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Michael Dorosh

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Posts posted by Michael Dorosh

  1. Originally posted by Steiner14:

    </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by 76mm:

    Carell? :D

    Carell exaggering german strenght? Where?

    The forum "experts" for the german army here seem not to know, that in 1944 the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe was at their biggest strenght in numbers. The most units, the best equipment produced in highest numbers.

    Maybe the author Kip refers to, meant it that way. </font>

  2. Originally posted by kipanderson:

    Hi,

    The following quote comes from Soviet Blitzkrieg by Walter S Dunn Jr. page 58. The preamble to the quote is a detailed account of the replacements and manpower of two infantry divisions in Army Group Centre.

    “The surplus of Germans over authorized strength probably prevailed over most to the divisions of Army Group Centre in June. The improvements in both divisions reflect a plentiful supply of men and weapons for the Eastern Front, rather than a shortage because of the diversion of men and material to France.”

    This is not taken out of context; there are pages on the subject which imply/say the same thing.

    How could this be? The answer I referred to in an earlier post. The German army’s own very full and detailed records do not correlate with the military histories written post war by German commanders. The Germans were able to fully rebuild most units with fully trained manpower right up to the second half of ’44. They were also increasingly well equipped.

    Added to this overall force ratios were far less in favour the Soviets than German accounts imply. By early ’43 the Soviet frontline army had reached six million and was held at that level until the end of the war. Force ratios German to Soviet were less than 1:2 for most of ’43 and less than 1:2.5 for most of ’44. And that is only counting German troops and not any of their allies.

    Again, very different from that which German officers would have you believe.

    The accounts written by German officers need to be regarded as personal frontline accounts not accurate military histories.

    If I had been through all the surviving German officers had experienced I am sure my account would also be very partial. It is called being human.

    All the best,

    Kip.

    Yes, and what was the state of training of those men? As indicated, basic training had been slashed in half, as had the minimum induction age. I suppose new troops had less time in march/transfer battalions or feldersatz battalions where they got "on job training" (i.e. anti-partisan operations, etc.) before deploying to the division - or do these "over strength" divisions actually include the training and replacement formations located well behind the front?

    [ December 17, 2007, 08:32 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

  3. Originally posted by Snake Raper:

    These points are all reasons why I feel that WW2 is played out. There is virtually no mystery, the people who have been gaming that war for years can show you (to the man essentially) the OOB for every unit there was. Place one extra MG team and I am sure you will hear about it.

    At least these days there is still some degree of mystery because it is new or hasn't happened yet. The unknown is more fun in my opinion.

    I'd have thought your own demonstration just now of your basic ignorance of how the war was fought proved just the opposite. ;)
  4. My Little Stalingrad Operation was too large, I think - two reinforced battalions for all of Ortona, 20 battles, it was a monster and didn't do the battle justice for the reasons you indicated. I'd be interested in seeing your take on Ortona if you decided to do a treatment of it.

    Sounds like Atkinson had Vokes pegged pretty well; doesn't deviate from the standard treatment of him, nor should he, I suppose. BD6's comment was interesting that he pays more attention to reporters, but of course, Atkinson is one himself. I wonder if that is institutional bias at work, or simply reflects what kind of resources were available to him.

    I don't know what Vokes could have done differently at Ortona, except not fight there at all - bypassing the city was probably a better choice - JonS might have a more informed opinion than me, however.

  5. Originally posted by JasonC:

    MD - while I agree the infantry and rifle formations fought most of the war, it is untrue that the Germans fielded no fully armored infantry units. Panzer Lehr had all 4 Pz Gdr battalions equipped with SPWs, plus the recce battalion. While the usual load out was a single armored Pz Gdr battalion per division, a number of divisions had 2 later in the war, and the recce battalion was sometimes armored as well (though usually only a portion was).

