THE MATERIAL WAR

[Retributar]

http://www.ww2modelmaker.com/articlepub/matwar.htm

The " MATERIAL WAR"…………what shortage?

'Some thought on the myth'

Many authors have in the past only glanced at the results of the 'Raw Material War' and its effects on the German arms industry. The designers and technical experts in Germany during World War Two faced many restrictions on their skills and ideas; one of the greatest challenges was the shortage of raw materials and production equipment.

There were shortages of important metals such as copper, chrome, nickel, molybdenum and vanadium, shortages of rubber and mineral oils, all combined to greatly effect 'normal' manufacturing practice. To make up for this, huge efforts were made to develop alternative materials, treatments and process.

Armour plate requires many additives to the base iron to produce the quality required for tank production. Plate production required carbon, manganese, silicon, molybdenum, chromium and nickel as well as a quantity of iron ore not found in quantity in Germany. Although available in the most, these materials often could not be processed quickly enough for 'total war' production requirements. In February 1943 Gobbel's gave his famous 'Total War' speech, which started (although never to the extent as in the USA/USSR and the United Kingdom) to expand the workforce with female workers.

Production was more carefully controlled with the appointment of Albert Speer to the production ministry. Materials use was a constant high priority and he had a major positive influence on the companies and their methods, savings had to be made quickly, he achieved surprising success.

The early experience of shortages of materials during the late thirties had taught the German buyers to establish large stockpiles of the required materials in their raw form.

Pressure by the 'Allied' nations after the Versailles Treaty was disregarded and put aside by Adolf Hitler. Pressure was increased as the shock waves of German military expansion spread throughout the world.

Suffering shortages as early as 1936, programmes under the larger than life Herman Goering, were soon established to increase both home production of raw materials as well as barter systems with Germanys own allies and neutral states such as Sweden and Switzerland. The four year plan introduced by Goering established iron ore supplies from Sweden as well as production materials such as ball bearings. Finland supplied ores; Switzerland had major financial interest and provided much of the foreign currency required in exchange for goods and gold. (Much use was made of gold and valuables removed from the concentration camp inmates/victims, the extent of this perverse trade is still being uncovered today!).

The main external sources for Nazi Germany's industry of war were: (excluding allies) Switzerland, Spain, Turkey and Sweden. War and expansion brought in the production of the occupied countries, Polish and French minerals, and oils from the Balkans and iron ore from Norway; all were quickly established and stockpiled.

Certain materials were available internally, the 'unlimited' availability of these assisted but, there was also the problems of processing the materials. Increasing allied heavy bombing of production and processing plants caused enormous difficulties to these very easily identified (from the air) industries. Production of finished materials would again start to slip even when stockpiles or ore deliveries were increasing.

Aluminium

Aluminium, vital in engines for example, was initially imported from Yugoslavia and Hungary in very large quantities, internal production increased but it was still was not enough so Germany expanded her own production facilities and mines still further. Scrap collection and recycling facilities were also added to production of raw aluminium, the programme was highly effective. The recycling programme produced half the quantity used by Germany in 1943.

Aluminium Production in Germany -1939 -1944

(000's of tonnes, metric) 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

Main Production 199 211 234 264 250 245

Recycled Production 48 65 98 108 145 150

Imports 7 47 51 50 37 60

TOTAL 254 323 381 422 432 455

Magnesium

Magnesium requirements in Germany were generally satisfied from the ore deposits found internally. Home production satisfied nearly all requirements as well as allowing stocks to be increased.

Magnesium production in Germany 1939-1944 (000's of tonnes)

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

Production 13.5 16.4 27.8 32.7 44.4 44.6

Copper

Although in very short supply, initial pre war stockpiles helped cover industry until new aluminium alloys could be developed as a substitute. Certain problems were caused and a number of advanced products could not be produced. Of prime interest was the dropping of the electric drives and transmissions for armoured vehicles.

This seems a strange decision when you consider the production/consumption and stockpile figures. (The main 'Saver' of copper was the aircraft industry, which very successfully reduced its consumption whilst increasing production).

