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Determinant

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Everything posted by Determinant

  1. I live in England and there are many fords, some dating back to medieval times. For those who don't seem to understand, a ford is a section of river where the bank has been dug out to provide a smooth entry to the water, and the river bed is generally reinforced with pebbles to provide a good grip. To my mind there seems to be nothing that would stop a tank crossing ones of these fords, especially as I frequently do it in a car![/QB]
  2. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Carter: > Is the combat advantage of digitization > properly modelled in TacOps? Seems to me that TacOps models an exceptional capability for situational awarness. As a commander you have complete knowledge of all your forces: You know where everyone is. You know exactly how much ammo they have on hand. You know what all your units are doing. When one of your units spots the enemy, you know instantly. If anything I think that TacOps gives the player better situational awarness than they might have in real life. Sure, the Army has some very useful digital situational awarenss systems on their vehicles, but the grunts don't have that stuff yet. OPFOR probably wouldn't be have the digital situational awarness systems either. But I don't mind. Compromises have to be made in a simulation, and I want OPFOR to be as tough as possible.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Absolutely. Penetrating the 'Fog of War': I haven't read 'Men Against Fire' for years but isn't there an anecdote in there from a company commander saying that his 'best' (all things are relative) day in combat was when he had both flanks anchored, while in a reasonably stable situation so that he knew what was going on or something like that? But it is good to read in the AARs from TacOps CPXs (never been there myself) that 'fog of war' is a continual factor bearing down on TacOps commanders. The British Army is attempting to link the next generation of battlefield radios with GPS so that at least a commander will know where all his guys are, and also information like ammo states will be more easily transmitted down the logs chain: trying to move towards at least partial oversight of the situation I suppose. But I guess the above really answers my question: if you properly modelled a digitized blue force up against a steam-powered OPFOR then blue force would be making something like two moves to the OPFORs every move. This would be particularly acute in novel and demanding situations - I guess that the OPFOR would still be pretty quick off the blocks when executing their well rehearsed drills in response to forseeable tactical problems... But as Major H has said previously in regard to one side having overwhelming air or arty there wouldn't be much point in trying to simulate a foregone conclusion.
  3. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by MajorH: Superior situational awareness doesn't help much if the enemy can engage at a greater range than you can with rounds that go through both sides of your vehicle while yours bounce off or disintegrate even at close range .<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Forgive me being dismissive of guns and armour: I'm one of those boring people who make controversial statements to stimulate debate. But: The enemy is engaging us from a position of advantage using his superior weapons? This sounds like his situational awareness is a lot better than ours. What were we (not) doing to allow this to happen? Before you do anything you have to cycle through the OODA loop (Observe, Orientate, Decision, Action). If you can do this quicker than your opponent than you have the initiative. My point is that a force using digital technologies (ie US Army & in particular M1A2) ought to be able to develop and to react to situations much more quickly than steam powered opponents (who are all still busy marking maps, writing orders, coding messages for the radio, waving coloured flags etc etc). Seizing the initiative is the real advantage on the battlfield and digitally equipped forces will normally be able to do this. Assuming that the technology doesn't crash of course...
  4. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software: Determinant, I have seen quite a few quotes from Jary. In general I have enjoyed seeing what he has to say. Although I must say that some of the stuff I have read runs contrary to the observations of others. Again, this is most likely the problem with "put ten experts in a room, ask them the same basic question, and get 25 different answers" problem I think he is, in this statement, blurring the distinction between emplaced, defensive, units vs. the everyday German squad. He is also ascribing the higher burst rates of the German gunners to doctrine. From what I have read these situations had more to do with the fact that German training standards had declined, not that they had changed. In other words, they were supposed to be firing in short bursts but were too inexperienced to do so. One of the big drawbacks to the MG42. It was too easy to burn through ammo, and excessive expendature of ammo is a consistant problem with inexperienced troops. So... stick a guy with a MG that has a high rate of fire, don't train him too well, scare him to death, and what do you expect will happen? Poor fire discipline That being said, if a MG is in a good defensive spot (i.e. well supported by others), has a lot of ammo, and the ability to keep the gun cool (air temp, # of spare barels, etc.) I think the gunner would be much more willing to do long pulls on the trigger. Steve [ 04-12-2001: Message edited by: Big Time Software ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Absolutely: Sydney Jary's experiences is very much 'one man's view' and it certainly wouldn't do to assume that his experiences as a platoon commander somehow encapsulated all fighting in Western Europe post Overlord. And yet... He is a first hand witness... I don't think that the quote I used necessarily comes down either side of this ongoing machine gun thread. Let's remember that there are more machine guns on the board in CM than those merely reflected in the specialist sustained role units (your .30/.50 cals, vickers, M42 HMGs etc): most every squad has a machine gun in the light role (be it Bren, MG34-MG42 fired off the bipod, BAR etc). These machine guns are crew-served because at least two men operate them (not sure about the BAR though