How do the fronts differ in CM BB?

[Tero]

Originally posted by Ari Maenpaa:

Note that those 8 losses were total write offs whereas all of the 87 documented kills not necessarily were.

Then again kills were not awarded if it was not verified or the target did not catch fire.

That’s unsure because usually the battleground was eventually lost to the enemy.

Not necessarily. But not before the ground had been contested first. You have to remember most of these Stug battles were during counter attacks, none of which were total and utter failures.

Also, the official Winter War figure for KO enemy tanks was 1200. The real figure as per Russian sources is slightly above that. And that counts only the ones in the Isthmus.

It’s also interesting to note that the Finns used their StuGs very recklessly. Basically against the German doctrine I guess. Most of the kills were achieved not in ambushes, but in vigorous counterattacks. Perhaps the rare but sudden armoured counterattacks threw the Soviet tank crews off-balance and thus helped the Finns to overcome.

I'd say it was more due to the low silhouette of the Stug making them harder targets.

In all fairness it must be said that most counterattacks got finally stopped by the Soviets.

When being fair be totally fair.

What you are talking about takes place during the first 10 days of the Soviet invasion. After Viipuri it is a totally different story.

Also, most of the counter attacks were not supported by armour. And most of the positive results were negated by the overall situation making a widrawal necessary even hours after the counter attack had been done and the Red Army was inactive.

A typical simplified pattern for such an attack went like this: A Finnish StuG company (with supporting infantry) counterattacks against a larger advancing RKKA formation and sweeps it’s armoured spearhead.

I would not call that a typical counter attack.

[Nekander]

Originally posted by Stu-40:

Onko suomalaista PBEM seuraa jossain, täytyisi oppia pelaamaan?

Hi Stu-40!

I have played only vs AI so far and I would also like to play PBEM. Feel free to contact me: erkonposti@sunpoint.net.

I would prefer some quite small scenario for our fist game. I can probably play turn or two per day.

I prefer using English when writing to this forum if you wonder why me reply is not in Finnish. Palataan astialle..

-Nekander

[Munter]

Originally posted by Ari Maenpaa:

I have been hunting for his Laguksen rynnäkkötykit in the old book stores for quite a long time. No luck so far.

Try Armour museum in Parolannummi, I got my copy from there. OR, you could try to get it directly from the local active members in the armour guild suborganizations. They usually have a few extra copies for purchase along with repro jäger insignia etc.

Good luck!

M

[ August 02, 2002, 10:55 AM: Message edited by: Munter ]

[Ari Maenpaa]

Originally posted by tero:

Then again kills were not awarded if it was not verified or the target did not catch fire.

You mean: kill = write-off ?

I know the Finns themselves were eager to repair everything which had even remote hope to get fixed, because there was always shortage of war equipment. Particularly of tanks. But did this practice lead correspondingly to so rigid terms demanded for a succesful tank kill that basically a verified kill meant a write off?

From Leppänen’s book I got indeed an impression of easily flammable Soviet tanks. More than half of the destroyed tanks started to burn or smoke.

Not necessarily. But not before the ground had been contested first. You have to remember most of these Stug battles were during counter attacks, none of which were total and utter failures.

None of the counterattacks resulted as catastrophes, I agree. Kuuterselkä was as bad as it got and even then the attack was partly succesful. And yep, all killed armour from the enemy spearheads were left to Finnish hands at least for some time as the StuGs continued their advance. But what about the kills resulted on noman’s land where the main enemy force was met?

To put it other way: how many uncertain kills were dropped out from the official stats? Any hunch?

Also, the official Winter War figure for KO enemy tanks was 1200. The real figure as per Russian sources is slightly above that. And that counts only the ones in the Isthmus.

You suggest that the rigidity in getting verified tank kills may have resulted in too few kill rings?

I'd say it was more due to the low silhouette of the Stug making them harder targets.

Then there were diffences in training standards and levels between the Finnish and Soviet tank crews.

Another odd thing is how surpringly well the StuGs performed in close range engagements. The gunner – driver connection must have been trained very well.

When being fair be totally fair.

What you are talking about takes place during the first 10 days of the Soviet invasion. After Viipuri it is a totally different story.

I don’t quite agree. If we look at what happened in Vuosalmi for instance. Wasn’t Lagus’ armoured division there for pushing the Soviets back to the other side of Vuoksi-river? But the counterattack couldn’t reach it’s goal and RKKA remained on the northern bank.

Naturally today we know how horribly imbalanced the scenario was to even begin with

Also, most of the counter attacks were not supported by armour.

Sure, but I was writing only about those where the StuGs were in play.

And most of the positive results were negated by the overall situation making a widrawal necessary even hours after the counter attack had been done and the Red Army was inactive.

I didn’t have time to analyze all the surrounding circumstances.

I would not call that a typical counter attack.

Well, I haven’t throughout sources right now, but the counterattack at Kuuterselkä fits well in the description, doesn’t it? And broadly taken, wasn’t the situation later at Talinmylly and Vuosalmi quite similar if looked solely from POV of a single StuG company?

StuGs advancing along a road. A face-to-face meeting with armoured enemy spearhead. StuGs score lots of quick kills against T-34-85s/ISU-152s at short to medium ranges. A bit later StuGs reach a large open area where lots of Soviet tanks and AT-guns are waiting in hulldown/hedgehog positions. The counterattack stops. The Soviet attack stops.

IIRC this strongly simplified theme repeated many times and every single time there were some unique nuances to it.

Ari

[Ari Maenpaa]

Munter,

I visited Armour Museum last summer with couple of friends. The current chairman of the armour guild's board, Erkki Kauppinen, was our guide and it took almost three hours to finish the tour. Very enjoyable and informative visit

Unfortunately no copy of the book was available anymore

Haven't yet tried to contact the local guild members. Thanks for the tip.

regards,

Ari

[kmk24]

Does anyone know why kenraaliluutnantti Laatikainen splited Ps.D in two, at Kuurterselkä?

[Tero]

Originally posted by Ari Maenpaa:

You mean: kill = write-off ?

I have seen this indicated in many sources. At least when it comes to awarding kills to infantry and AT gunners. I would like to know how they calculated the tank kills attributed to CAS and artillery though. I suspect the radio listening service might be involved in determining the overall KO figures.

I know the Finns themselves were eager to repair everything which had even remote hope to get fixed, because there was always shortage of war equipment. Particularly of tanks. But did this practice lead correspondingly to so rigid terms demanded for a succesful tank kill that basically a verified kill meant a write off?

It might be when it comes to kills awarded to individuals. I did find it quite incredible the AT gunners would be willing (and indeed able) to use as many as 41 PAK-38 rounds (according to Marskin Panssarintuhoojat) to make a "kill" of a tank. It seems it was required the kill had to be a total loss before it was awarded to a specific individual.

From Leppänen’s book I got indeed an impression of easily flammable Soviet tanks. More than half of the destroyed tanks started to burn or smoke.

Reading the appendix in Marskin Panssarintuhoojat made me think the opposite.

It seems the PAK40 was very much more effective than the PAK38.

None of the counterattacks resulted as catastrophes, I agree. Kuuterselkä was as bad as it got and even then the attack was partly succesful. And yep, all killed armour from the enemy spearheads were left to Finnish hands at least for some time as the StuGs continued their advance. But what about the kills resulted on noman’s land where the main enemy force was met?

In Marskin Panssarintuhoojat the trend seems to be that unless the tank did not burn or the enemy was seen hauling it away the kill was marked but not it did not get you awarded with the shoulder patch.

To put it other way: how many uncertain kills were dropped out from the official stats? Any hunch?

According to When Titans Clashed the Soviet sources admit to losing 294 tanks and SP-guns during the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation (so with a pinch of salt this can be considered to be the absolute bare minimum). The Finnish figure of KO'd tanks stands at 600-900 depending on the source. 1/3 total write off/all kills ratio is not IMO too wide a margin (less than the Western Front one anyway). The Finnish official figure for all kills is IMO in the ball park when talking about KO'd Soviet tanks.

You suggest that the rigidity in getting verified tank kills may have resulted in too few kill rings?

It did at least deny some kill awards from the infantry and AT gunners of the Jääkäriprikaati at least.

Then there were diffences in training standards and levels between the Finnish and Soviet tank crews.

All the anecdotes suggest the first shot hit and kill) almost invariably fell to the Stugs. Then again there is the subject of optics...

Another odd thing is how surpringly well the StuGs performed in close range engagements. The gunner – driver connection must have been trained very well.

Indeed.

I have also seen remarks that the Germans did not like to drive their Stugs in dense vegetation for fear of throwing a track.

In that light it may be that what you say about the recless use of Stugs might be correct after all.

I don’t quite agree. If we look at what happened in Vuosalmi for instance. Wasn’t Lagus’ armoured division there for pushing the Soviets back to the other side of Vuoksi-river? But the counterattack couldn’t reach it’s goal and RKKA remained on the northern bank.

True. But what about to the North of Lake Ladoga once the TT line was reached ? No innish armour there.

The Finnish SOP across the board was to counter attack to slow the enemy down. Even before Lagus' division entered the stage. The practise was a part of the widrawal plan. It bought time for the high command to mass the forces around Viipuri.

Naturally today we know how horribly imbalanced the scenario was to even begin with

Soviets advance.

Soviets: A battalion of infantry, around 20 tanks, tons of arty, a dozen or so CAS

Finns: A reinforced company (with depleted squads), 1-2 AT guns, some arty, 20mm ATR for AA. Reinforcements at turn 7: 2 Stugs and two companies of infantry.

End result: the Soviet force trashed and thrown back to its line of departure. Finnish losses 30-40 KIA, Soviet losses 100-300 KIA, 12 tanks KO'd.

Can't wait to see it.

Sure, but I was writing only about those where the StuGs were in play.

I would like to see more data of other units. It seems the Jääkäriprikaati is getting the lions share of press nowadays.

I didn’t have time to analyze all the surrounding circumstances.

Well, I haven’t throughout sources right now, but the counterattack at Kuuterselkä fits well in the description, doesn’t it? And broadly taken, wasn’t the situation later at Talinmylly and Vuosalmi quite similar if looked solely from POV of a single StuG company?

StuGs advancing along a road. A face-to-face meeting with armoured enemy spearhead. StuGs score lots of quick kills against T-34-85s/ISU-152s at short to medium ranges. A bit later StuGs reach a large open area where lots of Soviet tanks and AT-guns are waiting in hulldown/hedgehog positions. The counterattack stops. The Soviet attack stops.

IIRC this strongly simplified theme repeated many times and every single time there were some unique nuances to it.

Yes. And no. When was the other time we lost 5 Stugs at one go ? At Nummilahti, 2. At Vuosalmi, 1. All the other instances no write off's. So in that respect the Kuuterselkä counter attack is by no means an average counter attack from the Stug POV. From the infantry POV it was a very typical counter attack. But not from the Stug POV.

[ August 03, 2002, 12:20 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

[Ari Maenpaa]

Originally posted by kmk24:

Does anyone know why kenraaliluutnantti Laatikainen splited Ps.D in two, at Kuurterselkä?

You mean why wasn't it used to make the counterattack as one single unified and powerful formation?

Tiihonen gives many reasons in "Karjalan Kannaksen suurtaistelut kesällä 1944", but the most important ones were:

- The commander of the division, General Lagus, didn’t want to take the risk of placing both brigades on the same single road.

- Ps.D had too many assignments going on prior to the attack.

- Variety of the equipment in Ps.D (= the one and only Finnish armoured division) was considerable. The Finns had so little armour that even the obsolete tank models had to be kept in frontline duties still in 1944. So not all of the lighter tanks were considered to be fit for an attack mission (this became apparent later in Portinhoikka where the Soviets shot several Vickers tanks to shreds with AT-rifles).

I think those reasons can also answer to why the division was splitted at all although I couldn't find the reasoning for the original splitting order.

Ari

[kmk24]

Thanks Ari, but in Laguksen miehet - Marskin nyrkki, Käkelä writes:

"Komentaja teki nyt päätöksen, joka edellytti Ps.D:n keskittämistä Pamppalaan ja joukon koottua käyttöä vastahyökkäykseen.

Esitettyään kenraaliluutnantti Laatikaiselle kantansa Lagus ja Ps.D:n aselajijohtajat hämmästyivät. Laatikaisen ratkaisuksi kiteytyi yhtymän jako kahteen osaan. Lagus pyrki perustelemaan kantaansa: kahtia jaettuna yhtymän isku - ja murtovoima olisi mennyttä; koulutustyötäkin oli tehty aselajien yhteistoiminnan eteen jo kaksi vuotta. Mikään ei auttanut. Lagus ei saanut ääntään kuuluviin."