[Männer gegen Panzer]

Originally posted by Lascar:

This is an interesting training film used by the German army during the war. It features close in infantry assaults against T-34s and KV-1s with an assortment of infantry anti-tank weapons.

English subtitles included.

Part 1

Part 2

About the film

Wonderful stuff. Tom Mouat showed this at the Conference of Wargamers (COW) the year before last, and everyone enjoyed it hugely.

All the best,

John.

[Ignorant Commonwealth questions]

Originally posted by Andreas:

[snips]

Of course, companies would have individual missions. But those would still be undertaken in the framework of a battalion operation (im Verband), which may or may not have been reinforced. IOW - even in the German army companies would not wander around the country-side on an operation.

Well, quite.

I find it odd that a lot of people seem to be under the impression that the British Army habitually pitched its tactical planning at a higher organizational level than other armies. I would think it was more normally the reverse. The German, Russian and American armies, with a way of command adapted to large-scale continental warfare, typically regarded the regiment as the basic unit, whereas the British, with a tradition of small forces fighting peninsular campaigns or doing colonial policing, regarded the battalion as the basic unit (though they often referred to them as regiments), and the regiment-sized organization was a "brigade", and hence a formation rather than a unit.

The British Army's background of as a long-service professional army and the strong emphasis on the regiment (really, battalion) as the focus of tribal loyalty may make them less amenable to mixing elements of separate battalions of the same arm, whereas the armies with a more "continental" outlook might be thought of as being better able to treat elements of units as interchangeable parts; but I doubt that the difference is as strong as is commonly supposed. Nonetheless, reformers have tried since the end of WW2 to make the regimental system more "rational" on at least three occasions. In the aftermath of the infamously doltish Defence Review of 1957 there was a short-lived attmept to introduce brigade, rather than regimental, cap-badges. In the 1960s an attempt to amalgamate battalions into "big regiments" halted after the first few (Anglians first, Queen's next, combining many famous names from the English country regiments). Finally, just this last couple of years, a government whose members possess less military experience or understanding than any in living memory has succeeded in making the regimental system "tidy" and composed entirely of large regiments with dull names. Perhaps the stuffed suits in charge of it all imagine that this increased tidiness will produce "efficiency savings" to compensate for the lowest defence budget since the 1930s.

All the best,

John.

[Ignorant Commonwealth questions]

Originally posted by JonS:

[snips]

Hi John,

didn't the 3/4 CLY amalgamation occur in Normandy too? Or perhaps that was the second, and final, time that particular amalgamation happened.

No, my brain has come undone, it wasn't in the Desert at all, I was thinking of the Normandy one -- after V-B, how could I forget? Umm, magma, it must have been magma flows impinging upon my brain.

Originally posted by JonS:

Could you provide a bit of background on the Nor-Mons - date, units (1st Norfolks, 2nd Norfolks, etc), duration of amalgamation, anyfink really.

3 Mons and 1 Norfolks (I think the Norfolks' 2nd bn was in Burma at the time), Perriers Ridge or thereabouts (Basher Bates' VC battle). Having has a quick glance at J J How's "Hill 112" and "The British Breakout", in one of which I'm sure I've seen the term used, I can't find the thing, but it does mention 2 coys of each in a position on Perrier (as he spells it) ridge, so I think this might just have been elements of two bns fighting the same battle rather than a formal amalgamation.

All the best,

John.

All the best,

John.

[ November 25, 2007, 01:16 PM: Message edited by: John D Salt ]

[Ignorant Commonwealth questions]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

thanks for your reply. i was thinking more about company level stuff. with for example Americans or Germans it's not that rare to read about combat missions done by single companies.

It is not practicable for a company-sized sub-unit of one of the maneouvre arms to act independently for any length of time, simply because it does not have its own supply echelon. This is true in any army, and at any time up to the present.

For single actions lasting a day or less, sure, you can use a platoon or a company or any penny-packet you like, but AIUI German doctrine dictated that the company was the minimum force element to be used for armour, and British doctrine the half-squadron.

I do not think there was such a great deal of difference between national practices of augmentation and cross-attachment by the final stages of WW2; the Germans have always had the reputation of being "flexible" in organising their forces, but in many cases this was forced upon them because the units in question had already had the crap beaten out of them at least once.

