Paco QNS
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Malakovski
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Member # 9905
posted March 11, 2005 10:32 PM
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--------------------Anyone heard from Paco QNS lately? We were moving along pretty well for a while but I haven't heard form him in days...Malakovski
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Sent you my turn in the 8th.
Resent it on the 12/03/2005. Have yot received it?
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Flammen, I´ve had RL issues here.
Will return you a turn soon, please be patient.
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All files for G R O U P 8 are sent.
Good luck to all -including me-.
Thanks a lot to organizers, sponsors, scenario creators and all involved.
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All Group 8 members accounted for during this weekend.
As a note, I´ve just checked the reception of files, they were in the non-desired mailbox.
Setting up.
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No problem.
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Feliz Navidad para todos
Merry Christmas to everybody in the CM family !
both in BF and all loyal followers
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I would say it must be similar to a
Etat-Major de Brigade Légère Mécanique (Light Mechanised Brigade Staff)
probably bigger, with more batmen and signals.
Add a couple infantry platoons for escort, AA guns, several armored cars,...
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Here are a few links on the final battle of that wars, at Cuito Cuanavale, with wildly conflicting versions:
Minefield map of Cuito Cuanavale
Brief cuban version of that battle
An absolutely opposed version of the same battle
7th South African Infantry Battalion and Cuito Cuanavale (1987-1989)
Castro explains why Angola lost against SADF
The military defeat of the South Africans in Angola Monthly Review, April, 1989 by Horace Campbell
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I assume you have this one The Battle for Ebo, by Cobus Venter
((and what a bombastic music it has!))
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Don´t browse-and-select.
Check before you hit install in that moment:
it creates a
C:/program archives//battlefront/CMAK/new folder
in that line
so, you delete that new folder and simply let
C:/program archives/battlefront/CMAK/
and then install.
I explained myself badly up-before, but that is
what I mean.
Try this and inform.
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Same happened to me.
Run the Install again and check carefully location:
it opens a "new folder" on your CMAK directory, delete that "new folder", run the install and it would work well.
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Iam Ishora. Outskirts of Leningrad, between Kolpino and Krasny Bor.
The Spanish Volunteers Division (also known as 250 Division and "Blue Division") arrived to this front on September 1942.
The russian have been advancing with sappers works, until on 27th December they occupy Iam Ishora. They take two bunkers, one on each side of the road, and parallel to the old tank ditch, a chain of several others.
(( and, only a few days later ... ))"" 29 December ((1942)):
Continue the same works and detachments.
A reinforced platoon of 1st Company formed by Lt D. Andres Eloy Muro V. four sergeants and eighty one sappers acted like Combat Engineers of Assault, with the mission to blast the wire fences, open minefields and destruct with explosives various defensive elements (bunkers and weapons emplacements); a infantry force with mission of assault and annihilation of enemy combatants were constituted by 6th Company of 2nd Battalion of Regiment 262 of whose forces one platoon was located between both wire fences to support the action if it had, the other two platoons of infantry fulfilled their mission of annihilation. The infantry was preceded by combat engineers up to the enemy parament, to open breach in the minefield, located between the wire fence and the dig in enemy.
The force of the battalion fulfilled magnificently its mission, organized into three squads it burst in along with those of infantry in position blowing the indicated objectives the left and center squads, not having necessity to carry out no blast the squad of right verifying that the fire of artillery that preceded the attack had destroyed the targets assigned to them. This successful op by the battalion deserved the congratulation of the General of the Division that ordered the concession of seventeen Iron Crosses in order to compensate the brave combat engineers; our sensible losses were five dead among them the official who passed away a few hours after being transferred to the hospital and twelve wounded ones.
Died: Lt D. Andres Eloy Muro V., Corporal Jose Rodriguez M., soldiers Enrique Larfeuil L., Feliciano Moreno P. and Teodoro Domingo S.
Wounded: Corporal Lucio Herranz M. and the soldiers Angel Iglesias S., Eladio Lopez L., Francisco Cornejo M., Francisco Samaniego V., Eduardo Veiro M., Toribio Lorenzo M., Arturo Menéndez O., Mariano Leon C., Guillermo Gutierrez G. and Julian Carrasco H. .-
Incorporated to service from the hospital soldier Raimundo Couto G. ((unrelated)). ""
Source: "Soldado en tres guerras" Alfredo Bellod Gómez, Editorial San Martín, Madrid 2004"" 15 January ((1943))
Same situation and works.
