tss

zahl wrote: Has anyone read Ph.D. Tapio Tiihonen's gigantic dissertation "Karjalan kannaksen suurtaistelut kesällä 1944" I've tried. It is one of the worst-written dissertations that I've read, language is awkward and there are lots of things that--in my not-so-humble opinion--don't belong there, like analysis of Marxists dialectics. It certainly has lots of interesting data that hasn't been published elsewhere, but mining it out of it is a real chore. Here is a sample chapter title: "4.2 The Dualism of Soviet Allocation and Mannerheimian Unity". I think that his thesis supervisor should have at some point commented about the readability of the text. - Tommi

Ari Maenpaa wrote: On the other hand the forests north of Lake Ladoga were indeed excellent for the defender. A good example for this is the Kuolismaa-Tolvajärvi area that was fought over three times, once in the Winter War and twice in the Continuation War. Each time the attacker (RKKA in 1939 and 44, Finns in 1941) had severe difficulties, even though he had a numerical superiority. Both Soviet attacks failed, the Finnish attack succeeded when the advance on South opened the flank of the defenders and they had to withdraw. (Or they should have withdrawn, at one point the Soviet division commander sacrificed most of the 126th Infantry Regiment by ordering it to be encircled. Well, ordered it to defend a not-too-important village at all costs, which was in practice an order to be encircled.) Yep, there were trenches. Or at least before the Soviet artillery barraged them to smithreens, which happened numerous times. By mid-January the trenches were practically just a series of shellholes connected by 30cm deep ditches. The pioneer and reserve units dug them open during night, and the Soviet artillery collapsed them again during the day. And after all, weren't those other Kirvesmäki strongholds lost? Yes, but only the 5th was lost permanently, the others were captured by counter attacks. Then, on the night between the 7th and 8th of March, the defence was moved back about a kilometer to the support line. Had the new planned Soviet major offensive started, the defence would have been withdrawn ~3 km Northward. To be precice, the 5th stronghold had been captured already on 15 February, three days before the major attack. It was first lost on 13 February, recaptured on 14th, and lost for good on 15th. (Two squads of my grandfather's pioneer company were sent to clean the trenches after the nightly counter attack since they were full of corpses. By one source, 95 dead Soviets were carried away). It is too bad that the two published first-hand accounts of the battles of the 4th and 5th strongholds are in conflict in several places. In particular, the details of the night when that one platoon got lost are different on both books. The books were authored by two successive commanders of the 4th, Kaarlo Simojoki ("Taipale -- tavamukaista tykkitulta") and Alpo Reinikainen ("Posliinipojan talvisota"). Reinikainen's account contains certainly at least one error, since he mentions having found a dead pioneer on his way to the stronghold, but no pioneers were killed that night. (As I mentioned above, the pioneer unit in the area was the 31st Pioneer Company where my grandfather served. Their war diary gives a complete list of all casualties suffered. One man was possibly wounded on that night but the diary doesn't mention whether he was wounded on day or at night.) - Tommi

The Commissar wrote: Ok, so let's discuss this Isthmus. Fields and roads, eh? On some parts, forests on other parts. Were the Finns sitting in these fields and roads then, waiting to be attacked? In most parts the Mannerheim Line was dug few dozens of meters inside the forest, facing field openings. However, by mid-January, the forests were gone. For example, at Kirvesmäki section of Taipale, the treeline had moved ~2km backwards by mid-February. I doubt it. In fact, if they had any common sence, they would seek cover, no? At some points the defence lines had to be dug in the open terrain. At Taipale at least the Kirvesmäki 2nd and 5th strongholds were in the open, 3rd and 4th were inside forest, and 1st was partly in forest. I can't remember the placement of strongholds in the Terenttilä section of my head. I've been given a number of websites on this very thread about Fins during the war, but none really detailed the tactics and detailed positions and fights on the tactical level. Tommi seems to have a great deal of info, which he seems to get from books written in Finnish, which I unfortunately cannot read. Are any translations of these available? Not as far as I know. Generally, the sources can be divided into two classes: 1) Military history books that are mostly of batallion level or higher, with some excursions to company level. 2) Personal memoirs that are most often on the personal level and thus leave out lot of tactical details. I've found out that the best sources about tactics are usually memoirs by platoon and company commanders. However, these aren't generally scholarly studies so they have to be taken with a grain of salt. Perhaps the best combination that I've come across has been colonel Järvinen's two-volume study about Finnish and Soviet tactics that was written just after the war. However, they most probably haven't been translated to English, or at least no public printing has been made (since the books were used in the Finnish Military Academy, it is possible that military intelligence groups have translated them). Here's a general suggestion to all those cabable reading Finnish: if you came across Järvinen's "Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka Talvisodassa" or "Jatkosodan taisteluita" in an old-books' store, grab them. That "moon" landscape sounds awful good for hiding in. All those craters must play havoc on detecting the enemy in a field full of deep holes. It certainly helped. Actually, even Finns had sometimes difficulties in finding their own front line. For example, vänrikki Reinikainen's platoon got lost (on 17th or 18th February, can't remember right now) when they were going to relieve the defenders. They simply didn't notice the front line at all and went past it. On 18 February the platoon was defending the Kirvesmäki Stronghold 4. All other strongholds were lost that day (to be captured by bloody counterattacks in the following night) except that. In his memoirs Reinikainen comments that the main reason why they managed to hold the stronghold even when in the end they had less than 10 defenders and no automatic weapons left was that the enemy simply couldn't find the collapsed trenchline, and went past them. He himself was wounded by MG fire on that day when he tried to attack a T-28 with a demolition charge. - Tommi