I think that British WW2 task-organising practices have several recognisable threads:

1. The "desperate improvisation" trend. Early in the war, scratch forces were organised as necessary, for the same reason I mentioned above with the Germans. For example, while researching the death of a serjeant from 1 RWK in France 1940, I found accounts of West Kents, Queensmen and Berkshires all fighting together as a mixed force. Similarly, after HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk, survivors from their Royal Marine detachments (mostly from Pymouth) were amalgamated with remnants of 2nd Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders to form the wonderfully-named "Plymouth Argylls" [Note to American readers: Plymouth Argyle is a well-known soccer team]. Such practices continued throughout the war if units were hit hard enough to require amalgamation, as for example 3/4th CLY in the Desert and the "Nor-Mons" (Norfolks and Monmouths) in Normandy.

2. Private armies. Given the slightest excuse, an energetic British officer will improvise, with a greater or lesser degree of official approval, a bunch of blokes to go biffing the Boche on a private enterprise basis. The famous examples are the LRDG, SAS and PPA, which were highly specialised forces, but there were also special-forces type operations carried out by scratch or local forces, such as the Shan scouts mentioned in George MacDonald Fraser's "Quartered Safe Out Here", or the "Calcutta Light Sea Horse" mentioned in James Leasor's book "Boarding Party". In some cases these "private armies" grew to considerable size, as in the case of the second Chindit expedition.

3. Jock Columns. During the Desert War, "Jock" Campbell popularised these, not really an innovation so much as a return to traditional North-West Frontier habits of organising a column for a particular task -- "the section, the pom-pom, and six hundred men", as Kipling put it. They have been much criticised in the years since, but they did at least make the infantry mobile and capable of taking on armour.

4. The late war phase. Some divisions fought fairly much off the standard orbat, others didn't. For example, 11th Armoured notably organised as brigade groups, using the armoured recce regiment as a fourth armoured regiment and forming two balanced groups each of two armoured and two infantry units. Guards Armoured favoured "company-squadron teams", again producing evenly balanced forces but mixed at a lower level.

Whatever else one may be able to accuse the British Army of in its organizational practices, lack of variety is something it has never suffered from.

All the best,

John.

[ November 15, 2007, 02:15 PM: Message edited by: John D Salt ]

[Ignorant Commonwealth questions]

Originally posted by Broompatrol:

Thanks all, good info.

I guess I should have specified that my question would be how it relates to Combat Mission. I know that Coys don't wander the countryside looking for things to blow up on their own, but within the context of the game there are many company sized scenarios. I noticed that Vickers don't seem to be as common as HMG42's or M1919's. So, I was wondering how the Commonwealth forces visualized the proper use of Vickers.

Anyway thanks again. It helps to learn how they would be deployed.

To add a spot of my own drivelling to the stuff so far contributed:

1. Prior to the 1937ish reorganization, the British Army normally had 1 MG coy and 3 rifle coys to a battalion, just like almost every other army in the known world. Thereafter, compared to almost anyone else's organizations, the British Army was quite light in MMG scaling, and continues to be so to this day.

2. From 1941, the normal arrangement for most of the war in infantry divisions was an MG battalion (initially 4 coys each of 12 MMGs) under command of the division. From 1944, one of the companies was equipped with 4.2-in mortars rather than MMGs.

3. Airlanding divisions had a comparable number of MMGs overall, but they were farmed out to the units rather than centralized -- I think typically 2 pls of 4 MMGs for an airlanding bn.

4. Commandos had a heavy weapons troop for the commando which could use some mix of Vickers MMGs or 3-in mortars, say something like three of each.

5. Armoured divisions normally had only one infantry brigade, and would have an independent MG company. In 1944 this might have 3 pls each of 4 MMGs and 1 pl of 4 4.2-in mortars.

6. The motor machine gun brigades were odd organizations which existed only for about the last half of 1940. Three were organised, 1st, 2nd and 3rd. They saw only home service, and by the end of 1940 had been reorganized and redesignated as 26th, 25th and 28th armoured brigades respectively.

7. As far as "proper use of the Vickers" was concerned, I believe the British Army was doctrinally unusual in visualising the use of MMGs for indirect fire up to 4,500 yards. I have not seen any account of this being done in action, but I believe it was still doctrine when a mate of mine shot a Vickers course in, I think, the early 1960s.

All the best,

John.

[James Lucas, "Battle Group Peiper" ...]

Originally posted by Sgt AA:

Just finish the book and I'm not sure what it is that I read! Is he a historican or just i fiction writer?