    As always, thanks for your comments and clarifications. I always use Grossdeutschland as the litmus test - GD never did have their two mechanized infantry regiments fully equipped with SPWs. If you say Panzer Lehr actually managed it, I have no choice but to believe it - but I would have to believe they were the exception to the rule. I've yet to lay hands on a good divisional history; closest I've come is interviewing a platoon commander from Pz Gren Lehr Regiment 901 in his home here in Calgary. I laughed at Osprey's "elite units" title that gave a divisional order of battle and didn't even list his regiment... Admittedly, I suppose I am not looking hard enough - Fedorowicz is too expensive to contemplate for units I'm only briefly interested in. There doesn't seem to be much online, but I haven't googled Lehr in a long time.
  6. Originally posted by JasonC:

    The Canadian corps commander gets hauled over the coals and appears to fully deserve it,

    Which one? Crerar was given I Canadian Corps solely because he needed an operational command before taking 1 Canadian Army into battle in Normandy; he handled the Canadians on the Arielli Front for a few weeks in static conditions before buggering off to the UK. "Tommy" Burns commanded longer, and was called "Smiling Sunray" for his dour command style, but he did do well at the Hitler Line despite his personal failings. He was replaced in November 1944 by Foulkes, the result of a clerical error which saw the vulgar Chris Vokes moved laterally from Italy, taken out of 1 Canadian Division to go to 4th Canadian Armoured Division. Foulkes was supposed to go to the Armoured from the 2nd Infantry Division, but instead went to Italy to command I Canadian Corps, in which capacity he finished the war; given that the corps left Italy in February and spent a great deal of time redeploying to the Netherlands, I don't think he had a lot to do in any event - and wouldn't have been mentioned by Atkinson for the latter.

    "Little Stalingrad" has been covered in CM:AK by my Operation of the same name - I imagine you might have a different take on it, but I think an operational look at the overall battle, including the Gully and the Moro River battles would be interesting in a CMMC kind of way, with fairly small formations (divisional size) on each side keeping things manageable.

  7. Originally posted by Snake Raper:

    [QB] Perhaps I should have said that comparatively speaking they had good gear that is similar in function.

    MGs, mortars, AT, yes bolt-action rifles but rifles none the less (some of them were quite good at using them). What you are describe is essentially the modern equivalent.

    The point I was making was that the WW2 German rifle platoon was very similar to that of modern platoons. They have the same capability and sustainment (comparatively speaking). They had integrated support (MGs and mortars) at the platoon level, most other nations in the early goings had that support (mortars) at the company and higher level.

    Ah, that makes more sense. How good they were with their rifles makes little difference; riflemen rarely did anything effective with them. I'm not quoting SLA Marshall, either, but our very own Strome Galloway - if you've served operationally with the RCR, you'll know who that is, or should. He said that most riflemen could have carried pitchforks in the Second World War for all the difference it would have made. I'm certain it applied as much to the Germans as to his Royal Canadians.

    Not sure why you say that most German soldiers never saw a tank, the part of the war that saw them paste Europe says otherwise (that whole blitzkrieg thing).

    Have you read Matthew Cooper? "Blitzkrieg" wasn't a German military concept, though we've had that conversation here more than a few times. German armour in Poland in 1939, for example, was mostly timidly used and supported the infantry, but even at the height of the war, less than 20 percent of German divisions were armoured divisions. There were assault gun battalions and independent heavy tank units, but most German soldiers simply didn't operate with medium tanks (what we call main battle tanks today) all that often. They slogged around on foot and did battle in the time honoured way, perhaps with assault guns in support, usually relying on mortars or rocket artillery by 1944 particularly in the defence.

    Nor did they have personnel carriers as we do today - you've trained with the LAV, I take it, for current mechanized operations. The Germans didn't deploy a single regiment equipped with armoured personnel carriers during the war that I am aware of. Compare to US armored infantry battalions or CW Motor battalions which were available in decent numbers in the case of the former, and while not greatly numerous in the case of the latter, at least they were fully equipped unlike the panzergrenadiers/schützen regiments, who used underpowered and unarmoured trucks for the most part.