zahl wrote: But there was a time limit and this condition: "if the Finnish army would prove to be unable to intern the Nazi forces, the Soviet Union would offer help". That condition was probably the most important reason why the terms were not accepted. Finnish government saw that accepting that clause would invariably lead into occupation. There was no possible way to get the Germans out within the strict time limit (even if the Germans had complied, organizing the withdraw would have taken more time). And the politicians were pretty sure that if the Red Army entered Finland to fight Germans, it wouldn't leave as easily. Skipper wrote: This apparently was not an option in Stalin's view. I still think that he started the whole 1940 affair primarily to push the border further west. Yup. In the first phase Stalin wanted to establish a puppet government to Finland. I don't know for sure what he intended to do next, but I believe that after few months, the people of Finland would have "voluntarily" voted for joining the Soviet Union, just like it happened in the Baltic states. (It is interesting to note, that in the time between its annexation to SU and the German attack, Estonia lost proportionally more people than Finland lost in the Winter War). - Tommi

killmore wrote: 3) My friends Grandfather fought in WinterWar on Soviet side. He said they had idiots for commanders. They were forced to attack the bunkers through the half frozen lake and most of them died. At night 10 of them walked around the lake and took out all of the defenders easily. (they were acticting on their own - had no such orders) It is possible that that happened, though I'm a little suspicious about the bunker part since there weren't too many of them in the "unimportant" sectors, but covered MG nests would be well within realms of possibility. Also, while most of the RKKA attacks were frontal attacks en masse, many of the more successful ones were by relatively small teams. However, it would be quite difficult to find a Finnish account of the battle without more data. Two things in the account suggest that it might have happened on near Tali on early March 1940 (probably the first week): 1) The mention of a half frozen lake. As Tero mentioned, it is impossible to attack over a half frozen lake with infantry. However, the Saimaa channel was dammed at Juustila and the water was used to flood large areas. For example, the ice of Lake Kärstilänjärvi received 60-120 cm water. When it was found out that the flooding didn't stop infantry attacks (though made them hellish to do) and it severely disturbed own movements, it was stopped. 2) The mention of taking out all defenders easily. The defenders in the area belonged to the 23rd Division. As I mentioned earlier, the division was poorly-trained and still quite green. It had had severe losses in the breaktrough battles and few victories so the morale was not too good. The veteran troops held them to be quite worthless. (For those who can read Finnish, I strongly recommend W. Halsti's "Talvisodan päiväkirja" for its description of the confusing days after the February breakthrough. Halsti was the logistic officer of the 5th Division and his book is best account from the logistic side of the war that I've read). - Tommi