Can the facts in the book be thrusted, to me it seems that he made up a lot and the descripion of the characters is just too much.

Thanks in advance!

James Lucas is prolific, and produces some good stuff. He presumably counts as a "serious" historian, having been curator of photographs at the IWM or something like that. IIRC he served in the infantry in WW2, was captured in Italy, and married an Austrian woman after the war, and so has a brother-in-law who was a Fallschirmjager.

However, like you, I find it very, very hard to take "Kampfgruppe Peiper" seriously. I suspect that Mr. Lucas, imagining that all Liebstandarte vets would be as straight with him as his family-by-marriage, simply wrote down all the Sven Hassell-style stories they spun him as if they were true.

All the best,

John.

[Creating a fictional scenario....]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Baron Ritzner Von Jung,

May I suggest Feldgrau Dawn as a suitable name?

That's certainly a better idea that titling it as a Hollywood re-make of "Went the day well".

My suggestions for the scenario title are "Fire in the Eastport" or "Schwerpunkt: The Maine Effort".

All the best,

John.

[Scoring a draw & Hetzer questions.]

Originally posted by Other Means:

Any slope the AFV is on will add to the slope of the frontal armour, with some quite surprising results. I've had a Churchill XI bounce a Tiger from 150m because he was on a steep hill.

He killed it next shot - my mate was stunned. So was I actually, I never expected *anything* to bounce an 88/L56 from there.

A heavy Churchill should bounce PzGr 39 on the nose from an 88/56 at most ranges and angles. It's what it was designed to do.

All the best,

John.

[Minefields under Snow?]

Originally posted by Paul AU:

I’m wondering what impact snowfall had on minefield effectiveness.

AP especially - how much snow, if any, would reduce their effectiveness?

I'm guessing not much, but I wonder. Historical references?

The 1951 Basic Arctic Manual (FM31-70 or CATP 9-1) says that "TNT, Tetrytol amminium nitrate, composition "C", shaped charges and bangalore torpedoes are affected very little by cold" (para 158). The advice on anti-tank mines (para 159) says that care must be taken to ensure that they are mounted on a solid base, and "not buried too deeply otherwise the top layer may accept the weight and not detonate the mine". It also advises that "Additional charges will help overcome the smothering effect of deep snow", so this seems to have been a factor, and the use of carboard packing is recommended to prevent fuzes from being rendered ineffective by penetrating mositure that re-freezes. Finally, it is advised that mines must be painted white, as the covering of snow may blow away.

As to anti-personnel mines (para 160), the same precautions about solid basing and avoiding freezing moisture are mentioned. For tripped munitions -- white trip-wires are needed -- the point is made that trip-wires can be hidden in snow, and a nice trick in forested areas is to mount the mines themselves on trees.

Two kinds of mine that are used only in arctic conditions are track-mines, which must be extra sensitive to rpessure because they are intended to be set off by men on skis or snowshoes, and ice-mines, which are the only kind of mine where sympathetic detonation of multiple mines is intended (so that the enemy crossing the ice reprise the scene for "Alksandr Neskiy").

So, in short, your first guess was pretty much right.

All the best,

John.

[Hello Dandelion re Carentan]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

Oh Hi Matt, sorry about the late reply there, vacation and the birth of a daughter got in the way

Congratulations!

All the best,

John.

[Isn't the Sherman a little too powerful here?]

Originally posted by AttilaTheHungry:

Just got this game recently. It's pretty good, but since when can one Sherman knock out a King Tiger from the front? According to everything I've read it took many numbers of most tank types to kill one Tiger, and could only happen from the sides or rear.

I'm not saying that this is the mechanism simulated in CM:BO, but I've read a report of a 6-pounder knocking out a Panther on the nose by putting a shot through the opening in the ball MG mount on the glacis plate.

Never say "never"!

All the best,

John.

[British Rifle Grenades]

Originally posted by The_Enigma:

Hi all, was reading through the Bayonet Strength website and came across this quote:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> The Rifle Group would have probably been reduced to five men, each with a rifle, one of which was fitted with a discharger cup for launching grenades

Googling it,

The No.68 AT Rifle Grenade

Stated to be possibly the first HEAT device in use. Claims that it could penetrate through 50mm of armour.

First time i have heard of it, thought i would share it with you.

It does raise a question though, it says that it was designed in 1940 and was used throughout the war.

