ScoutPL
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Posts posted by ScoutPL
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Pillar, here we go in the most unoffensive and inpersonal way I can...
I imagine, judging from your last post that you'd like for me to read Leonard. Well, he doesnt share a place on my shelf next to my FM 7 series manuals but I did take a couple hours at Barnes and Noble to peruse his book. As you may expect I found fault with most of his writings, alot of which I described back in one of the other attrition/maneuver debates with Henri. I can look it up and post it again if you wish.
As far as your "Infantry Platoon" article goes....
"This article is meant to provide a brief look at some unconventional, though not unrealistic ways to operate a platoon."
Actually, none of the "novel" ideas you posted are any different from how I was trained to "maneuver" (for lack of a better term) a platoon or evan a squad. Only in your context and scale are you off base. Allow me to eplain.
"What I'm going to do is attempt to describe how I might use a single platoon against an enemy platoon, one on one, using improvisation and unconventional methods."
As a platoon leader, worried about bringing my guys home, I would never knowingly commit my platoon or one of my squads to a one on one fight. If I was to do so unknowingly I would back out as quickly as possible unless I knew help was just a few seconds away. Like maybe an immediate suppression call for fire or something similiar. Which by the way isnt going to happen in CM, so I guess what I'm saying here is I would do everything in my power to keep that from happening when I play CM. For a number of reasons. The first being you never want to attack anything one on one. That gives at best a 50-50 % chance of being successful. On the battlefield those are chances that cost lives and terrain unnecessarily. Most armies are set up on a triangle, pyramid structure for a reason. Platoons (3 squads) attack squads, companies (3 maneuver platoons) attack platoons, battalions (3 maneuver companies) attack companies. Notice the trend here?
"John, Rick, Aaron, you go around the left flank and try to flank the enemy squads position. Dan, Brett and Mike will lay heavy supprresive fire with the MG while you maneuver. I want Jason and Ken to maneuver far around the enemy squad and cutoff their rear, preparing to meet and delay any enemy squads coming to assist while we assault this one."
OK, so here we have a ten man squad including you the squad leader. Pretty heady days to have a fully manned squad but its probably the first day of the war. We have at least a two man machine gun team and a rifleman suppressing ten bad guys (Hey, its the first day of the war remember?) Now, I know what one of my squads are going to do if they come under fire from a lone machinegun, but thats for later. We have two maneuver elements, one consisting of three men and one consisting of two. Even assuming that none of them gets wounded, lost or killed on the way to the objective, you're still taking on the enemy with a 1:2 ratio. Oops! Here it is less then a minute in the firefight and we've already lost our 50-50 % chance of success! To make matters worse we're going to split up our 5 man assault element into two even smaller teams in the hope that the bad guys will get scared when they see two OD uniforms behind them and suddenly throw up their hands so we can claim victory. Does anyone else see the flaws in this logic? What happens if the two man team doing the end run, runs into a guy taking a piss and he blows them away? How will you know? You dont seriously think two men can hold off a whole other squad do you? How would you know they were in contact? Is one of them going to run back around and tell you? So then we just have one guy holding off ten. Are you going to go with the assault element? Or with the two man element? How do you decide? How do you control the fires of your machinegun so he doesnt shoot up either or both of your assault elements? What I see here is Pillar (if he survives himself) writing letters home to John's, Rick's, Aaron's, Jason's and Ken's parents explaining what happened, neglecting to put in "why" it happened and then writing one home to his own parents trying to explain why he's on latrine detail for the rest of the war. Thats probably too personal huh, Pillar. Well I felt it was necessary to carry on with your human element to add weight to my argument. Sorry if it burns.
Now you may have used your example above as a way of illustrating how you see maneuverist theory applied to the battlefield. By which I believe I understand you to be saying that a Maneuverist can accomplish the same goal as an attritionist with fewer forces and less bloodshed. Well either I just shot your theory full of holes or you had a very poor example.
Personnaly, I think you are once again trying to compare apples and oranges when you take theories that apply to upper echelons of command and try to stick them in CM, but I'll play along. Going back to how to destroy a squad. I was trained to manuever my platoon as one body. As a light infantryman I was most often involved in fighting that took place in woods or urban areas. The one thing that these types of terrain have in common is the small amount of actual combat space that exists. When in the forest the combat space created when two opposing forces collide is only a few hundred meters at the most, or in other words as far as you can see through the trees. In a town or city the combat space will often be no more then the width of a street dividing two rows of buildings. The same principle applies to open terrain actually, the battlespace dominated by mechanized forces is roughly corresponding since their mobility and powerful weaponry actually makes things seem a lot closer.
