SC2 Idea - Buy Turkish Allegiance

[Edwin P.]

Turkey rarely joins the Allies or Axis, but what if their allegiance could be purchased?

Idea - Allies can purchase Turkish Allegiance for 1500 MPPs and the Axis can purchase Turkish Allegiance for 2400 MPPs (the cost of 6 Air Fleets).

These costs are above what their opponent have invested in securing the allegiance of Turkey.

So if the Axis has invested 500MPP in buying Turkish Alligence then the Allies must invest 2000MPP ( 500+ 1500MPP ) to convince the Turkish government to join the Allies.

Thus the cost to influence Turkey is high but the benefits are great - you gain five units and threaten your opponent's Southern flank.

Of course, if this idea is accepted Turkey should have a 80% chance to return to neutrality if while an Axis ally the Allied forces liberate Paris or Rome or Berlin OR while a member of the Allies if the Axis conquer the United Kingdom or Russia. Futhermore, the use of Turkish MPPs should be limited to reinforcing or building Turkish units.

[ February 17, 2004, 05:28 PM: Message edited by: Edwin P. ]

[Bromley]

Handing over Greece to Turkey would probably help too, although you probably shouldn't be able to do that if the Italians own it. That might be used to lower the initial investment cost?

It'd mean that Turkey gets more MMPs, but of course they're lost from your nice, high-tech country.

[Edwin P.]

Excellent Idea,

So reduce the cost for Turkish Allegiance for each controlled territory given to Turkey; Greece, Iraq, Egypt, Syria & Albania(?).

For the Allies, even if Turkey does not join the Allies giving Turkey Egypt or Syria impedes Axis expansion and makes it more difficult for them to convince Turkey to join them. Of course, if Turkey does join the Axis then they join with the territories that the allies have given them.

Should the cost for Turkish Allegiance increase if the Spain was attacked by the Axis/Allies?

[ February 17, 2004, 06:40 PM: Message edited by: Edwin P. ]

[JerseyJohn]

Greece, Iraq and Egypt were independant countries and only Syria was a territory, first of France and then taken over by the UK, which promptly began talking about giving it post war independance to help keep the locals calm and peaceful.

The last time England and France were giving away territory, Turkey was one of the countries whos territories were being given! In twenty years the Turks didn't forget that, nor did they forget that Britain and France originally wanted to partition the entire country between themselves and directly control the Dardenelles.

Failing that, they invited Greece to grab it. Turkey was saved by an odd occurence, it won the war against Greece in the early 1920s.

Conclusion, I don't think Turkey would have trusted Germany's second attempt after losing by her side during the first attemp. I think Turkey would have trusted either England or France because they had consistently acted like a pair of scavengers waiting to pounce upon a rotting corpse -- Turkey's.

Beyond that, the Allies would not have put sovereign states up for grabs. Nutty idea -- at their worst they only dangled parts of hostile territories, as they did with Italy in WWI when they offered her parts of Austria-Hungary if she joined them. Afterwards they immediately renegged and left Russia in the lurch after it had destroyed itself by not accepting a separate peace till it was too late.

Who on earth would have trusted them? Between 1920 and the rise of Nazi Germany they didn't even trust each other!

The only territory I'd go with is Syria. If it were possible to dangle Cypruss then that's another possibility. Egypt and Iraq are absurd possiblities, may as well offer Ireland.

[Edwin P.]

Excellent Historical Rebuttal,

Although Iraq was historically part of Turkey, before WWI, you are saying that the UK government would never have considered recognizing Turkish soverignty over Iraq, even if it ment that Turkey would officially join the Allies. (I agree that the historical basis for giving Turkey Egypt or Greece is a long shot, a very very long shot). Strategically speaking, I think that Iraqi soverignty would weigh little on a scale when compared to the benefits of Turkey joining the allies.

On the other hand is the concept of allowing the Allies or Axis to purchase Turkish Allegiance, for a substantial sum in economic aid, a valid concept? Especially with the Axis having to commit much more to the project that the allies.

[ February 17, 2004, 06:51 PM: Message edited by: Edwin P. ]

[JerseyJohn]

I agree with the concept, but not in the choice of bribery!

Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece have probably had more wars in a triangle -- prior to Israel and it's neighbors -- than any other cornerstone on earth.

