now. Was there a reason for placing most of the heavies across from the British forces? I would think one such reason would possibly be that the British had heavier AFVs than the Americans, who were primarily equipped with Shermans. Or was it simply a coincidence? I would hesitate to call that a coincidence simply because I don't think the OKW would be quite so arbitrary with panzer unit assignments, especially the heavy cats.
I don't know that it's possible to give much useful advice on how to tackle Tigers with a 2-pdr. Make sure the next-of-kin entry in your paybook is up to date, I suppose. I believe that the accepted doctrine at the time, though, would be to hold fire until you get a worthwhile shot; at least from Hunt's Gap onwards, and probably earlier, the mission of anti-tank guns is to destroy armour, not to protect the infantry. Easier said than done with a 2-pdr, though.Originally posted by jwatts:I try not to play such scenarios as the Brits for just this reason, but lately I have been hankering to do just that, and was looking for some advice on how to do more than just needlessly waste my inadequate, but only, AT weapon.
All the best,
John.
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Russian engineering, dontcha love it.Originally posted by Sivodsi:Did you see the tracks turning as it was dragged up the hill? I'd have thought they would be jammed solid.
Clean the mud and gunk out of the cylinders, give it a squirt of WD-40, and the engine will probably start...
All the best,
John.
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You should say "armour" for armoured regiments, and "tanks" for tank battalions (or, later, regiments).Originally posted by jwatts:I am not much of an expert on British armor (or should I say armour?),
For those you should say "tanks".Originally posted by jwatts:but I recently purchased a book (forget the name) about the 1 and 2 RTR unit histories.
...and you should definitely say 2-pdr or 2-pr.Originally posted by jwatts:In all of my reading about the battles in the Western Desert, while the regiment's tanks were equipped with 2lb AP only,
I suspect that CM underestimates the behind-armour effect (BAE) of small-calibre projectiles, and I am dam' sure it underestimates the effect of AP when compared to APHE. Trials with the 2-pdr found not a ha'porth of difference between AP and APHE rounds, so the APHE was never ordered into full production.Originally posted by jwatts:they seem to be much more effective than is modelled in CM.
According to Zetterling, the total counts of each type in Normandy would have been about 126 Tiger Is and 623 Panthers, as against 897 Pz IVs. British forces would have faced most of them at one time or another. There was probably a good deal of misreporting of Shurzen-equipped Pz IVs as Tigers; 7 Armd Div 'G' war diary notes Schurzen as being intended to make a Pz IV look like a Tiger.Originally posted by jwatts:I might also ask, about how many of the accounts of "panthers/tigers" are true, in regards to fighting in NW Europe? Every time they run into opposition, it is only 88mm guns, Tigers, or Panthers. Obviously SOME of this is exaggeration due to FOW, but what kind of numbers of Ubercats are we talking about the Brits ACTUALLY facing in Normandy/Caen/Falaise?
All the best,
John.
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What a shame ol' Hyazinth never served in the Western Desert or Italy, where he might have met the Bays. What a great name for a scenario --Originally posted by George Mc:[snips]
legendary German tank commander Hyazinth Graf Strachwitz von Groß-Zauche und Camminetz
"Hyazinth Graf Strachwitz von Groß-Zauche und Camminetz v. Sir Ranulph Twisleton-Wykeham-Fiennes (Bart.)"
Still, AIUI the Baronet was killed at Cassino -- I don't know which battle, but it might be possible to have
"Frido von Senger und Etterlin v. Sir Ranulph Twisleton-Wykeham-Fiennes (Bart.)"
All the best,
John.
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Originally posted by JonS:
JDS:
Very many thanks for that. It's more than I remember there being there, but it does at least mention the fight at La Rosiere, which often seems to get missed out.Now, I must 'phone the RM museum and pester them on the question...
All the best,
John.
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Probably me -- there was a "cutting out" mission during the night by matelots from a British and a Polish destroyer against the flak ship in the harbour, and the Royal Marine Commandos reported that they could tell when British sailors were in action from the sound of swearing drifting across the water.Originally posted by JonS:Yep, page 209 of Victory in the West, vol I, has a fairly solid paragraph.
John, I also seem to recall someone ... you? ... posting something here about either naval ratings or ship-board Marines coming ashore to assist with the fighting at PeB.