but certainly true for the Bren and the Spandaus). SLA Marshall says that these weapons will be fired effectively when the rifles/SMGs are cowering in cover because the firer and loader draw confidence from their close proximity to each other. So when Jary talks about the German use of MGs he is referring to both squad _and_ specialist machine guns in CM terms. I am sure if the point was put to him (and it could be - he is still commenting on infantry in action within the pages of the British Army Review!) he might agree with the fire power factor of a German squad while disagreeing with how that factor was produced: He would probably say that a German squad in defence produces fire power through two men behind a bipod mounted Spandau firing long bursts while the other 6 men with slung K-98s/MP40s carry boxes of link forward to feed the gun... But the important conclusion that Jary makes as an infantry platoon commander is that the Germans in defence could produce a devastating weight of fire through their profligate use of machine gun ammo. Now certainly this was probably poor fire discipline but it did make movement by the attacker simply impossible without overwhelming support fire (invariably Regimental Artillery for the British). In conclusion: attacking does seem easier on the CM 'battlefield' in the face of defensive fire from automatic weapons. So what? If CM was made utterly 'realistic' (even supposing that such a thing was possible) I would not be interested in playing a game where it took 180 1 minute turns to identify, locate and neutralise a single machine gun in order for a rifle platoon to cross a field. I enjoy CM, and while it is a really good approximation, it is not actually real life combat in Western Europe in 44/45. And thank God for that...
  5. Armour and armament is a mere distraction. The principle advantage that the M1A2 has over other nations' MBTs is the use of digital processing through the Inter Vehicle Information System (IVIS) to give the Commander unparalleled situational awareness. Contraversial WW2 example: Think of technically better Soviet tanks (T-34?) being torn apart by inferior German models (Pz III). The reason?: Germans all had radios and therefore enjoyed improved situational awareness over their opponents. Is the combat advantage of digitization properly modelled in TacOps?
  6. "Like most infantry subalterns trained in the UK for the invasion of Europe, I was convinced of the excellence of our Bren light machine gun. After 40 years, I still view the Bren with affection. It was excellent, particularly as a highly portable and accurate infantry section weapon invaluable in the attack. However when it came to a fire fight between a German and a British platoon, their MG34 and MG42 won hands down. I remember my first reaction to actual infantry warfare in July 1944 was one of amazement at the crushing fire power of these very rapid firing guns. It seemed to me that the German infantryman seldom used his rifle. He was a carrier of boxes of light machine gun ammunition of which they seemed to have an endless supply. Our Bren gunners usually fired in short bursts of around five rounds, which not only conserved ammunition but also avoided the gun barrels overheating. Our theory was that, unless one hit the target with the first burst, the opposition would go to ground and subsequent bursts would be unlikely to be effective. The Germans thought otherwise, firing in long sustained bursts, the objective of which seemed to be to keep us pinned to the ground regardless of ammunition expenditure. Typically German - protracted and discordant. While we were usually attacking and therefore had to carry all the magazines for our Brens, the Germans, in defence, had the advantages of stockpiling belts of ammuntion for their Spandaus." Sydney Jary '18 Platoon' ISBN 1 901655 01 6
  7. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Pak40: 1) When life is on the line in the heat of a battle and a stream looks like it may be crossable in a certain are, chances are one of the tanks or vehicles is going to try to cross it. "Major, I'm afraid that my tank will get stuck" wont cut it when you're on a timed attack and the infantry is relying on your tank support. I suspect few commanders in action would want to risk crossing a water obstacle on a ford that had not been recced. There is enough uncertainty in what the Enemy will do without having to worry about whether or not you're going to have a vehicle get stuck under fire. Beside the getting stuck problem fords are an ideal place to lay antitank mines - they are invisible under the water and don't need digging in. Fords scary - like all water obstacles best avoided if at all possible... 2) Most fords are designed by humans for the exact purpose of vehicles to cross water. So why not let vehicles cross them during battle?[/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Fords aren't designed by humans - they are designed by the river - with all the uncertainty that that entails.
  8. This must mean that TacOps accurately models the shady and corrupt real world of defence equipment procurement! Maj H I salute your absolute dedication to a fully realisitic representation of modern warfare!
  9. Are you sure about infantry Coys being commanded by Capts under normal conditions? In 18 Platoon Sydney Jary's Company Commander always seems to have been a Major. You're quite right though about acting and local ranks in combat - come to that many UK infantry platoons today are commanded by Sergeants through a shortage of subalterns. It just seems a pity that CM with its fantastic attention to detail is off the ball on a small thing like ranks...
  10. A criticism so minor that it's hardly worth raising but... In the British Army of WWII (and today come to that): Squads (Sections really but life's too short) were commanded by Corporals. Companies were commanded by Majors. Battalions were commanded by Lieutenant Colonels. Is there a mod that gives the correct ranks for the Brits? I always wince when I see 'squad' commanders of UK forces listed as Sergeants - and worse yet 'Major' John Frost CO 2 PARA at Arnhem. The man was a Lt Col!
  11. Just because it's easy doesn't mean that it can't be deeply satisfying. Anyway that's not fair: the French Army I admire, the French State: Non, merci!
  12. This is probably on a TacOps FAQ somewhere, but is there any prospect of other nations eqpt being put into TacOps inventory? Speaking as a Brit it would be nice to be able to play a game at home. Against the French OPFOR...
  13. Determinant

