The 51st Again!

[Dirtweasle]

Found this book, and there is an interesting engagement at Hotten with decent descriptions of the Allied units in action there Dec. 22. (Co. A 51st ECB, elements of the 23rd AE, 440th AAA, 820th TD Battalion, 3rd Amrored) I am lacking however anything close to an accurate description of the German forces. The book indicates there were 4 Heavy Tanks, (Mark VI), and describes how they were put out of action. It also describes that the 2nd and 116th Panzer divesion sent forward elements/patrols out into the area. They describe infantry action, but not exact numbers. Presumably those were the parent divisions of the units that got a bloody nose at Hotten.

Interestingly enough they had a 37mm AT gun in action at the bridge which disabled one of the Mark VIs. Wonder what to sub for this?

Any assitance with information, or where to gather it would be greatly appreciated.

TIA

[gunnergoz]

It looks like the German forces were mostly the spearhead elements of the 116 Pz.Div.

From: Battle of the Bulge, Then and Now" by Jean Paul Pllud:

Kampgruppe Bayer: "Led by the commander of Pz.Rgt.16, Oberst Johannes Bayer, this was the (116 Pz) divisions' most potent battle group, which included, apart from panzers of Pz.Rgt.16, a battalion of grenadiers from Pz.Gren.Rgt. 60, an artillery battalion from Pz.Art.Rgt.146, and an engineers company from Pz.Pi.Btl. 675."

Judging from the photos in the book, most of the armor of Px.Rgt.16 was composed of mixed groups of Pz IV's and Panthers. No mention is made of the Pz VI's that your source places there.

Pallud's book, part of the "After the Battle" series printed in England is a must-have if you enjoy reading about the Bulge. The series is superb.

Hope this helps!

[Dirtweasle]

Originally posted by gunnergoz:

Judging from the photos in the book, most of the armor of Px.Rgt.16 was composed of mixed groups of Pz IV's and Panthers. No mention is made of the Pz VI's that your source places there.

Hope this helps!

Yes, thanks.

Here is an URL to a photo taken of one of the tanks destroyed, it sure does'nt look like a Tiger. Looks to be a Panther to me.

http://www.theindependent.com/Images/111198/BWTankVetDay.jpg

[gunnergoz]

Yep, that photo is in the Pallud book along with about 3 or 4 others taken in or around Hotton in those days. Sorry I can't scan them for you, I don't like "breaking the back" of good books to put them on my scanner.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Dirtweasle:

Yes, thanks.

Here is an URL to a photo taken of one of the tanks destroyed, it sure does'nt look like a Tiger. Looks to be a Panther to me.

Panther - if the one behind it is German, it is probably a Panzer IV (Guesswork™).

------------------

Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

See the section entitled "The 3d Armored Division Is Checked, 21-23 December" on this page -

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_16.htm

Down through the part at the top of page 385 where it says -

"So the night ended. During its course the 560th Volks Grenadier Division had made a smooth and unperceived relief of the 116th Panzer Division. At dawn the grenadiers held an irregular front reaching from the Ourthe River east to the Baraque de Fraiture crossroads athwart the Liege-Bastogne highway. This sector from river to highway now formed the center of the LVIII Panzer Corps with the 2d SS Panzer Division moving in on the east and the 116th Panzer Division circling to form the western wing beyond the Ourthe."

This was one of the wildest critical passages in the whole Bulge campaign. Basically what happened was a "non-meeting engagement" (I'll explain in a second), followed by a hasty defense of a bridge.

The Germans attacked sharply and made progress, but did not eliminate resistence. They then pulled back to pursue what looked, at the time, like a less defended line of advance, although that is turn was rapidly changing, as it later fell out.

The unit engaged on the German side was the forward kampgruppe of the 116th Panzer division (Kampgruppe Bayer), but nothing remotely like all of it. The basic force on the U.S. side was elements of CCR, 3rd Armored division - but numerous very small units added to the defense, including units from the rest of 3rd Armored, and on the flanks units from 2 different U.S. divisions, the 82nd Airborne and the 84th Infantry.

I will explain a little context because things are moving pretty fast at this time and can be hard to follow. Peiper had earlier broken out and bypassed St. Vith. He is the northern thrust. The 58th Panzer Corps (which includes the 116th Pz) had broken out a bit later and farther south. St. Vith was still holding out between the two penetrations, essentially.

When Peiper broke through, the north side of the Bulge forms, as the American troops on that side do a "right face", now facing south, along Peiper's flank and line of communication. Farther forward=east, Elsenborn ridge is holding, then this new south-facing line is being stretched out westward. On that "face", the 82nd airborne ties in with its "left hand", so to speak. Then the 3rd Armored holds the 82nd's "right hand", and tries to continue the line south, across the expanding face of the Bulge, toward Bastogne.