killmore wrote: I admit this one could be soviet propaganda but thats what this old soldier choose to believe. Then again There were Long Range naval guns there as one of you mentioned. I don't suspect a bit that RKKA soldiers were told that there were guns aimed at Leningrad and I don't find it strange that someone believed it. I have to admit that I remembered incorrectly the ranges of Finnish large-calibere coastal guns and there were, indeed, quite many pieces in use that would have had enough range to reach Leningrad from the border. From the border. It would have been an utterly stupid thing to do to try to construct a heavy coastal battery so near Soviet Union for two reasons: 1) The Soviets would have justifiably thought that the battery would have been aimed at Leningrad, and would have taken strict measures to prevent its completion. (Which, I believe, would include repeated shelling by 305 mm guns from Kronstadt). 2) In case of war the battery would be overrun in a matter of hours. When the Winter War started, RKKA captured the Terijoki town in the first 24 hours and the guns would have to be closer to border than that to reach Leningrad. From East to West Finnish coastal fortifications (with fortified positions for heavy guns) were: 1) Ino. This was built by Russians before WWI to protect St. Petersburg. They positioned many 10" and 12" guns there that would had almost (but not quite) enough range to reach the city. However, the fort was close enough to be able to shell the Kronstadt naval base. Ino was dismantled in the early 20's according to the peace treaty between Finland and Soviet Russia and all guns were moved to westward. In 1939 there was only a few men naval observer team positioned there. However, a short direction inland there was a cavalry battery with 4 76LK13 guns (maximum range whopping 7km). 2) Saarenpää in the Koivisto Islands. There were 6 10" coastal guns that had ~30km range. However, Saarenpää was 60km from the border and 90km from Leningrad, so its guns definitely couldn't threaten it. However, the battery could have harrassed--but not prevented, it hadn't enough range for that--ship movement into and out from Leningrad. 3) Ristiniemi near the mouth of the Vyborg bay. There were 2 305 mm naval guns that had ~40 km range. Ristiniemi was 90 km from the border and so far into North that it couldn't reach the usual ship lines leading into Leningrad. In fact, it was so far from the border that it didn't have range to reach even the Mannerheim Line (the Saarenpää battery could support the battle of the Southern end of the defence line). 4) Pukkio at Virolahti. There were several 8" guns that could just reach the Vyborg bay area with their 25km range. In addition to these forts, there were 120-152 mm guns at Humaljoki, Tuppura, and Ravansaari that had 15-20 km ranges. Those forts were a little further from border than Saarenpää and had shorter ranges (except Humaljoki that was few kms closer). On the Ladoga side of the Isthmus there were two coastal batteries near the border: 1) Järisevä with 2 120mm guns. The guns had a 13km range while the border was 20km away. 2) Kaarnaoja (Sakkola) with 2 152mm guns. These had a range of ~20 km, so they actually could reach the border area, being the only Finnish guns of the whole Winter War to do that. Both Kaarnaoja and Järisevä were positioned just behind the Mannerheim Line where the line was closest to the border and Leningrad. However, even from there the distance to Leningrad was ~60km, so no WWII-era gun in Finnish use could reach there. In all other places the Mannerheim Line was further from Leningrad. The Southernmost tip was 70 km from the city, and the line arced away from the city. - Tommi

tero wrote: Unfortunately there were only 2 (two) 37mm AT guns per regiment and no AT rifles to speak of. There were exactly two 20mm ATRs in use during Winter War. Not two types of, or not even two per some organizational unit, but two as the grand total available weapons. They were prototypes that were field-tested in the early part of the war, and then used in battle until they were lost. However, I don't have any idea for how long they lasted. There was also a prototype of 13mm AT MG. It was just as effective as it sounds (or given the success of .50" against light armor in CMBO, even less effective than it sounds). As far as I know, it was used in battle exactly once, when its gunner fired at close range (or that was what he said) to the thin flank armor of a BT (either 5 or 7) without any visible effect at all. The project was scrapped after that. A number of 14 mm Boys ATRs arrived Finland in the late part of the war, but I'm not certain if any reached the front in time. - Tommi [ 06-01-2001: Message edited by: tss ]

Ari Maenpaa wrote: And line the Finns held, because it was static so long. One interesting thing is that at Taipale the front line units generally lost ~2/3 of their strenght during one stay in the trenches. First, a term was two weeks, then it was shortened to one week, then to five days, and so on until at the end of the war the defenders were changed daily. The absolute losses changed from day to day, but the relative losses stayed remarkably constant throughout 1940. - Tommi