However i have never heard of it, was it a commonaly used weapon? </font>

[Cross of Iron]

Originally posted by General Brock:

Hi all,

I just saw the movie Cross of Iron all the way through for the first time. Why has this movie not been praised to it's due?? It's a great movie and more than this, it's just about the ONLY good eastern front movie out there.. this would never be made today so enjoy it now.

I have never understood why anyone likes this film -- I watched it years ago and recall it as the cinematic equivalent of the "flying guts picture library" school of comic trash. Nevertheless I hear people waxing lyrical about it from time to time. Would anyone care to attempt to explain why?

All the best,

John.

[Brutality in the Desert]

Originally posted by CousinPeePee:

Ok but enough of the nonsense.

Everybody else had enough of your nonsense a long time ago. Please stop it.

Originally posted by CousinPeePee:

Quarter was not given.

Utter drivel. I suggest that you look up the meaning of the word "quarter", which you clearly do not understand. Quarter was given by both sides as a matter of routine. Shooting at men who have not surrendered is not refusing to give quarter, and your attempt to misrepresent it as such is fooling nobody but yourself.

Twit.

John.

[Two of WW2s Greatest Tank Aces Compared]

Originally posted by Broompatrol:

I believe the (W) means wet ammo storage but I don't know what WSS means altogther

I imagine the Vs in VVSS (Vertical Volute Spring Suspension, as distinct from HVSS) have run together.

All the best,

John.

[Grenade and small HE effectiveness]

Originally posted by Kineas:

Okay, I don't have any concussion experience whatsoever (except when I was drunk and fell from a stage), but I simply don't believe that a - let's say - 76mm HE grenade going off 5meters from your head doesn't at least stun you for a while.

And a trench is definitely not open air, the blast wave can bounce back/between the trench walls.

Maybe someone with battle experience could enlighten us...?

Not battle experience, but I have been explosively concussed twice, once by a thunderflash and once by an SLR firing blank without a BFA. Neither of these involves very much explosive; it just has to be near enough to your head and it will render you completely unconscious for a few seconds, and disoriented for a few seconds more.

I should perhaps point out that I don't concuss easily, having a skull thick enough to withstand at different times a rounders bat between they eyes and a steel pipe in the back of the head without any trace of concussion. None of these events have had any permanent ill effects, and if you don't believe me you can ask my friend Peensmith the talking lamp-post.

All the best,

John.

[Grenade and small HE effectiveness]

Originally posted by FAI:

I'm interested to see those studies.

There aren't any. The number is from S L A Marshall's "Men Against Fire", and his data-collection methods are long since discredited.

The general observation that combat soldiers seem to fall into three groups -- roughly one part "heroes" to two parts "sheep" to one part "column-dodgers" -- is, however, borne out by the independent observation of Lionel Wigram, and despite his dubious methods Marshall's conclusions are broadly accepted by such highly-regarded analysts as Dave Grossman and Dave Rowland. In turn, much of Marshall's view is based on the pioneering work of du Picq's "Etudes sur le combat". As an aside, Grossman is interesting in his claims about the "operant conditioning" of modern Western youth to kill without compunction.

To claim that a particular numerical participation rate is borne out by any rigorous study is I think over-egging it. It simply isn't practical to collect the data, and if anyone has done so they have done a remarkably fine job of keeping it hidden.

All the best,

John.

[D-44]

Originally posted by Vergeltungswaffe:

Development started in 1943 and it was in service during the war.

Still quite a number of them in service today.

What's your source for saying they were in service during the war?

All the best,

John.

[Brutality in the Desert]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

[snips]

Fighting (all white, largely Saxon) Germans is conceptually the same as fighting the (all white, largely Saxon) British themslves, and what colonial power would encourage surpressed natives to slay whites?

I expect that most would do so if necessary; you don't get to be a successful colonial power by neglecting the military potential of your subject populations.

Assuming that Indians qualify in the category of "suppressed natives", the British Empire had no difficulty in employing them against the Germans on the Western Front in WW1. You have already noted the French use of colonial infantry, many units of which fought in the defence of France in 1940. The Spanish Fascists had no compunction about shipping Moorish infantry across the Med to fight in mainland Spain during the Civil War, and the Italian Fascists were happy to use native spahis against the Brits in the WW2 East African campaign. The Germans themselves in WW1 had no difficulty in employing Askaris against British forces in von Lettow-Borbeck's campaign.