I think it was between 1911 and 1913 where there a series of three wars ... The First [balkan War?} ... The Second ... etc .. & Third; I mean, they barely stopped to take a breath! Bulgaria was nearly always involved against Turkey and sometimes Greece would join in. Nothing was ever decided. By 1939, aside from the permanent antagonisms, Bulgaria and Rumania had a border dispute and Hungary and Rumania also had a border dispute. This was the sort of thing that went on constantly in the region.

If Turkey were suddenly given Bulgaria, for example, it would be like the U. N. suddenly giving the United States Vietnam -- that's nice, but do we want to spend the next hundred years fighting in it's jungles? Giving Turkey Greece would be similar, these were real blood hatreds.

Britain couldn't have given Turkey Iraq because of it's oil interests. It could not have Turkey Egypt because of the Suez Canal. Aside from which, it's more of the same blood hatreds.

Syria was probably more likely to adjust to rejoining Turkey than any of the others, but again they really felt they were an independant country. It would probably have led to a Civil War.

Cyprus was populated primarily by Turks and Greeks, as evidenced by the decades of bloodshed between those two factions. It was not a lost part of Greece, so there were no antagonisms to be stoked.

The only other possibility would have been the southern Caucasus, deeded to Turkey by the Bolsheviks in the March 1918 Treaty of Brest Litovsk. The Soviets took it back while Turkey was trying to avoid being carved up from other dirctions. Naturally, it's doubtful Stalin would have agreed to passing it back to them.

Hard situation. I'd go with Cyprus and Syria with the condition that a Turkish corps needs to always garrison each of them, or they immediately join the Axis!

[Edwin P.]

So would it be best to limit the Bribary to MPPs as orginally suggested?

Also:

Plans for Partitioning Turkey

Allied troops--British, French, and Italian, as well as a contingent of Greeks--occupied Istanbul and were permitted under the conditions of the armistice to intervene in areas where they considered their interests to be imperiled. During the war, the Allies had negotiated a series of agreements that outlined not only the definitive dismantling of the Ottoman Empire but also the partitioning among them of what Turkish nationalists had come to regard as the Turkish homeland. According to these agreements, Russia was at last to be rewarded with possession of Istanbul and the straits, as well as eastern Anatolia as far south as Bitlis below Lake Van. France and Italy were conceded portions of Anatolia, and Britain had promised Izmir to Greece--although it had also been promised to Italy--to encourage Greek entry into the war in 1917.

The Bolshevik government had renounced tsarist claims when it made its separate peace at Brest-Litovsk, but Britain, France, Italy, and Greece all pressed their respective claims at the Paris peace talks in 1919. All agreed with the provisions of President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points calling for an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan. How the Allies would implement the clause providing that the Turkish-speaking nation "should be assured of a secure sovereignty" was not clear.

The terms of a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire were presented by the Allies in April 1920 at San Remo, Italy, and were embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres, which was concluded the following August. The treaty was shaped by the wartime agreements made by the Allies. In addition, France received a mandate over Lebanon and Syria (including what is now Hatay Province in Turkey), and Britain's mandate covered Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine. Eastern Thrace up to a line from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara as well as Izmir and its hinterland were to be occupied by Greece, with the final disposition of the territory to be decided in a plebiscite. The Treaty of Sèvres was never enforced as such, as events in Turkey soon rendered it irrelevant.

During the summer and fall of 1919, with authorization from the Supreme Allied War Council, the Greeks occupied Edirne, Bursa, and Izmir. A landing was effected at the latter port under the protection of an Allied flotilla that included United States warships. The Greeks soon moved as far as Usak, 175 kilometers inland from Izmir. Military action between Turks and Greeks in Anatolia in 1920 was inconclusive, but the nationalist cause was strengthened the next year by a series of important victories. In January and again in April, Ismet Pasha defeated the Greek army at Inönü, blocking its advance into the interior of Anatolia. In July, in the face of a third offensive, the Turkish forces fell back in good order to the Sakarya River, eighty kilometers from Ankara, where Atatürk took personal command and decisively defeated the Greeks in a twenty-day battle.

An improvement in Turkey's diplomatic situation accompanied its military success. Impressed by the viability of the nationalist forces, both France and Italy withdrew from Anatolia by October 1921. Treaties were signed that year with Soviet Russia, the first European power to recognize the nationalists, establishing the boundary between the two countries. As early as 1919, the Turkish nationalists had cooperated with the Bolshevik government in attacking the newly proclaimed Armenian republic. Armenian resistance was broken by the summer of 1921, and the Kars region was occupied by the Turks. In 1922 the nationalists recognized the Soviet absorption of what remained of the Armenian state.