Skipper wrote: But soviet artillery used to hit quite a lot of things and generally was nowhere near "ineffective" or "conscript". In the late part of the war, true. In the early part (especially in the early Winter War) there was a lot of ineffective shelling where a battery would fire against the same empty spot of a forest for days or even weeks in some cases. Lately I've been searching information about the Särkisyrjä battle, 18-21 July 1941. (My grandfather and his brother were there, my grand uncle was killed on the second day of the battle). A quite lot of the Finns who were there had been at Taipale in the Winter War. Taipale was among the most heavily-shelled front sections of the war. Still, two different sources of Särkisyrjä both quote Taipale veterans saying that Soviet artillery was much worse at Särkisyrjä than at Taipale. I haven't been able to find out how many artillery pieces Soviets had there, but most probably they had only one or two 76 mm batteries [Oops, editing. I meant to write batallions], plus some 82 mm mortars. The reason for the perceived difference: at Särkisyrjä there was an excellent FO with an excellent position (the attic of a two-story school building situated on top of a high ridge). (Unfortunately, Särkisyrjä wasn't the worst artillery experience of the unit; in 1944 they were positioned at Rajajoki, the point of attack of the Soviet summer offensive. In that battle my grandfather was cut of his unit and had to spend three weeks behind Soviet lines with few of his mates). There is a persistant legend (well, not an actual legend but an attitude) here in Finland that in pretty much all battles the Soviets had at least 10:1 superiority and that heaps of Russkies died for each Finnish casualty. The image of early-Winter War battles is imprinted very deep. There certainly were combats like that (some even in the Continuation War), but in most cases the odds were quite equal, and losses were quite comparable. For example, at Särkisyrjä Finns had (in practice) two batallions (I/JR 37 and III/JR 37) while Soviets had a reinforced batallion (the exact strength is not known). So Finns actually had a numerical superiority, but not very large. Finnish losses, in particular of I/JR 37, were terrible. I don't have the exact figures right now, but there were well over 100 KIA and 200 WIA (and 6 MIA). Soviet losses are not known. The heaviest company losses were for 1./JR 37, my grandfather's company. When they were ordered to attack to the heavily-fortified Kokkomäki hill on the third day of the battle, only 27 men were left in line, less than 20%. The war diary of I/JR 37 estimates that Soviets losses were over 300 men, but that is almost certainly an exaggeration. In any case, Soviet losses were heavy, as evidenced by 12 Maxim MGs that were captured along with ~20 DT LMGs (I can't remember the actual figure). Actually, Särkisyrjä is a perfect example in that the heavy losses were to a large extent result of the belief that "one Finn equals to 10 Russkies". The regiment commander, colonel Sainio, most apparently believed that "worthless Russkies" couldn't stand a determined attack by "real men", and stubbornly continued to order frontal attacks against the heavily-defended village, sending his reserves into the battle piecementally. After the second day of the battle he verbally abused major Komonen (commander of III/JR 37) for failing to cut the Ruskeala-Sortavala road and ordered him to buy and wear a dress. It tells something of the battle that the losses of 1./JR 37 (later 9./JR 58) on that period were heavier than losses of the rest of the war combined, including the losses on 9-12 June 1944 when the company was, as I mentioned above, almost at the spearpoint of the Soviet major offensive. - Tommi [ 06-01-2001: Message edited by: tss ]

Skipper wrote: Note that soviet generals never had a directive to go to Helsinki - neither in 1940, nor in 1944. I don't know about 1940, but in 1939 they certainly had one. Oh, technically the honor of libarating Helsinki was reserved for the "People's Army of Finland" that was the "army" of the communist puppet "People's Government of Finland" that was formed at Terijoki on 1 December, 1939 shortly after RKKA had captured it. The Terijoki Government is perhaps the best evidence for the fact that Stalin didn't simply want the Karelia Isthmus for the war. After it was formed, the official policy of the Soviet government was that it was the only legal government of Finland. In particular this meant that negotiations to end the war were not possible (until Stalin quietly disbanded it in February, IIRC). Originally, the intent was that the "People's Army" would have two or three divisions formed from Finnish communists. In practice, it had only a single regiment and less than 50% of its manpower had Finnish roots (Finns, Ingrians, Karelians, Vatjans, Vepsäns, ...) and the rest came from different parts of Soviet Union (at least Russians, Ukrainians, and Kazahs). The non-Finnish men of the unit saw the humor of the situation and there was a running joke about Finnish mines ("Finskij mini", pardon my terrible Russian) and Minskian Finns ("Minskij Finni"). I've read several interviews of men of the "People's Army", and they all say that they were told that they would be the unit to liberate Helsinki. As for 1944, soviet generals considered results of the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation, and consequent peace treaty with Finland as a 100% successful. They might have considered it a success. However, according to the original operation plans it was a failure. The original plan was that the first phase of attack would capture Vyborg and the the attack would continue to Lappeenranta. Vyborg was captured but the RKKA was stopped long before Lappeenranta. The Soviet attack against VKT-line at the Tali-Ihantala area was a real attack and it was stopped. It is also clear that Soviets could have crushed Finland militarily in late 1944 if they had committed themselves to it. However, the first try failed and they would have sent a lot more troops in to do it. That was one thing that Stalin didn't want to do, since Germany was the main adversary so he was satisfied to have a conditional armistice. Note that the terms of the armistice were much more lenient than the terms that Stalin had given in March 1944. (In particular, the condition that Germans had to be evicted from Finland in only two weeks--a truly impossible task--was removed). In 1940, Mannerheim line was eventually broken. That was the background for the subsequent armistice. Notably, RKKA could but did not advance further than they wanted to go. I think that particular statement is little misleading. First, it is quite certain that had the war continued for several weeks more, Finnish defence would have totally collapsed. In the Karelian Isthmus there were three critical points (from South to North): 1) The Viipuri Bay. The Soviet breakthrough had been contained but the defenders were spread so thin that had the attack continued with reinforcements, the defence could have stood for maybe 3-4 days, not more. 2) The Tali area. Here the Finnish 23rd replacement division was all but crushed. The division commander was not too good and his men were poorly-trained and green. Here the next Soviet attack would probably have resulted in breakthrough and a possible encirclement of Vyborg. 3) The Vuosalmi-Äyräpää area. Finnish defenders were depleted and utterly tired. Additionally, the Soviets had captured most of the Äyräpää ridgeline and had an excellent LOS to Finnish lines. Here the defence could have stood for several days, at most. The worst thing for Finns was that there was only _one_ trained infantry batallion left as strategic reserves in the whole country. There were also several very poorly trained replacement units that would not have had real change in a battle. Thus, that part of your statement that RKKA could have advanced more is true. However, to claim that they didn't want to advance is false. In particular, the attacks against Vyborg continued to the end of war. In fact, last attacks were made in the morning of 13 March, a few hours before the peace, because some general or marshall wanted to conquer the town by arms. (I've read an account by one Russian soldier who had to participate in that last attack. He was _very_ bitter about it). In the end the Soviet decision to negotiate the peace was a political and not military. Stalin feared the possibility of war against Britain and France more than he wanted to occupy Finland. However, I believe that if he had known the true Finnish military situation, he would have continued the war. - Tommi