A governing principle of combat is to always make contact with the smallest element possible. So depending on the situation, but most frequently, I used a column formation with my lead squad in traveling overwatch, meaning the the lead fire team was actually 50-100 meters in front of the platoon. A contact would go like this (this is straight out of the FM by the way, they're called battle drills and each one of them covers each of the faults I found in your suggested "drill" above).
A team, First squad(four men)makes contact with a three man OP. They seek cover and concealment and begin suppressing the enemy. Their team leader reports what they see to his squad leader by hand signal if he can, other wise by voice. The squad leader reports to me and tells me he is maneuvering against the enemy. I concur and since I am right behind his squad I move up the platoon's weapons squad (2 MG's) to the head of the column. The squad leader bounds his B team around the enemy's flank, using cover and concealment. When he is ready to assault he pops a smoke, throws a colored cloth with a rock tied in it or some other prearranged signal to the other team to shift fires. The other team shifts or lifts fires as his assault element (5 men) sweeps across the objective. By now the enemy should be reduced or at least sufficiently suppressed to give him the advantage in combat power and the OP is eliminated. As the First squad is consolidating I pass the Second squad to the front and they take over the lead. Since I know I am near the enemy's defensive position I tighten up my formation and keep the MG's forward with me. The lead team makes contact again , only this time they report back an enemy squad with a MG in support. I tell the lead squad leader to set up a SBF position as I bring the MG's forward. I quickly survey the area as best I can and if I have a weapons squad leader I quickly brief him on the assault element's route and signals to be used. He places the MG teams as he sees fit within the SBF position. If I dont have a Wpns sqd ldr then I place the guns myself and give them their instructions. As the two trail squads are moving up I brief the lead (SBF) squad leader on the plan and then move out with the other two squads around the enemy's flank. I can assault with both squads, keep one in the treeline as a reserve or have one set up as security along a likely counterattack route. When I am prepared to assault I send up a flare or throw a colored panel as well as sending a message over the radio. The SBF shifts fires and we assault across the objective. This sounds an aweful like your "maneuverist" tactics, yet its what infantrymen have been practicing since the German Breakout in 1918.
"For example, we can advance with maneuver teams using overwatch provided by supportive teams, rather than sending ENTIRE squads forward, with entire squads in overwatch.
We can more easily bypass an enemy strongpoint, since contact is made only by team rather than squad.
Using supportive weaponry and fluidity, we can react to an ambush that costs us a few men, and turn it into a situation that costs the enemy an entire platoon."
All of these are equal capabilities using the battle drills I described above, which offer greater combat power and more control (i.e. flexibility).
"If a maneuver team makes contact with an enemy squad or platoon, we can shift our supportive teams to assist immediately, AND bring other maneuver elements to bear, all without having to concentrate a platoon and make it vulnerable to artillery."
Doesnt the first part of your sentence negate the last? In other words, how do you maneuver to assist an element without concentrating somewhat? Keeping the principle of combat space in mind you will have to mass to an extent just to gain fire superiority, which will have to be gained before you can even begin to maneuver against the enemy.
"Finally, we can make it easier to support our platoons with small calibre artillery or mortar since their fluidity and physical formlessness allows the platoon leader to mold his forces better around a barrage."
What? How can calling in friendly arty be easier when you have mutiple teams spread out, alot of them totally out of contact with their leader, then when you have your unit concentrated and under control?
"This methodology is as you can tell, VERY different from the standard methods used. Instead of lining up your squads in a "formation" designed to have "all guns forward", we have a fluid multi-element, "dynamic" (changeable/changing) force more adaptable to situational factors."
Squads on line is only one formation out of six listed in FM 7-8, and is one I have personally never used. And how exactly is this different from fire teams on line? Perhaps you should read some of MY books as well.
Now by your example I have conducted an attack using maneuver to conduct an attritionist type attack. And I say your damn right I did! One thing I think you guys are missing is exactly what attrition means to those you like to label "attritionist". I'm not even sure I fit into that category of yours but I have a feeling I would. To paraphrase Gen. Patton, "The american soldiers job is not to die for his country, its to make that other poor SOB die for his." Attrition warfare to me means attrit the hell out of the enemy.
"Attrition hence is interested in drawing the enemy into unfavourable conditions to fight, maneuver is about avoiding fights unless they are absolutely relevent to the goal."
If we arent interested in destroying the enemy in the field then why are we going to war in the first place? If all I need to do is blind him or starve him then the Air Force and Navy spend more then enough tax dollars to make sure that happens.
"Ironically however, an attritionist is willing to take even greater casualties, so long as it's "all together" on some main assault into an enemy ambush, and so long as the enemy takes greater casualties than himself. This often leads to friction between the two styles of fighting, and causes difficulty in mutual understanding."
The ironic part is you are falling into the same trap yourself. I think I made it clear above that every attempt can be made to ensure you dont fall into an enemy ambush and use maneuver effectively to ATTRIT the enemy while keeping your own casualties to a minimum.
Finally one last word on "Gamey."
"I think both sides should try to understand that the different styles are simply a translation of differing personality and situational interpretation. I'd like to see this community getting away from labelling different styles as "gamey" etc. simply because they differ from popular methods."
I have labeled your tactics Gamey before because they take advantage of game mechanics that you wouldn't find on the real battlefield, not because they were novel or not written down somewhere. Another thing to keep in mind, warfare has been around for as long as man has, so there may be some reasons why some methods are more "popular" then others. Like they've been proven to work effectively over and over and over.
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Shameless Bump
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I'd like to point out a number of errors and misconceptions in your thinking (since I used to be a platoon leader I would hope you would at least credit me with some knowledge in this area, even if you were reluctant to do so at the battalion level). But thought I'd ask before I dove in. Then it will hopefully be considered as friendly argumant rather then heated debate.
Your thinking is flawed on a number of levels and with your permission I'd like to elaborate.
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In this one I outline the German plan of attack. Got to www.geocities.com/fpd131 and enjoy!
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ACOW is great for breaking your teeth on but it is fraught with game mechanic problems that any grognard could go on about for days. Mainly the spotting and Opportunity fire rules are horrendous and result in the really sucessful players doing alot of jumping back and forth across LOS lines, just totally ruining the whole experience.
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The biggest obstacle to withdrawing in the face of overwhelming opposition is often time. It takes up a lot of turns to advance cautiously and with your units properly supporting one another. If you run into serious trouble real world, you probably would fall back. But in a game only lasting 25 or 30 mimnutes you often dont have time to step back and recock, particularly if you are conducting an attack that is properly using the principles of mass, objective and economy of force, as well as synchronicity. Then the fight comes down to who can handle his units better, keep them alive the longest, and still achieve the VP.
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In this one I outline the German plan of attack. Got to www.geocities.com/fpd131 and enjoy!
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Abteilung,
I dont know if you realize this but the length of your post was way below standard for this particular discussion. Plus you were way too brief and to the point. You must make another go at it. Jolly good attempt though. Better luck next time.
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The problem really isnt with unit size, though that does play a little into spotting, but more with CM's spotting rules. If you can spot a unit then chances are good that they will be able to spot you. Another problem is that units cant be made to break contact until they are broken or routed. Which means either you give units commands to move forward a yard per turn until they spot something and hope they dont get spotted in the same 60 seconds (which would take forever and ruin any fun in the game) or admit that stealthy recon just cant be simulated using CM. Not too shabby and admission given the overall quality of the game.
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I stopped by Barnes & Noble today and spent about an hour browsing through Leonhard's book. I didnt buy it since they had Michael Connelly's new novel (anybody who enjoys great crime fiction should check this guy out!), so I opted to spend my hard earned dollars on something I was sure I would enjoy.
But a few points on what I did read. I think its in the chapter titled "Constructing a Theory" that Leonhard states that an Army or a particular part of one could serve as a strategic "chief vulnerability." He offered the American Regular Army during the War for Independance as an example. Kill the army and the revolution dies with it. Great example.
Then in the Gulf War chapter he rails on the US for choosing the RG as the "chief vulnerability" at the operational level then admits in the next pragraph that the RG is actually Iraq's strategic vulnerability.
Question. How can your enemy have a strategic vulnerability that is seperate from their operational or tactical vulnerability? Leonhard admits that the strategic Iraqi vulnerability was the RG, but then he admonishes the US for going after it operationally. He claims the operational "chief vulnerability" of the Iraqis were their C&C and logistics assets. Ok, so we go after their chief vulnerability and barbecue every officer, radio van and fuel truck we can find. Does that accomplish our strategic goal? Hardly. The RG can be back up and operational in a matter of weeks. So even though we temporarily rendered them ineffective, we failed to destroy them.
To use another of Leonhards examples, the American Revolution is a great case of a force trying to go after an Army's infastructure and having some success, but ultimately losing the war because they were never able to bring their combat power against the enemy's strength (i.e. chief vulnerability).
Using Leonhards reasoning we are fighting a very limited war and we all know the dangers in doing that. The US's goal at all levels was the destruction of the RG, because that was the Iraqi vulnerability at all levels. Destroy the RG, destroy the Iraqi capability and will to fight (to paraphrase Leonhard himself). That didnt happen because the cease fire was called before it could be accomplished. Not because the Army wasnt trying, but because it takes some time to travel those kinda distances no matter what the level of resistance is.
An interesting side note. Leonhard also made the point that both command push and command pull doctrines can be appled to maneuver warfare, another contradiction with his statements about the conduct of the GW.
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Henri,
In most cases 20 words are better then 200. Thats why the Army has always stressed putting the bottom line up front in all of its correspondence. People have a tendancy to ramble on. Unless your synopsis is way out of whack with what Leonhard was saying, I think its safe to say that most of the posters here that are disagreeing with him (you) would continue to do so even if you posted all forty pages.
Amount of text has little to do with content. We all know that. I think there are some pretty good arguments here that suggest Leonhard's thesis (if I understand you correctly) that the US did a poor job of applying maneuver during the GW can be logically refuted based on facts.
Thats fine and dandy. No ones launching a nuclear stike on Casa de El Henri. We're just pointing out an opposite viewpoint. Leonhard could be wrong, Henri could be wrong, Jason could be wrong, I could be wrong. Probably the right answer lies out in the cosmos somewhere and its an entirely uncomprehensible amalgamation of all of our views.
Dont make the mistake (which I myself am guilty of upon occasion) of attaching your ego or self-esteem to this Message Board. The truth of the matter is that most of us wouldn't find anything the remotest bit interesting about the other outside of CM. So lets all work on not taking these debates so personally.
Now before all the "touchy-feely" posts, that inevitably follow a peace offering, begin pouring in let me finish with this. I still think you and Leonhard are way off base.
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"I withold sarcastic comments about your intellectual capacity and I wish you would do the same to me."
Oh come on Henri, nothings stopped you before, so dont hold back on my account. Thanks to you and Pillar, I actually have a rather thick skin now. Point to be made - I never brought up your intellectual capacity or penis size. Both of those were introduced by you. I simply stated, albeit in a sarcastic way, that I thought you were awefully one sided in your viewpoint. I feel that neither viewpoint, attrition vs. maneuver, is the "right" theory. A good commander will look at a situation with a good understanding of how to apply both theories and then choose the best COA.
"You seem to forget that maneuver warfare theory is the officially accepted theory of the US Marine Corps, and with a few restrictions, also that of the US Army."
How is it possible my short term memory is that bad? A quote from my post a day ago:
"When it comes down to slugging it out, the two services doctrine and TTP are very much alike. Its when the USMC has to go into these third world hotspots to help out that they HAVE to become hard corps maneuverists. Just like the Army's Ranger and Parachute Battalions, who have a very similar mission."
"Don't ask me, ask the Army why it wasn't done when it was supposed to be the aim of the war!"
I've already answered this question. Are you even reading my posts?
"You miss the point. By that time, the war was all over but the mopping up.The original plan was to attack and to crush the Republican Guard, because that was identified as what would cause a collapse of the Iraki army. But the Republican Guard was not destroyed because by the time the Army got around to it, the war was all over for all practical purposes because the Iraki Army had already collapsed."
Thankfully, when our commanders define the combat goal of our Army they look long term rather then just tomorrow. Taking out the RG was the LONG-TERM vulnerability of the Iraqi army. It would have taken Saddam years (under the right sanctions) to buy and repair that many replacement tanks and train new crews and officers, much less get them the same combat experience the RG had. Yes, taking out the C3I assets severely crippled the Iraqi Army, rendering them ineffective. But most C3I assets can be replaced rather quickly. T-72 tanks and trained crews are alot harder to find. Thats why they were the main objective. Why they weren't destroyed when it would have been easy to do so has already been explained, a number of times, by different people.
[This message has been edited by ScoutPL (edited 02-07-2001).]
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Jason, as usual well said.
I want to play your game but think I would probably spoil your fun. I'll wait to see if any of the "theorists" reply before sending in my own.
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Where can I find Franko's scenarios?
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Israel is a very poor example. They have a very limited mission with an even more limited scope. Try again.
You're right, I haven't read Leonhard. But if your take of his writing is accurate I dont see much point in reading it anyway. I ran into a lot of Army officers who have a drum to beat. They often publish in army periodicals (Infantry and Armor Magazine come to mind) and though their ideas are often refreshing and interesting to think about they are just as often heavily biased and lack depth. Some of them get published privately and have some success with their message (Hackworth and Bolger, for example). But I can tell from your writing that I would disagre with Leonhard and thats OK, too.
My diety comment simply comes from the fact that he seems to be the only author you ever quote at any length. I wasn't asking you to defend it, I was asking for some further explanation. If you dont want to give any, thats fine. And I never mentioned penis size, you did. So I dont know where you came up with that one from.
Everyone seems to think I have this huge chip on my shoulder about the US Army. Well I do to a certain extent and I have admitted to it before. But not everything I post here is not directly related to that. I just happen to think the facts either prove Leonhard wrong in his assessment or at the very least show that they can be interpreted to mean different things.
"Leonhard clearly spells out that the main problem with Operation Desert Storm was not the prevailing theory, but the fact that the US Army acted in direct contradiction to its own theory."
I still dont see this. This is based on one man's assessment of what happened and it doesn't seem that "clear" to me at all. Guess I'll have to wait for the cliffnotes. If the enemy doesnt stand to fight then there is no need for initiative at the battalion and brigade level, its just that simple. All we're doing is a scrimmage against the fourth string team, which results in a step by step dance through the play book. I saw mission oriented orders, commander's intent, blah, blah, blah on a regular basis during my time in. Especially at the CTC's, where victory is much harder to accomplish then it ever was in the Gulf.
"although the RG were the STRENGTH of the Iraki Army, they were not its main vulnerability and therefore not its center of gravity. The mission objective to destroy the RG was not aimed at the Iraki's main vulnerability, but at its main STRENGTH."
So we should have sent the armor after the fuel trucks and the C&C assets, even though the Air Force had done a bang up job on them already. Plus just write off the fact that it would be alot easier for Iraq to get its hand on a fuel truck then it would a replacement T-72 tank. Take out the RG and you take out the Iraqi Army. I dont care if its labeled as their strength, their chief vulnerability, their schwerepunkt, their ace in the hole or what ever. Bottom line, take it out, you render the Iraqi Army inop. The objective was to destroy the Iraqi army in the field. How could it be any simpler?
Now if we were attempting to take out the Iraqi army with the 82nd Abn Div then we might need to focus on taking out the body of the snake rather then the fangs. But that just wasnt the case. We could handle the RG toe-to-toe, so why avoid a fight we could win and would bring the conflict to a close much quicker?
"And although the stated mission objective was to destroy the RG, it was not accomplished, due mostly to another basic error, which was not to have a plan for what to do after the victory was ensured.Yes there were political reasons for this, but that's how it was from a military point of view."
Whose military point of view? Leonhard's? The plan all along was to crush the RG in the vicnity of Basra. That never changed. Pres. Bush began seeing the unholy carnage we had caused on that main highway north to Baghdad. Fear of the video footage of the Highway of Death and the one sided aspect of the war turning american public opinion against the war, influenced his decision to pull the plug. So the cease fire was called and the RG escaped north. The only thing the military did wrong there was show the man the photos. And we all know that wasnt really wrong at all. What happens after the fight has been won isnt the realm of the military anyway, thats what the statesmen are there for.
"after all, it WAS the destruction of the command network that really won the war, but that was not the plan..."
Hooray for the Air Force. Instant replay... Kosovo. I wasnt all that keen on having to slug it out with the Serbs in a February winter wonder land anyway. Of course now I suppose this will elicit all sorts of remarks about the American's penchant for sending bullets rather then men.
