dieseltaylor

Actually the question of how big the fields are is slightly loaded - Ambrose or Doubler says the average size is 50-75 acres which is complete baloney. I suspect the average is a tenth of that. And fields were very small and an AVRE could easily take out hedgerows across from one side to the other , and I suspect Crocodiles in some fields could do the same easy. It would take incredible bravery to sit in your dug in position waiting to be blown to kingdom come or flames to death with no riposte available to you. Untenable I would think. BTW the US were lent some Crocodiles when besieging Cherbourg or Brest and the Crocodiles rolled up - showed how far they could flame and the Germans in that position surrendered on the demonstration alone.

Hmmm! Perhaps before I get too involved I should point out that I very rarely play on mini-maps or even small maps so I could agree that in those circumstances what you two are saying makes a degree of sense. There can be no doubt that on small maps a module of artillery or an extra platoon may be more effective than a tank. That is solely because of map size not an absolute rule. I find that small maps with the hard edges so important are unsatisfactory in terms of my vision of real terrain, and the effects of flanking fire etc. I have almost always played on large or huge maps. This is in my estimation is better as particularly in CMBB it meant the Russians could buy tanks an actually use movement to weaken the German position rather than be faced with staring down the barrel of multiple Stugs with 80mm of armour or well positioned ATG. And given superior German tanks it is also good when playing the Western Allies. Also this talk of infantry being superior for attack and defense seems to be a generalisation where really your AT ability - as for early war Russians is fairly pathetic - should be qualified. I also suspect that again the presumption is a small map where infantry can be expected to get to all the interesting areas in reasonable time. ME writes of a couple of ATG nullifying tanks, it seems to me the tactical effects of having live tanks with the ability to switch a point of attack or simply to be "the fleet in being" is underated. However on a small maps perhaps these roles are not possible. In scenarios I do get to play some of the "unsatisfactory" aspects of the game. Flags positioned on map sides and baseline, small number of units, night fighting, maps that defy logic, reinforcements arriving 20 units at a time on entrance point, units arriving under fire. Of course these are not game faults but design mistakes - but I do get exposed to them. : ) BTW I had to laugh. a] you mean you do not know the parameters before you purchase!!!! b] you don't buy some wheels just in case there is a great position beyond the start line?!!!! c] I thought keyholing would be a stack easier! Looks like the cherrypickers ball. I like to play with casualties on so tha people get out of naughty cherrypicking behaviour. Incidentaly when talking of points and terrain as a force multiplier my analogy is a large Tiger at the end of a very long bridge over water and you have ten times the points in infantry - and he has the flags. Yipee for the infantry!

This seems a strange hybrid conversation given it is Normandy as the main thread : ) I cannot claim to have played more games than most but I have around 150 recorded at WeBoB where I joined in August 2004 and believe me I played loads more pre 2004 than after sometimes as many as eleven at once. And if you play PBEMHElper in trusted you also play games in half or a third of the time playing normally. So basically I have played quite a few games. I have to go off to breakfast but consider the most popular scenario Tiger Valley - tank heavy or infantry heavy?

There is a thread started on CMSF in which bocage and the effectiveness of the Cuilin plow featured - Steve says I am too dismissive and I say it was over-hyped for morale purposes. However the thread here is an interesting conjectural one on what would have happened if the Commonwealth Armies had the bocage to fight through, so for those who raqrely or never go to the CMSF forums [ i go very very rarely] I thought I would paste it here for WW2 grogs: "However just to stir up something that should be in CMX1 forum was what if the British had the bocage to contend with - is it possible any of these already existing might have been useful: http://www.war44.com/forum/allied-motorised-weapons/187-hobarts-funnies.html for a bit more detail and a picture of the plough which is missing from the Wikipedia article first quoted. Note the assertion that the Crocodile burst would last for ten minutes and the range. How wide are bocage fields? : ) And lobbed AVRe charges, and the demolition pronged vehicles ... Somehow you have to wonder.

I was going to do a lengthy piece on Doubler not mentioning the shortcomings of the cutter but as time passes and I have better things to do .... However just to stir up something that should be in CMX1 forum was what if the British had the bocage to contend with - is it possible any of these already existing might have been useful: http://www.war44.com/forum/allied-motorised-weapons/187-hobarts-funnies.html for a bit more detail and a picture of the plough which is missing from the Wikipedia article first quoted. Note the assertion that the Crocodile burst would last for ten minutes and the range. How wide are bocage fields? : ) And lobbed AVRe charges, and the pronged vehicles ...

