Brian
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Posts posted by Brian
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Wondered where you'd got off to. Not like you to be so quiet.Originally posted by Michael emrys:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Brian:
I'm in the middle of moving house and have been off line for the last fortnight.
You'll be gratified to know that while thumbing through one of my books on MGs that I came across a rare photo of a Bren mounted on an actual TRIPOD! I even posted the fact, but it was while you were gone, so you missed it.
Michael</font>
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I'm in the middle of moving house and have been off line for the last fortnight. I note the release date has finally been set but I can't find any reference to a price. Has it been mentioned yet? Will the sale of my children into indentured labour be necessary?
[ July 31, 2002, 01:43 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]
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Out of a matter of interest, surely the Germans would have been using beet sugar, whereas the Allies would have utilised cane sugar. Surely this would have made a difference in the sweetness of the rounds fired, for as we all know, beet sugar is notoriously less sweet than cane derived sugar.
BTW when was saccarine developed? Not that I'd ever accuse John of coating his results in that substance.
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This has been discussed before. Some factors which should be considered and which are not, in the game are:
Trajectory;
Windage;
Angle of strike;
The role of the weapon;
The nature of CMBO combat.
The 95mm CS was a low velocity weapon. Therefore its utilises a high trajectory, much higher than is actually dipicted in the game. High trajectory, low velocity weapons are notoriously harder to judge ranges for, that flat trajectory, high velocity weapons. Therefore, the accuracy of a vehicle utilising this weapon will be quite a lot lower, purely because prediction of range become a great deal more crucial than for medium or high velocity weapons.
Because of this low velocity and high trajectory, this sort of weapon is a great deal more affected by windage as well, particularly at longer ranges. CMBO does not, in the present model, include windage within its calculations.
When considering the penetration of HEAT rounds, the angle at which the round strikes becomes crucial. A medium to high-velocity round will tend to strike much more square on than does a low velocity round. Therefore, actually angling the armour becomes a disadvantage, compared to not-angling. Any penetration will more than likely also be highly variable, depending upon range, because the trajectory will determine the strike angle against the defending plate.
The 95mm CS tank was a support tank. Its role was to provide smoke and direct HE support. Effectively, it was a turreted assault gun. It was not utilised to hunt tanks. Any effort to use it for such a role would come up considerable resistance from both its crews and superiors who would feel that it was being misused. It was meant to destroy enemy strongpoints and eliminate enemy AT guns. Effectively, it was a hangover from the early war period when tanks did not fire HE.
The nature of CMBO's combat model is too much IMO emphasis upon close ranges. This is very artificial. The 95mm's disadvantages are not as obvious as its advantages and thus, CMBO creates a very artificial tactical environment for it.
[ July 06, 2002, 10:55 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]
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Errr, the gun in the Panzerjaeger I was a Czech 47mm, not a French one, Jason.Originally posted by JasonC:The French AT guns were considerably better than the German models. The Germans had 37mm "doorknockers". The French had heavier 47mm guns. The Germans were impressed enough with those they mounted some self-propelled on Pz I chassis as tank destroyers, the first little Marder they tried.
Furthermore, the French had relatively few of their 47mm weapons. I believe their main infantry AT weapon was the little 25mm Hotchkiss, which wasn't a bad weapon, in itself, except it was too lightly constructed to survive much towing.
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Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:
Michael Emrys - funny that I never picked up on that before when we discussed Men Against Tanks - ie that AT assets in Allied units were at divisional level. You are right - CW infantry battalions did have a 6 gun battery of 6-pounders but AFAIK never had the excellent 17 pounder which went to the divisional AT regiments.
Not completely true. By 1945, many battalions had re-equipped with 17 Pdrs IIRC. Further, the Airborne Battalion had from the major reorganisation in early 1944, 17 Pdrs and 6 Pdrs. The choice of which to take on a given operation was taken by the CO. Usually they took a mix. At D-Day, Arnhem and VARSITY, both types were present.
However, even so, the majority of heavier AT assets were not held by the infantry but by the RA. This division isn't quite as artificial as it seems, afterall, did the US Army have something similar with Tank Destroyer Command or what ever it was called, also holding most of the heavier AT guns, both towed and self-propelled?
Its interesting though, that despite the presence of such AT guns in the British battalion, that when I pull out my venerable copy of British and American Infantry Weapons of World War 2 by Lt.Col.A.J.Barker, published in 1969, he states:
The 2pr, 6pr and 17pr Anti-Tank guns which first supplemented and later replaced the British Boys anti-tank rifle, 25mm Hotchkiss and P.I.A.T cannot properly be considered infantry equipments. As their designation implies they were "guns" in the true sense of the word - pieces of artillery which became more complex as the weight of shell increased.
