An excellent article on tank comparisons, very relevant to CM2

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

Maybe in quantity & strategic terms, it was but it certinly wasn't for the crews in the T-34's whom died in the thousands, or in material losses Ie, in 1943 61% of all T-34's built & sent to the front were destroyed in combat, in 1944 52% of all T-34 production was destroyed etc.

Greetings John , by comparison German tanks in 1944 only had a 55-60% of surviving 6 months.... They were consumed in battle. Not nessessarly destroyed though, just had to be replaced.

[Dr. Brian]

This is very frustrating. This is a GREAT discussion, however, it is quite clear that after some serious research, the T-34 is an under-rated AFV, and is being subjected to various prejudices.

I suggest if one really wants to be unbiased, read from the horses mouth, i.e., actual combat reports, and first person accounts, from Red Army soldiers. Go to:

http://history.vif2.ru/atwar/index.html

and learn what Soviet soldiers thought about their AFVs, what they thought about German tactics, German AFVs (they thought the "King Tiger" was crap), etc.

We certainly have enough accounts from German and western writers that are unfamilair with Soviet weapons platforms. Isn't it about time we look at our other ally's reports?

A detailed, succinct view will encompass all assets and deficiencies of both vehicles.

------------------

Doc

God Bless Chesty Puller, Wherever He Is!

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by Dr. Brian:

This is very frustrating. This is a GREAT discussion, however, it is quite clear that after some serious research, the T-34 is an under-rated AFV, and is being subjected to various prejudices.

What prejudices?.

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[Guest machineman]

Originally posted by Dr. Brian:

This is very frustrating. This is a GREAT discussion, however, it is quite clear that after some serious research, the T-34 is an under-rated AFV, and is being subjected to various prejudices.

The Germans rated them very highly, one (Guderian, maybe?) going so far as to call the T-34 the 'best tank in the world', and everyone agrees it was a landmark in design.

It has to be pointed out however that they can be over-rated as well. Things like problems with visibility, communication, reliability, crew quarters, optics, and noise all take away from actual battlefield effectiveness, even if they do not show up on paper. Deficiencies shared with later marks of Soviet AFV's up to the present day, BTW. Overwhelming numbers due not so much to efficiency in production but an unbombed industrial base supplied with plenty of raw materials and relieved of the necessity to make anything but tanks thanks to Lend-lease made a big difference.

'Quantity makes its own quality' as the Soviets used to say.

I suggest if one really wants to be unbiased, read from the horses mouth, i.e., actual combat reports, and first person accounts, from Red Army soldiers.

It is a very interesting site, but it is NOT without a strong bias of its own.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by machineman:

It is a very interesting site, but it is NOT without a strong bias of its own.

A very good point, also, read the interview with Loza, his opinion of the T-34 was not too high (probably because he had to use Shermans ).

And yes, 'quantity makes its own quality' - the Red Army could afford to lose almost 3,000 AFVs in Bagration and still have more of them at the end of the campaign than at the beginning.

------------------

Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[PzKpfw 1]

I believe the quote was "Quanity has an quality, all its own"

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

A very good point, also, read the interview with Loza, his opinion of the T-34 was not too high (probably because he had to use Shermans ).

And yes, 'quantity makes its own quality' - the Red Army could afford to lose almost 3,000 AFVs in Bagration and still have more of them at the end of the campaign than at the beginning.

It seems to me the reason they could suffer such losses is because they had 20,000 tanks in the inventory through out most of the war and only committed 7-10,000 to the field forces. That way any unit could be selectively replaced and brought up to full strength on a as needed basis.

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

At the level of CM, I don't think it makes a lot of sense to count StuGs as anything but "tanks." They *were* the most numerous German AFVs, and would be often used in common CM-type battles (i.e., company-ish attack supported by platoon or so of tanks).

WRT modern TDs, don't forget the Jpz 4-5, developed and fielded by the Bundeswehr in the 60's. It looks a lot like an updated Jagdpanther.

A lot of things conspired to kill the TD concept, but it was mostly that the MBT became "mature." One advantage of the German TD concept was that you could put larger guns on specific chassis than you would have been able to if the chassis had a turret. I.e., a 75mm gun wouldn't fit in the turret of a Pz III, (or 38(t)), but will fit if you do away with the turret as in a StuG III (or Hetzer)[although the StuG was not really developed as a TD]. Same is true of the Jgpz IV/70. You also get more effective armor.

Now that you can (1) pretty much fit whatever gun you want in the turret; and (2) advances in electronics have made the advantages of having a turret even greater than they were previously, we probably won't see many WWII-style TDs.

ATGM carriers are a sort of TD, although I think they are/will be largely replaced by either aircraft (esp. helicopter) type atgms or man-portable atgms.

It's unclear, yet, what effect anti-tank artillery (such as the copperhead or the 120mm AT mortars) will have.

[Guest Germanboy]

John, thanks for correcting me on the quote. Paul, interesting bit of info, I had not known that they stockpiled them. I guess the main problem was tank-crews then?