Copper production in Germany 1939-1945 (000's of tonnes)

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

Production/Import 194 92 43 243 330 233

Consumption 446 292 238 210 220 219

Stockpile 660 460 265 298 408 452

It would appear when taking Copper as an example that forward planning was at fault. It would of been possible for Germany to maintain production rates of copper products well into 1947 with the stockpiles and local production even if the imports had been cut off completely.

Steel

The production of high-grade steel was one of the major difficulties faced by Germany from the very early years of the Nazi government. The main suppliers of quality iron ore were as follows:

Sweden 45%

France 27%

Spain 7%

Norway 21%

The importation of iron ore was a major problem with massive logistical challenges to overcome. Shipping was threatened and rail networks both lengthy and difficult. Soviet Baltic submarines and allied Atlantic blockades, surface fleet action and aircraft attacks on harbours all conspired to cause fluctuations in supplies to smelting works. Weapons such as tanks, guns and U-Boat production used over 70% of steel produced in Germany during the war.

Steel production in Germany 1939-1945

(Million of tonnes) 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

Production 22.9 26.1 31.8 32.9 34.6 28.5 5(?)

Rubber

Shortages of rubber in Germany were always a major problem. Supplies from imports very quickly dried up with the outbreak of war in 1939. British efforts to block supplies (and purchase massive amounts on the black market in a special operation by recruited criminal elements) were very effective both directly prior to Japans invasion of South East Asia and after via naval blockade.

Imports restarted after Pearl Harbour by the use of submarine transports, these however were very small, and in 1943 for example only 7,000 tonnes arrived.

Many products were produced as substitutes, Polyurethane for example was used as an insulator and in seals. 'Buna' the rubber substitute, was produced from coal in large amounts. Production of 'Buna' increased from 5,000 tonnes in 1939 to 117,000 tonnes in 1943. In 1944 Buna production (by reason of increased allied bombing attacks) had fallen to 104,000 tonnes.

Due to the replacement material programme, i.e. the change to steel wheels, polyurethane etc. no great shortages were suffered (to effect production) however the quality of the 'chemical rubber' was poor. Chemical rubber (synthetic) was less resilient, suffered increased ware, broke up in severe cold and was difficult to glue/bond onto road wheels.

Note: After 1943 all natural rubber imports ceased. Synthetic Buna and recycled products were the only available material.

Note: Truck and car tyres proved difficult to produce in Buna.

Plastic Material

Mainly the German war industry produced very good quality plastics that could be used as replacements for rubber and most insulation tasks. Optic's remained in glass but vision blocks and periscopes used the modern plastics, often referred to as 'Panzer glass'. Polyurethane based, most of these materials preformed very well. No real important shortages were caused, those that were, only caused temporary delays.

Note: Many of the production plants were captured early in 1945, thus shortages in early 1945 increased to critical levels. Production then collapsed completely and would have stopped all major vehicles and aircraft from being completed once stocks were used up.

Base Metals

Nickel (very rare), Molybdenum, vanadium and chrome (very rare) caused a few problems later in the war. Prior to September 1944 most supplies of the important imported metals, Nickel and Chromium were obtained from Finland (Nickel) and Turkey (chromium). After September 1944 these supplies ceased and industries had to use the stockpiles of ore. Dangerously low levels existed until some material was supplied by secret air supply. By January 1946 however German war industry production of products which demanded the use of these metals would of ceased, the stockpiles would of reduced to zero by that time and 'war' products such as barrels and automotives gears etc. would not of been manufactured. Gear wheels for example used poor quality materials that made them very unreliable, a classic example of this are transmissions for the Panzers and superchargers for aircraft.

Mineral Oils

Generally the light oils required in the manufacturing process were sufficiently replaced with other substances that allowed machining to be completed without too many problems.

Supply of the new vehicles and their testing was heavily compromised from mid 1944 onwards due to the shortage of engine oils, gear oils and gasoline. Factories had to reduce their testing hours in attempts to conserve the precious liquid, many delays must have occurred, a massive drop in the quality of vehicles being delivered was also very evident.