The good Lt.Col, was between 1954 and 1956, the Infantry Weapons Instructor at the Royal Military College of Science, as well as having served in the British Army from 1936 to 1958 and in various theatres, in Europe, East Africa, the Middle and Far East.
So, should AT guns be considered infantry weapons or not?
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While I've always believed the T-44 never saw service during WWII, basically arriving, like the JS-III, too late to see action, the Red Steel website claims otherwise:
Does anybody else have any information on the possible use of the T-44?During 1944 a new tank design based upon the T-34/85 appeared, designated T-44. It was originally planned to produce a T-34/100 but the inadequate size of the T-34/85's turret made it impossible. Due to the pressure laid down on the tank designers no time was given for trials and testing the vehicle good enough, and the design was doomed from the beginning. Even though the design itself was revolutionary with a low height, heavy armament, thick armour plates and the new transversial transmission, early machines proved to be unreliable due to its short testing times. The T-44 was a 35 ton medium tank beeing armed with the same 85mm L/53 gun used on the T-34/85 and SU-85. Production began in August 1944 at the rebuilt Zavod #75 in Kharkov, and 25 T-44s were built in late 1944, and a further 880 was built in 1945. It saw limited service in Germany, but major production orders were not given until 1946 when three factories were assigned to produce the T-44. The T-44 is one of the few vehicles used exclusively by the Red Army, but the T-44s combat record is largely uncovered. However it took part both in Germany in 1945 and the Hungarian uprising in 1956. They remained in the Red Army serving as training vehicles for recruits until 1963. The T-44 led to the massproduced T-54/55 family.
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While I have not specifically heard of Tigers being utilised by the Red Army, I have read IIRC in one of Zaloga's books, of them pressing into service Panthers quite happily, along with Panzer IIIs and IVs.
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Appears to be up and working again. Try this URL.Originally posted by John Kettler:Well, I was going to refer you all to the excellent site Red Steel, but the site has somehow disappeared, taking with it an amazing collection of photos of captured German armor, up through King Tigers, in Russian service. Anyone know what happened to that wonderful site?
Regards,
John Kettler
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It occurred just after the Iraq campaign. Slim's brigade was moved from Eastern Syria to Iran, IIRC.Originally posted by Michael emrys:Originally posted by Brian:
...at virtually the same time Wavell was organising and conducting campaigns in Iraq, Syria and East Africa and all on a severe shoe-string as well.Iran too about the same time, wasn't it?
Yes, Wavell was one of the best, especially in his post at Middle East Command. Huge tragedy that Churchill lost patience with him. Also think much the same can be said of Auchenleck, whom I regard as among the top half-dozen or so of British generals. Too bad he was too senior to be named outright as commander of Eighth Army with Wavell retaining the post of GOC/ME. That could have been a winning combination. It seems that after he got the boot in August '42 he went back to India and more or less sat out the war, didn't he? Major waste of talent.
Well, he did take control of ABDA command when it was created after the Japanese attack (more because the Americans knew they were on a losing wicket and didn't want to be associated with a defeat I suspect than necessarily they believed Wavell was necessarily the best man for the job) but he was already on the decline mentally, I suspect by that point. He couldn't seem to grapple with the fact that the Indian troops he was commanding in Malaya and Burma were not of the same standard as those he'd known in the Middle East. The result was a serious over-estimation of their abilities versus those of the Japanese and when reality intruded, he found he couldn't really come to terms with the results as the Japanese defeated his forces. He appeared to suffer a serious mental decline after that point. He did though, publish his anthology of poetry, Other Mens' Flowers after that, which makes interesting reading. He was a bit too intellectual in some ways for the British Army IMO.
Oh, I agree, they got the job done but all too often at a cost which wasn't very good IMO. It was a problem I suspect with overtraining in the UK for previous 3 years. The units which were brought back from the Middle East for the invasion faired better but still had to come to grips with the changed environment (and foe).I'd suggest that though, its actually at the tactical level that all too often the British Army failed to shine.You really think so? I would have thought that could be applied to armour tactics, but that the artillery-infantry battle was pretty well shaken out by Normandy. Of course there are always individual commanders and units that don't come up to the mark in all armies, but I should have thought that though not particularly brilliant in most cases, they got the job done.
Yes, well there is "flair" and there is "flair". I sometimes wish that de Guingard's wish had been answered. I often wonder how the 9 Div AIF would have done in Normandy....even so, a certain lack of tactical flair was noted by many German officersWell, but compared to the Germans, nearly everybody showed "a certain lack of tactical flair".