------------------

Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Henri]

Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

The Soviets had different classifications for lost AFV's; yes some were patched up & the blood hosed out (sometimes it was left in) & sent back to the Front, to be KO'd again, etc, but many weren't as they were total write offs, destroyed AFVs are shown in loss columns Ie, the below data is Soviet AFV losses by year starting from June 22 1941 to Sept 3 1945:

1941 - 20,500

1942 - 15,000

1943 - 23,400

1944 - 23,700

1945 - 13,700

It was my impression that upon the launching of Barbarossa, the Soviets had 15,000 tanks. If so, how could they lost over 20,000 by December 1941 and still have enough to launch their January counter-attacks that almost won the war right there?

Where did you get those numbers? I am not saying that they are wrong. but they do look a bit high to me.

Henri

[Henri]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

But to give an idea of just how distorted is the picture being peddled here, in the cartoon of the fully armored Germans against the unarmored Russians, try this little exercise. Rate the Russian AFV fleet from top to bottom, do the same with the German, and then go down the list pairing off vehicles. You will not find the T-34s matched against Panthers.

At last a plain and simple fact that puts a bit of sense into this hot "cold-war-stereotype-etc" discussion.

I totally agree with you (for once), and I would only add that comparing the T-34 tank that was already available at the start of Barbarossa with the Panther who was still having production and teething problems at the battle of Kursk is a bit much. As you point out, by 1943, the Germans were fielding tanks (in addition to upgraded T-34s)that were superior to the T-34 and in equal or greater numbers than the German Panthers/Tigers.I am not sure that one was better off fighting in a Panther than in a JS2.

Cold war stereotypes based on the need to picture the Russians as numb-brained robots with no regard for losses using inferior equipment and human wave attacks to win die hard. And I have observed that every attempt on this forum to put forward a more balanced view is met by immediate counter-attack from the cold warriors.

It is interesting to note that the original article quoted did not make any claims as to the superiority of Soviet AFVs, but only pointed out the dangers of over-simplification in comparing AFVs. Doesn't matter for some, it's from a Russian and therefore needs to be refuted...

Henri

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

To Paul - actually, the loss rates for tanks are higher than the quoted figures for either side, might suggest. I am aware this is the basic point you were making. It is just more extreme than the figures might lead some to believe.

I suspect those are figures for combat losses and do not include mechanical failures. Either that, or there is a time-deployed factor that is being misundertood. Perhaps both. But I suspect few AFVs on either side are left at the end of a year. Why do I say this?

Because the "half-life" of a German AFV in Normandy was more like *2-3 weeks*, not a year or six months. Specifically, they had 300 running AFVs left out of 2500 sent to the front, 2 months after the fighting began. That means the fleet was halved, three times over (50%, 25%, 12%). Many of the tanks did not arrive until late June, so most of this reduction occured in 6 weeks.

If the mechanical failures and the combat losses run in a ratio of about 1 vs. 2, then the figures you cited for each sides losses (55-62% range), would be consistent with almost all the deployed AFVs of each side, out of action well before the end of the year deployed. Including recovered vehicles, incidentally, which would extend the average life figure only modestly (only effects a fraction, and then they are lost again).

Which fits. AFVs did not soldier on for years, except in rare cases. The Germans designed the Panther's engine to last for only 500 miles. The Russians expected tanks to last for days, not years, once in combat - before destruction or breakdown. AFVs simply are not "durable goods" on the year-long, operational scale.

hey are more like a form of ammo, though a slower "burning" one. You throw a pack of them at the enemy, and replace them with a new set as they deplete. They do damage to him in the meantime, and help protect your own forces from the enemy's forces.

Lower loss rates, when present, mostly reflect smaller deployed fleets, because all the fleets are wasting assets and wear out over month long time scales (or a season, at best). E.g. DAK will lose a lot more tanks per month when it has 400 of the things running, than when it is operating only 40 while waiting for a new convoy to make it past Malta with more. It will also accomplish more, naturally, in the period when it has tanks.

Notice also that "tanks deployed that year" does not mean tanks deployed on January 1, and lost sometime over the course of the year. The ones that haven't become losses yet, are the ones deployed in the later parts of the year - or not deployed yet at all (e.g. reserve units, training, or being transported to battle areas).

Imagine the wastage is only 10% per month, and newly produced tanks are not lost in the month produced. Then summing over the months, 60% of the tanks produced in the year would still be around. Raise the wastage to 15% per month, and 48% are still operational. But the chance of a tank that was around on January 1, still being around, is only ~14%.

One can see the 48% figure and think "1/2 chance it is lost in its first year, so its average life is 2 years". But this is false. Only 2% could survive 15% wastage 24 times over, and half of them are gone after 4 months of action (.85^4 = .52).

The illusion is created by #1 imagining the tanks all there on January 1, instead of built new throughout the year, with most of the year-end survivors built recently, and #2 by imagining a linear process, instead of one effected by how many tanks are in the population wearing out or subject to loss in enemy action.

The Normandy fighting was a period of high attrition. But a large part of the reason for that, is that the front was stable despite incessant Allied attacks. Like the Bulge period too, such shorter periods of more intense fighting can account for a pretty large portion of overall vehicle losses. While without such intense efforts, the fronts move in favor of the more numerous side.