I get caught by Real Life for some time and when I come back, I find this thread. Well, on to replies... Tero wrote: Firstly, there were no guns in the Finnish inventory that could have reached Leningrad from the border, let alone from further inside the Finnish territory. Finnish army (WWII-time) had only one gun that could fire from the pre WWII-border to suburbs of Leningrad. It was a 305 mm railroad gun that was captured from Soviets at Hanko in 1941. Several other 305 mm coastal guns were in use even before the war, but they had shorter range. However, I think that they could have reached the Krondstadt fortress if they had been positioned right at the border, but they weren't (the Esternmost coastal fort at Ino was disarmed in the 20's according to terms of the peace agreement between Finland and Soviet-Russia). 2) I think Alan Clark wrote that Finns (& german units attached) had 2:1 advantage over Soviets in the 1941 - but Finns failed to achieve their objectives. What ? What were these objectives they failed to adcheive ? I'm not certain about that 2:1 advantage. It surely happened in some parts of the front, but not in all places. I guess that the Clark reference is about the attack towards the Murmansk railway at Kiestinki region. The most complete Finnish victory of 1941 happened at Western Karelian Isthmus and there was three Finnish infantry divisions against three Soviet infantry divisions. Two Soviet divisions were encirled and they lost all their heavy equipment (most captured intact) and most of their men, the third division was knocked out of battle. Thus they were no super-soldiers. (And 3:2 in 1942) After December 1941 there weren't any Finnish offensives at all, barring local counter-attacks. When the Soviets noticed that the Finnish front is quiet and will likely remain so, they took most of their troops out to fight Germans. In 1943 there were about 300000 Finns at front and 150000 Soviets, a difference of 2:1. - Tommi [ 06-01-2001: Message edited by: tss ]

Johnny D. wrote: A 20:1 kill ratio did happen in some engagements. Yes, there certainly were. For example, in the Iasi-Kishinev offensive one side lost ~13000 men of irrecoverable losses, while the other side lost ~270000. Guess which one was which? OK, here comes the answer: Soviets won. Completely. Actually, the casualty ratio was a lot better than the 20:1 if you count the whole Rumanian army to it, since the operation was the final straw that knocked it out of the war. And overall the loss, counting POWs, was closer to 20:1, to me that is still amazing. Overall? Germans lost ~5 million men in the Eastern front (KIA+POW, I can't bother to dig up the actual figure this late in the evening). Twenty times 5 million is 100 million. Are you claiming that Soviet combat losses were more than 50% of their total population? - Tommi