Yet, Wingate himself did not utilise them in the manner, himself. His final operations were directed more towards establishment of a semi-permament base in the enemy's rear. Therefore, it anybody is guilty of "misuse" of the Chindits, you'd have to blame him. However, as Slim points out, there was this massive outlay in resources which he believed, as theatre commander could have been better utilised in pushing the enemy back.Wingate. Perhaps one of the most difficult commanders to get a handle on. I think Slim's views on him, while charitable about him personally, indicate that Slim didn't exactly see eye-to-eye with his ideas on how to conduct a war. I tend to agree with him that Wingate's campaign's returns were not commensurate with the resources utilised.I think it's pretty clear that after Wingate's death there was no senior officer in the theater who knew how to use the Chindits and similar forces correctly. They were underarmed and undersupported for fighting stand-up battles against the Japanese main forces as they were latterly called on to do. They were actually guerillas or partisans whose greatest strength lay in their ability to strike unexpectedly against unprotected logistical infrastructure and then retire before the Japanese could organise a reaction.This provokes a further observation. Since much of our discussion has revolved around innovation and the (supposed) lack of it in the British army, I have always found it striking that where the British and Commonwealth soldiers really shined in that regard was in their special forces, which were never surpassed and seldom matched. The SAS, SBS, LRDG, Commandos, Chindits, and early exploits of the Parachute Regiment (such as the Bruneval raid) were magnificent. It seems that most of the best men in the Army found their way into such units rather than into the regulars, much to the loss of the latter. This was true to some extent in most if not all armies, but is most striking in the British services.
I suggest you read Slim's views on that, as well as George McDonald Fraser's Quartered Safe Out Here for an interesting view of what it was like to become mixed up with the sorts of odd chaps that those sorts of private armies attracted.
Well, Guderian always maintained that it was his copy of the provisional training pamphlet for the British Mechanised Force exercises of that period which was one of his inspirations for his theories on all-arms warfare.Overall though, I suspect the reputation of the British Army for being hidebound and conservative in its tactical theory is not warranted from my analysis.No, I wouldn't say that they were always sluggish or unimaginative in formulating theory, after all, they more or less invented Blitzkrieg in the form of experimental combined arms mechanized units during the late '20s-early '30s. It was the process getting those theories out to the actual fighting forces where they lost a lot of ground, especially compared to the Germans. Rommel had to teach them all over again how to fight with tanks. Which was likely his greatest contribution to Alllied victory.Michael
I think the biggest problem is that the British have always made such an effort at maintaining their air of amatuerism that they have convinced many people that they were all bumblers and fumblers. In reality, while the peace-time hangers-on who were in control for the first period of the war might have been, with some notable exceptions such as Wavell and O'Connor, etc. by the middle of the war, just as in the previous conflict, that had largely been replaced by a cold, calculating, efficient military machine, which while it might still have not quite got the hang of how to wage modern war, was on the verge of doing so.
[ June 23, 2002, 02:01 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]
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Originally posted by Michael emrys:
Well, I'd suggest that at the strategic level they excelled, myself (as long as Brooke could manage to control Winston and make him keep his fingers out of the pie). While they might have lost in say, Greece and Crete, which was one of those cases where Winston did interfere, at virtually the same time Wavell was organising and conducting campaigns in Iraq, Syria and East Africa and all on a severe shoe-string as well.I'd suggest that though, its actually at the tactical level that all too often the British Army failed to shine. More often than not the same mistakes were made by inexperienced officers after the experienced ones were killed. While every effort was made to transfer "lessons learnt", even so, a certain lack of tactical flair was noted by many German officers, with the resort to the same formations, despite the inadequacies of those formations already having being displayed.
Wingate. Perhaps one of the most difficult commanders to get a handle on. I think Slim's views on him, while charitable about him personally, indicate that Slim didn't exactly see eye-to-eye with his ideas on how to conduct a war. I tend to agree with him that Wingate's campaign's returns were not commensurate with the resources utilised. I agree that O'Connor was very good, its a great pity he fell foul of Montgomery and spent that period in captivity which prevented his full potential from being realised.Overall though, I suspect the reputation of the British Army for being hidebound and conservative in its tactical theory is not warranted from my analysis.
[ June 22, 2002, 12:33 PM: Message edited by: Brian ]
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Originally posted by Michael emrys:
I believe I've read the book you're using as a reference many, many, moons ago. I seem to remember it utilised US Navy designations rather than the British ones. My designation might be wrong, I admit but I suspect the US and RN designations were different.The problem is like with most things, the US Navy believed its designations were more sensible so the world unfortunately labours with them, rather than the RN ones.