But to see the distortions created by the "illusion" factors, imagine the half-life of an AFV is 1 month. Then the linear naive thought is "half gone in 1 month, average life 2 months. There are six such periods in the year. Well, they didn't lose every tank 6 times over; that can't be what happened". But this is an incorrect analysis.

What actually happens with that rate of "wastage", is 1/12th of the year's production happened in the last month, and those tanks haven't had any time to get smashed or break down. Half that number again are left from those produced the previous month. 11 terms of that series add up to 17% of the AFVs produced, still running.

If the AFVs have a 2-month half life, 28% are still running at year end (5/6ths of them made in the last 3-5 months). Even though only 2% of the AFVs around on January 1, would survive that rate of attrition.

And if the rate of vehicle production was increasing during the year, you'd get a higher figure with the same loss rate. In 1943 and 1944 combined, the German AFV production rate tripled. So the later months in each year, are more heavily "weighted" than the early ones. And those are the "younger" AFVs, more of which are still "alive". This will cause a "ramp" effect.

Suppose we approximate the 1943 "series" as .67 for 4 months, then 1 for the next 4, then 1.33 for the last four months - compared to the average for the year. Put in the 2 month "half life" and add up terms to find the % of AFVs remaining. Only 2.5% of the remaining AFVs are from the 4 "front months", so their lower weighting makes no difference. Most are from the last four months, when the production rate was higher. So you get 34% left, instead of 28%, with the same loss rate - a 20-25% increase just from the "ramp" effect.

The life expectency of an AFV in WW II was not measured in years. It was probably measured in weeks. Days in periods of intense combat, months at best in quiet times or inactive fronts. Figures for "lost in battle" vs. "produced that year" are therefore pretty meaningless. AFVs are meant to be lost, not kept, over time scales that long. They are not battleships.

[Paul Lakowski]

OK first some figures

Soviet Tank inventory

<PRE>

Hvy[KV& JS] medium[T-34] light* Total

1941 500 900 21,200 22,600

1942 600 800 6,300 7,700

1943 2000 13,400 11,900 20,600

1944 1600 9,200 11,000 21,100

1945 4,700 12,400 8,200 25,400

</PRE>

* T-26/BT5/7 in 1941 and T-26/BT-7/T-40/60/70 in 1942 and T-60/70 rest of the years.

Thats the number of each type and total inventory at the end of each year ,except 1941 which is 22 June 1941 and 1945 which is May 7th 1945.

Below is a sample of where all the tanks were on Oct 31st 1944 [German estimate]

At front = 3,160

In Reserve = 2,060

In Rear Area= 2,880

Unlocated units = 4,370

Far East etc= 930

Repair & in Transit = 4,800

Crews

<PRE>

SU production SU crews

1943 4,000 4,335

1944 11,958 13,032

1945 6,267 10,115

</PRE>

Varing loss estimates of Russian Tks & SUs

<PRE>

German Soviet

Production Loss Production Loss

1941 4,900 21,000 5,600 20,500

1942 14,400 16,197 28,000 15,100

1943 20,250 17,333 27,300 23,500

1944 25,500 19,050 34,700 23,700

</PRE>

As can be expected the German estimates on losses are quite good until they start to loss, buit contray to expectation they tend to under estimate Russian actual losses.

Sources for the above

"The Soviet Economy and the Red Army 1930-1945"

Walter S Dunn Jr ; Praeger

[This message has been edited by Paul Lakowski (edited 03-09-2001).]

[Jeff Duquette]

Great discussion. Hoping John will jump back in at some point. Jason, your energy is astounding.

Interesting the differences in historian’s figures. This is list of production vs. strength vs. loss for the Eastern Front. I copied it from Zaloga’s “Red Army Handbook”.

Paul: did you add a digit to the German 1941 Tank losses, or is Zaloga way under?

http://www.geocities.com/tigervib_2000/Soviet_German_tank.html

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Useful data. Here is what it implies to me.

The Russian AFV loss rate was 24% per month in 1941, probably from very high losses right at the begining, and in a few large cases like the Minsk, Smolensk, and Kiev pockets. Outside of those "one-off" effects, the rate is probably similar to the later year figures. Maybe somewhat above it for worse doctrine and a worse overall war situation.. In 1942, the loss rate per month falls to 11%. Thereafter, is it rock steady at 12% per month. That means a "half-life" of ~165 days.

It may surprise some that the figures are so steady, even with the production ramping up and the size of the fleet varying hither an yon, at first glance. But what is really happening is that the production rate accelerates in 1942, and mostly plateaus afterward. The rate of production can sustain the experienced loss rate and a certain size fleet. (Incidentally, I distributed a modest number of Lend Lease vehicles in 1942-1944 in addition to the Russian production figures - 8k all told).

See, if the fleet is too large for the production rate, the wastage exceeds replacement and the force size shrinks. This in turn reduces the absolute scale of losses somewhat - for the tanks, not the whole army, mind. When the production rate is high compared to the existing fleet size, then more are produced each month and the fleet expands, but drags the absolute loss rate up behind it. In between, the fleet size stabilizes in "thermostat" fashion.