People and Skills

During the post war years (up to 1938) there existed huge numbers of unemployed within Germany, recruitment into the skilled industries of the war machine caused few problems, infect it could be said that industry was still able to cherry pick the best. By 1939 however the supply of staff was starting to cause concern to the big factories of firms such as Daimler Benz, MHN, MAN and Henschel.

Problems increased during 1941 due to the general mobilisation of the armed forces in all three arms, in fact with the call-ups increasing industry actually lost large numbers of skilled workers.

With the advent of a greater take-up of personnel into the Wehrmacht the availability of skilled and non-skilled workers led to the involvement of female German nationals directly in production (still not permitted in 1943!), slave labour and deportations from occupied countries also increased vastly the labour pool.

As an example, (using data from the aircraft industry which is more accurately recorded), Daimler-Benz Motoren recorded a fall from 57% skilled workers to 27% skilled between 1939 and 1943!. Henschel (aircraft plants) recorded even more dramatic fall of, 52% skilled in 1940 to 11% in 1943. These levels of skilled workers led to fundamental changes in the way the factories worked.

Slave labour as well as Polish/Russian POW's continued to be used but in ever increasing numbers. Jewish concentration camp inmates were 'selected-out' for work parties or transfer to the many camps established near coal mines, ore mines as well as the foundries, mines, chemical plants and factories.

The master of the slave labour system was Fritz Sauckel (Nazi card member No. 1395, one of the first!) the Reich Defence Commissioner with the 'special' post of Plenipotentiary for Labour Allocation. He first prevented the foreign pre-war workers from leaving Germany then set about with greater vigour to 'gather' even more from the occupied areas.

Initially Fritz Sauckel attempted to encourage their 'employers' to treat his workers with kindness and humanity but with the Russian POW's and the Jews being processed into the system the treatment of these workers was generally disgusting. Being worked to death was a common fate for millions. Every industry was tainted by this crime, tank plants used armour plate and chemicals, many thousands died in these 'dirty' industries. Five million workers were used in Germany, many of them did not return home.

Machine Tools

“Very well developed but short of product”, the machine tool industry of Germany had struggled hard to re-establish itself as a world leader after World War I. Post war, many of these machines had been sold internationally to raise funds in foreign currency. With the re-armament programme developing so quickly and with a lead-time to delivery of about 1 year (up to 18 months/2 years for very specialist tools) German industry was now definitely struggling again to re-equip its production capability with these increased demands.

Supplies in numbers during 1939-1943 were thought to of been good. Assumptions that little damage had been done to the home industries machines despite increased bombing, reported numbers of machine tools rose to higher levels then even the USA had on stock ! Many have assumed that as the number were quite high Germany must have been in a good position, this was NOT the case, production rates however did not rise for the larger machines.

The design of an American machine for example, was far better than the German tool.

The reason, US machine tools were more flexible. German tools however, often better designed for the specific task (or small group of tasks), were not often as multifunctional as the US machine; this restricted their use when a new design was introduced. The high turnover of designs and upgrading of weapon systems had not been expected in Germany and other western nations. Germany could not adjust like her massive industrial enemies in the USSR (basic technical skills/high volume approach) or the United States (high technical skills/high volume approach).

Planned output of German produced machine tools was high but the productivity figures obtained were very low. (Again using the aircraft industry records).

The capture of vast amounts of Russian machine tools (planned for by a special commission) did not happen as the complete factory would be evacuated or destroyed in a scorched-earth policy just prior to the arrival of German troops. Supply of such tools was very slow and even had the opposite effect on German production as they had great difficulties revamping them for internal use in Germanys own industries.

Even when the new minister for production, Albert Speer, along with the very firm/positive support of Adolf Hitler, tried to decrease the levels of ‘production lead times’, it still did not climb above the 1 year/18 months period.