Today, at fifteen minutes past six a platoon of the 1st Company commanded by the Lt D. Emeterio Blanco S., verified at the sector of the 5th Company of the Grenadeirs Regiment 263, an operation of assault and destruction in enemy lines. This assault was done with complete success, accomplishing the Sappers the mission encomended: open breach in wires and destruction of enemy defensive organizations, resulting in nine wounded, of them: two non-evacuated. ""
Comandante (( Major)) Bellod was the CO of the 250 Assault Sappers Battalion, divisional unit.
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According to the book "Nieve roja", the death of Lt Muro was caused when returning to own lines, observing a new type of russian mine, he tried to recover it for study, but the mine was trapped and it blasted inflicting him grave wounds. He later died in the hospital, and was buried in Mestelewo.
Also, in other parts of the book, the op beginned at twenty five minutes past one, with a fire barrage with 36 guns. The sappers advanced on the minefields, and a quarter of hour later they entered the enemy parament and fight in close combat. Forty minutes after the beginning of the op, it was a success and the sappers returned.
"Nieve roja", Fernando y Miguel Angel Garrido Polonio, Editorial Oberon, 2002.
((As teenagers Fernando and Miguel Angel promised to their granny to rescue the remains of her brother, killed in Russia. The book tells how years later they fulfill their promise.))
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"Ejército" nº 92 Sep 47
(( Spanish Army official Review ))
"La compañía de cañones de infantería"
(( The infantry-gun Company ))
Col Manuel Sagrado Marchena
CO of Mountain Agrupment
(( He was the CO of the 262 Regiment, and Commander of Krasny Bor subsector on February, 10th 1943)) ((outskirts of Leningrad)).
-------------------------------------------"".., in the battle of Krasny-Bor, February, 1943, for six days of feverish night activity, the russians constructed approximately eighty gun-emplacements for pieces of the calibers among 4,5 and 7,62 centimeters , in first line and between their first and the second; distant their first line from ours approximately 40 meters counted on the terrace of the railroad Moscow - Leningrad, approximately 300 meters in most of the front of contact and 500 meters in the more remote place. They entered the pieces in position in the night 9-10 of February, and at dawn, approximately a hundred Batteries of all the calibers initiated an intense preparation of two hours of duration. About 20 per 100 of pieces, those placed in the first line, with direct shot aiming individually and observing from the piece, demolished covers, shieldings, nests of automatic weapons and emplaced light antitank guns, preparing the assault of the siberians; but an exiguous number of machine guns 'revived' among the rubbles of so conscientious demolition, drowning in pools of blood three consecutive assaults. In the ostentation of material probably there was absent a ' powerful complement ' of the Infantry: the Infantry gun. As a fact, against the machine guns ghosts, having been foreseen, an infantry gun could not have fired over the waves of assault, because of its tense trayectory in a completely horizontal plain. So, said better, it was missed the Infantry howitzer.-
Revista "Ejército" nº 92 Sep 47
"La compañía de cañones de infantería"
Cnel Manuel Sagrado Marchena
Jefe de Agrupación de Montaña
((era Cnel Jefe del Regto 262 y Jefe del subsector de Krasny Bor el 10-02-1943)).
"Y fiel a tal doctrina respondió su conducta. Así, en la batalla de Krassny-Bor, febrero de 1943, durante seis días de febril actividad nocturna, construyeron los rusos unos ochenta asentamientos a barbeta para piezas de los calibres entre 4,5 y 7,62 centímetros, en primera línea y entre la primera y segunda, distante aquélla de la línea contraria unos 40 metros, contados sobre el terraplen del ferrocarril Moscú-Leningrado, unos 300 metros en la mayor parte del frente de contacto y 500 metros en los sitios más alejados. Entraron las piezas en posición en la noche 9-10 de febrero, y al amanecer, unas cien Baterías de todos los calibres iniciaron una preparación intensa de dos horas de duración. El 20 por 100 de las piezas, las situadas en primera línea, con tiro directo sobre objetivo individual y observación desde la pieza, demolieron cubiertas, blindajes, nidos de armas automáticas y asentamientos avanzados de anticarros ligeros condición previa para el asalto de los siberianos; pero un exiguo número de ametralladoras "resucitadas" de entre los escombros de tan concienzuda demolición ahogó en riada de sangre tres asaltos consecutivos. En el alarde de material quizá faltó un "complemento potente" de la Infantería: el cañón de Infantería contra las ametralladoras fantasmas, de haber estado previsto, no hubiera podido tirar por encima de las olas de asalto, a causa de su trayectoria rasante en una llanura completamente horizontal. Faltó quizá el obús de Infantería.- -
I concur, those formulae always made my head fuzzy. Must be said, though, that the fuze type is a superfluous one. By default, to kill shields always were used delay ones -if available-.