More of Normandy infrastructure and geology can be read in extracts here: http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=9FhyfzbsQIQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA55&dq=%22E.P.F.+Rose%22&ots=Sl9fYRgM3K&sig=2fnjZsitUvwSauTZRsuhXPWQ210#PPA66,M1

ASLvet If you use more than the single finger it will not be so bad .... : ) Michael Emrys Are you kidding!!!?? An artillery module in preference to what tank? a PzII. Without even knowing the terrain the advice sucks! : )

Copyright has been abused by its extension at the behest of American media companies. Genuine inventions get less protection than sodding music and literature.

The Register

Your percentages agree with mine for wet. Incidentally I do wonder if very large number tests - 100 tanks per time actually obscure the average effect in battle. I have used dozen, tens and twenties and it seems to me that low figures record higher. Not logical but then in coding who knows what gremlins occur. : ) I also find the immobs. are front loaded. Arguably with less tanks going further into the game the problem would be less anyway but allowing for that perception it does appear front-loading exists. Just an observation. And yes CMAK is a great game. CMBB I am not fond of!

I have seen mention for a unit being requested to put out clothing on the ground to differentiate their position from the Germans - they were very close. I have also seen a report of FB's being active until 9 pm. Presumably planes could be launched at dawn so by 6 am the Germans could be getting their wake-up call. There is a joke! about Germans ducked when British FB's were about, everyone ducked when US FB's were about. Whether soundly based I know not. : ) I may well find the references whilst pursuing my other research. : )

If you prefer Rune I will call them tall hedges which Allied armour can travel through post July 1944 but German armour can never travel through. This is very similar in effect to the way CMBO [Normandy] treated bocage. I do find it easier to call them bocage. Incidentally if one wished to be picky! I wonder how many Italian battles featured plow equipped tanks.? Has anyone got photos or unit histories showing a widespread - or indeed any deployment.? I think BF left them in for those players likely to recreate Normandy battles.

Merely pointing out that tanks, at the risk of bogging and immobilsation COULD negotiate some bocage hedges. This has some relevance to CMAK in that pre- July '44 neither side is allowed to use this in game as all movement is forbidden through tall hedge/bocage. Rather more elegant would have been to put a 50% bogging on it or use the mine formula. But hey thats gone now ... : ) For CMx2 Normandy it is pointing out that it is dangerous terrain pre-cutter but is a tactical option. And yes I get the answer .....

Combatintman I really don't think anyone expects BF to change their decision. The thread is now really on the concept of bogging and how real life! measures up to the games. We all bumble around looking for some enlightenment. I see above we may have some - even if it is 27MB. SO all the palaver is not wasted. : )

Experts? As far as I am aware this site is populated by wargamers/historians. Who are you suggesting is calling themselves an expert? I trust you are not referring to Steve just because he has actively read books for 25 years.