For example, with a production rate of 2500 AFVs per month and a loss rate of 12%, the stable fleet size is (1/.12) * 2500 = 20,833 AFVs. The fleet size will approach that figure, more slowly the closer it already is to it, and from either direction (above or below).

If the wastage rate remains the same, but production increases to 3000 AFVs per month, the fleet size will execute an "S-curve" "crawl" up to 25,000 AFVs = (1/.12) * 3000. Look at the 1944 production data, and the 1945 fleet size. Spot on, that is exactly what it does.

The figures on locations of the AFVs are harder to credit, as an enemy's guess and only a snapshot. It is not clear the categories of "front", "reserve", "unlocated units", etc, have much meaning. ~1k in the far east will make little overall difference since there are no losses there. The only interesting aspect of it is the estimate for "at the front", roughly 1/5th of the total.

Why is that interesting? Because if 1/5th of the overall fleet is in contact at an average time, and the losses occur then, and the half-life for the whole fleet is 165 days, then the half-life in combat would be on the order of 33 days.

That is, 20% enter combat, 10% are lost in 33 days. The front portion is "topped off". Repeat five times. In 165 days, half the initial fleet size has been lost.

There might be some break-downs in other areas, but there are also repairs. 4-6 weeks will still be the right ballpark, if that is the portion held out of the battle.

That portion seems high to me. When preparing a blow, it certainly makes sense. You gather the "fist" and keep the armor wastage rate down. Then you commit a higher portion to combat, but for a limited period.

In the October "snapshot" reflects this sort of thing, then the portion at the front *on average*, may be higher than 20%. If it were 35% then the half-life in combat would be on the order of 2 months, which seems somewhat generous to me. But counting quiet areas and places with a high odds edge, it may be right.

Another way of looking at this is to say that no realistic figure for portion of armor at the front, will yield a half-life in action as long as 4 months. .88^4=.6, so 83% of the AFVs would have to be "at the front", at the average moment, to get a half-life in action that long. The true figure probably considerably less than that.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

OK, I can extend the same analysis to the figures provided for German production and fleet numbers. In 1941, the wastage rate is only ~6.5% per month. In 1942 it hits its lowest, ~5.75% per month. In 1943 it jumps to 10% per month, slightly under the Russian figure but barely so. In 1944, it is 12%, the same as the Russian figure.

In 1945, of course the front collapses. For what it is worth, I extended the series there on the assumption of a wastage rate equal to the Russian one in 1941 - 24% per month - and it leads to the prediction of about 2000 German AFVs left, surrendered.

Or in rougher terms, the wastage rate was half, or the vehicle life was twice as long, during the 1941-1942 period of victories. In the 1943-1944 period, it is basically the same as the Russians, only marginally better in 1943 and no different in 1944. In 1945, it is double the wastage rate of the Russians, akin to what happened to them in 1942.

Here in detail is the analysis I made, to "show my work". I took the yearly production figures and divided by 12 to get the monthly average. Then I distributed the production through the year to fit the increasing trend-line. I had a graph of German AFV production by month (from War Economy and Society 1939-1945, By Milward) to help guide this distribution, but it is meant to be approximate.

Here is the actual data series I used, monthly AFV production from July '41 on -

1941 - 250x4, 300x2

1942 - 300x3, 350x5, 400x4

1943 - 400x3, 500x6, 600x3

1944 - 650x3, 800x3, 900x3, 700x3

1945 - 500, 350, 200, 50

Then I just find the % wastage rate for the year, that will give the final AFV total in the data series on the other fellow's website. By that I mean (in pseudo-code) -

Take the starting amount

Multiple by 1 - R%

Add the production series number

That is the new starting amount

Next month

Repeat until year end.

Find R to hit the target ending number - a standard "internal rate of return" style econ calculation. Of course there were individual months above and below this average figure. But it gives the constant wastage rate actually seen, and thus allows conclusions about "half-life" in combat and the like.

Some may be surprised that the relatively stable German fleet size, reflects such internal dynamics. But that is the conclusion when the ramping production figures are properly accounted for. The home front is building tanks faster and faster, than they are mostly just maintaining the existing fleet size. The reason why, is the wastage rate is moving up to match the production rates.

Most of that adjustment occurs just where you would expect it, in 1943. The average for that year has 5/6ths the wastage rate of the Russians, up more than 60% from the average of the previous two years. In 1944, the climb to the Russian wastage rate is complete. At that point, German AFVs and Russian AFVs are lasting equally long in combat. The Russians lose more because they have more.

One can track the ratio of wastage rates, and then you get these numbers, German/Russian AFV wastage rate -

1941 - 3.7 to 1

1942 - 1.9 to 1

1943 - 1.2 to 1

1944 - 1 to 1

1945 - .5 to 1 (estimate)

To me that is a darn sight more meaningful as a measure of armor warfare, than the pretend "tank exchange ratio", with its implicit assumption that only tanks are killing each other, and the size of the fleets doesn't matter.

To be explicit about it, any claim that German AFVs lasted longer in combat than Russian ones, is a claim about the numbers in that chart. And the raw number of tanks lost, simply isn't about the same claim.

I hope this is interesting.