I wasn't aware that Port-en-Bessin even got a mention in the official history, I shall have to get a copy from the library and copy it down.
What few things I have been able to track down to date are mostly very slight, and sometimes I think so slight as to be entirely misleading; there are brief descriptions in Neillands' history of the Royal Marines and St-George Saunders' and Messneger's histories of the Commandos. Far the best single account is that in "Doc" Forfar's "Omaha to the Scheldt": He was the MO of 47. Unfortunately, some lummox at the Admiralty lost the unit war diary for June, so the archives I have been able to see at the PRO are pretty thin as well.
I think this is a great shame, as this action IMHO ranks as an achievement at least as high as the assaults on Pegasus and Horsa bridges, the Pointe du Hoc and the Merville Battery, all of which have been well written-up.
If anyone has anything that will improve on the sources above, I'd be very interested to hear it. I'm aware of the oral history archive at the Hemingway School at Port-en-Bessin, but have had no access to it. Maybe a long research holiday in Normandy is indicated for next year.
All the best,
John.
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Can I briefly misdirect this thread into a side-road, and ask if you have (or for that matter anyone else has) anything on the action of 47 Royal Marine Commando at Port-en-Bessin on D+1?Originally posted by JonS:[snips]
Incidentally KF - if you are ever considering doing a D-Day (6th June 1944) scen involving British/CW forces, drop me a line. I have some archival goodness that would probably be most useful, most especially for GOLD but also in a general sense for JUNO or SWORD.
I visited the memorial stone to 47 in the Garden of Remembrance at Eastney Barracks yesterday, and I think it's about time I started on some serious archive-thrashing to try to get the whole story.
All the best,
John.
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"Buffy" skills? JasonC can slay vampires? I didn't think he was that kind of SMG grog, but what do I know?Originally posted by michael kenny:[snips] ...way he was dismissed by Jason.
He may wiggle now by saying it was all a bit of showing off and a chance to show his 'Buffy' skills.
All the best,
John.
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A Type 95 light tank, I should say.Originally posted by Inola:I have already seen this picture. If I dont miss, this is a Japanese tank (cant remember more)
All the best,
John.
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Oh, you wrote "snippers".Originally posted by Zalgiris 1410:It is my understanding, which I admit is totally derived from secondary sources only, that 8 snippers per Battalion
In the British Army, only officers of at least field rank (Majors and above) can be trusted not to run with scissors.
All the best,
John.
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The figure of 16 comes from the copy of the "Sandhurst precis" I was issued as an Officer Cadet in Exeter UOTC in about 1982.Originally posted by Zalgiris 1410:It is my understanding, which I admit is totally derived from secondary sources only, that 8 snippers per Battalion is max, not 16 which I'm assuming to be the result from a case of double counting somewhere.
I can't find my copy of "Sniping in France" at the moment, but I seem to recall a similar figure being mentioned there.
It's not a section, in current establishments it is a platoon. I've never heard of it being referred to as a section.Originally posted by Zalgiris 1410:There being a need to do so given that they are in a full section of their all of own.
I'm wondering if we have a case of "half-counting", treating a sniper pair as one sniper and one observer, thus halving the number of "snipers".
Wossname Bull's nice new glossy Osprey book on WW2 tactics gives 8 as a battalion sniper establishment, but says this is typical rather than the maximum, and in any case also mentions snipers in sections, who are rather clearly not snipers in the wear-a-ghillie-suit, passed-the-long-course sense.
Given that people who've passed the sniper course are normally sergeants, the proportion of NCOs is all to cock whatever you do.Originally posted by Zalgiris 1410:-What section could not function (in the British Army) without the right and proper proportions between privates and NCOs, it would just not have been Cricket otherwise!
You have an odd view of the British Army if you think it pays the slightest attention to laid-down scales of anything (exempt officers who have just passed the staff course and the doctrine nazis from Upavon).
All the best,
John.
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Never mind that. Where's my beer? And not that Molson slops, either.Originally posted by J Ruddy:lol - you guys need to calm down a little.
I guess you don't recognize a troll when you see one...
All the best,
John.
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2 Pounder problems?
in Combat Mission: Afrika Korps
Posted
All the best,
John.