Use of CAS is gamey recon ? (Well, kinda sort of :-)

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

OK, knock off the hostility of this thread will be closed.

Bastables... If I am not mistaken the USAAF provided most of the CAS missions in the war, especially in Normandy. So looking at a British report in a British sector is likely to not be very representative.

CAS was not decisive, but it was very significant. Not only against rear areas, but against frontline vehicles not currently employed in combat. It also made movement by day highly risky, so just the fear of CAS made the Germans modify their entire doctrine.

Doubler, in his book "Closing With The Enemy" writes:

"...American air power in the summer of 1944 was not yet prepared to support ground forces."

"...by the Spring of 1945 American tactical air power had become a key player in ground combat. During fighting in France and along Germany's western borders in 1944, senior air and ground commanders came to realize that air power was a key ingredient in achieving victory in ground operations."

So I suggest that your opinion, based on this very early Normandy BRITISH report, is not representative of the Allies in general, but especially not over the course of the rest of the war.

Doubler gives this example of effectiveness of CAS:

"Fighter=bombers were also effective against German target of opportunity, and aircraft played a major [my emphasis] role in the defeat of the strongerst German counterattack of the hedgerow fighting. On 11 July the Panzer Lehr launched a major attack against XIX Corps, but by nightfall American air and ground units had prevailed. IX TAC alone claimed a total of 22 German tanks destroyed."

The Mortain offensive was, by every single account I have ever read, decided by CAS. In fact, it has been held up as the first example of air power having made a decisive impact on a land battle. Yes, the land based forces and other factors played a huge role, but the losses inflicted by CAS and, as importantly, the confusion within German formations it caused, was the key element in the battle. Allied and German accounts are very clear on this.

To say that CAS was decisive against armor in France would be wrong. To say that it was ineffective would be baseless.

Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

During Normandy the Panzer divisions spent most of their time facing British formations on the British sector. USAAF may have provided many CAS sorties, but not vs. armoured formations until the closing stages. There is also a difference in forcing Panzer to take cover and killing them. I'd always thought Mortain was decided by American counter attacks as forewarned ground defence.

British reports continued through the war, the ratios do not change inspite of better command and control

[Guest Big Time Software]

Bastables, nah... the important ones are the numbers for those KO'd due to enemy action. Adding in the non-combat and unknown causes doesn't change the proportional relationship in the slightest. Plus, all the numbers are here for people to play around with

If your case was simply "CAS did not kill more tanks than other tanks" I think there is enough evidence to show this here. However, I read your arguments as saying that you felt that CAS was not a significant factor in knocking out AFVs. So it is at least my opinion that you overstated your case if you were just trying to show that they were not #1.

Steve

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Bastables, nah... the important ones are the numbers for those KO'd due to enemy action. Adding in the non-combat and unknown causes doesn't change the proportional relationship in the slightest. Plus, all the numbers are here for people to play around with

If your case was simply "CAS did not kill more tanks than other tanks" I think there is enough evidence to show this here. However, I read your arguments as saying that you felt that CAS was not a significant factor in knocking out AFVs. So it is at least my opinion that you overstated your case if you were just trying to show that they were not #1.

Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You can read my arguments in what ever manner you wish Steve, that your choice. I never made any arguments execpt to debate Polar in what I thought was his attempts to show that CAS was the decsive factor in killing Tanks.

its not the ratios Steve its the final numbers which may mislead people, you ignore that the greatest killer of German tanks is lack of fuel, that is important.

[This message has been edited by Bastables (edited 01-11-2001).]

[Guest tero]

Originally posted by Big Time Software:

>But this is simply not true. CAS in CM is far from being "100% on target". I have seen planes bomb nothing. Sure, they were trying for something, but when bombs strike 200m away... it is kinda hard to say that they are "100% on target". And what happens when a plane strikes a friendly unit? "100% on target" in this case means "100% on the WRONG target".

By "on target" I mean CAS in CM picks A target (hostile or frienldy) 100% of the bomb runs it makes, NOT how accurate it is in its strike.

>But more importantly... sometimes CAS doesn't even show up on the battlefield. This simulates the plane not finding anything to bomb or not even finding the right area to target (i.e. didn't even find the playing area in the virtual big world around it). And if the weather isn't perfect, the chances of CAS showing up is dramatically reduced.

That is not quite the same now is it ? Not finding the area or a target in the area is OK. But NEVER picking a bogus target just is not historically accurate.

