Should 88s be capable of delivering airbursts on TRPs?

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

You would convince me a lot more with a German artillerists field-training pamphlet about how to fuse HE shells for ground level airbursts and to fire said airbursts indirectly and on-call via an ad hoc FO (since AA battalions did not have any), than with any number of stories about troops who said "and then the shells burst right over my head - it was an ambush - they had us zero'd with 88s and it was murder..."

You would also convince me a lot more of the practice being common, as opposed to an occasional stop-gap measure, if you can explain to me what the supposed bleeding point is. The number of German weapons that can put a shell on a crossroads to nuke troops in the open is pretty freaking large. The number of things a live 88 can do that every gun the German arsenal can't do as well, is also pretty freaking large. But this ain't one of them.

Why on earth waste useful 88s firing indirect fire at infantry in the open at an ambush crossroads, instead using them to nuke tanks from 4 miles or shoot bombers out of the air - while parking a 150mm infantry gun a mile away with a line of sight, or a battery of 120mm mortars 2 miles away behind a ridge, or for the mission assignment just putting 10 teller mines in the dang crossroads and the sticking an MG 42 on a set-n-locked tripod, on the place?

As I have said, I think with a fair amount of extra work, they could probably do it, and that sometime or other, somebody probably did. But nobody has given the slightest military reason to think it was common or specially useful or even sensible in any way.

Do people think the number of shells you can throw somewhere indirect is limited by the tubes you've got, so you aren't getting enough use out of your guns if you don't fire everyone of them in your arsenal in every way it can be fired, on every occasion when it might be fired? If so, I can quickly disabuse you of the notion. The German army had not lack of artillery pieces - of a dozen types - capable of putting a shell at a crossroads, if some local commander knew the time he'd want it.

They did have shortages of shells, so they hardly had every tube firing whenever it could. Automatically, most were silent most of the time, because otherwise 3 days of firing and there wouldn't be a shell left in German occupied Europe. The rate determining step, as chemists put it, on the delivery of artillery shells, was how fast they were being made, not tubes to send them through. Generic tubes, they had.

On the other hand, they did have shortages of high-powered, long-range anti-tank guns, and most front line commanders would sell their mother to get one. So just exactly how is it a brilliant tactical stroke worthy of constant duplication, to reduce an 88 FLAK to a glorified and dandified 105mm howitzer, if even that?

"But I bought one with my points, and I want to use it every turn". G. Ga-ga. Gam, gam, gam. Gam-ey!

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"But I bought one with my points, and I want to use it every turn". G. Ga-ga. Gam, gam, gam. Gam-ey!<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What is that supposed to mean? Come on, nobody here is calling for that feature to be included on the basis of what was discussed here, and I have not even asked for it to be included in CMBO. If you are one of these guys who just thinks that only stuff benefiting the Allies should be included, just say so and I will start ignoring you immediately. Until that line from you this has been a perfectly civilised thread.

As for the rest of your post, that is what I will be looking for.

First of all - I am still thinking direct, not indirect fire, in which case an 88 battery may be more accessible than ordinary arty, and maybe less likely to receive counterbattery fire. That is just of the top of my head.

Another point - we can probably agree that airbursts are more deadly than ordinary arty to soft-skinned/lightly armoured vehicles and infantry. So there is another reason to prefer an 88 airburst over ordinary arty if you are aiming at these type of targets.

Ordinary arty was also used in that kind of role, AFAIK. The Germans would just pre-register e.g. a bridge somewhere behind enemy lines and put down the occasional stonk, assuming that there would be supply traffic on it. I have no idea how often that happened, and it is clearly out of CM's scope.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[This message has been edited by Germanboy (edited 01-16-2001).]

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

I have a habit usually thought indelicate of blurting out unstated minor premises. Chalk it up to the scholastic philosopher in me. I'm even worse at cocktail parties. I will point out that no one was mentioned in my quip, which was a purely anonymous last straw-man standing after my previous tendentious arguments. And knocking the stuffing out of it was fun.

As for the statement that "no one here is calling for its inclusion", on the contrary. You may not be, fine.

As for the "only help Amis" quip, that is rather silly, what with nothing on earth to base it on.

Then there is the point that you meant direct fire. Fine, that is what you meant. If you read what I've written, you will find me arguing against the proposition that use of 88s either for "fused ambush airbursts at crossroads" or "indirect fire" are both common and ordinary and typical, which notion is being defended on the thread, in case you hadn't noticed.

Then you comment that if the fire is direct, the guns delivering it might be more available. This is halfway plausible enough in some situations - like, the reason the 88s are really there is to stop an armored column, which just hasn't arrived yet. But my objections still apply in that case. Why warn the armor not to proceed into the ambush by giving away the 88s presence, when a MG would suffice to scatter the infantry?

And if they aren't waiting to ambush an armored column, it simply pushes the same objection back a step. Why are the defenders deploying an 88 FLAK battery to defend this crossroads from infantry, instead of doing something more useful and urgent that only 88s can go do, while letting a couple of infantry guns do the job?

"The infantry guns might not be available". Right, and the 88s are, just by coincidence. Incidentally, the Germans built and deployed more than 17 million Teller mines in WW II. Think they could spare 10 for your crossroads? Compared to a battery of 88s?

Then there is the statement that the reason to do it is the greater effectiveness of an airburst. Unstated minor number one - against infantry in the open. Unstated minor number two - for the same weight of shell.