Attempts to move production and manufacturing to remote sites created further difficulties and with large ‘heavy’ projects like the Panther and Tiger the Germans found that, little helped.

These remote sites, although effective in avoiding the heavy bombings of the British Bomber command and the US 8th Air Force, did not greatly increase production of heavy weapons as transport difficulties to and from prevented supplies getting through. Mostly these sites were used for the ‘lighter’ industries producing aircraft and rockets.

The general chaotic situation in Germany and the remaining 'occupied territories' conspired to delay production at every point in the chain.

Factors directly effecting production were;

1.The continual loss of important component producers as the Allied and Soviet armies squeezed Germany.

2.Base material production factories bombed by US and British bombers

3.Short supply of high-grade steels.

Over all, production would fall throughout German and its satellite industries as the war situation worsened; the prime two causes to effect the production and performances of their weapons was two fold, firstly the lack of good quality multi function machine tools in the required quantities and oil supplies as power and a basic material for critical components production.

A selected list of Component suppliers for Panther tank production

Sueddeutsche Argus-werke, Karlsrute - Brakes

Ehrlich, Gotha - Cooling Fans, Turret Traverse

Systems

Karl Born, Aschersleben - Exhaust System

Bosch, Stuttgart - Electrical

I, Arnold, Freidensdorf - Fuel Tanks / Systems

Dinger - Rear Idler + Gear box + Final

Drive Housing

Kercher Q Co. - Gearbox + Final Drive Housing

Mecklenburg, Eisen-Werkes - Gearbox + Final Drive Housing

Zahnradfabrik, Wald-werke - Gearbox

Herman Fessal - Controls + Gearbox valves

DDHV, Dortmund-

Hoerder Huettenveran - Basic Hull

Krupps - Weapons and Basic hull

OD-Werkes - Hatches

Worms Ruhrstahl AG - Hull Louvers + Rear Idler

Luttfahrtgerate bau Arno Muller - MG Ball mount internal

Arkett - Hull visor + MG Ball cover

Maschinenfbk Dorst - Periscopes + Vision Blocks

Richard Krahmer - Stowage bins (ammunition)

Wilh Lenze - Seats

Jos Muench - Crank starter system

Bochumer - Drive sprockets (pre-machined)

Witten-Annen Eisen-Werkes - Drive Sprockets (pre-machined)

Aug Engels - Track and Track Pins

Wegmann and Co. - Turret (complete)

Hoesch AG. - Torson Bars

Roechling GmbH - Torson Bars

Maschinenfabrik Imp GmbH Ventilation Fans (interior)

Diana Mashinenfabrik - Road Wheels

[Retributar]

German industrial capacity:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=44888

hauptmannn

Member: Posted: 07 Mar 2004 11:27

"We have all heard of Germany's lack of industrial capacity to produce tanks, trucks, weapons, aircraft, etc. And that the allies surpassed the axis in production of equipment and weapons. What i do not understand is why Germany could not build more factories for example, was it because of the lack of raw materials? manpower? resources to run them, e.g. oil?"

Prit

Member: Posted: 07 Mar 2004 12:15

"It's a very complicated question. Here are some answers, in no particular order.

Firstly, Germany lacked an indigenous source of good-quality iron ore . Goering tried to make Germany self-sufficient in iron ore by a huge programme of building plant's to process the low-grade ore from German mines, but this was never going to produce enough iron and steel for Germany's needs.

Secondly, Germany was hamstrung by fuel shortages . The synthetic oil programme was designed to be ready for war by 1943-4, and was never able to produce enough to satisfy Germany's needs . The Rumanian oil wells helped, but there was still a constant shortage.

Thirdly, resources were deployed very badly. Goering had little grasp of economic and industrial realities , and appointed people like Udet because he could dominate them, not because they had any particular talent or aptitude. The result was an extremely inefficient use of resources . For example, Udet allocate 9 tons of aluminium per aircraft manufactured, regardless of the aircraft type. As a result, Messerschmidt was inundated with surplus aluminium that could have been used elsewhere . Also, not enough attention was paid to what was purchased. The British and Americans, for example, tended to order two aero engines per mounted engine; the German ratio was nearer 1.4. Consequently, aircraft were often immobilised for lack of spares or replacement engines.