And the shell brinell was, well, the better you could built for that kind of shot.
That is a pre- WWI formula, and it was infered from experiences with real fire. Since the article gave no data on that experiences, I searched,
and found this brief article, unrelated .
Yes. I prefer the empiric method, if possible:
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Magazine "Ejército" Year XV nº 176 Sep 1954
((My Description of the figure: Trench of 2 meters approx. of wide, with coverCAMPAIGN FORTIFICATION. TEST OF a SHIELD WITH REAL FIRE (from the North American publication Combat Forces Journal.). -
It is known that a protection cover in Korea, with tree trunks and earth, had resisted the direct hit of the 122 mm caliber without even throwing dust on the occupants of the protected shelter; but was not known if the grenade had instantaneous fuze or delayed. In order to determine the effect of American projectiles on this type of shield, the School of Application of Artillery of Fort Sill has made a series of experiences recently, using, since it does not have howitzers of 122 mm, the one of 105 with delay fuze and the one of 155 with instantaneous fuze. The shots were done on a cover (see figure) formed by one layer of tree trunks, about 8 centimeters of diameter by each meter of light or length nonsupported, on it was piled and compressed earth in a thickness of 1,60 meters, crowned by a layer of explosion and a sand-bag revetment. The cover was the same one for the different phases from the tests, varying only the layer of explosion, formed with a material whose object was to cause the fast performance of the fuze. The first experience was made with 105 mm and the ballistic data for final speed and angle of impact were such of that corresponding to charge 7, at a 6.750 meters of range. One of the layers of explosion was formed by slabs of stone of 7,62 centimeters, and the other by metallic cases, full of earth or stone. In this test, a projectile of 105 mm, with delayed-action fuze, dismantled a great amount of earth tamped, but the paper leaned to the inferior layer of tree trunks did not suffer any damage. For the second experience ( 155 mm) it was calculated that charge 4 at 721 meters would provide approximately the final ballistic data of the indirect shot with charge 6 at 9.140 meters.
Three classes were used of explosion layers: full gabions of earth, stone crushed with thickness of 7.62 cm. and this same one of slabs of stone. The results of this second experience were similar to the obtained with 105 mm:
considerable external in the cover and very small effects in the interior; only, initiation of cross-sectional cracks in some of the driest tree trunks and old and longitudinal fissures in one or two tree trunks (the projectile of 105, no it affected the tree trunks). It was not proven 155 with delayed-action fuze, with the absolute certainty that it would perforate or squash the tree trunks and because it is not probable that the Communists use delayed-action fuze in counterbattery fire shot without observation. The layer of explosion more favorable turned out to be the one of slabs of stone; the one of metallic gabions and crushed stone, inferior to the first were equivalent to each other.
The consequent modifications has been recommended for the Manual of Campaign 5-15 (( FM 5-15 )). - ((Translated by)) Lieutenant Colonel Casas ((and retranslated by babelfish and me)).