Problem is, they were simply too inaccurate, being fired from the heaving deck of a landing craft at an approximate range. I also think they'd crater the beach too much. One thing on these sorts of operations is that you must make sure that your tanks can get across that sand to the defences behind the beachs, so its important not to make it too hard for them, so you have to accept you can't cause too much damage on the beach itself. Otherwise they'd have been firing 16in over open sights, if they really wanted to destroy the beach defences for sure.
I think you'll find that was a late war, post-Normandy development. One of the problems in the original design was they weren't sure how close they could pack the firing frames. They were frightened of sympathetic ignitions. -
You are most likely correct. I can't recall if the later models had some means of altering elevation, but the basic technique was that you motored in to a determined distance from the beach, pointed the boat at your designated target and let fly. Remember, these were area saturation weapons and not very precise anyway. Presumably that's why the 5" was included on the LSM®s: to take care of point targets. Would have been very nice to have at Omaha.Originally posted by Michael emrys:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Xavier:
:eek:
it seems there were no possibility to increase or decrease the angle of the firing tubes on these boats.
Michael</font>
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I think you'll find they were primarily LCT®s, not LCM®s which would have been a bit small to really carry enough rockets. The LCT®s were utilised from Sicily onwards.Originally posted by Michael emrys:Earlier on, there were the rocket firing LCM®s for beach bombardment. These were mostly used in the Pacific, but were also present on D-Day.
Michael
Interestingly, while I was looking the LCT® up, I came across the LCI®, which I'd never heard of before:
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Actually there was, I believe Jon. The Italians had constructed a coastal railway which extended well into Cyranecia, IIRC. Problem with it, it was frequently attacked and cut by raiding parties.Originally posted by JonS:No, don't forget there wasn't a railroad. The British had access to a single track line from Cairo/Alexandria to the frontier, the Italians and the Germans were completely without rail.
Regards
JonS
[ June 16, 2002, 03:02 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]
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Ok, just makeing sure you weren't refering to:Originally posted by Tarqulene:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />That my impression that US commanders were being sacked for lack of aggressive spirit, was correct, Tarqulene.
"Force forwards.... pure willpower"the US commanders were attempting to force their infantry forwards, through the use of what appears to be almost pure willpower, rather than a proper understanding of the conditions facing them.
The statement could be easily (mis?)understood as a criticism of extreme aggression on the part of the US commanders, not too little.</font>
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Which contention would that be? </font>Originally posted by Tarqulene:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Brian:
This appears to support my contention.
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You do appear to have had an enjoyable afternoon, Jon.Originally posted by JonS:So, it would seem that a lack of aggression would seem to have been at least part of the reason so many were fired. Of course, 'aggression' isn't an intrinsically 'bad' thing for a soldier to have.How commanders who don't have to face the enemy display it, though, is a bit more problematic.
Regards
JonS
BTW, the excerpts you sent were interesting.This appears to support my contention. Perhaps Jason might like to reply (hopefully without using too much bandwidth).
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Jason, you know, its because of this sort of thing people get more than a trifle annoyed with you. It adds nothing to the debate and merely raises the temperature.Originally posted by JasonC:I will now do my Brian impersonation (tongue firmly in cheek).
"Those yanks, excitable lot, wot? Need a little steadying, dontcha know. Weren't around for more than a few minutes of the last one, poor sods - missed all the lessons. Darned unimaginative too. Strictly commoners you know, wot? Do things one way, can't understand improvements. Oh, build well enough if we give them the plans. Can't fight worth a damn, but then there are a lot of them, seeing they let in all that European lot. The wogs begin where? Right-ho. Now, if they'd let Monty run the whole show, be in Berlin by now, wot? Simply mindless. Shoving the lads forward, leaning on the guns - right out of Sassoon. Naturally they blame the chap just under them, so half have already got the sack. And the wars just started for them, wot? Any be left at the end of the show?"
My apologies to PG Wodehouse and the entire population of the UK.
It also indicates IMO a deep-seated insecurity complex in that you appear unable or unwilling to take onboard any criticism, either positive or negative of the US military or its methods in WWII. Such a retreat to nationalism is IMO completely out of place here.
Now, as the start of this debate was a comment by someone else who attempted to make a disparaging claim that the US Army was indeed "gadget happy" I'm increasingly at a loss as to why you're upset that I've been attempting to refute that claim by suggesting it was actually a great deal more conservative than that original poster claimed.