All the best,

John.

[Brutality in the Desert]

Originally posted by the_enigma:

Prehaps we have ran the course of what we can talking about in regards to Salamis?

Hardly at all. And there is probably lots to be said about ancient naval tactics generally, rather than just at Salamis.

Originally posted by the_enigma:

Where is the topic starter anyway?

I think somebody bricked up the bridge he lived under.

All the best,

John.

[Brutality in the Desert]

Originally posted by Kanonier Reichmann:

But with no light being offered to it.

It's in the fridge. Fridges have lights. No need to offer it one, just open the door.

All the best,

John.

[U.S. WWII Tank Destroyer Doctrine.]

Originally posted by coe:

[snips]

- hesitating at this moment to say anything extreme due to lack of data but for entertainment purposes I'll say some extreme ideas that I'm starting to entertain.

[snips]

(turret speed). i.e. if you are going to waltz around in a first to see-first to fire = first to kill environment, why bother having a big Panther tank at least if you were moving faster you'd be harder to hit? (maybe that is unfair since I am comparing a Hellcat speed)...and when you blow up you cost far more to replace than a PzIV. 1946 would have been interesting.

The idea of concentrating on gun-power first and speed second, with armour last, is of course exactly what was done in both French and German tank design in the 1950s and 1960s.

Originally posted by coe:

[snips]

change, I am starting to wonder why bother have tanks at all on either side and just have slightly uparmored TDs.

...whereas the Swedes went for a fixed-gun tank, but very well protected indeed.

All the best,

John.

[Information concerning purchasing decision]

Originally posted by Bartokomus:

I second Jason's sentiments; CMBO can be easily skipped in favour of CMBB/CMAK.

You truly won't regret buying these games; and as noted, the price for these titles is shamefully low.

Quite right. Far the best bargain I have ever seen in computer games.

The short answer to the original question is "buy it". The long answer is "buy it now".

All the best,

John.

[The Morale Model is RETARDED...]

Originally posted by Vark:

As a new member to this forum can I tentatively suggest the insults and name-calling stop and the discussion once more centres on the mechanics of the game/ineresting observations etc. See, you can tell I'm a teacher!!

p.s. Squatdog, could you have come up with a less inflamatory term to describe your criticisms of the moral model?

Right early in the thread, I asked Squatdog what evidence he had for his criticism, and what watrgames he could point to that had better morale models than CM, but he did not apparently think either question worth responding to. Good luck encouraging him to make a more constructive contribution. It would be great if he could describe a fire effects model better than that embodied in CM, especially if it could be placed on a basis of factual findings; but I don't hold out much hope.

I think there probably is a worthwhile point lurking under Squatdog's criticism, in that I tend to agree that the suppressive effect of fire should impose inertia much more than panic flight, or, to put it another way, there should be quite a wide band of morale "health" between pin/suppress and "run AWAAAY!", at least for bullet fire, and especially for troops who have already gone to ground -- micro-terrain in apparently bare-arsed ground can surprisingly often offer near-complete immunity to bullet fire. I have previously expressed my dissatisfaction with the way bullet fire can rout people out of entrenchments, which is not somnething I can recall hearing of in combat -- I would expect to have to go in and clear them with grenade or bayonet.

But the whole question of when people freeze, take cover, or run away on the battlefield is one about which frighteningly little is known, even by professionals in the field. I bet the morale model in CAEN or Urbat or OneSAF is substantially more retarded than the one in CM.

All the best,

John.

[The Morale Model is RETARDED...]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

John D Salt,

Judging from the MoD film I cited, things were not good at all on the ration front during the yomp.

What was the title of the film?

It's not fun eating nothing but compo for weeks on end, but I doubt that anyone ever missed a resupply.

Originally posted by John Kettler:

Are you treating the Paras as regular troops or as SpecOps in your reply? Based on the MoD film. I'd

say they fell in the latter category.

The simple definition is that they aren't special forces unless they come under Director, Special Forces. The paras at the time came under D. Inf., and still do, apart from the bn re-roled as "rangers" (IMHO a bloody silly name, as the term "ranger" has never previously had SF connotations in British usage, and if the clowns in MoD had had the slightest feeling for tradition they could happily have resurrected the name of, say, the Raiding Support Regiment, even if they felt obliged to change its non-PC motto, "Quit you like men").

All the best,

John.