of 2.24 ms wide, formed by - down to above -, layer of tree trunks, earth cover
tamped of thickness 5´ with lateral and sides of sand-bags, layer of explosion, also covered of sand-bags. It forms a sloped triangle, with angle of 21º with land line, 5.14 meters of length measure the cover, covering 4.80 trench meters, that it opens by his end with an exit slit. )) (( BTW, yes, the figure mixs measures, or it seems. ))
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Revista "Ejército" Año XV nº 176 Sep 1954
(( Datos figura: Trinchera de 2 metros aprox. de ancho, con cubierta de 2,24 metros formada por -de abajo arriba-, capa de rollizos, cubierta de tierra apisonada de espesor 5´ con laterales y lados de sacos terreros, capa de explosión, a su vez cubierta de sacos terreros. Forma un triángulo, con ángulo de 21º con el terreno. Mide la cubierta 5,14 m de largo, cubriendo 4,80 m de trinchera, que se abre por su extremo con una salida. )) (( Ah!, por cierto, Sí, el dibujo mezcla medidas )).FORTIFICACION DE CAMPAÑA. PRUEBA DE UN BLINDAJE CON FUEGO REAL (De la publicación norteamericana Combat Forces Journal.).-
Se sabía que en Corea la cubierta de protección, a base de rollizos y tierra, había resistido el impacto directo del calibre 122 mm., sin arrojar siquiera polvo sobre los ocupantes del abrigo protegido; pero no se sabía si la granada llevaba espoleta instantánea o de retardo. Para determinar el efecto de los proyectiles americanos sobre dicho tipo de blindaje, la Escuela de Aplicación de Artillería de Fort Sill, ha realizado recientemente una serie de experiencias, utilizando, puesto que no dispone de obuses de 122 mm, el de 105 con espoleta retardada y el de 155 con espoleta instantánea.
Los disparos se hicieron sobre una cubierta (veáse figura) formada por una capa de rollizos, de unos 8 centímetros de diámetro por cada metro de luz o longitud no apoyada, sobre la que se apisonó tierra en un espesor de 1,60 metros, coronado por una capa de explosión y un revestimiento de sacos terreros.
La cubierta fué la misma para las distintas fases de las pruebas, variando sólo
la capa de explosión, que como es sabido, se forma con un material duro, cuyo objeto es provocar la rápida actuación de la espoleta.
La primera experiencia se realizó con el 105 mm y los datos balísticos finales -velocidad y ángulo de arribada- fueron los mismos que los correspondientes a la carga 7, a 6.750 m. de alcance. Una de las capas de explosión estaba formada por lajas de piedra en 7,62 centímetros, y la otra por cestones metálicos, llenos de tierra o piedra. En este ensayo, un proyectil de 105 mm, con espoleta de retardo, desmanteló una gran cantidad de tierra apisonada, pero el papel que se había adosado a la capa inferior de la capa de rollizos no sufrió daño alguno.
Para la segunda experiencia 155 mm se calculó que la carga 4 a 721 m., proporcionaría aproximadamente, los datos balísticos finales que cabría esperar del tiro indirecto, con la carga 6 a 9.140 m. Se utilizaron tres clases de capas de explosión: cestones llenos de tierra, piedra machacada con espesor de 7,62 cm. y este mismo de lajas de piedra. Los resultados de esta segunda experiencia fueron parecidos a los obtenidos con el 105 mm.: considerables efectos externos en la cubierta y muy pequeños en el interior; tan sólo, iniciación de grietas transversales en algunos de los rollizos más secos y viejos y fisuras longitudinales en uno o dos rollizos (el proyectil de 105, no afectó a los rollizos). No se probó el 155 con espoleta retardada, por contar con la seguridad de que perforaría o aplastaría los rollizos y porque no es probable que los comunistas utilicen espoleta retardada en tiro de contrabatería sin observación.
La capa de explosión más favorable resultó ser la de lajas de piedra; la de
cestones metálicos y piedra machacada, inferiores a la primera, resultaron
equivalentes entre sí.
Se ha recomendado la consiguiente modificación de las cifras que figuran en
el Manual de Campaña 5-15 .- Teniente Coronel Casas.
(( Edited for vs spelling ,
to correct "tested on", must said "infered from"
AND, to give a caution note, for there is a catch ... ))
[ November 06, 2004, 01:40 PM: Message edited by: Paco QNS ]
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Sergei, the usual airfield of that time was really a big open field, with the better drainage available.
I bought -dirt cheap- an "Atlas de aérodromos de España" (( Spain´s airfields atlas )), republished in 1996, first issued in 1934 (( compiling different data from bulletins issued from 1929 on. ))
I will give data for a couple of them:
Cuatro Vientos, in Madrid. A military airfield ((one of the first in Spain)) ((you can´t say it was typical, since it was besides the capital city and the oldest airfield in Spain))
Maximum dimensons: 1.200 * 700 meters (in the scheme is marked as "Campo de vuelo"= airfield.
