JoePrivate
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Posts posted by JoePrivate
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Originally posted by Pillar:
It sounds to me like Bullethead has a VERY good idea of what Maneuver warfare is. I don't think that's the problem.
I think the problem is that nobody seems to understand what "Attrition" really is. Is it simply "fighting", or is it more than that?
It seems to me the root of all this disagreement lies in "attrition". When BH says "Manuever in order to conduct Attrition" I think he's really meaning "Manuever in order to conduct fighting". Am I correct BH?
We need to focus on defining "attrition" better here. I offered some descriptions earlier in this thread on my own take.
[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 02-20-2001).]
I don't know Pillar, BH asked a question of you awhile back that went unanswered and may help clarify things.
BH wrote:I see what you're saying, but it doesn't make any sense. I can't think of anybody except U.S. Grant and von Falkenhayn who deliberately set out to conduct attrition as an end unto itself, as the underlying philosophy of their campaigns. IOW, there doesn't seem to be a "school of attrition" against which a "school of maneuver" can be set up. So it seems to me that L&L misconstrued military history and science, invented a problem that doesn't really exist, and then provided a bogus "solution" to the equally bogus problem. Kinda like Hillary and health care.
OK, let's talk history. Napolean is widely credited with breaking the mold of "positional warfare" by targeting the enemy's main army instead of a spot of ground. He therefore conducted huge, daring maneuvers to bring about decisive battles in which he could inflict horrible attrition on the enemy while keeping his own force intact as much as possible in order to exploit battlefield success later. This is maneuver used to enhance battle. According to Henri, this makes Napolean an "attritionist". So is he or is he not an "attritionist" by your definition?
OTOH, there is von Falkenhayn, who caused Verdun to happen with attrition as the express intent of the campaign, rather than taking Verdun itself. He wanted to bleed France to death, figuring he could win in the end because there were more Germans than Frenchmen. His goal was either to cause France to surrender once a certain number of casualties had been inflicted, or to weaken them enough that breakthrough maneuver could be be achieved. This is battle used to enhance maneuver, which by Henri's definition makes von Falkenhayn a "maneuverist" despite his express intentions of attrition. So to which school does von Falkenhayn belong according to you?
As an aside, what do you think of von Falkenhayn's plan? Given the military realties of the time (continuous front with no flanks to turn, inability of frontal assaults to achieve breakthrough), can you think of a more logical goal for an offensive?
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Lol, yeah that's funny alright. To answer your question, it's because CM is a platoon/company simulator not a soldier simulator. The AT teams only carry a shreck, piat or bazooka, their only role is an AT one.
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Getting back to the platoon in combat, I just watched a show for the first time called "Battle Stripes", a documentary about the training of Platoon Leaders and Sargeants for the British Army(?). It was very enlightening I thought. Three concepts I recall the instructors kept on hammering into the trainees was leadership, work as a team to kill the enemy and keep your men alive. Most interesting was the post-exercise analysis, the reason for trainee failures: "he knows his theory but unable to use it/doesn't use it in practice".
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There's an excerpt from 'Steel Inferno' on the first clash(Jun7) between the 12thSS and the Sherbrooke Fusiliers. The Fusiliers lost 21 tanks with 7 damaged in the six hour battle, the 12thSS reported expending only 40 rounds of AT ammunition. The short engagement ranges are deadly and CM reflects that to a large degree. Try extending the range and you may come back here wondering the opposite.
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Originally posted by Pillar:
1. What factors and/or situations are conducive to splitting squads into support and maneuver elements? Always? When wouldn't you?
Situations where I am unsure if I wish to engage in an all out fight, which is often. Typically, I use these sorts of techniques (teams etc.) when conducting my screen. Whenever I want my options as open as possible, this is how I do it. There really is no exact situation that decides it.
2. What influence does platoon experience, C&C, HQ abilities and platoon type have on your technique?
The same they would have for anyone. I use the strengths of my platoon and try to avoid weaknesses. A platoon hq with a command bonus would be better used in more open terrain, etc.
Do you use Regulars? Or higher experience? How come?