Fourthly, Germany suffered from severe manpower shortages . The initial mobilisation took little account of essential workers, and many men had to be returned to civilian life after enlistment in order to restore production. Even the widespread use of migrant and slave labour failed completely to address the issue. Goering's original plan was to mobilise far more women workers, but this met resistance from Hitler and others. < "Finally!!!...an idea that would have worked...as it did in America!."

Also, the manpower that was available was often used inefficiently. Productivity in the German armaments industry, pre-1943, was far lower per worker than in Britain, let alone the USA.

When Speer got a grip of the problems, he demonstrated what was possible - German armaments production peaked in the third quarter of 1944, despite years of bombing, using the same resources that were used in 1940. Speer said after the war that if resources had been used properly from the outset, the Wehrmacht could easily have had twice as many tanks, trucks etc at the outset of Barbarossa as was actually the case.

Hope that helps - I'm sure other issues were involved too."

Prit

[ December 10, 2004, 02:10 AM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

[Retributar]

More Statistics For The Statistically Minded:

http://rhino.shef.ac.uk:3001/mr-home/hobbies/gnp.txt

Mark Harrison, ³Accounting for war: Soviet production, employement and

defence burden, 1940 - 1945², Cambridge University press 1996.

Table 5.17. GNP of the great powers, 1939-45 (billions international dollars

and 1985 prices)

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

1. USA 788 851 1001 1190 1407 1522 1494

2. UK 215 237 258 265 271 260 249

3. USSR 308 345 297 227 252 300 284

4. Germany 271 273 290 294 300 308 216

5. Italy 114 115 114 112 102 83 65

6. Japan 135 139 141 141 143 136 68

Rows 1,2,4,5,6 from Maddison, A. ³Dynamic forces in capitalist

development: a long-run comparative view², Oxford, 1991.

Row 3 Harrison¹s responsibility***.

Table 5.18. The military burden: five great powers, 1939 - 44 (per cent of

national income)

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

1. USA 2 3 14 40 53 54

2. UK 15 44 53 52 55 53

3. USSR 17 28 61 61 53

4. Germany 32 49 56 66 71

5. Italy 10 21 30 31 40

Rows (per cent of):

1. NNP at current factor cost (Harrison, Economic History Review, 2nd

ser., vol 41(2), 1988, pp.171-92)

2. net national expenditure at current prices (Howlett, P., in ³The

economic history of Britain since 1700², 2nd ed., vol 3, Cambridge, pp.

1-31)

3. GNP at 1937 factor cost (Harrison¹s responsibility***)

4. NNP at current prices (Overy, R.J. ³War and economy of the Third

Reich², Oxford, 1994.

5. GDP at current prices (Zamagni, V. ³The economic history of Italy,

1860-1990: recovery after decline², Oxford, 1993.

*** Harrison makes a case by treating the Soviet production at 1937 factor

cost (or prices) instead of current factor cost (or prices). Should not

he do the same with the others?

Hessel Duncan Hall, ³North American Supply², Her Majesty¹s Stationery

Office, London, 1955, p. 421.

Volume of munition produced (billions of 1944 US dollars)

1935-1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

US 1.5 1.5 4.5 20 38 42

Canada 0.5 1 1.5 1.5

UK 2.5 3.5 6.5 9 11 11

USSR** 8 5 8.5 11.5 14 16

Germany 12 6 6 8.5 13.5 17

Japan 2 1 2 3 4.5 6

** Current prices, perhaps.

--

D. Protsenko

[Retributar]

Panzer Statistics

http://www.achtungpanzer.com/prod.htm

Statistics for selected models:

Sd.Kfz. Type: Production period: Number produced:

101 PzKpfw I 1934-1943 1563

121 PzKpfw II 1935-1944 1924

(LT-35) PzKpfw 35(t) 1935-1939 424

140 PzKpfw 38(t) 1938-1942 1411

138/2 Jagdpanzer 38(t) Hetzer 1944-1945 2584

141 PzKpfw III 1936-1944 5733

142/167 Stug III/IV 1940-1945 10548

161 PzKpfw IV 1936-1945 8544

171 PzKpfw V Panther 1942-1945 5976

173 Panzerjager V Jagdpanther 1944-1945 425

181 PzKpfw VI Tiger 1942-1944 1355

184 Panzerjager Ferdinand/Elephant 1943 90

182 Tiger II Ausf. B "Konigstiger" 1944-1945 489

186 Jagdpanzer VI Jagdtiger 1944-1945 85

Note: In some cases not all of the chassis were used for tank production, numbers were used for various conversions.

Comparison Chart for selected models:

Model: Crew: Armament: Max. Armor Thickness: Road Range:

PzKpfw 38(t) Ausf A 4 37mm L/48.7 25mm 250km

PzKpfw III Ausf M 5 50mm L/60 57mm 155km

PzKpfw IV Ausf H 5 75mm L/48 80mm 210km

PzKpfw V Panther Ausf G 5 75mm L/70 110mm 200km

PzKpfw VI Tiger 5 88mm L/56 100mm 140km

PzKpfw VI Tiger II 5 88mm L/71 180mm 170km

Soviet T-34/76B 4 76.2mm L/41.2 65mm 450km

Soviet T-34/85 5 85mm L/51.5

85mm L/54.6 75mm 240km

Soviet JS-II 4 122mm L/43 120mm 250km

American M4A1 Sherman 5 75mm L/37.5 76mm 196km

American M4A4 Sherman 5 75mm L/37.5 76mm 160km

Prices of selected models:

Model: Price in Reichsmarks (RM):

Volkswagen Käfer (VW Beetle) 990

Opel Kadett 2100

DKW Meisterklasse 2350

Ford Taunus 2870

Adler Triumph Junior 2950

Sd.Kfz.6 30000

Sd.Kfz.7 36000

Sd.Kfz.8 46000

Sd.Kfz.9 60000

Sd.Kfz.10 15000

Sd.Kfz.11 22000

PzKpfw II Ausf a 52640 with armament

PzKpfw II Ausf B 38000 w/o armament

PzKpfw II Ausf F 49228 w/o armament / 52728 with armament

Sturmpanzer II Bison 53000 with armament

PzKpfw III Ausf M 96183 w/o armament / 103163 w/o radio

Stug III Ausf G 82500 with armament & radio

PzKpfw IV Ausf F2 115962 with armament & radio

75mm KwK 37 L/24 8000

75mm StuK 37 L/24 9150

75mm StuK 40 L/43 12500

75mm KwK 42 L/70 12000

PzKpfw VI Tiger 250800 w/o armament & radio / 299800 with armament & radio

PzKpfw VI Tiger II 321500 with armament & radio

German Machine Guns Used in Armored Fighting Vehicles:

Data

Maschinengewehr 13 (MG 13)

Maschinengewehr 34 (MG 34)

Maschinengewehr 42 (MG 42)

Calibre: 7.92mm

7.92mm

7.92mm

Lenght: 1466mm

1219mm

1220mm

Barrel Lenght: 717mm

627mm

533mm

Weight Empty: 10.89kg

11.50kg (with bipod)

11.50kg (with bipod)

Muzzle Velocity: 823m/s

755m/s

755m/s

Rate of Fire: 650rpm

800-900rpm

1500rpm

Type of Feed: 25 round box magazine

75 round saddle drum

50 round belt linked to form 250 rounds

75 round saddle drum

50 round belt

German vs. Soviet AFV losses - 1941-45:

Period: Ratio: Period: Ratio:

06/41-02/42 1:5.0 12/43-06/44 1:1.4

03/42-05/42 1:6.6 07/44 1:4.0

06/42-10/42 1:7.9 08/44 1:2.0

11/42-03/43 1:1.3 09/44 1:1.0

04/43-08/43 1:5.7 10/43-11/44 1:1.3

09/43-11/43 1:2.5 - -

Armored Fighting Vehicles Production 1939-45:

1939

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

1945

Germany 1359

2200

5200

9200

17300

22100

4400

Soviet Union 2794

6590

24446

24089

28963

15419

Human Losses:

Country/ Military Personel/ Civilians >

(incl. partisans and resistance fighters if applicable)

USSR 13.000.000 7.000.000

Germany 3.500.000 3.800.000

Poland 120.000 5.300.000

Yugoslavia 300.000 1.300.000

Romania 200.000 465.000

France 250.000 360.000

British Empire and Commonwealth 452.000 60.000

Italy 330.000 80.000

Hungary 120.000 280.000

Czechoslovakia 10.000 330.000

German Armed Forces, Strength and Losses 1939-1944:

Date Active Strength (in millions) Cumulative Losses (in millions) Total Mobilized (in millions)

May 31 / 1939 1.4

-

1.4

May 31 / 1940 5.6

0.085

5.7

May 31 / 1941 7.2

0.185

7.4

May 31 / 1942 8.6

0.800

9.4

May 31 / 1943 9.5

1.700

11.2

May 31 / 1944 9.1

3.300

12.4

September 30 / 1944 9.1

3.900

13.0

[Retributar]

Military Aid to the USSR

http://www.battlefield.ru/library/lend/intro.html

During the winter 1941-42 the deliveries from USA has begun. For the first time this tanks took part in battles in the spring 1942. Unfortunately although on excellent conditions for the crew and quite enough firepower this tank wasn't match to the Eastern Front conditions. On responses of Russian tankers it was rather mediocre SP-gun then good tank. Nevertheless one thousand three hundred M3A3 and A5 tanks was lended to the USSR.

The Red Army received 2007 M4A2s (Sherman) with 75 mm gun and 2095 M4A2 Shermans with 76 mm gun.

October 1941 to June 1942

Aircraft 1285

Tanks 2249

Machine-guns 81287

Explosives, pounds 59455620

Trucks 36825

Field telephones 56445

Telephone wire, km 600000

1942 and 1943

Aircraft 3052

Tanks 4084

Vehicles 520000

Fighter Aircraft

P-39 5707 (4719 reached the USSR)

P-40 2397

P-47 195

P-63 2397 (21 lost in transfer)

Hurricane 2952

Spitfire 1331

Total: 14982

Bomber and Attack Aircraft

A-20 2908

B-25 862

B-24 1

Hampden 23

Albemarle 14

Mosquito 1

Total 3809

Total Aircraft Delivered - 18,791

Total USSR Aircraft Production- 139,748

Besides the tanks, Allies delivered a plenty of APCs. Before war the Red Army did not have any good APC model. In the summer 1943 the deliveries of tracked "Universal" (Great Britain), wheeled M3A1 (USA), halftracked M3, M5 (USA) have begun.

In general, military aid to the Soviet Union offeref a great help in the 1941-43 but becomes insignificant at the end of war with the Soviet industry growing.

[Retributar]

Production Totals for the "Tiger II":

http://www.homepurchaseprogram.com/tiger2.html

1943/12 - 02 > 02

1944/01 - 03 > 05

1944/02 - 05 > 10

1944/03 - 06 > 16

1944/04 - 06 > 22

1944/05 - 15 > 37

1944/06 - 32 > 69

1944/07 - 45 > 114

1944/08 - 84 > 198

1944/09 - 73 > 271

1944/10 - 26 > 297

1944/11 - 22 > 319

1944/12 - 60 > 379

1945/01 - 40 > 419

1945/02 - 42 > 461

1945/03 - 18 > 479

* Not many of these large/heavy 'Juggernauts',...and the slow tortuous process of cranking up production show's just how difficult it was to get a new production line off the ground in Germany's wartime condition's!.*

[ December 13, 2004, 09:58 AM: Message edited by: Retributar ]