Conditions of floor: Sandy, in the NE covered with grass.
Instalations: Two big sidelined hangars, and a big one, for the repairs. Besides them, three big buildings and nine medium ones. A dozen more little ones.
Caceres:
Military airfield.
Max. dim.: 400 * 400 meters
Floor: "Plain, arcillous and hard, though a bit slippy. There is no danger in overpassing it, since there are no drainage canals separating it from the next camps."
Instals.: "Hangars: an iron one, able for five planes, sited in the NW angle"
Albacete
Max.dim.: 1.010 * 950 meters
Floor: plain and permeable.
Hangars: Four hangars of 22*22 meters, and a garage -all side by side-, an officers pavillion, sanitary services and rest area. Repairs building, storage, houses for guards and mechanic personnel, "cantina"=military Pub, water storage, electric house and a tennis floor.
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As a side note, it must be remembered that quite a bunch of planes then had no tail wheel, but a sort of steel stick ( both the I-15 and I-16 -at least the .5 and .10 models - fighters came to mind ). That was to help them to stop, if possible, without the plane in a "drinking water" posture (in that days jargon).
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FWIW
According to the Parodi Formulae:
x= C * K * A
x= penetration, in meters
C= W / 1000 * ( a * a )
W= Weight of shot, in kilograms
a= caliber of shot, in meters
K= 0.43 for very hard rock; 0.88 for concrete; 1.63 for bricks; 3.44 for compact earth; and 5.84 for removed earth
A= a logarithmic function of speed in meters oer second = 0.18 for 100 m/s; 0.3 for 140 m/s; 0.46 for 195 m/s; 0.59 for 240 m/s; 0.69 for 280 m/s; 0.76 for 310 m/s; 0.95 for 400 m/s; and 1.13 for 500 m/s
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There is another formulae, by Nobile di Giorgi, but it is more complicated, and only give results for concrete and removed earth.
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For the explosion effect:
Bombs, kilograms: 50; 100; 300; 1.000; 1.800
Explos.charge, in Kg: 26 ; 55 ; 165 ; 550 ; 1.000
Penetration of
Concrete, in meters: 0.6; 0.75; 1.1; 1.65; 2
Armoured concr., mts : 0.45; 0.55; 0.8; 1.25; 1.5
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For airplane bombs, dropped from a height of 4.000 meters in a medium consistency earth terrain:
Weight of bomb, in kgs: 45 136 272 500 907 1.814
Depth of crater, in mts: 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.3 5 5.6
Diameter crater, mts: 7.6 8.8 10.6 12.4 14.6 17.8
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Source:
Review "Ejercito" nº22 "El hormigón en las fortificaciones", Tte Cnel José Pérez Reyna, November 1941
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Here are some examples of sangars, both old and modern:
From the origins, in India:
Royal Scots Fusiliers, an outpost in Sangar, Tirah 1897
In Falklands/Malvinas:
Mount Longdon Sangar One of many sangars still on Mount Longdon. Most showed
signs of habitation and were strewn with rubbish
View from sangar Mount Longdon This is looking down a gully on Mount Longdon. The sangar had the debris
(links and cases) from a machine gun that had been fired from the sangar.
After The Battle A photographic collection of the Falkland Battle fields and Memorials
And back to Afganistan:
Sappers from 59 Cdo Sqn RoyalEngineers search a Taliban bunker.
Preparations are made to demolish the position.and Iraq:
Pack Mules, Pickets, and Sangars: Mountain Warfare Methods of the Iraqi Army
BTW, usually the stone fortifications are abhorred by standing doctrine. The reason is because arty shells and rifle shots will cause the stones to splinter, making a sort of shrapnel from them. Of course, when you can´t dig, better the stones than nothing.
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FWIW:
National Doctrine WWII Artillery notesThe Soviets had a hard time training good observers and fire control specialists. Those who could usually ended up in Artillery Divisions. In most wartames, this is reflected by the fact that all Soviet artillery except mortars and direct fire must be pre-plotted. However, the Soviets on the attack should frequently receive a large volume of artillery at their disposal.Artillery is deployed strongly and in great volume. In fact, Soviet doctrine states, "the speed of deployment by artillery units decides the outcome of the battle." In repeated offensive operations, density reached 300-480 pieces per mile of front.