Do you really want to see the US Army viewed as being "gadget happy", despite IMO there being no evidence to prove it?? :confused:
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Originally posted by JonS:
[QB]Originally posted by Brian:
Its a pity my copy of Hastings is on loan at the moment. However, I'm surprised someone else has not referred to it...Oh, alright:
Hastings, M. (1984), Overlord: d-day and the battle for normandy 1944, Pan Books Ltd, London (1985). p. 291.
Thanks, mate. Now, does he mention as to the reason why they were sacked? I seem to remember it was because of both a perception of incompetence and lack of aggression on their part.
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Originally posted by Brian:
My understanding of the decision to change over to dusk/night attacks was indeed to nullify the superior long-range, German AT weapons and allow the British/Canadians to utilise the mass available to them to smash their way through the German lines. Further it allowed Bomber Command to bring in their bombers. Harris was reluctant enough to utilise them tactically let alone in daylight, unless ordered to.No idea. Perhaps Jason can tell us?
They used them in several operations in numbers from about 700 to over a 1,000. Most of the big offensives which utilised Montgomery's ideas on "collosal cracks" featured the use of strategic bombers tactically. TOTALISE and the others, afterwards, spring to mind.
Its interesting though, that it was more the use of tactical fighters by the American Quesada (?sp) during Cobra which was more telling than the bombers IIRC. I think the one place where the bombers could/should perhaps have been used, they weren't - MARKET-GARDEN.
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mmm, doublepost. Not sure why.
[ June 15, 2002, 02:42 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]
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But they did not develop nor utilise it themselves, relying upon the British to supply both vehicles and crews, Michael.Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:But US troops did use Crocodile on occasion...
[/qb
It was the CRA, Michael, Ivor Maxe (again I think that was the spelling of his name, perhaps John or Jon could supply more detail) who was quite critical of the emphasis placed upon long and large pre-attack bombardments by most commanders during the mid period in WWI (ie after the Somme and before the 100 days). Its mentioned in I believe Bidwell's Firepower.[qb]Did the British really believe gunpower in WW I was "misuse"? Probably the same guys that put magazine cutoffs on the Lee Enfields so that the troops would not shoot so much....
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Isn't it important that they failed to satisfy their superiors who had a view of the battlefield which was not supported by reality? Their superiors believed that the "one shoe fits all" technology should have worked and it was a lack of either ability or aggression on the part of the commander, rather than in reality that it was not until innovation, be it in superior tactics or technical means (ie the Cullin device) that they were were able to actually push forward.Originally posted by Tarqulene:Are we? Jason has yet to answer the point - how many and why were so many US Brigade and Divisional commanders sacked in the first few weeks of the push inland?
Ah, but that doesn't necessarily matter. As MD mentioned, it could have simply been because the commanders were inexperienced. Not because in their inexperience or incompetence they improperly used their troops ("sheer willpower.")Why they were getting sacked matters. Finally, if they were quickly sacked and replaced with commanders who had far more than "willpower" to draw on, it could actually weaken your argument.
You should also remember we are talking about the outlook of an organisation, the US Army, rather than the views of individuals within that organisation. Jason has yet to explain why the upgunnng of the Sherman was resisted, as was the introduction of a heavy tank with an adequate gun, in favour of the "one shoe fits all" 75mm gun tank.
Robert J. Icks was quite scathing in his criticism of the conservatism he faced within the US Army's heirachy, both pre and during the war WRT the development of armour.
I guess what I'm trying to get at is the bare fact that there was a high turnover rate doesn't really matter. It's certainly interesting, and lends support to your argument, but I don't think you can stand on it alone.
Its a pity my copy of Hastings is on loan at the moment. However, I'm surprised someone else has not referred to it. Moreover, I'm surprised at the way in which Jason is making this such a storm in a teacup. Remember, we are afterall, in the long run talking about my impressions...
Its an indication IMO that the US commanders were desperately searching for a means to achieve a breakthrough and hit upon the one weapon at their disposal that seemed to work - overwhelming and massive firepower. Again, if anything, it reminds me of the mid-years of the Great War, when the British came to rely overly much on the use of artillery to shoot them onto their objectives, something the CRA, Maxe (I think that was his name) noted dryly during that conflict in criticism of that misuse of artillery.What do you have to say about the "bigger hammer" of the American artillery? Jasons post certainly certainly doesn't _rule out_ the possibility that many American commanders weren't using it properly, but I found it more persuasive than the bare fact that many commanders were sacked.
Now, here's a different sort of take - how long do you think the German defences in the Bocage would have lasted if the US Army had developed and utilised the Crocodile or the AVRE?
[ June 15, 2002, 02:13 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]
Has the price been mentioned yet?
in Combat Mission Archive #4 (2002)
Posted
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