    From Ellis (Brute Force):

    Our perception of land operations in the Second World War has...been distorted by an excessive emphasis upon the hardware employed. The main focus of attention has been the tank and the formations that employed it, most notably the (German) panzer divisions. Despite the fact that only 40 of the 520 German divisions that saw combat were panzer divisions (there were also an extra 24 motorised/panzergrenadier divisions), the history of German operations has been written largely in terms of blitzkrieg and has concentrated almost exclusively upon the exploits of the mechanized formations. Even more misleadingly,this presentation of ground combat as a largely armored confrontation has been extended to cover Allied operations, so that in the popular imagination the exploits of the British and Commonwealth Armies, with only 11 armored divisions out of 73 (that saw combat), and of the Americans in Europe, with only 16 out of 59, are typified by tanks sweeping around the Western Desert or trying to keep up with Patton in the race through Sicily and across northern France. Of course, these armored forces did play a somewhat more important role in operations than the simple proportions might indicate, but it still has to be stressed that they in no way dominated the battlefield or precipitated the evolution of completely new modes of warfare.

  8. Originally posted by Snake Raper:

    Eastern front is popular because of the German and Russian armies, very big battles, the biggest in fact. The Germans had brilliant combined arms tactics and platoon weaponry that are basically mirrored today.

    Huh? Most German soldiers never saw a tank, and the majority were armed with bolt action rifles. Not sure what regiment you're in, but here in 41 CBG we use the C7A1... ;)

    The German artillery system was antiquated compared to what a Commonwealth FOO or American FO could do. Their section tactics were completely the opposite of what the Commonweath and Americans trained to do - and what we train to do today. (The Germans used the lMG as the main killing weapon, whereas the CW used the LMG as a support weapon to allow the riflemen to maneuver.)

    Not saying the Germans weren't effective, but as far as "brilliant", they were not the modern army that mythologists would have us believe. As far as mirroring the section, we have a section completely armed with semi-automatic rifles, two Minimis, two M203 grenade launchers, vs. a 1944 German rifle section with an MP40 machine pistol (near useless beyond 200 metres), an MG42 (which fired far too fast at 1200 rpm), and 7 K98s, though the sturmgewehr had started to see issue in quantities - though the Grenadier/Volksgrenadier regiments probably did not enjoy as high a priority as the panzergrenadier or "elite" formations such as Hermann Goering, Grossdeutschland, W-SS, Panzer Lehr, etc. Our sections are divided into two man fire teams and can be subdivided very usefully; the two Minimis provide much useful firepower when and where needed; the German section was AIUI much more unwieldy and not often broken down beyond perhaps a gun team and a rifle team.

    [ December 16, 2007, 08:00 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

  9. Originally posted by 76mm:

    </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by kipanderson:

    [QB] Hi,

    I cannot look up his name but he is “the man” on the German army of WWII as an institution… who has gone through all the histories/units many where over strength.

    This guy is the authority on the German army as an institution… is up there with Newton and Glantz as a serious historian of WWII…

    I will have a dig around and see if I can come up with the book and author…

    Perhaps Sajer or Carell? :D </font>
  10. Originally posted by Andrew H.:

    </font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by dynaman200:

    > The North Vietnamese beat the U.S. outright in Vietnam

    That's what Pyrrhus said about the Romans. And it's extremely silly to talk about how we "won militarily" even as we lost the war. If "winning militarily" means anything, it needs to mean that you won the war. We can then go on to lose the peace...

    But what we did in Vietnam was lose a war of attrition, even as we won every battle. But we didn't win every battle *by enough.* We took more casualties than we could afford. The Vietnamese took even more casualties, of course - but they could afford them. And the battles we won were not decisive; they didn't interfere with N. Vietnam's real warfighting ability.

    But Vietnam (and Korea and WWII and the Civil War) aren't particularly relevant to the way the US fights wars now because our new warfighting doctrine (AirLand Battle and its friends) is the direct result of our failure in Vietnam.