Originally, about 80% of artillery was organic to rifle divisions or corps. After the major defeats of 1941, the remaining pieces were centralized and production became a top priority, resulting in the formation of artillery brigades, divisions, and corps, some of the highly specialized, employed at Stalingrad and thereafter.
Mortars and rockets play a greater role in the Soviet army than any other. Mortars are massed and used (and observed for) like conventional artillery; while rockets are under corps control and are added to key breakthrough attacks. In the attack, self-propelled artillery such as the SU-122 and SU-152 are used heavily for direct-fire artillery support. 120mm and 82mm mortars have roughly the same effects and burst radii as 122mm howitzers and 76mm guns, respectively.
76mm guns are widely used for direct-fire support of infantry and tanks. Less commonly, they're used as conventional artillery. 122mm howitzers are the backbone of conventional Soviet artillery, and 152's are used to supplement or against tougher targets. 122mm guns and 152mm gun-howitzers tend to show up in corps artillery. Antitank guns see heavy use.
Planning, coordination, and timing are key to Soviet doctrine. Detailed plans are layed out hours or days in advance, with plans to effectively neutralize all probable threats and to use surprise concentrations, false transfers, rolling barrages, etc. Fire plans can get quite detailed. [i think that in your average scenario the Soviets should be given more artillery than the Germans, but most of its use will have to be preplanned before the game begins.] Point targets are destroyed more often with direct fire than with precision indirect fire. In defense, phase lines are computed so that a barrage at a particular range can be set up quickly when enemy forces move to that range.
I don't think the Soviets had VT fuze, but they did have quick, delay, and mechanical timed. Open, parallel, and converged sheafs were used.
Barrages were layed down no closer than 220 yards with cover, and 440 without, to friendly forces (110 if flanking fire). Calls for antipersonnel defensive fire were always highest priority. Rolling barrages were set up to lead infantry attacks by roughly 200 yards and tanks by 300-800 yards. Fire transfer could be accomplished by up to 1650 yards via K-transfer (an expensive method, though not as bad as full recomputation), or direct transfer from a checkpoint or previous concentration by up to 330 yards.
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Organizationally speaking, the minimum maneuver element depends only on shared motivation and goals. How many men is it? It is however many you can train to work as a team, for an immediate goal which they did not set, in a cause that they share.
The idea did not revolutionize infantry tactics on the spot. In fact, the British considered "fire and movement" small-unit tactics impractical to teach, at least "too difficult to be taught to the Kitchener divisions."38But it infiltrated below the surface, as ideas do. And the next time German infantry faced the insoluble problem, it sprang forth from the children of those who went to South Africa, as mature as Athena from the head of Zeus.
On 2 March 1915, the German War Ministry ordered the formation of an Assault Detachment (Sturmabteilung) from men provided by the combat engineers to develop the new assault doctrine and train other units. From August 1915 the training unit was commanded by Capt. Willy Martin Rohr. Rohr was born in Metz in 1877, a professional soldier, son of a professional soldier. His commanding officer gave him a free hand plus support in obtaining men and materials. Over the next two years, Rohr's unit redesigned the assault organization, adopted a name for troops they had trained as assault specialists (stosstruppen). They experimented with changes to the uniform, replaced jackboots with laced mountaineer boots, sewed leather patches on knees and elbows, and added body armor. As it turns out, the only item of experimental armor which Captain Rohr finally adopted was the stahlhelm, the coal-scuttle helmet whose latest Kevlar incarnation is known as The Fritz.
From various pages onThe second innovation by Captain Rohr addressed this challenge. He put a mix of weapons into each squad. Exploiting improvements in weapons design and manufacture, he redesigned the sturmabteilung's small-unit organization and doctrine around a variety of newly available man- portable weapons. Captain Geyer's handbook, The Attack in Trench Warfare(companion volume to The Defensive Battle,which he co-wrote with Colonel Bauer) said that "infantry were ... expected to use the fire of their own rifles, grenades, mortars, and machine guns to get forward, which represented a [doctrine of] fire effect combined with movement." Their maneuver element was a trupp or fire-team of four to seven men with self-contained bases of fire: rifles, a light mortar and a light machine gun. A light machine gun trupp, for instance, comprised an NCO plus three men; a rifle trupp consisted of an NCO plus six men.44This organizational structure has not changed significantly in 80 years. For comparison, the smallest maneuver element depicted in the current FM 7-8, in figure 2.4 on page 2.28, shows two riflemen, a light machine gunner, and a grenadier.