More experienced units work without command better, and being spread out sometimes command isn't always possible. My teams have to be able to react autonomously at least to some minor degree. Therefore higher experience troops do me well here. That isn't to say regulars can't handle it -- they will. You just have to think ahead a little more.
Do you keep your platoon in C&C?
If it's practical. There is no set way of doing it... if the situation calls for an action that will put me out of CC, I don't have a problem doing it, if that's what you mean.
Would you use, for example, a British or German Rifle platoon in this manner? If no or depends, then what type do you favour?
Any platoon will do. Again, just be aware of your weaknesses and strengths. (That doesn't mean not taking risks of course)
I guess I was curious about your distinction here by looking for specific examples from you. A split squad is not as 'robust' as a full one in a firefight, that's even more pronounced when they are Regular. If out of C&C then a split squad will be even more fragile and its added delay in carrying out orders makes for less flexibility, not more, allowing your opponent to get inside your 'tempo'. There's a distinct correlation between firepower/range/cover, a split British Rifle squad for example is pretty anemic, not very good at much of anything on its own.
3. At what range do you think you will make contact against the defending platoon with your maneuver element(s)? What do you think is the likely outcome for said maneuver element(s)?Usually I can sense when I'll make contact based on the terrain. You know, "This feels like a good place for an ambush"...
It's rare that my maneuver element will walk directly into the heart of an ambush and get slaughtered, since ambushes can be sensed. A little paranoia helps too. There is a small chance the enemy will surprise me and ambush me perfectly, in which case I'll loose a few men (possibly the entire team), but I'd point out that using a full squad to make contact with the enemy in said situation won't do you any better anyway. In any ambush, you can expect to loose a few men. Furthermore, with more supportive elements and so forth the chances of the "ambushee" surviving are much better.
Upon contact, the supporting elements plaster the enemy once he is discovered and 81mm is there within less than a minute. From there I look at the situation and start deciding how to handle the new threat.
It is VERY helpful to have mortar support rather than just MG's.
That's fine, I think it's a given that a squad or team that walks into an ambush blind will be chewed up pretty good. If I *sensed* an area may contain the enemy then for sure it will be targetted with indirect or mortar fire, or smoked. That's not really what I was trying to get at. I was thinking more along the lines of your spread out platoon split into maneuver/support elements dealing with a more concentrated enemy upon contact.
4. Upon contact what influences your next decision whether to engage or bypass?The goal, the context, the terrain, the purpose of the platoon, etc.
How would you best accomplish that with your support/maneuver elements being 'down' some already? Again we're talking platoon vs platoon only.
First thing, get the hell out of the ambush zone. Then it's just a matter of maneuvering while the enemy is being distracted by artillery or other support.
Some terrain allows you to bug out and disappear back into the forest/fog etc. without even supporting elements.
Using supportive weaponry and fluidity, we can react to an ambush that costs us a few men, and turn it into a situation that costs the enemy an entire platoon.
I.E. Get the hell out/maneuver the enemy and hit him with artillery. Isolate portions of his formation with your own men if you need to do it toe to toe like that without the artillery. You have to see it done to believe it.
If bypass, then what do you think are the likely actions of the defending platoon you aren't engaging? How would you deal with that?
He'll either hold his position in which case he continues to take casualties from my mortar/support or he'll dislocate, in which case I've pushed him back and accomplished my goal. All I have to do is repeat that.
Often players will freak out when they see this sort of thing, not feeling quite comfortable with what is going on. They'll abandon their positions without me having to fight them for it. THAT, is a maneuverists dream
If he counter attacks, the formlessness works wonders. So does the mortars.
Again I was looking more for a specific example of how you would use your support/maneuver elements to either engage or bypass. How that technique would be more effective than a traditionally more concentrated platoon upon contacting the enemy initially. Keeping in mind that if some of your elements are out of C&C, they cannot react as well in a fluid situation and we are just talking platoon vs platoon here. Sure it's easy to say then just bring up some firesupport to suppress the enemy but I'm curious simply about the platoons actions in an isolated case. Bypass means to me going around not withdrawing, lol, you agree that split squads have limitations in combat effectiveness and/or reaction times when out of C&C? Doesn't this give an advantage to the defender to get 'inside' your plans? I agree there are situations where simply maneuvering a force can threaten the enemy and cause him to move and/or react.