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The USMC is often forced to take a maneuver warfare type approach to many of its tactical problems due to the three big factors I discussed earlier. The situation, the assets and the enemy. The clearest real world mission for the USMC is the projection of small forces into hostile AO's, often to evacuate US citizens. Since they lack the combat power to seize terrain for a long period or to go toe to toe with the aggressor force they have to rely heavily on maneuver to get their job done. Also they often have to go into situations where they have little influence over the overall outcome of things. So they have to stress flexible and mission oriented thinking in those situations. I think you would find their approach to breaching the Iraqi defenses in Kuwait very similar to the US Army approach in Iraq. When it comes down to slugging it out, the two services doctrine and TTP are very much alike. Its when the USMC has to go into these third world hotspots to help out that they HAVE to become hard corps maneuverists. Just like the Army's Ranger and Parachute Battalions, who have a very similar mission.
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A few questions for Henri and his diety, Leonhard.
"The thesis of this appendix is quite simply that the US Army which led the coalition forces to success was not a good army. It was merely a better army than its opponent."
Does Leonhard point to a "good army" as an example? I would argue that, no matter how much you disagree with its doctrine or techniques, a good hard look at its battlefield track record would convince anyone that the US Army gets as close to that qualification as an organization that size can.
"The prevailing theory was that the center of gravity of the Iraki regime was the Republican Guard Corps. Hence the destruction of the Corps would result in the paralysis of Hussein's forces... maneuver theory insists that the enemy's center of gravity is his critical vulnerability, that aspect of which will paralyze or disrupt his forces." (The Republican Guard was not destroyed...).
Read a couple histories of the Iran-Iraq war. It should become obvious, just as it did to US intel analysts, that the RG units were exactly that. They had the best equipment, the best training , the highest morale, etc. They were allowed to escape by our political leadership. The fact that after three days of hard pounding by our air and ground forces they were still able to conduct a relatively organized withdrawal should serve as evidence of their quality. Keep in mind I said "relatively". I spent a couple weeks herding up the other "combat forces" (the consript divisions) and destroying equipment. The conscript divisions were hollow shells and the majority of the equipment, crew served weapons and vehicles, didnt work or hadnt been maintained. Had the Republican Guard been destroyed (which by the way was the commanders intent in every OpOrder I ever read after Jan 13th), I think it would have become very clear how they were indeed the Iraqi Army biggest vulnerability. After their destruction paralysis would have definately followed. They were the only units still maneuvering effectively after the first 48 hours.
"The defeat of the Iraki forces through disruption occured as a result of the interdiction of their supply lines by air and neutralization of their command-and-control systems."
Correct me if I'm wrong but has anyone ever limited maneuver warfare to one dimension? Is this not the aim of the penetration/exploitation phase? Why not do it from the air if you have the capability?
"Another deviation from maneuver warfare theory was the preoccupation with mass rather than momentum or force, a mistake that General Schwartzkopf gradually realized and corrected".
"Operation Desert Storm was strictly controlled from the top down...I have maintained previously that this type of command-push is not necessarily a violation of maneuver theory...."
I would very much like to hear these two points expanded on. Swarzkopf is no hero of mine, I'm fully aware of his criticisms in handling his staff. But I was always under the impression his top-down style ended at task and purpose and commander's intent. The whole point of all those studies done on the GW commanders was that they had learned the lessons of Vietnam and stepped back to let subordinates fight their battles on their own. If Leonhard has evidence of other things happening then I'd like to hear them.
"TRADOC's official interpretation of Operation Desert Storm included the observation that the US Army is moving ever closer to mission tactics and missionorders. In fact, just the reverse is true...My battalion and brigade commanders both noted after the war that they had no tactical decisions to make..."
Neither did mine. But I would argue that that was entirely situational. With no one fighting or maneuvering against you, you follow the plan as it was laid out. Commanders dont have to make decisions when there are no decisions to be made. The overwhelming success of the ground/air campaign contributed to this, not a lack of initiative or top-down control by higher commanders.