>So if this whole discussion is based on CM having some sort of "100% on target" problem, whatever point you are trying to make is based on falwed information. CM's CAS is far from 100%.

It is not 100% accurate, yes. But when it decides to attack it picks a valid target 100% of the time.

>In conclusion, whatever information is gained by CAS is of dubious value.

Not dubious in my oppinion if you can be 100% certain CAS made a strike on a real target. I agree the intel one gets is not high quality but it is an indicative of the general disposition of the enemy. Sometimes it is just as well but at times the player with CAS gets valuable hints that are tactically valuable.

>As a "game flaw" it comes up so very few times it is hardly something that is a serious problem. The other problems with spotting happen on a turn by turn basis in every game, so it seems to be a silly waste of time discussing this issue that happens maybe once in 100 games.

Maybe. But it does not happen once in 100 games. It happens everytime the CAS makes a strike. If you have CAS in those 100 games and you get one strike per game it happens 100 times per 100 games.

[Guest Big Time Software]

Bastables wrote:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>During Normandy the Panzer divisions spent most of their time facing British formations on the British sector.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

True to a large extent. However, the figures you stated were very limited in scope. They only accounted for one particular type of tank, not all AFVs on the battlefield or vehicles in general. So the numbers you quoted are not necessarily representative of CAS' impact on the battlefield. Fact of the matter is more King Tigers were knocked out in Normandy by heavy and medium bombers than tanks or other ground combat units (AFAIK).

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>USAAF may have provided many CAS sorties, but not vs. armoured formations until the closing stages.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don't know either way on this.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>There is also a difference in forcing Panzer to take cover and killing them.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, but that is my point. If you can keep the enemy's tanks hiding and moving at night (which is very limiting), you have done quite a bit to help the troops on the ground. While this in and of itself might not have caused direct KO's, it could be seen as partially responsible for the huge number of crew abandonments. Looking at the previous post where 40 fuel trucks were blown up by CAS as an example. No fuel, no movement. No movement, no capabilites. No capabilities, no point

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I'd always thought Mortain was decided by American counter attacks as forewarned ground defence.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

ULTRA had a big part in the battle, for sure. But all it could do was alert the troops where and when to expect the Germans to be. It couldn't kill them. American counter attacks in other sectors helped as well, but airpower was seen as the decisive edge that crushed the German counter attack in its tracks. Sure, it is highly likely that the US forces would have defeated the counter attack without CAS, but at much greater cost and much later than it did. Like I said, evern account I have read about this offensive has always discussed the importance CAS played in winning it. Not the ONLY factor, but for the first time considdered decisive (at least by the authors I have read).

Steve

[Guest Big Time Software]

Bastables wrote:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>its not the ratios Steve its the final numbers which may mislead people, you ignore that the greatest killer of German tanks is lack of fuel, that is important.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I didn't ignore it; it is irrelevant. When trying to look at which battlefield weapons were more effective vs. other battlefield weapons, abandoned vehicles should not be factored in. There were other factors that lead to abandonement, not tank guns, bazookas, CAS, or anything else. At least not directly or they would have been not been counted as abandoned. The most likely INDIRECT cause for the abandonment of tanks would be airpower (not just CAS). If supply trains and trucks can't get fuel and parts to the front, abandoned vehicles would certainly result. Tanks were not responsible for blowing up trains or the bulk of supply columns.

Steve

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Bastables wrote:

True to a large extent. However, the figures you stated were very limited in scope. They only accounted for one particular type of tank, not all AFVs on the battlefield or vehicles in general. So the numbers you quoted are not necessarily representative of CAS' impact on the battlefield. Fact of the matter is more King Tigers were knocked out in Normandy by heavy and medium bombers than tanks or other ground combat units (AFAIK).

Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The latter two deal with all tank which for the British would include the PIV/70s, Panthers, PIV, JPIV and Tigers and StuG losses, not just the Panther. Do you think that my post is misleading and I should make it clearer?

[Guest tero]

Originally posted by CavScout:

>It is not "gamey" because all units fire on "real" targets. If one wants the CAS to drop ordnance on "none" targets you would need to have other units do the same. Need to have your Panther unload some HE into a tree line that the TC thought held infantry.

That is already implemented in the game !!!