    The US strategy in the civil war was to use our superior manpower and material resources to outproduce and outman the CSA. Essentially, we fought and won a battle of attrition.

    This was the exact same plan we used in WWII - the US plan was not rely on our technological prowess to overwhelm the Germans (good thing); we relied on our tremendous (and unmolested) industrial capacity to vastly outproduce the Nazis and then to engage in a war of attrition (in which we substituted using and losing materiel for men). But the materiel we used was not technologically superior to what the Germans had; it was generally good enough, and we had a lot of it. The Sherman gets a bad rap; it was a completely adequate tank - but certainly not technologically overwhelming compared to German vehicles. But we could produce lots of them (and part of the reason why more powerful tanks were not produced sooner had to do with the fact that we could produce and transport lots and lots of Sherman tanks). We also produced lots of artillery and radios and planes and fuel and trucks, etc. None of this was particularly better than what the Germans had...but quantity has a quality all its own, whether you are talking about soldiers or equipment.

    Anyway, the american plan of relying on attrition and our overwhelming industrial capacity was a strategic failure in VN and (IMO) Korea. It works fine when you are locked in a life or death struggle with an adversary and can turn the entire economy to warfighting. It doesn't work as well when you are fighting a war on the side.

    Anyway, the failure in VN,

    </font>

  11. Originally posted by kipanderson:

    BTW… the June’44 army the Germans fielded was their best ever. Superbly equipped and trained. In most units full order of battle. It is just that everyone else had improved even more smile.gif .

    Not even close to being true. Many of the "German" troops garrisoning the coast in Normandy, for example, weren't even German and I believe by June 1944 or shortly thereafter, foreign troops began to outnumber German nationals (volksdeutsche and reichsdeutsche) in the Waffen SS.

    What could possibly be your source for this?

    Basic training by June of 1944 had decreased in the Heer from 16 weeks to less than 8. Recruitment age had dropped from 18 years of age to dip down to, I believe 16. Physical standards dropped, and even the SS was accepting conscripts in addition to their racial standards dropping. Not that foreign nationals made poor soldiers (I don't believe the racist nonsense that the Germans did), but they didn't receive the training nor equipment the "German" formations did, and historically did not operate as well, in general, as the low-numbered ethnic Germans.

    Even the low-numbered SS formations were not at their prime in 1944 - compare the teenagers in the 12th SS Division with the Leibstandarte at their best one or two years earlier and there are marked differences in tactical ability and staying power that go well beyond the differences in Allied firepower applied to them.

    Not that the German Army was bad in June 1944, but the statement that they were at their peak in terms of performance seems indefensible given their composition alone.

    [ December 16, 2007, 03:02 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

  12. Originally posted by Rambler:

    I'm WW2ed out as well. Well, more like ETOed out. The ETO, east or west, has been done to death

    There isn't a single game out there that deals in detail with Scheldt Fortress South or North, the battles for the Channel Ports, the battle at Kapelsche Veer - most battles, perhaps even the majority, that took place between the landings in Normandy (and the ones in Southern France) and VE-Day have been untouched by games of any scope - tactical or operational. The same handful of situations have been picked over, usually the Normandy landings, the Battle of the Bulge, Operation COBRA, MARKET-GARDEN, and to a lesser extent the Rhine Crossings.

    As a general theme, there have been many games taking place in the ETO, or with the equipment used there, but specifically, the surface has barely even been scratched, particularly if looking at any kind of campaign type play.

    Look at the CC series; the MARKET-GARDEN game featured a nice campaign. If something could come along to link an operational layer to the tactical layer in the same way as CMMC, there would be much fertile ground in NW Europe that has never been touched in any genre - boardgame OR computer, and that includes ASL, PL, Steel Panthers, CC, CM, etc.