    Switch

    Ahh, beg pardon for my confusion, didn't think that anyone had enough money to fire tungsten at people (even before any Dubya tax cuts!). What's it supposed to do that steel core rounds can't do? Don't care how good body armour is - if I took even lead anywhere it would be: Good Night Vienna, hands up/white hanky out - for me the war is over...
  14. Determinant

    Switch

    Ahh, isn't this a switch from Depleted Uranium to Tungsten question? I think lead is probably still the heavy metal of preference for punching holes through people - as is DU for punching holes through armour. You just musn't breathe in the dust afterwards. It's a bit like smoking I suppose. Dangerous for your health. We must all make war safe for flowers and butterflys.
  15. Determinant

    M1A2 Armor

    Something that's always bothered me about the photos that I've seen of the Abrams (never seen one in the flesh): It always looks to have a bad shot trap under the main gun mantlet (cf Leopard2 and Challenger2). I note Carter's quote about under turret armour (but it can't be meant to deflect kinetic attacks onto the top deck or into the turret ring surely?) - it all leaves me v. confused.
  16. But do light forces necessarily need 'real armour penetration'? Surely 25mm is a great round for most every day combat situations - I'm sure if it was coming for my dismounted infantry foxhole then I'd be kind of cuddling up in the bottom for the time being... And as for stabilisation: why not fire it from the halt (and well to the rear) and let your dismounts do the maneouvre for you?
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