You can knock yourself out trying to kill a sound contact with that Panther of yours. That is what a PBEM opponent of mine did. He got his last operational Sherman killed because he tried to kill a Pzscreck by firing at its last known position. I had moved it some 20 meters to the left and it KO'd that Sherman while it insisted on firing at the manually set area target instead of the Pzschreck it spotted some ways off.

Not having the AI conrolled ground units start blazing at shadows is realistic as there is such a thing as fire discipline. If you order it to do so it is another matter.

I think that kind of fire discipline does not readily apply to CAS as their job is seek and destroy and they have to identify, flying at high speed, concealed and camouflaged targets often under AA fire.

[This message has been edited by tero (edited 01-11-2001).]

[Guest tero]

Originally posted by wwb_99:

>Reportedly, the 8 .50s on a P-47 were capable of flipping a mark IV on its back when fired next to it. That is a lotta high velocity steel jacketed rounds hitting in one place at one time.

"Heavy ordnance" is counted from the caliber, not the weight of the fire. I think

[Bastables]

Come on people rally around, we can make this thread bigger than that pansy german optics one!

[Guest tero]

Originally posted by tss:

>Gotta start nitpicking...

You would, wouldn't you.

I know I should start bringing my source books to work.

I was referring to the Hyppy Heikki model with... what is the word for "kiinteä lavettinen" anyway ?

[Guest Big Time Software]

Tero wrote:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>That is not quite the same now is it ? Not finding the area or a target in the area is OK. But NEVER picking a bogus target just is not historically accurate.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

To what degree? How often did CAS, in a battlefield full of targets to choose from, decide to shoot at shadows? I would think very rarely. How often did a CAS mission shoot at nothing in a non-front line situation? Probably not too much, but I would be more often. But this is outside of CM's scope.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It is not 100% accurate, yes. But when it decides to attack it picks a valid target 100% of the time.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But if the bombs hit 200m away from the target you can't see, it effectively means the information you receive is not 100% accurate. Because it isn't 100% accurate you can not treat it as if it is. Therefore, your contention that you get some 100% effect bonus is inherently incorrect. And there is still the debate as to what exactly it is you are gaining...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Not dubious in my oppinion if you can be 100% certain CAS made a strike on a real target. I agree the intel one gets is not high quality but it is an indicative of the general disposition of the enemy.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

On a battlefield the size of CM's, with the type of battlefield it is simulating (i.e. an active one), it is to be expected that the enemy is pretty much everywhere. Seeing a CAS strike only confirms one thing -> that there are enemy units on the board. No kidding

It does not tell you that there is an enemy unit right where the bombs hit, it doesn't tell you that the bombs fell where significant concentration of forces are massed. It doesn't even tell you if the CAS plane even targeted something of value. I have seen aircraft do things like target a Kübelwagen on one side of the map and leave a Tiger alone on the other side. So what does it tell you exactly?

That there is at least one enemy unit, ranging from infantry to armor to a truck, somewhere in the general direction/area of the attack.

Not very usefull at all, and likely historically correct since it is unlikely that a plane would target nothing in a target rich environment, the ground units would be somewhat aware of the strike (depending on conditions), and the information it gives is dubious speculation only.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Maybe. But it does not happen once in 100 games. It happens everytime the CAS makes a strike. If you have CAS in those 100 games and you get one strike per game it happens 100 times per 100 games.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But this is not representational of the "gameyness" of the tactic. The more something is commonly available to exploit, the more significant it is. If the opportunity to exploit something rarely presents itself, then it is rarely a tactic that can be used and therefore rarely a factor for the average gamer. When compared to something like the general spotting system, it has an insignificant impact on the game as a whole, and most likely even the individual battle in question.

I have never played a QB against someone that used CAS and I have never used it. So for my experience it has NEVER been a factor. Compare this with spotting behavior problems, which happens in every game that everybody plays, potentially every turn of the game and to a much more siginficant effect.

So again, IF there is any ahistorical aspect of CAS that can yield an ahistorical advantage for one side, it comes up very rarely and is of very limited use if at all. Therefore, it isn't a big deal and we really shouldn't spend time going on and on about it. Kinda like concentrating on find that needle in the haystack when there is a stack of needles right next to you

Steve

[Guest Big Time Software]

Bastables wrote:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The latter two deal with all tank which for the British would include the PIV/70s, Panthers, PIV, JPIV and Tigers and StuG losses, not just the Panther. Do you think that my post is misleading and I should make it clearer?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Naw, I got confused and was posting about the earlier post while discussing the larger point. And that is that destruction of AFVs in total is not necessarily all factored into these numbers. In the second to last one, they have identified the major AFVs (but not all). In the last one they lump everything together as "panzers" which is undefined.