Keith wrote: The author has several pages discussing the long range patrols performed by German squads - sometimes with Finnish scouts. I am sure there were also many Finish only patrols. There was a rough division that Finns patrolled South of Belomorsk, and Germans to the North of it. In the Petsamo area there were both Finnish and German patrols. The author also makes it clear that the Finnish and German offensive in 1941 had sufficient momentum to cut the railway, but the Finns did not want to. That is far from clear. Really far. At Kiestinki, the first combined Finno-German attack was stopped by a Soviet counter attack in mid-August, and actually the point unit (Finnish JR53) got almost encircled, with its supply route going through roadless wilderness. In the beginning of September Finns retreated from "The Spike" and withdrew 15 km. The front then stayed in place until November, when a new attack was supposed to start. Now Mannerheim ordered Siilasvuo to stop attacking. Whether the attack could have reached the railroad at Louhi is far from certain. The Soviets had received reinforcements in the area, winter was coming fast, and Germans didn't have winter equipment. Additionally, German supply wagons were too heavy for offroad usage, so they would have had to advance along the heavily fortified railroad (a side branch of the Murmansk railroad). The author describes how the Germans typically destroyed bridges as the best way to break the rail line. Yup. However, rail bridges are pretty difficult to destroy and you have to have lots of explosives that are a beast to carry through a forest. Addendum: rail bridges were also heavily defended, at least compared with other rail sections, and got progressively better defence as war went on. Blowing a bridge would usually be not possible without combat, and combat 20-70 km behind enemy lines is usually not too bright idea. (Finnish patrolmen tried to avoid combat relying on mines and quick ambushes instead). - Tommi [ 05-05-2001: Message edited by: tss ]

Keith wrote: Finland was very concious to of this and decided not to attempt cutting the Murmansk rail line in Russian territory, I'd like to give minor corrections. First, Murmansk rail line was, indeed, cut by Finns near Lake Onega. However, the Soviets had built a new East-West railroad connecting Belomorsk (Sorokka) and Archangel that got heavy use after the North-South railroad was cut. Finnish command staff decided not to attempt to cut the railroad North of Belomorsk after the first Finno-German attack was stopped at Kiestinki. This put general Siilasvuo between a rock and a hard place because officially he had to cooperate fully with Germans but unofficially he was told that Finns shouldn't advance anymore. However, the planning for an attack to the railroad continued throughout the war because it kept Germans happy. Finns always delibrately put too high demands for German participation to keep the attack from manifesting. (Once the number of required German forces was actually increased when the Germans surprisingly agreed to one version of the plan). Instead they said the Germans could try it alone if they wish. It was never said openly. German was in a position to starve Finland at will so it had to be done more subtly. The Germans only succeeded in doing so intermittently through ski patrols equipped with demolitions. Most raids to the Murmansk railroad were made by Finns. However, those attacks were usually done South of Belomorsk so they didn't affect the lend-lease transports that went to East and were aimed against supply transports of the Soviet units fighting in the area. Most raids were small-scale, where a one-two squad patrol mined the tracks and perhaps stayed to fire at the train for few minutes. The largest one happened in winter 1942 when Polish-born ratsumestari Majewski organized his two-batallion "Mammoth patrol" that held a long part of the railroad for a full day. The Archangel railroad, where most of the lend-lease stuff was transported, was left in peace by Finns. Only one long-range recon patrol mined it in few places, against orders. - Tommi

Jeff Heidman wrote: I can't help but have trouble believing ANY of the Finn stories, because they are all like this. To be exact, the post didn't claim that all SMG kills were at 600 meters. Actually, given that in firing range conditions the maximal effective range of a Suomi SMG was a little over 300 meters and practical maximum range in combat (firing single shots or 2-3 round bursts) was ~150 meters, it is very probable that zero the hero meant that the 600 m kills were rifle kills. As my earlier post mentioned, Häyhä's figure of 505 is too high, but it's not known how much. If I had to guess, I'd say that the real figure would be around 300, but like I wrote, nobody really knows. I also would like to know who the other mysterious sniper was, since I've never heard about any Finnish sniper with over 400 claimed rifle kills. We here in Finland have the problem that we generally take the Red Army casualty estimates that occur in war diaries and memoirs too seriously, forgetting that a defending infantry unit will most often exaggarate (knowingly or not) the number of enemy attackers. The same thing holds also in attacks. One particularly illuminating case is the attack against major Grigorejev's partisan brigade at Tjasa River 30 July 1942. One particularly well-known Finnish source of the battle mentions that 300 Soviet bodies were counted in the battle area. The real figure was (apparently) 113. According to an intercepted radio message, the brigade lost 258 men, counting the men who got lost in the forest in the confusion of Soviet withdrawal. Certainly their total losses were less than the "300 bodies that were counted". - Tommi