I know you guys are really enjoying debating the maneuver/attrition warfare thing, its obvious by the size and scope of your arguments. But what you are arguing is theory, not reality. The world is way too gray for one theory or another to serve as the end all solution. The reality is that a good army will be well trained on the basics and remain flexible enough to adapt to any given situation. The army that wins the war will be the one that can adopt the most effective technique, whether it be destroy the enemy by maneuver or force, quicker and more effectively then its opponent. The method chosen will also have a lot to do with an army's assets and strengths. No one can adopt an entirely maneuveristic approach to warfare and be successful. The bottom line is you have to destroy the enemy's will to fight. That always includes some attrition. If you are able to maneuver against your enemy to achieve that attrition then great job, but there still has to be some butt kicking going on somewhere. You can also debate that armies could do a better job of applying maneuver doctrine. But ask a logistician if we couldnt do a better job at moving supplies and he'd say yes. Ask a Medical Doctor if we could do better job evacing our wounded and he'd say yes. Ask an admin officer if we could do a better job managing replacememnts and he would say yes. But ask them if the current system works and, bottom line, they'd say yes to that too. Does current US Army doctrine and training fit the criteria of being adaptable to the situation, the assets and the enemy, while keeping the maneuver units trained on the basics? I would like for someone to point out an example of where its not. Then point out an army in the world that is better prepared for combat and all its uncertainties. I think you'll be hard pressed to do both.
[This message has been edited by ScoutPL (edited 02-06-2001).]
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Man, you guys could make changing a tire sound hard....
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The biggest hazards for a reconnaissance of enemy positions will usually be their LP/OP's (listening/observation posts). Fortunately, these posts are manned by regular line troops that are often rotated through every few hours. An alert RT can idenify and sneak past an OP line relatively easily. Mainly because an OP line is meant to give early warning of an attack, not small teams trying to infiltrate behind the line. Troops tend to talk, smoke, eat, sleep etc. All of that will give their position away. OP duty is often looked at as time away from the sergeants which translates to goof off time. Other factors can give them away too. Forgetting to camoflage the fresh dirt from a hasty fighting position or continually following the same path back and forth to the point it becomes worn, are other examples. Once an RT gets behind the outpost line its pretty easy to move around. The enemy is always much more relaxed and takes fewer precautions when he thinks he is safe. A good RT can take advantage of that and accomplish their mission.
Also keep in mind that the RT's were forced to break contact and go to ground after only accomplishing about half their goals. The S2's final analysis is still about 50 % knowledge and 50% guesswork. But its alot more then the commander knew at the beginning.
[This message has been edited by ScoutPL (edited 02-03-2001).]
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From my discussion with Fionn-
ScoutPL:
Probably the biggest discrepancy here is I'm an infantryman, so I always had all the dismounted recon assets I needed. Would be interesting to know how many of your officer friends were infantry and would include themselves in that assessment of not having enough assets.
Fionn:
Well, many are from either the Cavalry branch ( which is traditionally low on dismounts ( I don't think I need to tell you how utterly pitiable the M3 is for dismounted recon. An entire platoon can only put 8 dismounts out. Hell, that's not even enough for local security when stopped IMO. ) ) or MechInf. Light infantry units are, I am certain, operating under the screen of far greater dismounted elements allocated to reconnaissance missions.
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Croda - Most infantry battalions in wooded terrain defend a sector around 4+ km wide and 6+ km deep, dependant on the number of AOA's. Way to big for a CM fight. That said 1km by 1.5 km might be a wee bit too small. Try at least a 1.5 - 2 km wide and 3+ deep. Draw your map as terrain really exists. Open areas and wooded areas come in really large clumps, not hundreds of little small ones. Just relying on the AI map maker wont do it. Also make sure its terrain that an infanry battalion would defend. Restrictive mobility, short sighting distances, etc. When your done send me the file and I'll post my version to my website. The you guys can take it wherever you wanta go with it from there.
Henri, I appreciate your candor. I am exchanging emails with Fionn now and I think basically he is right. I havent "been onto him," I just have a different perspective on the issue. Our armored forces do have a shortage of dismounted recon assets at the battalion/brigade level. Since I never served in an armored unit I haven't ran into that problem, so my take is going to be alot different. As an infantryman, dismounts were something I never had a shortage of. I'm sure he's found plenty of officers from the mechanized side of our service who will support that view. Whether broad front recon is the answer is another can of worms that I've taken off my menu for good.
Battalion Defense Tutorial Part Three posted...
in Combat Mission Archive #4 (2002)
Posted
Bump