But I don't understand why there is quibbling here. You presented data that clearly shows that CAS did not knock out the larger number of AFVs killed through enemy action. This is not in dispute by me or anybody else that I can see. So if this is all your point is, you have presented it well and I am in agreement. No need to discuss it further.

However, if your opinion is that CAS was not a significant contributor to AFV distruction (directly, not to mention indirectly) I think I have already presented a strong case to show that this is not true, or at least highly questionable. Since you have not addressed my points in my previous posts (other than as we have discussed on this page) I can only assume that you do not wish to challenge them.

So as far as I can tell, we are discussing nothing

Steve

[Guest tero]

Some pertaining figures I found:

During the first 30 days over Normandy 124 Wing killed 12 tanks, one AC and damaged 4 tanks. It lost 11 Typhoons (6 to enemy action) + one damaged.

It expended some 3 700 RP's, averageing at about 308 RP's per confirmed kill.

Overall, 20-30% of the RP's failed to explode.

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Bastables wrote:

I didn't ignore it; it is irrelevant. When trying to look at which battlefield weapons were more effective vs. other battlefield weapons, abandoned vehicles should not be factored in. There were other factors that lead to abandonement, not tank guns, bazookas, CAS, or anything else. At least not directly or they would have been not been counted as abandoned. The most likely INDIRECT cause for the abandonment of tanks would be airpower (not just CAS). If supply trains and trucks can't get fuel and parts to the front, abandoned vehicles would certainly result. Tanks were not responsible for blowing up trains or the bulk of supply columns.

Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

With the Allied encirclment yes Shermans did play a big part in cutting off supplies from armoured formations and destroying or capturing German veh repair points.

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Bastables wrote:

Naw, I got confused and was posting about the earlier post while discussing the larger point. And that is that destruction of AFVs in total is not necessarily all factored into these numbers. In the second to last one, they have identified the major AFVs (but not all). In the last one they lump everything together as "panzers" which is undefined.

But I don't understand why there is quibbling here. You presented data that clearly shows that CAS did not knock out the larger number of AFVs killed through enemy action. This is not in dispute by me or anybody else that I can see. So if this is all your point is, you have presented it well and I am in agreement. No need to discuss it further.

However, if your opinion is that CAS was not a significant contributor to AFV distruction (directly, not to mention indirectly) I think I have already presented a strong case to show that this is not true, or at least highly questionable. Since you have not addressed my points in my previous posts (other than as we have discussed on this page) I can only assume that you do not wish to challenge them.

So as far as I can tell, we are discussing nothing

Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes you're correct Steve; you've forced me to state my ulterior motive. That this thread grows to dwarf the German Optics one. HUZZA!

[Guest tero]

Originally posted by Big Time Software:

>But this is not representational of the "gameyness" of the tactic.

Agreed. But it is "potentionally gamey"

Say, you come upon a feature of the map that forces you to choose between two different routes. Your intetion is to bypass the enemy and hit his flank. God sent the CAS arrives, picks the enemy for target for a change and the strike is made on a target along the other route. Now you KNOW there is somebody along that route. What you do then is up to you and how aggressive you feel. But the fact is you got gamey advance warning of things to come.

>The more something is commonly available to exploit, the more significant it is. If the opportunity to exploit something rarely presents itself, then it is rarely a tactic that can be used and therefore rarely a factor for the average gamer.

On average, yes. But since you can be 100% that CAS went for a target in that general area you can plan ahead accordingly.

>When compared to something like the general spotting system, it has an insignificant impact on the game as a whole, and most likely even the individual battle in question.

A storm in a glass of water, I agree. But the thing is "gamey is as gamey does". The Kamikaze Jeep recce is deemed gamey even though the average gamer would not dream of doing it. Now everytime there is a CAS strike you know for certain you can benefit from it. I think it would enhance the gaming experience if there was a degree of uncertainty to it that was not ahistorical.

>I have never played a QB against someone that used CAS and I have never used it. So for my experience it has NEVER been a factor.

You close your eyes and it goes away ?

>Compare this with spotting behavior problems, which happens in every game that everybody plays, potentially every turn of the game and to a much more siginficant effect.