According to Liddell-Hart, giving power of maneuver to the smallest infantry units was an "epoch-making change." According to John English, "Battles depended as never before on the tactical knowledge and ability of junior officers and NCOs. And herein lay the greatest change of all."45
Evolution of Infantry Assault Tactics 1850-1918 by Frank W Sweet
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Just two words:(And I wouldn't be too enthusiastic about igniting a home made powder charge to propel a home made molotov cocktail in a home made molotov cocktail projector...)Neither this nor the russian one were "home made", though.
I think it was a black powder charge, probably ignited by a little spring.
Essex Home Guard The Defence of Workington during WWII
Battlefront.com Discussion Area: MAJOR OMISSION - Allied Hand Held
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GaJ wrote:
One way is putting your firing position near the breaking-LOS ridge. In that way, a short "Assault" or "Advance" order will put them on a safe reverse slope (or wood, or any other LOS breaker, such as buildings).One repeatable problem I have is LOS for covering fallback. It's almost a Catch 22. The guys are forward to be the first ones to see the oncoming enemy and trigger the ambush. So they see them, open fire, then want to run. But they were forward so they could *be* the ones to see the oncoming troops. Hence the people further back who are supposed to be covering still logically (and in practice) can't see the enemy units that the forward people have now engaged and want to retreat from!Another, is smoke (not enough in CM for that, though).
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Isn´t ironic that -at the same time- the tendency in modern war movies is exactly the opposite to "Photographic Quality Graphics" ?
In both "Saving Private Ryan" and in "Band of Brothers" the image in battle scenes is granulous, the camera shaky and -to allow inmersiveness and realism-, trying to give us something as Stendhal´s "Fabrizio del Dongo" feelings in Waterloo in 'The Charterhouse of Parma' :
No war is clean, and no war image can be seen as clear as a "Photographic First-Person-Shooter" -a few years ago there were both a Saloon and a Police one, based obviously in this: Shoot To Drill - 1998-02-02 - Puget Sound Business Journal''Had what he'd seen been a battle? . . . Had this battle been Waterloo?--------------------------------------------
For me, give me advances in AI and put the graphics in a secondary improvement area.
Regards,
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A) AFAIK, there was no such thing as a "Layered Defense" -as a military concept- till it was applied to the Missile Defense recently. (In case of doubt, check with Google -it is applied mainly to the SDI, and to antivirus software-);
the correct term is: "Elastic Defense in Depth", and the favourite link (most cited in this forum) is In essence, it combines:
1) an outpost line -very lightly manned- with direct views to the enemy ((In CM terms, light MGs, sharpshooters and anti-tank-teams));
2) a Main-Line-of-Resistence, sited on reverse slope, formed of strongpoints with mutual support (and including a strong reserve),
and 3) an artillery line, or final resistance line (with indirect fire batteries), again on reverse slope.
the emphasis is put on
flexibility
decentralized command
iniciative
and inmediate response and counter-attack.
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C) Here is an example of elastic defense in depth:
CSI REPORT No. 13 - TACTICAL RESPONSES TO CONCERNED ARTILLERY
GERMAN COUNTERARTILLERY MEASURES ON THE EASTERN FRONT IN 1944-45: OPERATION BAGRATION
by Dr. Samuel J. Lewis
- - -1st Battalion, 27th Fusilier Regiment, 12th Infantry Division
There are relatively few German Army battalion-level accounts concerning Operation Bagration. The following recollection by a battalion commander cannot be substantiated by documentation, but it does reflect how the Germans attempted to maneuver within the battle zone, which was consistent with the elastic defense.