  13. To add to Jason's comment, I've done a survey of all tactical level board games that deal with 20th Century combat at the man-to-man, squad, and platoon level published from the first one in 1969 up to 2000; of the 120+ titles, the vast majority are set in the Second World War exclusively; there are some set in "modern" or for our purposes post 1945 era, but of these, as many are multi-purpose as not (meaning they portray both Second World War and "modern" rather than one or the other).

  14. Originally posted by Paper Tiger:

    It's funny but I feel that WW2 IS modern combat. Apart from new weapon types, body armour and high tech equipment, it's all there.

    "New weapon types" such as what? Grenade launchers I suppose, though rifle grenade launchers were fielded by most armies in the Second World War, as were assault rifles (by the Germans.) Body armour was in use by the British and Canadians in Northwest Europe - and I'm not certain the use of body armour today has had an appreciable change on tactics insofar as it would effect the kind of orders someone could give in a company-based simulation. So it's probably a lot closer than even you are giving it credit for.
  15. Originally posted by Chelco:

    I'm a wargaming wh0re of sorts: any period has interesting twists for me. So, while I enjoy modern warfare a lot

    ...Jason,

    While I respect your opinion and tastes for wargaming, I couldn't avoid finding your post too pretentious. Stephen Biddle would have a ball reading the previous snippet.

    And who couldn't avoid finding your post sophomoric and embarrassing, particularly the part about "enjoyng modern warfare a lot"? Perhaps those least able to understand Jason's points are those most likely to criticize their tone.
  16. Originally posted by Egon:

    ... thx for the compliment, Sneaksie (reminds me of the words I heard, when they tried to make me stay in the army for another four years - lol).

    OK, back to the topic then. I found out, that there is a so-called "Deutsche Heereskarte 1:25000". I googled a lot, but those are scarce and high-prized on eBay and the archives don´t seem to have them accessible for Mr. Average (esp. NOT for wargamers, I guess).

    Try an archive in Britain, Canada or the US, particularly regimental archives. I know my regiment in Calgary has holdings of captured enemy maps from NW Europe. More than one way to skin a cat, you know.
  17. aaadelete1.jpg

    It's not difficult, guys. This is (unfinished) board 12 from my version of Action at Kommerscheidt. Note the gully and the Marketplace. Also the use of green grass cover for the board and tan/grey building colour to differentiate between the wooden and stone buildings on the original SL map.

    The problem is, and you can see it on Steiner's maps too (which oddly have paved roads?), the wide open spaces and lack of cover between buildings. Probably ok for Syria, but nothing like a European town, which is why the majority of the SL/ASL conversions for CM sucked. Recently, I've found myself simply making CMBB/CMAK conversions by using the force mixes in the scenarios as a guide, and creating a map using the random generator and then tweaking it to look "similar".

    For example:

    aaadelete2.jpg

    This is from SL Scenario 203 "Bitter Defence at Otta". (Tracking down "rogue" and extra scenarios for a game system that has been dormant since 1985 is less challenging now that we have ebay). The scenario card calls for board 7, 2 and 5 from left to right. But to do a straight conversion to ASL would simply look goofy. So I started with a random map in the generator, and I think this looks far more like Norway actually did, particularly the natural tree cover on what is supposed to be board 2.

    The problems start to compound when you put ASL forces into CM - like adding "LMG" units just because an ASL LMG counter is called for. What many of the conversion authors never realized was that an LMG counter represented a crackerjack machinegunner in an infantry squad, not an "extra" unit.

    Oh, if anyone thinks I'm picking on ASL, and actually still plays, I just published a book on ASL scenario creation -

    http://www.lulu.com/content/1170795

    Just in time for Christmas. smile.gif

    display_thumbnail.php?fCID=1170795&fSize=320_&1196257966

    sdhpreview.png

    There is a chapter in the book about converting from one type of game to another than might prove enlightening. In this case, for the book, I discussed how one could use Combat Mission scenarios for inspiration in creating ASL scens, and I give an illustrated example as well as detailed playtest notes.

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