In the thread on Immobilisations I mentioned that I thought that the bocage had been poorly represented by BF, first in CMBO, and then in CMAK. The reason being that after a certain date in 1944 all Allied tanks can go through bocage/tall hedges with ease [20 seconds for a Honey] but German tanks cannot negotiate them at all. This seems slightly illogical as though underpowered a Tiger might be expected to be able to damage a bank quite badly by ramming or indeed clamber over provided it did not mind its belly being open. Of course as almost all the time the Germans were defending, and secondly recovering a heavy tank would be difficult and better avoided means BF's decision to ban German tanks from traversing bocage/tall hedges has some substance. The drawback probably being the wholesale use by designers of impassable bocage over maps set in Normandy. Fortunately nowdays designers are cleverer and representing bocage types of terrain The relevance to the Immobilisation thread being that I think the Cuilin plow is overstated and that charging banks with metal prongs on the front can be dangerous to a tanks health - not to mention the crew. Steve has asserted that I am being overly down on the value of the plow and in his 25 years of active WW2 reading he does not agree with my assertion. My take is that all the plow variants did exist and were effective on some bocage hedgerows. However in view of the many months spent bottled up in Normandy the Press and Generals played up the effectiveness for civilian war morale purposes. Having spent many decades pasing through France, and southern Devon, which have similar field systems I am familiar with the very impressive and massive nature of a lot of the hedgerows. The idea that a light tank such as the Honey could bull its way through these substantial barriers is hogwash - and the same applies to Shermans. I am pleased to learn that In Normandy BF will be doing a superior job on the bocage. How effective was the plow? According to most US texts very much so however Zaloga's masterly article reveals a bit more about the weapon: http://www.ospreypublishing.com/articles/world_war_2/normandy_legends/ Normandy legends: the Culin hedgerow cutter July 1, 2001 12:00 AM Popular histories of modern wars inevitably simplify events and create myths and legends. The campaign in Normandy has created more than most, especially in view of the numerous television documentaries on this theme. For example, it is difficult to find an account of the breakout from Normandy that does not include reference to the Culin hedgerow cutter. My own recent account Campaign 88: Operation Cobra 1944 mentions it, of course. Another recent study calls it a myth. So it is worth taking a more detailed look to see how big a role it actually played in the battle. A significant tactical dilemma facing the US Army in Normandy was the local terrain, called bocage in French. Bocage refers to farmland separated by thick coastal hedgerows. These hedgerows are denser, thicker, and higher in Normandy than elsewhere along the French coast or in the British countryside on the opposite side of the Channel. From a military perspective, they were ideal for defence, since they broke up the local terrain into small fields edged by natural earthen obstacles. They provide real defence in depth, extending dozens of miles beyond the coast. The bocage undermined the US Army's advantages in armour and firepower, and the hedgerows gave the German defenders natural shelter from attack. This type of terrain most adversely affected the US sector of the Normandy beach-head. While some British units to the immediate east of the American sector were also located in bocage country, the area south of Caen where most of the British offensives took place was a more conventional form of terrain with, relatively open, rolling fields. The bocage presented a substantial obstacle to tanks. While it was certainly possible for tanks to charge the hedgerows and push over the top, this exposed their thin belly armour to German anti-tank weapons. Some hedges were so entangled with foliage and small trees that a tank could become trapped if attempting to push through, or could shed a track, effectively immobilising it. One of the central aims of Operation Cobra in July 1944 was to break out of the bocage country into the open countryside south of St. Lo where the heavily mechanised US Army could exploit its advantages. A variety of schemes were tried to deal with the hedgerows. Combat engineer units had been advocating the use of tank dozers to breach them. These were ordinary M4 medium tanks fitted with a special hydraulically operated M1 bulldozer blade. Originally developed in 1943, there were few in Normandy in July 1944. Experiments made clear that the dozer blades could work, but some hedges were so thick that satchel charges were needed to blow a clean gap. In July, the US First Army placed an urgent request for supply of 278 blades with an aim to providing at least one dozer per tank platoon. In fact, by the time of Operation Cobra on 25 July, there were only about 40 in service. Another approach was conceived by tankers of the 747th Tank Battalion, attached to the 29th Division. In conjunction with Lt. Col. Robert Ploger's 121st Engineer Combat Battalion, the tankers experimented with combined engineer-tank tactics to create breaches in the hedge wide enough for a tank to pass through. During an attack on 24 June, the engineers placed a pair of 24 lb charges eight feet apart at the base of the hedge. The tactics worked, but the engineers decided that a charge double the size was really needed. Ploger began a more careful study of the problem. A tank company, penetrating one and a half miles through bocage country, would on average encounter 34 separate hedgerows. This would require 17 tons of explosive per company or about 60 tons per battalion. This was clearly beyond the resources of any engineer battalion. After bloody experience in bocage fighting, the 29th Division commander, Maj. Gen. Charles Gebhardt, ordered the creation of a special training area near Couvains prior to a planned assault towards St. Lo on 11 July 1944. The M4 medium tanks and infantry squads practised a variety of new tactics to fight in the hedgerows, leading to the slogan 'One Squad, one tank, one field'. Ploger and the tankers continued to experiment with explosive breaching, and found that a much smaller charge could be used if it could be buried deep within the base of the hedge. However, digging holes in the hedge while under fire was both time-consuming and dangerous. One of the tankers came up with the idea of fitting a pair of timber prongs on the front of each tank, called a 'Salad Fork'. When a breach in the bocage was needed, a tank would charge across the field and embed the prongs in the base of the hedge. When the tank backed out, it would pull out the timber prong, leaving small tunnels. The engineers pre-packaged 15 lb of explosive in the fibre-board containers used to transport 105 mm artillery ammunition. Two of these improvised demolition charges could