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Great discussion. Hoping John will jump back in at some point. Jason, your energy is astounding.

Interesting the differences in historian’s figures. This is list of production vs. strength vs. loss for the Eastern Front. I copied it from Zaloga’s “Red Army Handbook”.

Paul: did you add a digit to the German 1941 Tank losses, or is Zaloga way under?

http://www.geocities.com/tigervib_2000/Soviet_German_tank.html

Jeff to make it clear the loss figures are all Russian, the germans are estimates of Russian losses while the Russian is from there archives.

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

To be explicit about it, any claim that German AFVs lasted longer in combat than Russian ones, is a claim about the numbers in that chart. And the raw number of tanks lost, simply isn't about the same claim.

I hope this is interesting.

This is very similar to my conclusion, I did a simple calculation that I'll get into later .

[Guest machineman]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:. In 1944, the climb to the Russian wastage rate is complete. At that point, German AFVs and Russian AFVs are lasting equally long in combat.

So the point is that while the Germans lost less tanks, they had less tanks originally, so the rates of loss are similar, and it may not have been much safer to be a German tanker than a Soviet one, especially by the end of the war. OK.

What I understood to be the original counterpoint to the 'T-34 is great tank' idea was that, yes it was a good tank, but it historically took a hell of a hammering on a tank to tank basis with the implication that either the tanks (or the method in which they were employed) lagged substantially behind the Germans in practice, however good they looked on paper.

Jeffs 'Red Army Handbook' figures give an exchange advantage to the Germans of 1:7 in '41, 1:6 in 42, 1:4 in '43 and '44, only dropping to a near parity rate of 1:1.2 in '45, when it could be argued the Germans were as far (or farther) on their last legs than the Soviets were in '41. This advantage is amplified by being being outnumbered fairly constantly by 4:1 in tanks throughout the war.

So unless there is some other factor I'm missing it boils down to something being badly wrong with the Red Armys tank effort throughout the war, either in the tanks themselves or the tactics in which they were used.

[This message has been edited by machineman (edited 03-10-2001).]

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

The part I think you may be missing, or underrating the importance of, is that the Russians are not just losing tanks out of their larger fleet, *to* the German tanks. They are also losing them to PAK, and mines, and mechanical failure, and in the late war to fausts.

There is no question the Russians are losing a lot of tanks. And in terms of doctrine, we know they did not include artillery in the combine arms mix, in a close coordination, moment by moment way. We know they were still using tank-heavy formations too much, without enough support from towed guns and infantry, into 1943. And from particular incidents and the way things went on other fronts where similar doctrinal mistakes were committed, we can make some definite statements about the probably effects of those weaknesses.

They probably lost tanks in larger numbers when they lost them. You find this in all the "tank fleet", cavalry-related formations. E.g. the Brits in North Africa or even Goodwood, or the first U.S. attempts in Tunisia. And we can add, that German PAK ought to have scored particularly well, since the Russian tanks did not have the same ability to call down arty on them flexibly, as say the Germans had in North Africa. All true.

But what is causing the German tank losses, and what is causing the Russian tank losses? PAK doubtless got some of the German ones, but not many after mid 1943. The Germans weren't attacking very much, so they would not hit many of them. The Germans, on the other hand, deployed as many or more PAK and heavy FLAK as AFVs in the whole war.

Similarly, AT mines probably killed few German AFVs after 1942, or at all really. But the Germans deployed 21 million AT mines in WW II, which is 100 for every Allied AFV, east or west. In Italy, the Brits say 30% of their tank losses were to mines. The Germans also deployed millions of effective infantry AT weapons, though obviously of limited range. The Germans probably lost some tanks to such causes in 1942, when the weapons were still primitive, and maybe some in 1943. But few, comparatively.

And the other big cause of tank losses is simply mechanical failure. This can be increased by tough action certainly. It can be pushed by doctrine that strives driving until the tanks "give", which is probably dumb in most cases though not in all. But the largest single determinant of this category, is simply going to be how many tanks are being operated, since some fraction of them will always break.

When the wastage rates are the same, and most of the German losses are to mechanical failure or to Russian AFVs, while the Russian losses are spread over those two plus PAK, AT mines, and infantry AT weapons, I sincerely doubt the "tank exchange ratio" means anything like what it purports to mean. It does not mean that in AFV combat, the typical German tanker was an "ace" by the time he was KO'ed.

Incidentally, I do not doubt in the least that the better German tanks ran up scores akin to those ratios, on average. But that is only a modest portion of the "fleet". The rest of the fleet were probably getting kill ratios between 1 to 1 and 2 to 1. And the PAK likewise. And the mines some. Etc.

[This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 03-10-2001).]

[PzKpfw 1]

Originally posted by Henri:

It was my impression that upon the launching of Barbarossa, the Soviets had 15,000 tanks. If so, how could they lost over 20,000 by December 1941 and still have enough to launch their January counter-attacks that almost won the war right there?

Henri

Henri as of June 1 1941 the Soviets had a total tank park of 23,106 tanks, of which, 2,611 were 100% operational, 16,080 required routine maintance in unit workshops, 2,157 required medium maintance in district workshops, & 2,258 required factory repairs at central depots.

As of Jan 1 1942 with total production during 1941 running while sustaing the losses, the Soviet's had managed to produce another 4,415 tanks. The Soviet tank park as of Jan 1 consisted of 7,700 tanks of which 6,300 were light tanks. As for the deployment of Soviet armor: 2000 were deployed against the Germans, 2500 were deployed in the far east, & the remaing 3,200 in training units.

in 1942 the Soviets produced 24,443 tanks & SU's & recieved 3,500 thru Lend lease. Losses for 1942 were 15,000 tanks & SU's. As of Jan 1 1943 the Soviets had a total of 18,100 tanks. The Soviet factories were now significantly outproducing the Germans, Ie, in December 1942 the Soviets produced 1,568 T-34s alone compared to German output of 155 PzKpfw IV's & 38 PzKpfw VI tanks.

In 1943 the Soviet's lost 23,500 AFVs losses by type were 22,400 tanks & 1,100 SU. Tank losses equaled 51.4% of all production while SU lossess totaled only 25% of 1943 production. Ie, Soviet production in 1943 was 23,977 AFV's Ie,:

15,712 - T-34-76

100 - T-34-85

452 - KV1-S

130 - KV-85

102 - IS-2

3,343 - T-70

120 - T-80

1,928 - SU-76

635 - SU-122

750 - SU-85

670 - SU-152

35 - ISU-152

Soviet AFV strengh as of July 1, 1943 stood at 15,476 Tanks & SU's deployed such as:

Army - 10,199 - tanks & SU's.

STAVKA - 2,688 - tanks & SU's.

Far East - 2,589 - tank's.

Note the above does not include AFVs being used in the trainimng establishments. As of July 1, 1943 the Germans had a total of 2,088 tanks & SP's, deployed on the Eastren Front, whick left the Soviet's with an 6:1 advantage in armor as of July 1 1943.

In 1944 the Soviets lost 23,700 AFVs losses by type were 16,900 tanks, & 6,800 SU's. 1944 AFV production was 29,002 AFVs. In 1945 the Soviets lost 13,700 AFVs, losses by type was 8,700 tanks, & 5,000 SU. Losses for 1945 equaled 25% of the AFV's available. As of May 9, 1945 the Soviet AFV park consisted of, 25,200 tanks, 10,100 SU's, & 34,600 HT's, AC's etc.

Regards, John Waters

------------------

"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 03-10-2001).]

[Guest machineman]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:But what is causing the German tank losses, and what is causing the Russian tank losses?

That is a good question. No doubt some more ideas will come up on this from people that are smarter than me. But in my opinion with regards to the Russians losing more to non-tanks to the Germans there is a few counter-balancing factors on the German side.

One is over 30,000 Sturmoviks built compared around one tenth that number of Stukas and Henschels, another is the tendency of the Germans to defend by counter attack (in which case they would run into mines and A/tk guns), another is fuel shortages plus the speed of the Soviet advances causing minor problems to turn into 'blow up tank and and abandon' type losses.

On the other hand the defender does have an advantage sometimes in pre reconnoitered positions.

I would think things would even out.

As far as the reasoning that say, a Stug or a PzIV is roughly equivalent or more likely below a T-35/85 in gun performance and armour therefore it should on average not get more than 1:1 or 1:2 ratio kill ratio, I'd say not necessarily. Crew training, tactical ability, optics, and overall 'fightability' of the design can all make a much bigger difference than specs show, otherwise the Israelis would have been wiped off the map a long time ago.

Some Stug formations for example had very impressive records, I have here the 190th Assault Gun Brigade claiming 104 tank kills vs 4 losses in 26 Feb 1945. To break an eggshell you first have to hit it before it can hit you.

Well, this thread has been interesting, but now I am going to sleep finally.

[This message has been edited by machineman (edited 03-10-2001).]

[Jeff Duquette]

Jason Said: The part I think you may be missing, or underrating the importance of, is that the Russians are not just losing tanks out of their larger fleet, *to* the German tanks. They are also losing them to PAK, and mines, and mechanical failure, and in the late war to fausts.

This would also tend to be further exacerbated by the tendency (at least at an operational or strategic level) for focus of effort in offensive action (schwerpunckt) to fall on weaker infantry formations – weaker segments of the front (ala Operation Uranus). Attack where the enemy is not (not ala Kursk). For obvious reasons Soviet Offensives were not always starting in areas where the Panzers were at their thickest. That is why one would typically expect high numbers of tank casualties’ resultant from PAK and Flak guns, as well as Stug’s.

But the Germans were notorious for their counter punching abilities. So presumably, after the initiation of a Soviet Offensive effort, one would tend to see German Mechanized formations descending on Soviet penetrations in an effort to reestablish the front, and to reestablish contact with encircled infantry formations. I would reckon at that point (if the figures were available) one would tend to see a decrease in PAK and Assault gun related Soviet tank casualties and a corresponding rise in Soviet tank losses attributable to Panzers.

Jason Said: They probably lost tanks in larger numbers when they lost them. You find this in all the "tank fleet", cavalry-related formations. E.g. the Brits in North Africa or even Goodwood, or the first U.S. attempts in Tunisia. .