One could say that the spotting problems are universal while this minute factor plays to the hands of the Allied player. Mostly. Wen the aspect of Jupiter is right in the house of Virgo.

>So again, IF there is any ahistorical aspect of CAS that can yield an ahistorical advantage for one side, it comes up very rarely and is of very limited use if at all. Therefore, it isn't a big deal and we really shouldn't spend time going on and on about it. Kinda like concentrating on find that needle in the haystack when there is a stack of needles right next to you

You assume the needles are all the same. What if you are looking for a needle that turns red in certain light in stack of regular white neeldes ?

[This message has been edited by tero (edited 01-11-2001).]

[Guest Big Time Software]

Tero,

OK, I think I have whittled down your original point enough, but here is the last point you make that I think I need to address again:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Say, you come upon a feature of the map that forces you to choose between two different routes. Your intetion is to bypass the enemy and hit his flank. God sent the CAS arrives, picks the enemy for target for a change and the strike is made on a target along the other route. Now you KNOW there is somebody along that route. What you do then is up to you and how aggressive you feel. But the fact is you got gamey advance warning of things to come.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But a good commander would ASSUME there was something there in the first place. At least in a CM battle. So the CAS strike is not telling you anything you shuldn't have guessed on your own. So how does seeing this affect planning in any significant way? I say it shouldn't affect it at all. Not even a little bit.

What if this strike went after the ONE asset holding the LEFT side of the map AND knocked it out, while the main force on the RIGHT side of the map wasn't touched? If you were headed for the LEFT, would you then say "oh gosh, there must be something there, I will go to the RIGH instead"? Or do you say "gosh, something is in front of me, well I will stay on course"? If it is the former you would be a fool since the information tells you NOTHING more than you already should have guessed. If you do the latter, you shouldn't proceed any differently than you would have if the plane didn't perform a strike at all.

Again... I can see no, or extremely LIMITED, value to get out of this situation. And as I have outlined in previous postings, it this minor theoretical gain might actually be realistic.

So in the end I say there is nothing "gamey" to exploit. It simply isn't an issue since there is no real effect on the game. At least not a positive one for the CAS player. A not so good player might actually screw themselves over if they tried to overread into this action.

Steve

[Guest tero]

>To what degree? How often did CAS, in a battlefield full of targets to choose from, decide to shoot at shadows?

This is a point I can only use gut instinct. Every source says it is impossible to determine the Allied usage of any given ordance (just as it is impossible to get info on the total numer of KO'd Allied tanks). How the hell can that be ? Did they burn the production statistics, the shipping manifestos and the quartemaster logs ? The number of sorties is counted but there is no concise data on how many times the ordnance was jetisoned for example. Nor are there any overall statisticts on the success of the missions/sorties. Only kills are racked, not how many bombs or rockets were used to produce one kill. Released gun camera footage shows attacks on targets but I quess they burned all the thousands of miles of footage on bombs and rockest hitting nothing.

All I can say CAS did not have any termal sights back then so to have them attack a valid target 100% of the strikes they make is less than historically accurate.

>I would think very rarely. How often did a CAS mission shoot at nothing in a non-front line situation? Probably not too much, but I would be more often. But this is outside of CM's scope.

Agreed. But you do agree there is a remote possibility they did make some bomb runs that were not on target.

>But if the bombs hit 200m away from the target you can't see, it effectively means the information you receive is not 100% accurate. Because it isn't 100% accurate you can not treat it as if it is. Therefore, your contention that you get some 100% effect bonus is inherently incorrect.

No it is not. And I do not contend the intel received is anywhere near 1% accurate. What you do get a 100% accurate INDICATION about the disposition of the enemy troops and you can take it into account as valid intel when you paln your moves. The effect bonus 100% because there is no reason to believe the strike was made on anything but an enemy unit.

>And there is still the debate as to what exactly it is you are gaining...

Yes. I maintain there are times when the fact that CAS is 100% on target yields battlefield information that was not available to the commanders IRL. Radio communication between CAS and the force commander can not be said to be 100% accurate when you take into account there is a possibility CAS will not find the designated area eventhough the force commander was yelling the airwaves blue for them to show up. That is why there should also be a uncertainty factor in the CAS target acquisition. They might be near Bingo fuel and if the commander was telling them to hit the enemy they might pick a suitable terrain feature and blast away in hope they hit something.