zero the hero wrote: Simo Häyhä, as recounted in the book, was responsible for the demise of 505 Russian soldiers! I'd like to point out that Häyhä himself has said that his official SMG kill figure (> 250) is seriously exaggerated. His rifle kill figure was 246, IIRC, but that is not exact since he didn't start counting immediately and it is possible that there were cases of "confirmed kills" that weren't really hits. The real number of his kills will never be known. Häyhä fought one sniper duel against a good Soviet sniper whose identity is unknown at least here in Finland. The Soviet sniper had killed three Finnish officers in few days when Häyhä was sent after him. Häyhä spent one full day in a camouflaged hole in the snow without moving at all and when the evening come the Soviet sniper left his hideout carelesly, and Häyhä got him. - Tommi

Berlichtingen: Some clearification here... Kampfgruppe Nord did poorly in their first action... they were not trained. By the time the division was formed, the men had been replaced with trained Waffen-SS... the division was highly successful from that point on. I still disagree. A quick Internet search puts the date of the transformation from a kampfgruppe to a division to September 1941, and that is before the heavy Kiestinki battles. While Kiestinki was not a catastrophe for Nord like Salla battles were, its performance was not particularly spectacular. At times the SS men manned a front that was 50% shorter per defender than Finnish and Heer troops had, but the enemy patrols could still get through it almost at will. - Tommi

Mike the bike wrote: Rather than harp on about how my boys were better than your boys, what were those moments that defined the best and worst about each nation's military in WW2? I have two candidates for the high point of Finnish army: 1) The defence of Mantsi Island during Winter War (1939-40). Initially there were only a two-gun coastal artillery battery (150 mm) and one infantry company. The Soviets had a full infantry regiment in the area. The island held to the end of the war, after being reinforced several times. Several years ago the minutes of RKKA's high-level conference on April 1940 were published here in Finland. One of the most entertaining parts was when the commander of the said Red Army regiment tried to explain to Stalin why he couldn't capture the island when having more than 10:1 superiority. (Also, he had to answer to difficult questions about getting his regiment later encircled by a single batallion). 2) The two-week long Tali-Ihantala battle (June-July 1944) that was the largest battle ever fought in the Nordic countries. A major Soviet armored spearhead was stopped with heavy casualties. From a large-scale military point of view, I'd put the Finnish low-point to the offensive of Ryhmä O ("Group O") to Kuolismaa area in 1941. Colonel (or was he a General-Major, I can't remember) Oinonen conducted a series of frontal assaults against heavily-fortified and well-motivated Soviet troops, losing heavy casualties. What made this attack particularly boneheaded was the fact that the flanks of the defending 126th Infantry Regiment were wide open because of vast wildernesses of the area. However, the Soviet defensive victory was not so impressive as some Soviet sources claim. Jaakko Rugojev's "Majuri Vallin rykmentti" ("The Regiment of Major Valli") claims that Finns had three attacking regiments and one brigade against the Soviet 126th, while in truth there were only one brigade and two cavalry regiments, and the cavalry regiments were smaller than infantry batallions. So in practice, there were five Finnish batallions against three Soviet ones. Another good candidate is the stubborness of General Laatikainen when he steadfastly refused to believe the evidence that Soviet major offensive was coming in summer 1944. In the smaller scale there were many unimaginative company-level frontal assaults that caused heavy casualties with no results. Perhaps the worst one happened at the Rukajärvi sector but I can't remember which unit it was. A Finnish company had arrived at the edge of a kilometer-wide marsh with a high forested hill on the other side. The company commander sent a scout patrol that established that the hill was defended. The commander then sent out for reinforcements and artillery support (the guns had fallen behind because of difficult terrain). The infantry reinforcements came before artillery spotters. The commander of the new company immediately ordered an attack over the marsh. The commander of the old company who had the seniority specifically ordered to stop the attack but the new commander didn't listen and attacked anyway. His company lost over 90 men KIA, WIA, and MIA. The worst thing is that the lieutenant in question survived and wasn't even court-martialled. - Tommi [ 05-02-2001: Message edited by: tss ]

Berlichtingen wrote: 6th... the 9th was a Panzer Division I don't participate on debates about "best soldiers" because I've seen so many of them to degenerate into pure flamefests. However, I just popped in to point out that the performance of the 6th SS Mountain Division Nord was abysmal in 1941 and that is enough for me to strike the unit out of the list of best soldiers. (About 24 hours after the division begun its attack its commander sent a report to his superiors stating that "he didn't believe that the division could carry out offensive operations"). - Tommi

DEF BUNGIS wrote: But what equipment did they really use??? Everything. For example, there were little over 60 different field gun models in use. Finnish, Russian, Soviet, German, Swedish, British, American, French, Polish, and Japanese, at least. I'm not certain whether I remember all manufacturing countries. Oh, there was also one heavy cannon from Chile but it was a Swedish design. Most AT guns were either Swedish, Soviet, French, or German. There were also Finnish, Polish, and some third-country (Hungary?) licence-built copies of the Swedish Bofors gun. Not even infantry small-arms were uniform. There were at least Finnish, Russian, Soviet, Italian, and Japanese rifles in use. (Though, I don't know whether the light Japanese ones were used after Winter War because of supply problems). Finnish air-force had combat planes from the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, USA, UK, Soviet Union, and France. Non-combat planes were from all over world. Tank units are quite easy since there were only two models in use that weren't used anywhere else in the Eastern Front: BT-42 assault gun and Landsverk Anti AA-tank. Though, Finns modified captured T-26s by adding a bow MG (but not to all vehicles) and removing the rear-facing MGs. Similarily, the MGs of German-made vehicles (Stug-IIIG, PzKw-IVJ) were replaced by captured Soviet DTs. Well, it's time to start celebrating the 1 May, so I think I'll stop this here. - Tommi

Gyrene wrote: The Sissi (Called Sissu in some sources) were Finland's very elite troops. They wreaked havoc behind Russian lines with their long range ski patrols and raids. 'Sissi' is the correct word. It means literally 'guerilla'. The other word 'sisu' is quite hard to translate exactly but 'grim determination' comes quite close. It is not certain whether the terms are etymologically related, since they both are very old. The earliest 'sissi' troops that I'm certain of were the guerilla fighters of the "Great Hatred" (1712-21). The most famous 'sissi' units of WWII were long-distance patrolmen who conducted recon missions and raids behind Soviet lines. They had mostly SMGs. Perhaps the most common squad type had 7 SMGs and 2 rifles (or 6 SMGs and 3 rifles). Very commonly the rifles were captured Soviet automatic or semi-automatic rifles. A 'sissi' squad also carried a good amount of demolition charges and anti-personnel mines. The organization of 'sissi' forces was light, with a company having usually 4-6 2-squad platoons. The units were small because 100 men is just about the absolute maximum number of men that can move through a forest without leaving trails that a blind man can follow. 'Sissi' troops had only rarely heavier weapons. Unto Korhonen, who fought for the whole war in the long-range recon patrol of the 14th Division, has stated that they had only once a LMG and then it was only because he was stupid enough to carry one on his first patrol. - Tommi

BloodyBucket wrote: Nearly every Civil War museum I have been to features a musket that has a round in the barrel that met the round coming out. That happened also with 7.62mm rifles at Suomussalmi, 1939. The rifle was subsequently lost, though, so it is possible that it was only an urban legend. Also, at Ihantala one Finnish 152mm artillery round hit an incoming Soviet (probably 122mm) round midair. - Tommi

Jarmo wrote: Anyhoo, I believe 155 in direct fire was pretty rare, although I remember a mention that it was the sure way to kill german AT pillboxes. Depends on the type of the pillbox. If it is a flanking-fire pillbox with no openings towards the enemy, it will be very difficult to get the gun in firing position. The Red Army used 210 mm howitzers firing direct against Finnish pillboxes at Summa. There were two large bunkers ("Poppius" and "Miljoona") and several small. A direct hit all but destroyed "Poppius" (one half collapsed) that was not designed for flanking fire. However, the only thing that the guns managed to do to the flanking-fire "Miljoona" was to destroy its steel observation posts. The front wall was thick enough to withstand direct hits. The small pillboxes were wooden and they were destroyed by smaller guns (122 mm howitzers). - Tommi

Panzer Leader wrote: Is this a list of units for the game, or are we talking about a list of game improrvements? "The List" with capitals denotes the list of game improvements that are under consideration by BTS. They haven't posted the complete list ever (something to do with trade secrets or like that) but from time to time Steve or Charles has mentioned that a particular feature is in it. - Tommi

Shatter: I am sure this has been mentioned before, but I never heard anyone say anything. Yup, quite many times. I seem to remember that Steve once said that it was a nice idea but not possible before the engine rewrite. - Tommi