create a gap wide enough for a tank and the accompanying infantry. The small tracked M29 Weasel utility vehicles would follow the tank-engineer team, bringing along extra explosive. As only 53 tanks were available for the 11 July assault, they were concentrated in the sectors of the 116th Regiment. These new tactics and training paid off, and the 116th Regiment succeeded in rupturing the German lines far more effectively than in the past. These tactics were copied by other units, including the 703rd Tank Battalion attached to the 4th Infantry Division. There are records that indicate that other tank units in the neighboring V Corps fielded 'brush cutters' on their tanks in July, but details are lacking. The 11 July 1944 attack by the 747th Tank Battalion disclosed problems with the 'Salad Forks'. The timbers were often bent or wrenched off the tanks during the violent collision with the hedge. On a more positive note, it was found that in some cases, the impact of the Salad Fork alone could breach a hedge. This led Lt. Charles Green to devise a more durable 'tank bumper' or 'Green Dozer' made out of railroad tracks. These were welded to the tanks of the 747th Tank Battalion in mid-July for the upcoming offensive. Curiously enough, a very similar device was dreamed up almost simultaneously by the 2nd Armored Division. It is possible that they were aware of the experiments by the 747th Tank Battalion, as these had been demonstrated to a number of officers. The division's cavalry unit, the 102nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, had been discussing ways to cut through the hedges. Sgt. Curtis G. Culin devised a set of prongs not very different from Green's Tank Bumper, and supervised the construction of a prototype using salvaged German tank obstacles. Tests with the device proved very successful, and it was dubbed the Rhinoceros. It received many other names including the Culin cutter, hedgerow prongs, hedgerow cutters, and various combinations of these. Tanks fitted with the device were dubbed Rhino tanks. What separated Culin's device from other similar schemes was a bit of luck. On 14 July, the First Army commander, Gen. Omar Bradley visited the 2nd Armored Division prior to Operation Cobra. Bradley had seen an earlier demonstration of the Salad Fork, but was more impressed by the Culin Rhino since it didn't require explosives. He ordered the First Army Ordnance Section to begin construction of as many of these devices on an emergency basis. The best source of supply for the steel prongs was the litter of 'Rommel's Asparagus' along the Normandy beaches. Rommel had ordered the installation of hundreds of steel anti-tank obstructions, and these served as the raw material for the prongs. Between 15 July and 25 July, when Operation Cobra started, over 500 Rhinos were manufactured. This was enough for about 60 per cent of the tanks in First Army taking part in the initial assault. On 22 July, a modified M5A1 light tank was demonstrated to Gen. George S. Patton and a team from the 3rd Armored Division. After the demonstration, the division was ordered to build its own Rhino devices on a crash programme. A workshop was set up in St. Jean de Daye under the supervision of Warrant Officer Douglas, who had been a professional welder in civilian life. Douglas had no plans for the Culin device, and devised a modified version that was distinguished by a pair of triangular plates at either end which he felt would penetrate the hedge better. A total of 57 of these 'Douglas cutters' were attached to tanks of the 3rd Armored Division prior to Cobra. The various types of Rhino devices were all considered top secret, and Bradley ordered that none be used until the main operation began. The use of the Rhino tanks in Operation Cobra has become something of legend. Nearly all accounts of the campaign mention the devices, even if they mention none of the other innovations introduced during Cobra, such as the new 76 mm gun M4 medium tank, and the new tank-infantry communication aids. One recent study of Cobra, Col. James Carafano's 'After D-Day', goes so far as to label the stories of the Rhino tanks a myth. Certainly, the importance of the Rhino tanks has tended to be exaggerated. It is an appealing tale of ingenuity in the heat of battle. It makes for a good story, particularly in popular histories and in television documentaries. It is far more dramatic, especially on TV, than the technical complexity of tank radios, tactical improvements and other less visual innovations. Were the Rhino tanks effective? In fact, there is very little evidence. Some tank units that used Rhino devices on the first day of the battle, 25 July, found that they were no panacea. The problem was not so much the Rhinos as the pre-attack bombardment which churned up the pastures, which made it difficult to charge across the fields and build up enough speed to breach the hedgerows. Other units such as the 3rd Armored Division had little luck with the hedge cutters. But they had been added to their tanks at the very last minute with little chance to practice the new tank-infantry tactics. The 3rd Armored Division had far fewer tanks with hedge cutters than the 2nd Armored Division, only about 25 per cent compared to almost 75 per cent. It might have been expected that the 2nd Armored Division, which put up such a sterling performance in Cobra, might have emerged as champions of the device they had helped pioneer. In fact, operational accounts of the 2nd Armored Division in Cobra provide few indications that the devices ever played much of a role. This had more to do with the conduct of the fighting than with any technical virtue or failing of the Rhinos. The preliminary air attack against the Panzer Lehr Division shattered the main force opposing the 2nd Armored Division. As a result, the division aggressively pushed through the German defences. Rather than struggle cross-country through the bocage, the 2nd Armored Division used the country roads wherever possible, avoiding the need to use the Rhinos. Tankers that I have interviewed over the years had mixed feelings about the Rhinos. Some said that the Rhino worked, but that it was hard on the crew. Others said they hardly ever used it, as once the break-through began, the situation was so fluid that it was seldom needed. In contrast, the far less celebrated dozer tanks are often mentioned, since they were useful not only in breaking through the hedgerows, but in repairing the bomb damaged roads. Whether effective or not, the Rhino tanks have become one of the popular legends of the Normandy campaign, and are likely to remain so in spite of debunking by historians. by Steven Zaloga Further reading Katcher, Phillip, Men-At-Arms 70: US Army 1941–45, Osprey, Oxford, 1984 Badsey, Stephen, Campaign 01: Normandy 1944, Osprey, Oxford, 1990 Badsey, Stephen, Campaign 24: Arnhem 1944, Osprey, Oxford, 1993 Henry, Mark, Men-At-Arms 342: US Army in WWII (1), Osprey, Oxford, 2000 Henry, Mark, Men-At-Arms 347: US Army in WWII (2), Osprey, Oxford, 2000 Henry, Mark, Men-At-Arms 350: US Army in WWII (3), Osprey, Oxford, 2001