>On a battlefield the size of CM's, with the type of battlefield it is simulating (i.e. an active one), it is to be expected that the enemy is pretty much everywhere. Seeing a CAS strike only confirms one thing -> that there are enemy units on the board. No kidding

That much is evident from turn one. Why would there be a game anyway.

Everything else depends on the players. Seeing a CAS strike does also confirm the general area the enemy unit is located.

>It does not tell you that there is an enemy unit right where the bombs hit, it doesn't tell you that the bombs fell where significant concentration of forces are massed. It doesn't even tell you if the CAS plane even targeted something of value.

But it tells me it picked a target that was not in my OB in an area where I might not have any units from my OB. If there was a possibility the strike was made against a hay stack I might not deem it as relevant as I deem it now.

>I have seen aircraft do things like target a Kübelwagen on one side of the map and leave a Tiger alone on the other side.

I thought you said you never played a game where there was CAS involved ?

>So what does it tell you exactly?

>That there is at least one enemy unit, ranging from infantry to armor to a truck, somewhere in the general direction/area of the attack.

>Not very usefull at all, and likely historically correct since it is unlikely that a plane would target nothing in a target rich environment,

Now you are giving too much credit to the Allied CAS. I take it you do agree the claims made during the war by CAS pilots were overstated. Where was all that firepower expended on if they did not hit the targets they had claimed they had hit ? Since it is impossible to get any numbers on ordnance expenditure I smell a cover up.

>the ground units would be somewhat aware of the strike (depending on conditions),

Agreed. Including the Germans. I would imagine they would head for cover the instance the CAS planes are spotted.

>and the information it gives is dubious speculation only.

Again, it is speculation but it is not dubious. Educated quessing would be more suitable.

[Guest tero]

>So how does seeing this affect planning in any significant way? I say it shouldn't affect it at all. Not even a little bit.

Not even if you are playing a scenario in which you have a historical force mix with no Jumbos/Churchills and TD's capable of taking Lions and Tigers and Bears head on ?

As I have said earlier the effect bonus you gain is only marginal at best, it is highly dependant on your tastes and preferences and the prevailing tactical conditions. But it still is an unwarranted bonus.

>A not so good player might actually screw themselves over if they tried to overread into this action.

Most likely. And a very good player might deem it to be just another factor (that there is definitively somebody in that neck of the woods) to add into the equations.

[tss]

tero wrote:

I was referring to the Hyppy Heikki model with... what is the word for "kiinteä lavettinen" anyway ?

Paulaharju uses "gun without a recoil system". Quite cumbersome, so I think there's probably some shorter expression somewhere. And the official Finnish term is "jäykkälavettinen". Technically "kiinteälavettinen" may mean a gun that has an old-type naval swivel mount. However, I'm not completely sure whether that is the official term or not since my sources are at home.

There was no single "Hyppy-Heikki" ("Jumping-Henry") model, but gunners tended to call just about all pre-1900 guns with that name, both Russian and French models. Some batteries used "Hyppy-Jaakko" as the name.

I think that the models around 100 mm had longest jumps. The 152 mm guns were so heavy (120 "puuta"s is about 2000 kg and 190 is a little over 3000 kg) that the recoil force was not enough to send them back much. The lighter guns had smaller propellant charges so they didn't have that much recoil.

Note that if the guns had been used as designed, the recoil effects wouldn't have been as bad as they were. Many batteries had no recoil-absorbing equipment such as anti-recoil wedges, wheel chains, and like.

But since the situation was what it was, the running joke about the guns was that they needed two observers. One to see where the round lands and one to see where the gun goes.

- Tommi

[Guest tero]

>Paulaharju uses "gun without a recoil system". Quite cumbersome, so I think there's probably some shorter expression somewhere. And the official Finnish term is "jäykkälavettinen". Technically "kiinteälavettinen" may mean a gun that has an old-type naval swivel mount. However, I'm not completely sure whether that is the official term or not since my sources are at home.

Jäykkälavettinen sounds right. More correct than my kiinteälavettinen anyway in this context.

>There was no single "Hyppy-Heikki" ("Jumping-Henry") model, but gunners tended to call just about all pre-1900 guns with that name, both Russian and French models. Some batteries used "Hyppy-Jaakko" as the name.

But you do agree they we mostly phased out when the newer war booty guns were overhauled and distributed to the batteries after Winter War.