Excellent point. I recently got a copy of Niklas Zitterling’s “Normandy 1944” in which Zitterling tracks German Tank Strengths for all German Mechanized\Motorized formations in Normandy Jun-Aug (and in some cases tracking is indicated on almost a daily basis). The trend for the majority of formations is a “trickling” loss in tank strength with spikes occurring during major allied push between Jun - Aug. That is until Falaise. I would estimate most Divisions were hovering around 50% Panzer strength by mid August. During Falaise – boom – all formations tank strength drop rapidly to zero or near zero.

One does come away from Zitterling with the impression that the Germans were quite efficient at battlefield recovery and field repairs. Very few replacement Panzers were injected into the German Army in Normandy. German Panzer Formations fought with what they came with. So the drops and subsequent rises in operational tank strengths are largely a function of battlefield recovery and repair of damaged machines.

Jason Said: And we can add, that German PAK ought to have scored particularly well, since the Russian tanks did not have the same ability to call down arty on them flexibly, as say the Germans had in North Africa.

This is something I have brought up here before: Soviet inflexibility in employing indirect artillery fire tactically, ala British, German, and American armies. Presumably this is somewhat a function of the low ratio of field radios in the Soviet Army relative to Anglo-American or German Armies. So while the Soviets were quite good at massing artillery fires at a breakthrough point, and would probably be reasonably effective in a static defense mode (once phone lines had been laid between FO and FDCs), on a fluid battlefield Soviet indirect fire capability must have been close to nil. It will be interesting to see how BTS approaches this aspect of CM2.

Jason Said: Similarly, AT mines probably killed few German AFVs after 1942, or at all really. But the Germans deployed 21 million AT mines in WW II, which is 100 for every Allied AFV, east or west. In Italy, the Brits say 30% of their tank losses were to mines. The Germans also deployed millions of effective infantry AT weapons, though obviously of limited range. The Germans probably lost some tanks to such causes in 1942, when the weapons were still primitive, and maybe some in 1943. But few, comparatively.

Armies tend to mark their minefields for both their own benefit as well to put the fear into the bad guys. Friendly minefields are really only truly effective if they can be covered by friendly fire. Mine fields “canalize” enemy efforts. Ideally they force the enemy to attack along avenues in which you want them to attack. Most tank casualty stats don’t typically break out minefield casualties (some rare exceptions by the Brits URL: http://www.geocities.com/jeffduquette/tank_casualties.html). Typically mine casualties seem to be rolled into a general category of “other causes”…and in most of the cases I have seen “other causes” accounts for a relatively small chunk of the whole.

Jason Said: And the other big cause of tank losses is simply mechanical failure. This can be increased by tough action certainly. It can be pushed by doctrine that strives driving until the tanks "give", which is probably dumb in most cases though not in all. But the largest single determinant of this category, is simply going to be how many tanks are being operated, since some fraction of them will always break.

I think the importance of mechanical breakdowns at the operational level tends to be very under appreciated by “us” average wargamers. In a game like CM we're very focused on the tactical nitty-gritty. However, actually getting several Panthers or Tigers to the battlefield in working condition was seemingly a battle in and of itself.

I can't really quantify this, but it would seem that Panthers and Tigers which actually were able to make it onto the battlefield must have been truly decisive tools at a tactical level, simply because there probably weren’t that many of these beasts actually making it onto the battlefield.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

About Normandy - "I would estimate most Divisions were hovering around 50% Panzer strength by mid August".

I don't think so. An actual enumeration based on the German returns gives only 300 operational AFV by around August 7. And 2500 AFV were sent to Normandy all told. The attrition took place in the fights with the British, gradually elsewhere, and during the immediate breakout fighting from ~26 July to August 7. By the time of Falaise, the German AFV fleet was already "double reduced" (two "steps" in rank). Typical Panzer divisions had around 30 running AFV by the first week in August. 116th Pz, which was the reserve and not committed until the breakout, had 1/4 to 1/3rd of the running AFVs remaining.

Incidentally, in one 6-day period from the breakout until early August, U.S. 2nd Armored division fought components of ten German division, half of them mobile ones, and scored heavily with little loss itself. The breakout, not Falaise, was the collapse point.

The German AFV fleet was already thinned.

Then the previously unscathed U.S. armor divisions hit the front with ~1500 AFV. More AFVs were thrown into the Mortain fiasco. Between them, these two causes left little to be lost in the Falaise fight.

Falaise destroyed the soft vehicles and the artillery and the rear area troops, and cut up the infantry. But the tanks were already gone; that indeed is what made Falaise possible.

Another fellow seems to think I just assumed that T-34s are scoring 1:1 or 1:2 vs. Pz IVs and StuGs because they are similar vehicles or something, and then gives one anecdotal report and refers to tactics and doctrine, etc. I am not assuming it, I am deducing it. There are not enough dead Russian tanks to go around, for these vehicle types to have scored high kill ratios on average.

Suppose the vanilla German types are scoring 3 to 1. Presumably the heavy types, Panther and up, are doing better. Say they are scoring 6 to 1. Two thirds of the German fleet is in the first category, and 1/3rd is in the second, so those two assumptions acount for 4 times the size of the German fleet. Problem - that is all the dead Russian tanks. It leaves nothing for the PAK and the mines and the fausts.

For 1943-1944, we can basically discount the mechanical failures on both sides. Since the longevity of an AFV in combat was about the same, the portion of mechanical failures was probably about the same. The effect of weeding these out, is just to "amplify" the effect of the PAK and mines and such, since those simpler items do not break down (or in anything like the same numbers as tanks).

But the PAKs cannot be discounted. The whole Russian AFV "bag" cannot be parceled out to the German AFV fleet alone. The Germans deployed more PAK and heavy FLAK than AFVs, with the two numbers close enough to call it 1 and 1. So half of the "hammers" are missing in the above allocation of losses between German AFV types.

And the Russians were indeed directing their armor at the German infantry formations. Moreover, the Germans had excellent PAK and FLAK, a good doctrine on using them, and we know the Russian armor doctrine was particularly susceptible to these guns, because of limited armor-artillery cooperation. There is every reason to think that these accounted for a large portion of the dead Russian AFVs. Perhaps not half (despite being half the "hammers), but something on the order of 1/4.

Well, then work it out. 100 Russians die to 25 PAK and 25 AFV. PAK get 1:1, 75 left. 8 of the AFV are Panther or better. Are they scoring no higher than the Pz IVs and the StuGs, despite the endless reports of their uber-effectiveness? I don't think so. If they score 5 each on average, that is 40 and leaves 35 for 17 vanilla AFVs Therefore, 2:1 is an upper bound on the possible effectiveness of the vanilla German types, like the Pz IV and the StuG.

And that leaves nothing to the mines. Yes, mines are meant to channel enemies, but 21 million AT mines is more than just some channeling. I mentioned the losses in Italy. Undoubtedly, mines are more effective in mountains and valleys than on the open steppe. But to give an idea, ~10% of Russian AFVs to this cause would mean ~1000 mines planted for one that goes off. That is not a high claim. The truth could be half that or half-again, but it is the right ballpark.

With the infantry AT weapons, the story is somewhat different. They probably accounted for very few dead Russian AFVs through 1943. In 1944 the portion was rising, as a flood of more effective fausts reached the front. Some estimates for the late war put 25% of losses down to this cause.

If you count the people who got tank-killer medals, for instance, you will find 14,000 of them, and I doubt many of those awards were collected in 1941 and 42. Notice that 14,000 still means that only about 1/500 deployed fausts, ignoring those still on-hand in March '45, accounted for a tank. If you allocate 8k of those to 43-44 Russian front, that is ~20% of the kills.

I happen to think that is too high, for various reasons. But *between* them, the mines and the AT weapons - 28 million items - probably accounted for ~1/5th of the losses in the 43-44 period. And that changes the above loss allocation picture.

Now we've got 100 tanks, 5-10 by mines and 10-15 by infantry AT, 80 left. 25 PAK take out 25, leaves 55. 8 Panther or better get 4 each is 32, leaves 23. Which implies 4:3 kill ratios for the StuGs and the Pz IVs. Maybe it is 5:3 (~28), with only 4:5 for the PAK and FLAK (20).

But any reasonable allocation, will leave the kill ratio for the 2/3rds of the German AFV fleet that is "vanilla", between 1:1 and 2:1. In particular, claims that the vanilla AFVs got scores above 2:1 are incompatible with claims that the Panther and other "up-armored" types, outperformed them by any meaningful amount. If the up-armored AFVs were getting multiple kills in the "ace" range (~5), then the vanilla ones were not getting 2:1.

All weapons cannot be above average.

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

I think the importance of mechanical breakdowns at the operational level tends to be very under appreciated by “us” average wargamers. In a game like CM we're very focused on the tactical nitty-gritty. However, actually getting several Panthers or Tigers to the battlefield in working condition was seemingly a battle in and of itself.

This is exactly the point I was getting to , as a study of the German tank strength goes down the same route..... I found "survival" rates of 60% in 1942 for each 6 month period and 55% in 1943 and 50% in 1944.And this seemed to be the same wether it was Pz -IV or Tiger. The conclusion I drew was that mechanical survival must be driving this.

A simple study of the AT gun inventory shows that there survival rate was about 1/2 the above figures....so by mounting a Pak 40 on a Captured tank chassis you doubled its survival. By late war the inventory strengths of AT guns can only support about 20 x AT guns per Infantry Division....thats about 2 per infantry battalion and a company with ~ 8 at the Divisional level attached to the Fusilier Battalion [Divisional reserve].

I can't really quantify this, but it would seem that Panthers and Tigers which actually were able to make it onto the battlefield must have been truly decisive tools at a tactical level, simply because there probably weren’t that many of these beasts actually making it onto the battlefield.

Yes thats why a 35 ton Panther entering production in mid to late 1942 ,would have been a much better choice than 45 ton Panther entering production in early to mid 1943.

Not only do you end up with alot more Panthers produced , you also can sustain a much larger Panther force in the field, enough to completely requip every Panzer Battalion with 'Lighter Panther' by early 1944.