A 150mm infantry gun will rock the world of a squad of infantry in the open meandering through a boresighted crossroads. Its shell weighs about 100 pounds. The Germans had enough to issue them every infantry regiment, although often they were then mounted on some sort of chassis to serve as an assault gun. Even if it detonates "point". In CM terms, it has a 200 blast, vs. 51 for an 88 HE. Or you could mine and mortar and machinegun the place, obviously.

It is not like infantry in the open is the hardest target to manage to somehow mess up. Let alone at a known ambush location. Who cares whether they buy the farm from a big slow howitzer shell or a fast small anti-aircraft shell? Or a teller mine, or a machinegun bullet?

Then there was the statement that the 88s might be less susceptible to counterbattery fire. Wait, they were firing direct. That means they are in LOS, perfect target for a fire mission. Whereas if you sat 3 81mm mortars behind a ridge somewhere - or a 120mm Mortar FO - then a sneaky HQ could sight for them without firing a shot, and nobody would even know where the rounds came from (except "straight up").

I'd also like to understand an explanation for the stellar effectiveness of counterbattery fire on 9 teller mines after the ambush has already been sprung, and the unspeakable losses the Germans would incur thereby, that could be avoided if a battery of 88mm FLAK are divert to your sector, to stop the urgent threat from a platoon of American infantry walking down the middle of a road.

At the risk of being as annoying as a scholastic, I state again the obvious minor - the reason people think German 88s "should" be able to deliver airbursts on American infantry, is because U.S. artillery can deliver airbursts on German infantry, and it is unfair, flat unfair, or at least a denial of potential revenge, not to be able to do it too. Well, mine goes to 11.

The reason this is a silly idea is that 88 FLAK guns had better things to do, in the sense of more important tasks they were good at that most weapons in the German arsenal were not nearly as good at. The U.S. artillery having the ability is marginally improving its effectiveness in its doctrinal, proper role, which it does better than anything else, and without diverting from anything else, which is why it does it regularly.

Even then, it makes very little difference. How many German squads have you seen get caught in the open by U.S. 105mm arty, without airbursts, and get away whole because whew, at least the ~15-20 firecrackers that just went off all around me, out here in the open in overlapping casualty zones from a quarter of them, weren't airbursts?

Why do I think somebody nevertheless once went to the trouble to do it? As an ad hoc thing, it makes perfect sense. The gun is in the wrong place. It is on some other mission - perhaps it was supposed to block the road from tanks that did not show. Perhaps it is a relatively hasty defense, and the outpost line only bought the MRL 30 minutes to set up, and no time to lay mines. Perhaps the battalion mortars just expended their last rounds on a different part of the fight 500 yards wwest. It is not the right weapon, it is not the economical weapon, after helping win this local fight (hopefully), the 88 will leave to do something more important. But here it is, and here they come, and somebody thinks of a trap, and they arrange their little present.

Perfectly plausible. Without making it common, regular, etc, to use 88s for indirect fire.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

At the risk of being as annoying as a scholastic, I state again the obvious minor - the reason people think German 88s "should" be able to deliver airbursts on American infantry, is because U.S. artillery can deliver airbursts on German infantry, and it is unfair, flat unfair, or at least a denial of potential revenge, not to be able to do it too. Well, mine goes to 11.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, I can just repeat myself - please look at the question mark at the end of the thread title. My issue is not to have something better to beat up the Allies with, it is historical accuracy. I have no issue with the Germans not being able to do this if there is no evidence that they did it. At the moment I am not so sure. All your arguments against it are perfectly valid, but they are surmising and deduction. On the contrary I have read a reasonable number of 1st person accounts from the Allied side stating they came under high-velocity airburst fire from the Germans in the open. Somewhere these airbursts must have come from. Currently there is nothing in CM that can do them. Would it be appropriate to include them? If so, how? I don't know either, but at the moment I am not prepared to just dismiss the idea out of hand. That is where we will have to agree to disagree. I know that a good case is needed to convince BTS to include them, and if that can not be put together it won't be.

If there was a historical precedent for it happening on a significant scale on the level CM simulates than it should be in CM,IMO. I don't know whether there is, but neither do you.

Last point - my grandfather served in a specialist unit, a Bemessbatallion in Heeresgruppe Nord. I have never heard of them, I did web searches, nothing - I can not find out anything about them apart from what he tells me. According to what he says, his unit played a crucial role in the administration of German arty fire on the front around Leningrad. The fact that it seems impossible to find out about this unit while there is lots of easily accessible info about other German units says to me that German arty procedures are a bit under-researched. Maybe this issue falls into the under-researched bit, I don't know.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Jeff Heidman]

Interesting thread.

I just have one comment to make.

In general, first hand accounts frrm those on the receiving end of fire are a very poor source of information. They typically exaggerate the capabilities of their enemies to a great degree, and make assumptions about what is happening to them that are often completely incorrect, sometimes to an almost comical (if it weren't so deadly) degree.

Case in point: The German prisoners who demanded to see the automatic 105mm guns that were used against them during the Bulge. The artillery was so heavy and effective, they thought that the Americans must have invented an automatic artillery piece. Should we assume that is the case since some German combat troops reported that they were under fire from automatic artillery?

Jeff Heidman

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

In general, first hand accounts frrm those on the receiving end of fire are a very poor source of information. They typically exaggerate the capabilities of their enemies to a great degree, and make assumptions about what is happening to them that are often completely incorrect, sometimes to an almost comical (if it weren't so deadly) degree.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Jeff, I totally agree. I just did some cybershopping on this issue and will get back here on this. I would not argue for inclusion of anything on the basis of first-hand accounts. I see them as a pointer and departure for research, nothing more, nothing less.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.