Looking forward to your response.I've tried to give you some hypothetical reactions etc. What is important though is that rather than focus on my answers, you focus on my thought process. Exactly *what* one does isn't as important as how one thinks when it comes to understanding maneuverists.
It's all very situational.
Hmm, I agree with Bullethead in that I don't see this 'versus' distinction at all, as opposed to simply playing CM well, which means at some point you will have to engage the enemy.
[This message has been edited by JoePrivate (edited 02-18-2001).]
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A few questions from a CM player's perspective re your Infantry Platoon on Attack technique.
1. What factors and/or situations are conducive to splitting squads into support and maneuver elements? Always? When wouldn't you?
2. What influence does platoon experience, C&C, HQ abilities and platoon type have on your technique?
Do you use Regulars? Or higher experience? How come?
Do you keep your platoon in C&C?
Would you use, for example, a British or German Rifle platoon in this manner? If no or depends, then what type do you favour?
3. At what range do you think you will make contact against the defending platoon with your maneuver element(s)? What do you think is the likely outcome for said maneuver element(s)?
4. Upon contact what influences your next decision whether to engage or bypass?
Using supportive weaponry and fluidity, we can react to an ambush that costs us a few men, and turn it into a situation that costs the enemy an entire platoon.How would you best accomplish that with your support/maneuver elements being 'down' some already? Again we're talking platoon vs platoon only.
If bypass, then what do you think are the likely actions of the defending platoon you aren't engaging? How would you deal with that?
Looking forward to your response.
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Originally posted by Spook:
Geez, since the last time I've checked, it seems that there's far more "heat" being generated here than the "light" that we actually need.
Anyway, Jeff makes a good point in one regard. When we watch the anti-HT attack resolutions, we see the graphic of a grenade being lobbed, we see it explode, and it's usually at the time of explosion that some "effect" (or a miss) is seen for the HT. Thus we might presume we're seeing the result of a SINGLE grenade.
But Jeff is probably right. This is still probably an abstraction, and isn't supposed to be a 1:1 representation of a grenade toss, considering that it comes from a UNIT (squad, half-squad, HQ) instead of any specific single man.
What we do see is that infantry "close assaults" CAN destroy HT's. The question still remains though: Has HT "vulnerability" been inadvertantly reduced?
Let's step back a bit and look at it from the SUSCEPTIBILITY aspect. This means: has the chance to "HIT" the vehicle at close ranges been inadvertantly reduced instead? You can't destroy what you can't "hit" (allowing that near-misses of HE-type weapons might still qualify as hits).
Recall further my one test case using the .50-caliber MG. I used three of these on three islands, and in one minute's time, NONE of these seemed to score a "hit" on an enemy HT. But it was only one test, and with only three "samples." Not enough yet for me to render an opinion.
So for any of you who can do so now, set up a "HT test scenario" with 40X40 islands using more HT-islands, and with each HT being targeting by an enemy HMG. What would be preferable would be German halftracks against US .50's. Add in foot infantry too to support the HMG's, so that the HT's aren't able to easily target and destroy the HMG teams prematurely.
Let's see how that goes. And be sure to note how many HT's are KO'ed by infantry and how many by the HMG's.
[This message has been edited by Spook (edited 02-16-2001).]
I was curious also so setup 10 islands with 60m of open tiles surrounded by rough tiles. One .50cal MG, one HQ(+2Morale&Command) and one US Rifle squad w/grenades only versus one 251/1 HT, all Regulars. At start, average range for HMG was 63m, for the Rifle squad about 16m. I ran it 5 times.
.50cal - 47 kills
Rifle Squad - 1 kill
HQ - 1 kill
251/1 survived once
Six times the engagement lasted longer than one minute, but never longer than two minutes(except for the lone 251/1 victor). Usually it was all over in less than 30s. More samples would be needed I think especially in light of your case which appears exceptional.
[This message has been edited by JoePrivate (edited 02-16-2001).]