I have to report bocage or not tall hedges are only passable by Allied tanks only, after a certain date in 1944.

I thought bogging and immobilisations would be relevant to tanks who rammed earthen banks in CMx2 Normandy. It is CMAK where the Stuarts go through in 20 seconds. I will start a new thread as requested. However for those that do not follow to the new thread these excerpts were taken by someone from Doubler, and Ambroses work. One or other has inserted a very large lie in the following: : ) Both authors are the kind of people who will be quoted repeatedly.

Bocage - I am rather hurt that you see me as a lightweight in the bocage! As if for some reason I have not already read the available information on the Web and even searched geographical sites for further information. If certain information is repeated often enough gets tobe taken as fact. However relatively few people have actually described the "bocage" that they drove through. We have two strands on the same subject. How CMAK treats the matter and RL. In CMAK the bocage/tall hedge is driven through with nary a stop - I think 15 seconds is the fastest. And curiously this probably is pretty much what the show for the Press and Generals demonstrated. The faster the tank the faster it goes through. Lets talk real life: However to extrapolate that Show to 6ft banks with trees and bushes that have been growing there for several hundred years is lunacy. One might easily argue that rather like buildings bocage is a hugely variable and someone who is used to what passes for hedges and fences in the US may think a modest bocage is the be all and end all on the subject. At one stage I read a unit history - a US unit who was most instructive on the short size of the fields which meant repeated ramming was required and this was very bad for the tank. The tracks simply could not provide enough traction to force a way through. This was particularly true in damp conditions and also where a field was sloped to the side. By my reckoning he was on a medium bocage route. Now I have spent three years trying to re-locate this source which is by far the most descriptive account of bocage busting being free of hype. I have also been collecting information and photos but as I have guests arriving in 10 minutes and need too dress this can wait. : )

I would imagine that: a] not many nZ staff have the experience b] knowing how deeply the boat will float must be quite a trick - I suggest impossible until launched

BF. I always thought the tanks were modelled better than the humans BECAUSE it is easier to do. I disheartened to learn you guys actually planned it to be small scale - I guess the lucky hit factor was really working for you : )! It is way better played at Battalion and multiple platoons. Particularly in view of the problems with omni-unit infantry firing .... The way you refer to the Cuilin plow makes me scared you actually believe the hype that it/was generated. Anybody who has spent time in Normandy or Devon knows that serious bocage was pretty much tank proof apart from serious assault and the thought that the caged Allied armies needed a good publicity story and the use of plows to take out smaller hedges was a godsend. However the implementation in CMAK with light tanks travelling through "boacage/tall hedges" faster than Shermans is plain daft. In real life, and excluding the show put on for visiting journalists and officers where a whole load of lightwieght hedges were driven through en-masse, a medium hedge would take many ramming attempts to break - not very good for tank or crew. So before giving Allied vehicles the magical power I suggest an examination of the legend for what is was. A item that did work on certain types of hedge and was avaiable for some serious morale improving publicity at the right time. When you read that: does it occur to anyone that this is a lot of explosives to use for hedges where a Stuart goes through in a matter of seconds but the mighty Tiger cannot pass at all! Something sucks mightily.

Interesting thread. Interesting because at WeBoB there is a serious CMBB battle going on currently. I think there is about 15 players a side on the same battle and bogging has been a subject of great interest. I am not playing in it as it is simultaneous mirrored which I regard as the most heinous way to play CM. However out of interest on the map I ran 9 T34's to the far end in mud and lost a third - that was in eight minutes of travel. Looking to see if ground pressure made much differnce on test steppe map in wet conditions with rain using three each of Shermans, Churchills, T34s , and SU152 at then end of the fifth turn there are two completely immobilised and three bogged. The curiosity is that after 30 minutes it was 2 Churchills and 2 Su152s immobilised and one Sherman. Therefore 33%. Obviously they were all given movement for the test period which would exceed a normal game in terms of travel distance. I have done a repeat with 14 varied tanks and 4 were immobilised - curiously two Sturta who were lightest versus one Sherman 76 with almost 50% more psi. Over compensation for Sherman bogging in CMBO? My feeling has always been that CM was never designed to be played with small forces on small maps and so when I used to play CMBB, of which I must have played over 100 games pre-CMAK, I played large maps with platoons of tanks so that a bogging or two did not potentially destroy the game. If you reduce the scale of CM down to where individual units, teams, vehicles are absolutely critical then I suggest you are trying to make it do what it was incapable of doing. We all know th infantry were done as a supporting arm for tanks and crudely modelled to take into account the capacity of the PC's of the time. Trying to reduce the scale to teams etc is like going to play poker and deciding that you are only going to play 10 hands rather than play the whole evening. You have therefore raised your expectation to a high level and if the ten hands you recieve are rubbish then you are doomed to disappointment. Playing with a couple of tanks just makes bogging too important - you should play games where you have 15 tanks : ) *** I trust that the bocage rule will not give extraordinary power to the Allied tracked vehicles in CMX2. That the Germns doctrinally did not climb over hedged banks does not mean it was impossible - just very risky from being vulnerable to risking bogging!!

A company I am a shareholder in says it is going to sell TPMS for the OTR market next year. I am curious about the market size. Just for those like me who did not know much about tires OTR is Off The Road and is the type of things you put on quarry trucks, tractors, graders, undergound heavy equipment, port authority vehicles, scrap yarders, etc etc. The largest tires - with a 63" centre go for over $250000 on a spot price even in these times. The smallest OTR's are about 25" centres and are currently over-supplied following the contraction in the construction and logging industries. The working life of the big tyres BTW might be measured in weeks rather than year. I know nothing practical about the matter but I know that this board knows pretty much everything so - Tractor tires [about1.3 m sold annually in the US] is tyre pressure important, how often would it be checked - as opposed to how often it SHOULD be checked. How long do they last? Or any other information

There was an old joke about Skodas [before VW owned them] and being seen in one was fatal for your image http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/lancashire/8030766.stm

And apparently it just does not stop with people: http://www.theage.com.au/national/biggest-losers-nz-rejects-our-fat-frigates-20090502-aqur.html