The 12th Infantry Division served under the XXXIX Panzer Corps of the German Fourth Army. Since March 1944, the division fought east of Mogilev defending a 32-kilometer front along the Pronja Bend with no reserves, excluding the field replacement battalion. The 1st Battalion defended a front of more than four kilometers behind the Pronja River, which was fifteen to twenty-five meters wide and served as an antitank obstacle. Throughout May, the arrival of replacements and the return of convalescents increased the battalion's strength to about 430 men. By June, the 4 companies each fielded 70 to 100 men. The battalion held the northern flank of the division, with its neighbor to the north being the 337th Infantry Division. The battalion aggressively patrolled the 1 1/2-kilometer gap between it and its neighbor to the north and the front down to the river, most of which could not be observed from the main line of resistance.12
The battalion did not defend the river line but, rather, established its first line on a series of hilltops and rises (30 meters above the river) 300 to 500 meters from the river. That trench linked a series of weapons pits, each sited to provide flanking fire for another. Where appropriate, the infantry had placed mines and wire in front of the line. The troops lived in squad bunkers sited on reverse slopes. The battalion commander set up a second line 400 to 600 meters behind the first, mostly on reverse slopes. Covered communications trenches linked the first and second lines. It took the battalion eight weeks to complete five such lines.13
The Red Army's 2d Belorussian Front faced the German Fourth and Ninth Armies. It occupied a 160-kilometer front and achieved an artillery density of 181 guns and mortars per kilometer. The Front's main effort rested with the 49th Army, which concentrated ten rifle divisions to strike the German 337th Infantry Division, the northern neighbor of the aforementioned 1st Battalion.14
The usual harbingers of a Soviet offensive alerted the German defenders, accentuated on 22 June by Red Army loudspeaker psychological operations broadcasts, artillery fire, and aggressive patrolling. By the evening of the 22d, the battalion had driven the Soviet advance parties back across the Pronja River. The battalion commander expected the major attack on the following day, so during the night, he evacuated the first line and occupied the second line. However, he left several forward observers in the first line. After illuminating the battlefield during the night, the Soviets began their barrage of all calibers at about 0400. The rolling barrage lasted about three hours, moving back and forth several times across the first line and destroying just about all the positions and communications links in the first line. The German battalion in the second line suffered forty casualties from the barrage.15
Following the three-hour barrage, the German battalion commander took the unorthodox measure of moving forward to the first line. He found that a sufficient number of positions had survived for his troops to occupy. The first Soviet attack broke down about 200 meters in front of the first line. Subsequent attacks in regimental strength met the same fate. During the night, the German battalion once again withdrew to the second line where it once again averted the brunt of the morning Soviet artillery barrage and subsequently moved back to the first line. To avoid being surrounded, the battalion finally retreated on the night of 24 June.16
D) Here is an interesting paper on both defensive and offensive tactics:Dynamics of doctrine: the change in German tactical doctrine during the First World War by Timothy T. Lupfer
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E) Fom the previous (d) point
I found From a 1916 issue of Illustration : a series of battlefield sketches by André Laffargue showing an attack on enemy trenchesOn 9 May 1915 Capt. Andre Laffargue led an attack on a German position. Afterwards, Laffargue reflected upon the problems of the attack and expressed his ideas in a pamphlet, "The Attack in Trench Warfare." The French Army published, the pamphlet, but distributed it for information only; it did not become French doctrine. The British did not translate it.6 Early in the summer of 1916 the Germans captured a copy of the pamphlet, translated it at once, and issued it to units. Ludwig Renn wrote that Laffargue's ideas had immediate use as a tactical manual for German infantry.- - -
F) Another interesting paper, though more on offensive tactics:
Evolution of Infantry Assault Tactics 1850-1918 by Frank W. Sweet
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G) And finally, take a look to this PDF done in Powerpoint-style
German Army Tactical German Army Tactical Adaptation during World War 1
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I admit it is difficult to apply all the principles of the "Elastic Defense in Depth" in the CM games:
a) usually, you can´t choose the terrain were you want to defend from -something essential-,
not enough troops per Kilometer of front to create a real MLR -AND- enough reserves ((though it is usual to put the armoured assets in reserve for mobile counterattacks))c) costs for fortifications preclude a real complete MLR.
Regards,
the correct term is: "Elastic Defense in Depth", and the favourite link (most cited in this forum) is
**** ROW V (Part 2) ****
in Combat Mission: Afrika Korps
Posted
Send it this morning before work.
Just resent, please check.