Some elements of 3rd Armored, plus the 82nd, and the infantry to their left, isolated and cut up Peiper's incursion. At that point, Peiper had those forces on three sides of him, and St. Vith holding out to his left rear. When his kamgruppe is destroyed, the threat it that area subsides, and part of 3rd armored is freed up again. So far so good. But then St. Vith collapses. You might say both sides "exchanged" their pocketed troops.

All of this is by way of explaining, that 3rd Armored was hardly in this sector just before. But it was being repositioned. And the Germans ran into and part-way through it at the first contact.

That is the part I meant when I said there was a "non-meeting engagement". Two task forces of 3rd Armored, TF Orr and TF Hogan, advanced down two parallel roads towards the Germans, and at the same time, without either knowing about it, the main column of KG Bayer passed along a road parallel to these two, right smack between them, in the other freaking direction. Put your left forefinger between the 1st and 2nd figures of your right hand, and you get the idea.

Your left hand's forefinger is KG Bayer. Your right middle finger is TF Hogan. Your right forefinger is TF Orr. The knuckle of your right middle finger, is Hotten and the location of your fight with the engineers. See the picture? Soy, incidentally, is where your right forefinger's knuckle is.

TF Hogan was cut off by this advance (wiggle your "saluting" finger). The advance was not immediately directed at Hotten, but between Hotten and Soy. Soy was the HQ location of CCR, 3rd Armored.

Why does all this matter? In order to understand what the various pieces of KG Bayer were doing that day, and trying to accomplish. On their left rear there is this cut-off TF. On their right rear, turning to face them, is another TF, this one not cut off. On their right front is the HQ of CCR, which soon becomes a nest of tanks trying to deal with them.

On their left front, is the village of Hotten, with an appetizing intact class-70 (tons) wooden bridge, defended by a few engineers, a couple hundred rear area service troops, 1 Stuart, 2 Shermans, 2 40mm AA, and this 37mm AT gun. In addition, early in the fight, 1 Jackson TD "appeared from nowhere" on the side of the river nearest the Germans, and played a key role.

4 or 5 tanks were reported in the (morning) attack to have come especially close. These used woods for cover and made it right to the eastern edge of town, and knocked out both tanks (Sherm + Stuart) on that side of the river, rapidly. At least one was a Panther, and was knocked out in turn by a direct hit from the Jackson on the other side of the river.

The Jackson may or may not have gotten another one. 1 more was credited to the 37mm AT gun, and 2-3 others to bazookas. There were more tanks in the afternoon, not just the initial 4-5 however. And the zooks probably got some of their kills in the afternoon fighting.

German infantry made it into the buildings on the near side of the river, but did not reach the bridge. MGs, rifles, and zooks stopped them (the German commander called it "a hailstorm of fire"). Incidentally, the fight opened with German mortar and MG fire.

2 platoons from the 84th division reach the defenders late in the afternoon to help out, from the west. But they reported that when they got there, the German infantry was pulling out of town and getting back into their halftracks as though the fight was over.

KG Bayer was engaged in a larger fight. It was trying to hold the high ground between Soy and Hotten. CCR was counterattacking from that direction, and the Germans were lighting them up from the heights outside the town (east). Around 2 in the afternoon, the last German tanks in the town area pulled out to join those on these heights.

Otherwise put, Bayer was flanking Hotten from its eastern side, but in doing so he exposed his own eastern flank to CCR, and took flanking fire from its tanks. He fought these from the heights east of Hotten.

The early morning attack had tried to seize the town and especially the bridge rapidly, but had failed. In the afternoon, only the elements the Germans could spare from other tasks were put into the fight, while the bulk of the forward elements were facing east to fight CCR. And smaller elements were screening TF Hogan, and later the same day the 560th Volsgrenadiers faced TF Orr.

Back to your hands, because this can be confusing. The forward part of KG Bayer is the panzer regiment and one Pz Gdr regiment. Part of that Pz Gdr regiment was left to screen "Hogan", the cut off one. Call that the inside of your left forefinger near the knuckle.

And by afternoon, "Orr" is screened by leading elements of the 560 VG, marching up in 116th Pz's "wake". That is the outside of your left forefinger near the knuckle.

These two are holding open a corridor, down which the panzer regiment and most of 1 Pz Gdr regiment pass. The second Pz Gdr regiment follows behind them, but is not engaged up front. Later that night, TF Hogan tried to get out and unluckily ran smack into this second Pz Gdr regiment, though - so it did have a job of sorts to do, holding open the line of communications. Call that the first joint of your left forefinger, counting away from the knuckle.

So what is up at the pointy end? The panzer regiment, and most of a Pz Gdr regiment. The German commander's initial plan was to ignore flank security for the sake of mass, push this force right between Soy and Hotten where the high ground was, and then turn left and take Hotten. Then he'd have a bridge and a hole, and it would be off to the races.

But he had two big problems - the bridge did not fall to a quick coup-de-main in the morning, and he took heavy fire from his right flank, the CCR position. He faced the bulk of his KG right to meet this threat, and from the high ground he punished CCR rather badly that day.

He sent some of his Pz Gdr (probably a battalion or less, since some were back screening "Hogan" and some were with the tanks on the heights) to try to take the place again, but it did not happen.

Units from the 84th came up from the west to help the Hotten defenders by late afternoon. The CCR counter-attackers at Soy got reinforced by 1 battalion of the 82nd Airborne by evening, too - and were immediately put into a night attack toward Hotten over unfamiliar ground, which failed dismally. Meanwhile, CCA, 3rd Armored was coming up in the rear to provide a reserve.

All of this made continuing the attack look rather harder on the German side. The bypassed TF Hogan had not been reduced, and a short infantry attack on it was driven off.

But most of all, the German commander heard that 2nd Panzer, farther south, had successfully seized a bridge over the same river. It threatened to turn the left flank of this whole area. He therefore decided to pull his lead KG out of the cul-de-sac or salient made the previous day, and redeploy the division to advance behind and to the right of 2nd Panzer.

So units of the 560th VG infantry division relieved the forward units of 116th Panzer that night, on the heights between Soy and Hotten in particular, which the Germans still held. 116th Panzer passed out of this area of the battle, stepping back, sidestepping left, and then advancing again.

The next day, the U.S. tried to attack the German position on the heights, but they had no greater success against the VG with their PAKs, than they had the previous day against the tanks of 116th Pz.

I hope some of this is vaguely comprehensible - LOL. I close with a quote from the official history at the site mentioned above. With some of my comments included in brackets, here is the key portion for your affair -

"The town of Hotton (about ten miles northwest of La Roche) is built astride the main channel of the Ourthe at a point where the valley widens. Here a series of roads converge to cross the river and proceed on the west bank to the more important junction center at Marche from which roads radiate in all directions. In the center of Hotton the river was spanned at this time by a class 70 two-way wooden bridge. In the buildings east of the river were installed about two hundred men from the service detachments of the division and CCR headquarters. There were, in addition, one light and one medium tank. On the west bank at the bridge exit a platoon of the 51st Engineer Battalion (Capt. Preston C. Hodges) was deployed, reinforced by two 40-mm. antitank guns [sic - sounds like AA - either that or it means Brit 2-lbers, which seems unlikely. AA is a natural right beside a depot and a bridge, is it not?], a 37mm. antitank gun [was that actually AA too? Donno], and a Sherman tank. A squad of engineers guarded a footbridge at Hampteau, two thousand yards south.

Page 379

At dawn mortar and small arms fire suddenly gave notice of the enemy. Despite casualties and confusion a defense was hastily set up by the executive officer of the 23d Armored Engineer Battalion (Maj. Jack W. Fickessen), engineer trucks were driven out to block the roads, and bazookas and machine guns were distributed for a close-in defense of the town. Taking advantage of the woods that came right up to the eastern edge of Hotton, four or five enemy tanks rumbled forward to lead the assault. The two American tanks east of the river were knocked out at once; but on the opposite bank a 90-mm. tank destroyer "appeared from nowhere," got a direct hit on a Panther and perhaps a second German as well. The enemy infantry were able to take about half the buildings on the near bank but were checked short of the bridge by the rifles, bazookas, and machine guns in the hands of men on both banks of the river. (A "hailstorm of fire," say the Germans.) The engineer squad guarding the footbridge south of Hotton was overrun, apparently by Germans wearing American uniforms, but fortunately this bridge could bear no vehicles.

By the middle of the morning the defenders, now recovered from their initial surprise, were holding their own and the vehicles in the town were evacuated to the north along with most of the medical personnel and ambulances. Two or three more German tanks were destroyed by bazookas (one was even chalked up to the account of the 37-mm. antitank gun). For some reason the enemy had not thrown all of his tanks into the battle at once, a fortunate circumstance. [see above discussion] By 1400 the tanks still in town joined those on the hill east of Hotton against the counterattack which Colonel Howze had launched along the Soy road. About this time Howze was able to get a small group of tanks and infantry around to the north of the attackers and into Hotton, redressing the balance somewhat [notice this reinforcement, around 2 PM. The town does not seem in danger of falling after this point]. As yet it was impossible to bring any friendly artillery to bear, and the foot troops continued to rely largely on their own weapons for the rest of the day.

General Rose, as already indicated, had at his immediate disposal a very limited reserve. Although he had ordered Howze to counterattack with the entire force of the Combat Command Reserve it became apparent as day wore on that this would be insufficient. The ground over which the counterattack from Soy had to move gave every advantage to the Germans. Maneuver was restricted by the cuts through which ran the Hotton road, by a stream bordering the road on the south, and by the *German position atop the nose of the hill between the two towns* [that is where all the German tanks were, natch] which gave observation and fire over the barren ground to the north. Since General Rose had been promised the use of a battalion from the 517th Parachute Infantry, he decided to hold up the drive from Soy until it arrived. Also it appeared that the defenders of Hotton would shortly be reinforced by part of the leading RCT of the 84th Infantry Division, moving via Marche under orders from Ridgway to secure the Ourthe River line south of Hotton.

This help was slow in coming. As early as 0900 the 51st Engineer Battalion commander had asked the 84th to send aid to Hotton but the staff of the latter seem to have taken rather skeptically reports of the enemy strength in-

Page 380

volved. Two platoons finally arrived in Hotton late in the afternoon but by this time the German infantry were leaving the town and loading into their half-tracks as if the fight were over [note - this was probably an hour or two after the CCR force reached Hotten from the north. The German gave up before the 84th's men arrived, it appears]. Through the night American mortars in Hotton laid down a defensive barrage of illuminating shell and high explosives, but the enemy made no move to return to the assault.

The commander of the 116th Panzer Division, as well as General Manteuffel, would later pay tribute to "the bravery of the American engineers" at Hotton. They had reason for this acknowledgment (in which they could have included signal and service troops, unknown gun and tank crews) because the failure to secure the Hotton bridge was decisive in the future history of the LVIII Panzer Corps. Credit must also go to the Combat Command Reserve at Soy *whose fire, as the enemy acknowledged, caught Kampfgruppe Bayer in the flank* and checkmated its single-minded employment against Hotton. Finally, a share in the successful defense of the Hotton bridge should be assigned those elements of the three 3d Armored task forces which, on the 21st, had engaged the bulk of the 116th Panzer Division and 560th Volks Grenadier Division and prevented a wholesale advance into the Hotton sector." [Cf my points about the wild confusion of the "non-meeting engagement"]

I hope this is interesting. A fun little puzzle indeed...

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

So, you are probably now wondering, "what the heck does all of that mean, in terms of German units present in CM terms?" - LOL.

Of course I don't know. But I can give it an educated guess.

The initial morning attack was probably made by a Pz Gdr company, probably motorized and fighting dismounted, supported by 81mm mortars and a mixed tank platoon. That is, something like this -

1-2 Panther

2-4 Pz IV

Co + 4 Plt HQ

9 Motorized Pz Gdr Sqd

4 HMG

2 81mm mortar

1 81mm mortar FO

These advanced on the town from the east.

Either one of these infantry platoons, or perhaps a fourth platoon (but probably not a whole second company), got over the river far south and came up the western bank, from the south.

This force took out 2 of the defending tanks but did not establish more than a foothold in the town, is my sense of the reports. They lost 1-3 of their tanks, including at least one Panther to the U.S. Jackson.

In the mid to late morning, there was a lull. The U.S. sent wounded and trains away safely. The German tanks had pulled back out of the town, but the infantry probably still had some buildings, with a heads down no-man's land a few buildings wide, probably. The Germans were relatively inactive, because the initial failure was being assessed, reported, etc, and because a hot running fight against a larger U.S. was in progress to the northeast.

Sometime around noon, the Germans probably tried again. I would guess the force this time was at most 2 companies of Pz Gdr, including at least one in halftracks / the armored variety. They were probably supported by 1-2 platoons of Pz IVs, meaning around 8 tanks. 0-2 Panthers this time, as the tank duel with CCR would probably seem a more important place for them. Tanks ventured into the streets to support the Pz Gdrs with HE against the U.S. in the buildings, and the zooks got a few of them, as did the 37mm (AA or ATG).

There was no heavy artillery support this time - histories always record such things. The mortars from the morning were out of ammo, and heavier guns probably were not far enough forward. The tank guns substituted. This attack is the one that took half the buildings on the east bank, but was stopped short of the bridge by "a storm of fire".

How did the Germans have the impression of a "storm of fire?" There was one surviving Sherman and the Jackson may still have been there, but that would not account for it. No artillery was being used, and light mortars weren't available until night.

There are two key factors in the history. It is stated that "bazookas and MGs were distributed for a close in defense of the town". This location was a stores and trains sort of depot for CCR 3rd Armored division. It is distinctly possible they had crates of the things. Your history may provide more info, but I would assume many 30 cal and 50 cal MGs, as well as numerous bazooka teams, on the U.S. side.

The other factor is probably the AA guns. Those 40mm Bofors are hellish weapons against infantry. They were probably sighted to cover the bridge area, and the result was that the German infantry could get to the edge of their "LOS footprint", but not into it. The German tanks that were lost, may have been trying to get LOS to them, and passed close enough to zook teams trying to do so that they got taken out.

I doubt very much any Tigers were used. The tanks called that, were probably Pz IVs. The transposition, IV to VI, is easy enough to make, and inexperienced troops called every boxy-looking German tank they saw, a Tiger. While they obviously fought superbly, I doubt the trains and signals people from CCR rear echelon were all that experienced fighting German tanks. So it would be an understandable mistake.

Why didn't the Germans use Panthers more, when the mix of U.S. AT weapons was long on things that might kill a Pz IV, but short on things that could kill a Panther? The U.S. had 2x75mm on Shermans, 2x40mm AA, 2x37mm on Stuart and gun, loads of zooks, and all of 1x90mm on a Jackson. But the Germans did not know this. They only knew that they spearheaded the initial "armor forward" morning "coup-de-main" attempt, with a Panther (or two), and it was promptly and completely knocked out by a large-caliber ATG. So they led with infantry after that. Also, in the afternoon, the Panthers were in heavier "demand" facing the tanks of CCR on the heights toward Soy, than against the brave hodge-podge crew defending Hotten.

Also, it may be that the "heavy tanks", as opposed to just "tanks", mentioned in your history, refers to the number of Panthers used. That is, perhaps there were 4 Panthers and ~8-12 Panzer IVs involved all day. That would fit some aspects of German practices pretty well. And from the standpoint of knocking them out, the defenders would be quite right to call them "heavy tanks".

As for the question, "what would sub for this", my guess is another 40mm AA. There were 37mm AA being used. But if you are sure it was an AT gun, then use a 57mm and be sure you don't give it any "T" ammo. There is a difference of course, but it as close as you are going to get to a true 37mm ATG dismounted (= same gun as the Stuart or M-8).

My guesses. Check them against your histories and see if they fit before you buy them all the way - LOL. I hope this helps.

[This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 02-27-2001).]

[Dirtweasle]

Thanks Jason, very valuable.

Something interesting is there are quite a bit of conflicting reports on the engagement once you scratch past the surface. At least in so far as who destroyed the Panther. Seems there were units down the road and in the surrounding areas that were out of communications, and reports of who did what when are... well hard to figure. I've got a couple bookmarks to sites on my home computer that have stories indicating that a man named Popp got the Panther with a bazooka for instance.

The book I have indicates that the M4 that was toasted early was manned by a 3rd AD TC without a crew that was in at the supply depot in the outskirts of the city. Lieutenants Jamison and Wright had to talk him into taking some men from the 51st ECB as crew and moving into the battle. The story told in this book has the Sherman laying fire into some trees/brush at the direction of a dismounted T/5 Johnson who gave aiming corrections to the tank and alledgedly knocked off a Panzer hiding back in the trees. No mention of the fate of said Sherman really, though they do mention a "Light Tank" being KO'd early on by "Mark VI" Guessing this was a Panther as they misidentified another (same?) Panther as a Mark VI.

The 40mm Bofors are mentioned as being part of the 440th AAA Battalion. The 37mm seems to been "borrowed" by the engineers out of the rear trains of the 3rd AD. The history goes on to say there were "several" .50 cal MGs placed in the village, along with Daisy-Chain mines, and bazookas also "borrowed" from the supply depot.

As to the mystery M-10; Capt. Barnes and a detachment of volunteer clerks and such from the 51st H&S Co. apparantly went off to Marche looking for help, and found the M-10 manning a road block and got it to come down and join the battle.

I wish operations were easier to create in CM, or perhaps I'm just not getting the hang of it. The fight around Hotton seems to really require more than a 30 minute shoot-out to get the right "look and feel"

BTW - Anyone have a decent scaled map of the area? Just got a little out-of-scale sketch in the book, and it has virtualy no detail. The National Geographic map I have simply shows Hotton as a very small dot on the river.