ScoutPL

BUMP!! Two solutions posted so far! Be sure to go to my website and check them out. Place any comments you may have on the Tactics and Techniques forum or submit your own solution!

Another contribution, this one from Mr. Tankersley. Be sure to check it out, this guy does a great job! I do have one criticism though but we'll see if anybody else chimes in first. [This message has been edited by ScoutPL (edited 03-18-2001).]

Thanks for the contribution Dirtweasle! I only see one problem with your plan. Maybe some of the other guys will go to the site and see it too, thats what we're here for right? I'll let you know what I think may be presenting a problem for you after we get some other responses. No problem with the map change Dirt W. Just for FYI though, a military map only has five colors on it (there wasnt any water on the CM map so I didnt get to use any blue). I'm no artist so you kinda have to use your imagination a little. I thought about not even including the scenario file, requiring you to do your planning off of a bad, possibly inaccurate, map, just like a real field commander. But figured most guys wouldn't quite go for that. [This message has been edited by ScoutPL (edited 03-18-2001).]

OK here we go. The first game is posted on my webite. www.geocities.com/fpd131 Enjoy!

Check the Tactics and Techniques forum for the link.

"They can be and were dug in 5 minutes and less. Pick up a copy of Macksey's 'Rommel:Battles and Campaigns' for a photo of this practice being employed not before a battle or in a lull, but during a firefight." I have a couple comments on this quote. Anyone surprised? I spent some time in the euphrates river valley, fairly similiar to North Africa, and will admit that there are areas where a man could dig a hasty in five minutes. But most of the ground in those areas is actually rock not sand and to be perfectly honest the problem you ran into in the sandy areas was actually getting your hole to maintain its shape. Most defensive positions in the desert are actually built up rather then down. But the desert is an entirely different animal then western europe. If you live in a region similiar to western europe I challenge you to go down to the local city park or your back yard and see how quickly you can dig a "slit trench" with a 24" shovel. I bet it takes longer then 5 minutes. "(typically 6 to 8 inches deep and 2 to 3 feet long)" and if you dig it to these dimensions I challenge you to get your body in it. To be effective a slittrench, hasty, or whatever, it needs to be at least as long as your body. Even if you curl into a fetal position you would be digging the same amount of dirt since you would have to make it wider. But the idea is to be able to fight from it in the prone. That way you dont piss off all of your mates by curling up in your hole. Also, if you have a picture of a guy digging a hole under fire my first question is "what the hell was the photographer doing?" There may have been some bad guys in the area and they may have been trading shots, but my bet is if the photographer risked his neck for the pic, the fighting couldnt have been that fierce. I dont really know of course, I'm just relying on my knowledge of human nature and the effects of combat.

I spent eights years as a grunt in the US Army so allow me to add my two cents. Digging defensive positions is out of the scope of CM due to the time available. Digging positions, even a "shellscrape" (we called them Hasty fighting positions) takes at least ten to fifteen minutes to do to a depth that will offer some protection from direct fire. And keep in mind thats just direct GRAZING fire. Since a hasty position is only about 6-8 inches deep (just enough for you to lay in and get below the surface of the ground) it offers no protection against plunging fire (direct fire from a higher elevation), indirect fire, or any sort of direct fire with explosive ordinance. So I think its safe to argue that hasties are covered in the game mechanics. The abstracted "roll of the ground" so to speak. Even if it isnt, 15 minutes is half an average game in CM and if you're digging then you're not defending or attacking, which means you're losing. After you dig your hasty you can start on your foxhole if you're going to be in the area for a while or you're setting up a defensive position. All US light infantrymen carry an entrenching tool and most carry up to six empty sandbags just for this purpose. US fighting positions are two man positions except for crew served weapons which can have up to four men in them. An average two man rifle pit will take a couple hours to dig the necessary 6' deep by 3' wide by 6' in length (roughly). Thats in soft ground using shovels and picks brought up from the rear just for this purpose. In heavily forested or rocky areas it can take twice as long. Crew served weapon positions start out at four of five hours and go from there. If its for a defense then you're talking about bringing up plywood or a similiar material plus more sandbags for overhead cover. Even more time. An infantry battalion digging in for an anti armor defense takes at least 48 hours from receiving the mission to setting in the last mine or sandbag. All for a fight that will last approximately an hour. Its no wonder that todays modern armies have engineer vehicles that are dedicated strictly to digging fighting positions. As a rifle platoon leader I would get one of these vehicles for maybe an hour or two when we went into a defense. They spent that entire time digging the crew served positions and a few foxholes, the rest we had to do by shovel. These things take up an enormous amount of time and energy. Another key factor is the level of exhaustion that hits a unit after a defense. Its useless for a good 24 hours after the last enemy tank is destroyed, simply because everyone has been busting their hump for the last 72 hours. As far as setting up fortifications before the battle starts so you can have "multiple" lines of resistance, thats pretty far out there. We always planned alternate and supplementary postions but we would have figured the war was over if we ever had time to actually dig them. The only way you could do that is if you're playing a scenario where the defender had at least a few weeks to set up and then you're probably playing on a scale for which CM isnt meant for, i.e. a battalion attack on the Siegfried Line would only be against the first MLR. Another battalion would take on the next MLR, etc. Another key point here is that if you allow your enemy to continually fall back to successive defensive positions, you're not doing a very good job attacking him to begin with.

Crying in his beer, guys. I lost myt entire harddrive, everything in the can, gone, kaput. Which means my next update and any hope of a future update to my Battalion Delay Defense is gone as well. I even have to go back and download all of the patches and mods I was using. Actually after browsing some of the discussions going on I'm kinda glad I was gone. Henri's up to his old tricks of starting a debate and then ending up agreeing with everybody (musta taken some lessons from good ole Pillar) and the recon debate (totally irrelevant to CM in my humble opinion) has returned with new zest and fervor. I'm trolling for ideas for my next project. I want to either do another tutorial or try something entirely different. I'm looking for tutorial ideas, but keep in mind I'm an infantryman and can only be authoritative on Tanks supporting infantry so dont ask me to discuss how to take down a city block with a platoon of armor. My other idea is to host a sort of tactics forum of my own. The format would go like this. Once a week or so I would present a CM tactical problem on my website to include TO&E, terrain analysis, and detailed intel report. Particiapants would download a simple briefback form, then describe and illustrate how they would tackle the problem. They would then return the file to me. The best ones would get posted for open debate by others. At the end of the week I would post the actual enemy situation and offer a short discussion on how the battles may have gone. If we have some good debates going, perhaps the best solutions could actually fight out the scenario to see which TTP's worked the best. Let me know if this sounds like something that would generate a lot of interest.

"I would love to see it in CM2." My entire point being its not in CM1. And its alot more complex then force structure. Realistically portraying scout operations is alot more then just sneaking forward and finding the enemy. The whole "spotting" rules would have to be revamped, probably to the point you would be playing a first person game, which takes away the focus of CM.

Hey fellas, not to beat a dead horse or anything, but do you suppose since its so hard to realistically portray scouts and scout operations in CM that maybe its a little beyond the scope of the game?

"Incidentally the good thing about Fionn is he can actually demonstrate his theories in CM, whereas other forum contributors have theories and that's it" I certainly hope you're not including me in such a broad, flame-provoking statement, Mr. Bates.

Check out my stuff at www.geocities.com/fpd131 Hopefully it'll help.

"By the way, you didn't answer my question re recon work in your last thread (Part 3). This was rationalized, yes?" From earlier board: "May I ask what "assets" you employed for your intelligence? (I assume you rationalized this as recon conducted beforehand or "off the board" to make the study clearer.)" All of this is very thoroughly discussed in Part Two. Be sure to read it completely then come back with more specific questions if you still have them. If you're asking about what particular "units" I used then I went with Crack SS infantry. I figured they would have the best AI "brains" for handling encounters with superior forces. I was wrong. "That American 57mm AT sold its life dearly. I found it a bit incredulous that a regular crew already down to three men could reload, acquire and dispatch a second StuG so quickly, however. The fortunes of war? Perhaps." All of that stuff is handled by the AI, dude. So call it what you want. "Also, I noticed that one of your second German team's HT's had unloaded its 20mm AA gun? Why?" Once again the AI. The Pioneer platoon those tracks were transporting may have come under fire and that was their response. I dont know exactly why. I didnt give them that command. "Any thoughts on your part as to the original American dispositions?" Read Part One. "Finally, that Puma went scooting along the road through all that snow as if it were a NASCAR entrant. What's with that? I was under the impression that speeds in snow would be greatly reduced. Apparently not so." That particular road is a paved road which may make a difference. I dont know. Speed off of the roads is greatly decreased, particularly for wheeled vehicles and infantry. You'll notice that a number of halftracks have already been immobilized in the german assault position due to the snow.

OK good point Tris. Right click on Movie link. Select "save target as..." and direct download to you pbem file. When download is complete open file as you would a normal PBEM file and enter "abnrgr" as the password. I have ver 1.12, so it may effect your playback if you have an older version, not sure. [This message has been edited by ScoutPL (edited 02-25-2001).]

Well actually only Phase One of the german attack is up, but be sure to check it out anyway. Movies included!! Go to www.geocities.com/fpd131

Well actually only Phase One of the german attack is up, but be sure to check it out anyway. Movies included!! Go to www.geocities.com/fpd131

Classicly an infiltration is a type of deliberate attack in which you break your unit into subunits and attempt to "sneak" them past the enemy's MLR, have them regroup and attack a key objective in his rear. First of all this sort of attack is usually conducted in a low-intensity type conflict where the "front line" isnt really very well defined to begin with. The objective is always known before hand, some info is generally known about the routes (often scouted before hand) and the infiltration attack is usually used to support another major attack. I would argue that the reason Pillar was able to get a full rifle platoon and an FO into the enemy's rear by bypassing on a flank is chiefly due to game mechanics not solid tactics. On a real battlefield units on the defense are tied in with one another, making the sneaky flanking maneuvers so common in CM very dangerous in real life. Now I know alot of guys are going to scream its just a game, quit comparing it to real life, blah, blah. Well, I'm not the one getting on here and telling the pros their own doctrine is in the can because it just doesnt work that great in CM, especially compared to TTP's that take advantage of the game mechanics. I dont have a problem with guys playing CM, however they want to play it. They're welcome to use 10k by 10k maps with 50 Pershings against 50 Tigers if they want to, I dont care. I wont play with them but there are enough people that enjoy this great game that they'll always find someone to play with. What bothers me though, is guys who get on here and tell me the doctrine I have been trained to use is sub-par, because it can be defeated in CM. Well it can be defeated in CM because CM is a game with limitations. I get immense pleasure out of simulating real world, historical combat on CM but I have to put myself and the folks I play with under certain restrictions that keep it as real as possible. Bottom line: Infiltration works for Pillar and Fionn because it takes advantage of the game mechanics. Nothing wrong with that. But if you're playing a die hard realist then you may want to ask about sideline buffers, etc. before jumping in with them for a game.

Thanks for clarifying your position Atlas, you just made my "dont ever play this guy, he doesnt understand the true potential of CM" list.

Leonhards work defines what he believes to be the "perfect" maneuverist doctrine. Which by the way isnt practiced by any modern army to the standard he would like to see. I feel that this is simply because its rather unrealistic. A substantial chapter in Leonhards book is focused on the US performance of the Gulf War. He feels the Coalition should have identified the Iraqi command and control and support network as their "primary vulnerability", rather then the republican guard. He thinks they failed to do that and if the Iraqi's had decided to fight the outcome would have been very different. He even goes as far as to say the Coalition forces really didnt do that great of a job, they just had an even worse enemy. There are two arguments against this. One, you could argue that the Coalition forces did identify the C&C assets and supply network as the Iraqi's main vulnerability and took it out in the 30 day air campaign before the ground war even started. When we crossed into Iraq, the Iraqi divisions we faced had been without effective leadership or resupply for weeks. The second argument is more of a strategic one. The coalition forces identified the RG as the Iraqi "primary vulnerability" since without the RG the Iraqi armed forces would be defunct for months or even years to come. The air campaign, on an operational level, destroyed the Republican Guards support infrastructure and the RG became the strategic main vulnerability. Therefore it became the focus of the ground campaign. Lind does a good job of putting what is in most Army and USMC combat arms manuals into civilian form for general consumption. I think Bullethead has done a great job illustrating this point, the main reason I havent felt it necessary to post anything except an occasional jibe at Pillar. (Isnt it great how he disappears for days when I come on? Yes Pillar, I am aware that's an exageration on my part) As far as this being about decision making versus TTP's. How do you seperate the two? If you use manueverist decision making you're going to have to use maneuverist TTP's to support your maneuverist plan, right? How about Pillar and Henri were trying to make distinctions where there are none. Your decision making process is driven by your doctrine which also drives your TTP. The two are too interlinked to be seperated. Modern day US doctrine is extremely maneuverist in scope. Lenonhard, and Lind to a certain extent, just feel like it isnt being properly implemented or adhered to. Pillar and Henri's outlook has always been that American doctrine was inherently flawed because it wasnt maneuver driven at all (with the possible exception of the USMC, which for some reason Henri thinks is entirely out of sync with the the other four services in the US Armed Forces). I think we can all agree they were wrong in that assumption. Perhaps Leonhard has a point, I dont know for sure. What I do know is that doctrine usually only works perfectly in a perfect environment. And we all know how often that kind of environment occurs on the battlefield.

I will declare Pillar the ultimate dabate "maneuverist" since anytime the waters get a little hot he pulls his feet out rather quickly. I have yet to get a reply directed specifically at any of my posts, instead he sidestepped them by agreeing with Bullethead who is saying the exact same things I am. Also, Bullethead has been far unkinder to Henri then I have ever been to poor picked on Pillar so I think his trying to seperate the two of us is rather comical. As always lets go back to the bottom line. There simply aren't two seperate schools of thought on this matter. There just happen to be some "fringe" guys (L&L, as they have become to be called, for example) who feel there is a better way of defining or explaining how most modern military officers (American anyway) have been trained to fight. Ask anyone on this board who has went through American military training and they'll tell you the same thing. So who are you going to believe? I brought out the CavScout/ScoutPL fight as an example of a "attritionist" tactic of offering a "gap" for maneuver that allowed me to utilize maneuver to "create" an enemy weakness, in other words strike my enemy's flank. I dont think a recognized, self created gap is a weakness, per se. It may lool like that to the bad guy, so I guess you could applaud him for going for it, but it really wasnt one. Understand now? "If I espouse my own view and try to convince you, you get upset. This time I tried being more passive, and you call it "back pedaling". Well ScoutPL I guess I can't win with you." Dude, you're not going to win, because you have nothing to convince me of. I understand perfectly well the principles you are trying to support. You just have them misapplied and misinterpreted. Thats been the point of most of the posts directed at you and Henri. "If some of you can't handle voicing your OWN opinions, you certainly aren't ready to hear mine." What does this mean? I voiced my opinion rather voraciously in the first couple pages of this board, most of which you chose to ignore. You, sir, are the one who has continually dodged the bullet by stating you wanted to "read" more or digest Bulletheads comments, rather then voice your opinions. If you're beginning to think you were wrong in the choice of arguments you've been persueing then you should come on out from under the bed and say so. And yeah, bud, I'm still the same old ScoutPL, never presented myself as anything different.

Pillar, YOU must need to go back and read past posts since you obviously missed the one where I explained that I purposely wanted CavScout to think he had found a gap so I could attack his flank with my reserve forces. I presented weakness on that side in hopes of drawing him across the map and giving me an open flank. Another key point is that CavScout continued to acheive Mass and Security while keeping his Objective in mind the entire time. He didnt go bumping into my line until he found a gap. From his point of view it looked like he had destroyed, broken or suppressed (dare I say attrited) the majority of units on that flank, so he decided to commit his Main Effort there. Also this back pedaling of yours is rather disappointing. You have always been an advocate for maneuver, maneuver, maneuver. You even started this thread with a broad proclamation about maneuver (at many different levels of command). I can get quotes if you'd like but would rather just refer you to your first post as a whole. I see nothing but statements in that post, not questions. Hardly the kind of writing someone looking for advice or opinion would write. And you also seem a pretty smart guy to me, so you should be very aware of what sort of response such a post would receive. I even asked you if I could respond in kind and you agreed. But now all of the sudden you have decided to shut up and listen for a change. But then you get "holier then thou" when some of the guys make the mistake of assuming you're still defending the same position you've been defending for the past 6 months. I like that you are beginning to understand that allof this is all more interrelated then you originally thought. Perhaps next time you'll think a little more before making such broad, unfounded statements. I think the most telling evidence on this board so far has been the "maneuverists" reluctance to take up my challenge and "put their money where their mouth is" as some other great mind said earlier on this board.

I've been lurking for the past couple days, mainly because I just didnt feel like I had anything above what I'd already said to contribute. But I want to make an offer. I think I have a very good example of what Bullethead, Cav Scout, and myself would characterize as a "realistic" combat approach to a problem in my Battalion Defense Tutorial. I welcome these two guys criticisms of my plan (both defense and attack) and challenge the so-called "maneuverists" to come up with their own. They can either do this via a narrative or I will happily email them the scenario basics. I will then post the narrative or the scenario revision on my site and folks can compare the two schools of thought. This would avoid the immensely incensing prospect of an actual one on one fight that others on the board have wanted, but still get each others points across a little clearer I think. Any takers? My site: www.geocities.com/fpd131

Pillar, I understand perfectly well the premise behind Maneuver theory and wholeheartedly support it, when its applicable. My problem has always been that I'm not so sure that its applicable to CM. What makes it so appealing in CM is that it takes advantage of game mechanics that arent available to the real world company or battalion commander. For example, you have a very well defined, restrictive battle space. You can always attack knowing that your flanks are secure and with the knowledge that the enemy's counterattack capability is extremely limited. Either to forces he has set aside (making his MLR weaker) or to weak in game reinforcements. Another key factor is of course the spotting rules, which everyone is familiar with by now. Interestingly enough, I dont think its possible in CM to take out the enemy's "main vulnerability" with applying attrition. If its a VP location then there is certainly going to have to be a fight for it. If its to limit exit VP then only direct fire can stop that. So where is the maneuverist theory being applied? I think you are mixing up tactics and strategy again. Yes its always best to use maneuver to put your enemy at a disadvantage. But in the CM realm, a disadvantage is a spot in battlespace that makes it easier for you to kill the enemy (i.e. attrit him). I was fighting a battle with CavScout the other day (CavScout, sorry I got disconnected man, and this is going to ruin our game but it's a great example. Please let me know if I miss read the situation.) I was weak on my left flank and kept getting strong reinforcements on my right. Rather then use those reinforcements to strengthen my left, as a true attritionist would do, I kept them consolidated and continued to show weakness on my left. From what I could see of the battlefield CavScout had taken the bait and heavily weighted his attack on my left. I was in the process of conducting a combined arms attack into his left flank as we were disconnected. I had quickly dispatched his left flank security element and was closing in on him with fives tanks and a company(-) of infantry. I think he had begun to react to this new threat but I felt certain it was too late. Now, that wasnt purely attritionist. But, I was using maneuver to gain an advantage over my enemy. Does that make me a maneuverist? Not by your definition. So as a maneuverist what should I have done? What was CavScout's "main vulnerability"? I feel certain it was his armor, which without, his attack would have stalled and it would have been easy to slice up the rest of his force. Does that make me an attritionist? My understanding of maneuver is rather complete I believe. And I think Leonhard does a good job of arguing his case. I think his example from the Gulf War is a poor one, but I do understand his theory. I took a number of classes in college taught by a Marine Infantry Major, Henri, so I have a very solid base in the Marine Corps view of maneuver as well. But once again its all about scale. "Maneuver theory" doesnt apply to the rifle company or the rifle battalion, and I know you guys are going to insist you're not arguing that it does. The only reply I can make to that is to stop using platoons and companies in your examples. I doubt if Lind has anything significantly different to say about maneuver then Leonhard, and I know he was a major influence on the development of Marine Corps doctrine. So unless I'm wrong about that, please forgive me if I don't run out and purchase his book. As far as Capt.'s game, I'd love to partake, provided the playing field is even, etc, etc. How do I find out what the hell you guys are talking about? I cant find a reference to his post, unless you're talking about the brigade game he wants to run.

Understanding a different point of view means the point of view has to make sense to the rational mind. So far you havent come back and explained to me why the things I found wrong with your "point of view" are inaccurate. And Bud, its not just becuase I think I'm right and you're wrong. Your ideas just dont pass the acid test. I dont have a problem with maneuverists theory, I think some of the extreme examples are a little wishful thinking on the real battlefield but as a whole its a sound theory. I still believe the best commander is one who can blend both theories into a good solid workable technique. So far I havent seen any evidence of your examples fitting that bill.

Its a good thing you brought up definitions Pillar, because I'm certain I dont fit yours for "attritionist". Realist I'll own up to but not attritionist. I think history (in all of its bloody ugliness) has demonstrated that wars are won by kicking the other guys butt off the battlefield. Not by maneuvering around him til he got dizzy and decided to quit. So, no I wont be joining anyones game that has me coming into it labeled as an attritionist, because I dont consider myself one and I'm pretty sure alot of other people wouldn't either. Including Rommel. And yes I have read Rommel's Attacks and the Rommel Papers so I think I have a pretty good idea of where the man came from. And believe me Rommel liked nothing more then kicking the sh&t out of his enemies. He was very adept at using maneuver to do it, but bottom line he used superior firepower to suppress the enemy in order to allow himself to maneuver to a position of advantage to where he could wreck further havoc on his enemy. Not attrition tactics (if there is such a thing), not maneuverist tactics, just plain common sense and "realist" tactics. Bottom line. "In the end, I disagree with you still. I think you are viewing things from a very different standpoint or "paradigm" as myself." Isn't a differing viewpoint the whole seed of this debate? Or is this a maneuverist way of saying this isnt a fight I want to take up so we must just be arguing about different things? To use your words: "For a maneuverist, movement can be about giving up the fight entirely." Guess I should throw up my hands and surrender, since I have been thoroughly defeated. I'm just too locked into my "attritionist" thinking to realize it!