The final drive against the Greeks began in August 1922. In September the Turks moved into Izmir, where thousands were killed during the ensuing fighting and in the disorder that followed the city's capture. Greek soldiers and refugees, who had crowded into Izmir, were rescued by Allied ships.

The nationalist army then concentrated on driving remaining Greek forces out of eastern Thrace, but the new campaign threatened to put the Turks in direct confrontation with Allied contingents defending access to the straits and holding Istanbul, where they were protecting the Ottoman government. A crisis was averted when Atatürk accepted a British-proposed truce that brought an end to the fighting and also signaled that the Allies were unwilling to intervene on behalf of the Greeks. In compliance with the Armistice of Mundanya, concluded in October, Greek troops withdrew beyond the Maritsa River, allowing the Turkish nationalists to occupy territory up to that boundary. The agreement entailed acceptance of a continued Allied presence in the straits and in Istanbul until a comprehensive settlement could be reached.

At the end of October 1922, the Allies invited the nationalist and Ottoman governments to a conference at Lausanne, Switzerland, but Atatürk was determined that the nationalist government should be Turkey's sole representative. In November 1922, the Grand National Assembly separated the offices of sultan and caliph and abolished the former. The assembly further stated that the Ottoman regime had ceased to be the government of Turkey when the Allies seized the capital in 1920, in effect abolishing the Ottoman Empire. Mehmet VI went into exile on Malta, and his cousin, Abdülmecid, was named caliph.

Turkey was the only power defeated in World War I to negotiate with the Allies as an equal and to influence the provisions of the resultant treaty. Ismet Pasha was the chief Turkish negotiator at the Lausanne Conference, which opened in November 1922. The National Pact of 1919 was the basis of the Turkish negotiating position, and its provisions were incorporated in the Treaty of Lausanne, concluded in July 1923. With this treaty, the Allies recognized the present-day territory of Turkey and denied Turkey's claim to the Mosul area in the east (in present-day Iraq) and Hatay, which included the Mediterranean port of Alexandretta (Iskenderun). The boundary with the newly created state of Iraq was settled by a League of Nations initiative in 1926, and Iskenderun was ceded in 1939 by France during its rule as mandatory power for Syria.

[ February 17, 2004, 07:16 PM: Message edited by: Edwin P. ]

[JerseyJohn]

Yes, MPPs sounds like a good solution.

Enjoyed the essay. Got a headache trying to keep track of who was screwing who out of what, but aside from that ...

[Edwin P.]

Glad you liked it.

This history of Turkey is why I think that the Turkish government would have considered moving on on Syria (and Iraq too, as Turkey needed the Oil) if the Axis has kicked the UK out of Egypt or forced the UK to surrender.

If the Allies came back to win the war the Turks could claim that they merely restored what was theirs and were preventing Axis access to the Iraqi oil fields.

[JerseyJohn]

Well, here's my overall take on it.

Germany and Italy would have had no problem backing Turkey in a move on the entire Middle East, with the understanding that they got first dibbs on the Iraqi Oil trade.

Italy wanted Egypt for the Suez Canal. It's extension plan was for control of the Red Sea and the Sudan, linking it from Libya to it's East African possessions and the Indian Ocean.

Italy also wanted direct control of Greece and Yugoslavia. If the Axis had won, with Germany controling Russia, I believe it would quickly have pulled out of the Balkans, leaving Italy and it's minor Allies to split hairs over who controlled what part of it, but Turkey would have been shut out of it.

So, wrapping the Axis part up, we see Turkey controlloing Syria, Trans Jorden/Palestine and Iraq with Italy in Egypt and the Sudan.

The Allies were not in an equal position. As mentioned, I can see Britain ceding Cyprus, which is impossible in the present system, and Syria. Of course Turkey would have wanted Iraq, but it's inconceivable Britain would have made such an offer. The British were instrumental in creating the country and immediately pushed a 99 year oil deal on the fledgling nation! Britain could not have ceded either Jordan or Palestine because they'd made deals with the locals not only oust the Turks, but also to gain their loyalty. So, British options were much more severly limited.

I can see Britain offering Bulgaria after it had signed a treaty with Germany, but that's a bit late in the war and I'm not altogether sure Turkey would have been interested, unless the table were clearly being turned against the Axis.

Introducing another factor. These things should be done with consideration of which side is actually winning the war. Turkey by this time had one paramount consideration; it didn't want to be destroyed by either side.

[Bromley]

I should have made it clearer in my first post that I was referring only to the Axis giving territory to Turkey and then only if it was Germany and not Italy that took Greece.

Without being an expert in the field, I figured that Italy could not give away Greece, if only because of the Roman Empire and Mare Nostrum things.

Likewise, I'd assume that any alliance that had America in it would not be able to give away territory. Just look at the way the US nearly helped the French colonies in their bid for independence after the war, before reality kicked in. So if the the US has joined the Allies, then all hope of giving away territory vanishes.

From what JJ is saying, the only acceptable and realistic territory before the US joins is the Levant (we were quite happy to screw the Arabs over after WW1 and we'd already won the war then). I personally think that, given the timing (i.e. when Germany is rampant) and my perception of the relative importance of the two territories, that gifting the Levant to Turkey should just make it harder for the Axis to influence Turkey their way. As in, Turkey will not join the Axis without getting Greece (and the usual load of cash), but the Levant gift would not make them likely to join the Allies at that time (remember, it's probably only the UK and France atm.)

That provides a negative effect to the Allies gifting territory, which is necessary from a game POV as it's territory that they might expect to lose anyway pretty quickly when France falls. On the up side, they make it harder for the Axis to sway Turkey. On the down side, if the Axis is willing to give up Greece then the effect is minimal and Turkey is bigger. Perhaps there also needs to be a hit to US war readiness?

Either way, as JJ says, it'd at least need to look to an informed observer as if one side was beating the snot out of the other (whether with the benefit of hindsight that actually turns out to be the case ) before Turkey would join. Perhaps:

Allies:

1. USSR is Allied. No way would Turkey join the Allies when the USSR appeared to be in bed with Germany.

2. The Levant was gifted (before US joins - not possible after).

3. Germany/Italy out of Africa.

4. Greece is Allied. Actually, I'm not sure how this would work in the real world of ~1940, but I'm thinking of projection of power. If the rivalry element was so important, maybe that should read Greece=Neutral?

Axis:

1. UK/France out of Egypt, the Levant and Iraq. 2. Greece not Allied (either Neutral or Axis).

3. Either London taken or significant gains in USSR. Sevastopol should be given a high weighting.

4. Axis minor alliances (more=better).

5. Greece is gifted.

No idea what the MPP costs should be, although it might be an idea to have those items above associated with costs rather than being prerequisites. That way you avoid gamey strategies where the UK has 1 Corps in Iraq cut off from supply that prevents the Axis from enlisting Turkey.

Any of this sound reasonable? Or not .

[JerseyJohn]

Bromley

It sounds reasonable to me.

My main problem with the basic situation is, in the actual event, Turkey was evasive with both sides. By the 1930s they trusted nobody -- and with good reason.

During the war Germany sent arms to Spain, Portugal and Turkey. Emmisaries like von Neurath made visits and did everything but beg them to join the Axis and they each responded with vague answers and postponed decisions till the matter was eventually dropped.

In the case of Portugal, I think it was foolish of Germany to try and get them involved as it was more valuable, for trade purposes, being neutral. A situation similar to Switzerland's.

Spain would have been a fine addition for the taking of Gibraltar and also in terms of providing submarine bases in the Canary Islands, but it's influence on the war, though great, would not have been decisive.

Turkey is in a different category, as you and Edwin well realize.

In the Axis it might actually have made a decisive difference, if for no other reason it's geographical position but beyond that it had the capability of fielding an effective army in it's own right.

With Turkey in the Axis the Middle East and the Caucasus might have fallen with very little effort compared to the monumental struggles such as Stalingrad and Kursk.

For the Allies, on the other hand, Turkish entry would probably have meant Axis control of the European part of the country and a costly deadlock in the Dardenelles. There would be the tangible advantage of bomber bases within reach of the Ploesti oil fields and the potential disasster of a Turkish collapse!

As was the case with Spain, it might be that the Turkish leaders suspected their people would buckle quickly to war weariness, which aside from Mussolini's ineptitudes, was the basic problem with Italy .

So, it seems to me, that the Allied position is more a matter of keeping Spain and Turkey neutral than luring them into the cause.

In Turkey's case I'm not quite clear on how they managed this historically. At several junctures the smart move seems to have been kicking in with Germany!

In Iberia, Admiral Canaris was instrumental in convincing both Lisbon and Madrid that joining the Axis would be disasterous -- he did many things covertly against his own government. Perhaps he had a hand in Turkey's decision to remain neutral.

[ February 18, 2004, 07:05 AM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]