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Originally posted by KwazyDog:
Well, I think to refer to it as a bug is a little incorrect to be honest, as the code for close assults hasnt been changed for some time. What you are seeing guys is the way it has been for some time, and hasnt been changed in 1.12.
I am still investigating the matter, though I am beginning to wonder what we are defing as a close assult here. From 10-15 meters the Half Tracks are knocked out easily, and this is easy to replicate. Now from 20-25 meters is does indeed become harder...but the question is, is this wrong?
....
Dan
Well perhaps nothing was changed intentionally but something has changed. A test case with a HT in a 20m island surrounded by rough tiles and a platoon of infantry w/grenades only. Engagement range of 13m or less before HT moves, then 15 to 22m, run 5 times.
Version 1.05
M3HT lasted 14s, 10s, 8s, 9s, and 9s before KO'd
251/1HT lasted 9s, 11s, 11s, 9s, and 10s before KO'd
Version 1.12
M3HT lasted 105s, 125s, 221s, 131s, and 123s before KO'd
251/1HT lasted 93s, 138s, 58s, 118s, and 84s before KO'd
Maybe the results from 1.05 are unrealistic and the 1.12 results are more 'in-line', I don't know, but the difference is there.
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Treeburst155 has something here. When the StuH42 is right next to the bocage its LOS is blocked at around 30m to one side but on the other side there are 'spots' where its LOS extends up 100m.
Yet when the StuH42 is moved a little back from the bocage then its LOS only extends to around 30m on both sides.
The only thing I'm not sure of is if you can actually drive an AFV up to the bocage that close in a game, as displayed in the first image, without it backing off.
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JgPvIV and PvIV/70
Role
Tank Hunter/Infantry Support
Pros
They have a good price/performance ratio versus most other German AFVs, especially the JgPzIV. Their hard hitting guns and sloped armour/low silhouette make them very deadly on the battlefield. The JgPzIV has low ground pressure and a good ammo loadout, much better in both counts than the StugIII.
Cons
They are both turretless and only have one MG with low ammo. The PzIV/70 is slow and has a high ground pressure.
Use
As others have said the obvious choice is to use them as a mobile AT weapon in defense/ambush. When HD they can usually only be defeated by tungsten from the front. I regularly use them in the infantry support role when needed. As well, when attacking or in a meeting engagement, I will use a JgPzIV and MkIV combo, with the JgPzIVs leading the MkIVs. Even when not HD most Allied guns will not penetrate the sloped armour of the JgPzIV, having them out front means they will be engaged first, allowing the MkIVs time and freedom to effectively engage themselves without getting KO'd early.
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Originally posted by Terence:
Did the germans not train for attacking or defending at night? I imagine the idea might have occurred to them after being pasted by the Red Army at night a few times.
And if the Russians did train for it, is there some evidence you could point to that displays that they were in fact, good at it.
Im reading Steel Inferno now, and Im very impressed with the author's research and his obvious careful study. Among other things, he cites the war diaries of various units as evidence for how a particular action transpired or how a weapons system worked.
Is there anyhing similar for this night fighting issue.
An excerpt or selection of excerpts from German units reports that say things like: "Well, Herr Hauptmann, we got nailed again last night by Ivan. Losses are high, and the men are terrified to go out to pee after 6 pm. I don't know how they do it but I'd swear by Goerings fat arse that every Russian soldier can see in the dark."
Or something.
I'm reading Steel Inferno also, the author states the the 12SS specifically trained for night attacks, infiltration, camouflage etc. Now that probably was a result of total Allied air superiority in Normandy and perhaps also lessons learned from Russia. The author also states the Commonwealth troops, at least in the opening weeks of the campaign, did not conduct night operations, in fact seemed ill-prepared for any sort of night activity at all. I'm not overly familiar with the Russian campaign, but from CM:BO BTS doesn't factor those 'general characteristics', leaving us instead with the experience/fanatical/HQ modifiers.
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Originally posted by John Kettler:
Would love a response from Steve on the new information presented after his initial response.
Please?
John Kettler
I think Steve was simply mistaken in his initial post because the 250/9 and 234/1 both can fire at FBs with 1.12. It is only the Lynx that can't, which is in line with the information presented here. Are you saying the Lynx should be able to fire on FBs as well?
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Originally posted by Jagdcarcajou:
Hey,
Has anyone checked the test scenario besides me? Just want to know if results are consistent with my own.
Good to hear BTS is on the case.
I had actually just bumped into my first case of this the other night since 1.12 came out, but I attributed it to bad luck until Jeff posted up. Once I started testing I saw a noticeable difference.
Chris
I ran your test scenario 10 times under 1.12, and resolved one minute of action with the following results:
The squads with rifle grenades and fausts destroyed the HTs immediately, no suprise there I guess.
The squads with demo charges destroyed the Sherman 7 times, immobilized it twice and no damage once; destroyed the MkIV 4 times, immobilized it twice, damaged the gun once and no damage 3 times.
The squads with grenades destroyed the US HT 3 times, immobilized it once, no damage 6 times; destroyed the German HT once, no damage 9 times.
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Originally posted by crepitis:
Its nice to see that joeprivate was big enough to re-post and acknowledge his premature judgement of the number of CMBO players who have some degree of colour blindness.What was that about "evidence" being required before making a statement?
That's too funny. Having noticed the thread languishing with no response, I attempted a *humourous* post to bump it and get people's attention. It even had a smiley to indicate it's non-seriousness, followed by a suggestion to help a guy out. I guess that flew over some heads, whatever...
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Another counter question: Is there a *game* with unlimited artillery?
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I don't understand this. If you allow the computer to pick for you it's because you want the unexpected and a new challenge isn't it? If you have a pre-determined force make-up in mind already then why didn't you just manually choose it yourself?, instead of picking unrestricted computer selection and then complaining about what you received!
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Don't want to rain on anyone's parade here but this has been discussed a lot before. BTS has commented that it's something that they will be looking at for CM2.
Here's a relevant url http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/014942.html
[This message has been edited by JoePrivate (edited 02-09-2001).]
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Originally posted by Tanaka:
I'm a bit late on this topic, but in my PBEM and some TCPIP experience, never lost a single defense game and by the contrary lost most of my attacks and assaults... For sure something is wrong with me, please care to tell me what it is
After the 1st pts reduction in one of the patches (think it was 1.05) I've noticed that it is even more easy to win on defense...
I agree with Tanaka, it is very easy to win on defense now, especially with the reduced fortification costs. The attacker doesn't have the overwhelming numbers to take losses and keep on coming like before the change, which was winnable as the defender even then. The terrain can favour either side, that's just the way it goes, but the attack/defend ratio doesn't need to be tweaked from my experience.
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Originally posted by dumrox:
Skipper, in your reply, you stated, "Since you can shift waypoints on the next turn, and/or change them from fast move to hunt or reverse, and all this without command delay. ".
This is probably in the manual, but I don't have it with me right now. How do you change the command of an existing waypoint? I do move the waypoints around, but don't know how to change a "Move" waypoint to, say, a "Hunt" waypoint without backing out and reissuing (and then suffering the delay).
Thanks in advance.
Just left-click on the waypoint and press the key for the desired command.
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Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:
Steve - I agree completely. Perhaps if we had some quotes from the manual, this is what Desert Fox has been trying to say. My apologies if I've dismissed anyone unnecessarily, I presumed we were talking about staight infantry fighting as shown in CMBO, not high-speed breakthrough operations.
No, just using Babelfish to translate, the quotes from DesertFox talk about PzGrs in SPWs, in conjunction with armour, fighting from their vehicles in the main battle area against improved positions, foxholes, nests of resistance etc. Doesn't sound like 'only in the rear area' but I will stand to be corrected.
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Perhaps your 10 - 20% estimate is a bit high and unsupported by the facts, ie no responses to this thread. Do you have any evidence you're not alone?
Maximus has a new 'mud' mod, may be worth trying when it's available. Good luck.
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Would the sight of the crew bailing out confirm matters?
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A general rule of thumb is about half the range of the panzerfaust type to get a good shot in. Also if possible fire from the sides or rear, the squads seem more likely to fire then.
Bogging
in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Posted
Perhaps I have been unlucky, but bogging and immobilzation are alive and well with snow conditions in 1.12.