>I think that the models around 100 mm had longest jumps.

I think the most common photo are of the 107mm and 152mm guns.

[Polar]

I think I need to clarrify a few things here.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Bastables wrote: I never made any arguments execpt to debate Polar in what I thought was his attempts to show that CAS was the decsive factor in killing Tanks.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

First, I never said, nor argued (to my knowledge), that air power was THE desciding factor in the battle of Normandy. I was only questioning the authors use of the statistics to prove his belief in the ineffectivenenss of CAS.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Bastables wrote: What you’ve done Polar is taken a small sample and attempted to prove a point, with only 39 Panzer losses out of the Hundreds<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Don't blame me... those numbers were entered into evidence by your wittness.

I think what is being missed here is that I have never taken the stance that CAS was an uber killer, I have only taken one particular article to task for it's poor use of statistics to prove that CAS was ineffective. The article is filled with spurios conclusions... I just chose one of the easier examples to demonstrate this. If anyone wants a full critique, I'd be happy to give them one when I have the time.

We are just coming at this at two different angles... I could actually care less whether CAS was effective or not... what I DO care about is when such ill concieved articles are used as proof of one point over another. What makes this even more annoying to me, is that the stats this guy used could have easily proven to be contrary to his argument.

I will point out a few other points in his article though, just to give you a taste of his missuse of data:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Nicklas Zertling wrote: But even among such targets it seems that losses inflicted by air power were comparatively small compared to allied artillery, mortars, machine guns etc.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>But he also writes (with regard to airplane armament): Machine guns and cannons had sufficient accuracy, but lacked the power necessary to produce more than superficial damage.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh??? SO which is it? Are machine guns underpowered? Or are they responsible for taking out tanks?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Then he writes: An example is the 12. SS-Pz.Div. during June. The worst day for the division was 26 June, when it suffered 730 casualties.7 During this day it rained. In fact on the six most casualty-intensive days during June the weather either prevented or hampered air operations.8 If anything the correlation between air operations and casualties seem to be inverse in this case. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Gee, do you think it had something to do with the Germans committing more assets since they had no fear of air attack?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Also he writes: A similar case can be made for the II. SS-Pz.Korps. The most costly actions for this corps were fought during Epsom. In a report the effects of the enormous allied artillery fire are described. It is said that this was the main cause of German losses. It is also explicitly stated that he effects of the numerous attacks by allied air units were of "secondary importance".<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well no S***. I will conceed that when under fire from an "enormous" artillery assault, a few Fighter Bombers WOULD be of little concern. Much like a few artillery rounds would be inconsequential if you had 100 fighter bombers buzzing overhead. It's a matter of scale, NOT effectiveness.

If you don't want me scrutinizing or impeaching evidence, then don't submit it.

Joe

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"I had no shoes and I cried, then I met a man who had no socks." - Fred Mertz

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Polar:

I think I need to clarrify a few things here.

If you lok at his main point, he says (essentially) that Allied pilots boasted about their kills, to the toon of 10 times??? While dying at an alarming rate???????? Hell no. If those pilots KNEW that they were dying for nothing, don't you think they would have pointed that out? Hell yes!

Joe

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No Polar, this is your main point. They did died out of all proportion relative to the number of tanks they killed, CAS is the most deadly form of work for Air forces. Again and again it is said that Allied air power was the decisive arm vs tanks, claims made on the basis of huge number of tanks killed. This fact was covered by over claming or not hitting any thing at all. ‘Since there could be no question of the planned exploitation by the Queen's Own Rifles to seize the eastern parts of the airfield, Brigadier Blackader ordered the attack halted at 2100 hours. 5 squadrons of rocket-firing Typhoons were called in against the SS tanks and artillery around the airfield - the Germans said later they suffered no equipment casualties from these attacks. By 2130 hours B Squadron of the Fort Garrys and the Winnipeg survivors were back at Marcelet.’ (1997 Reynolds). 5 sqn hitting a German defence on an airfield and a village on a plateau and they hit bugger all.

[Sirocco]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

in 5 years of combat Rommel was taken out of action by what... MGs from a plane<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But how close was he to the front line..?

From everything I've read CAS was actually more effective on lines of supply than the front line, though I'm sure it had a great impact there, perhaps not in actually destorying things, just in terrorising crews to the extent they were no longer quite as effective.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent