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Commad in WWII


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Hello all. With all this stuff about CGI going on, "continuous time" and "WEGO" have been discussed a great deal. So, I'm wondering this, in WWII how long did it take for orders to get around. Also, how long did a company and a battalion commander have to think about their commands?

I understand that the "real time" in CC is unrealistic because you have to much control over units(ie recon enters building, encounters squad. You click on them and they instantly snap to your orders and withdraw). But I also know that real commanders couldn't ponder their actions for half an hour, decide to go get a drink, use the latrine, give orders, then watch the orders being carried out over and over to look for every nuance.

So I'm asking, what was it like typically in WWII and how close does CMBO come.

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usually Guy,

and It is much the same today. Is that Regiment tells the Batallion CO's what they want done. "We want you to attack town A"

It is then up to the batallion CO on how to do this. Batallion will look at his map and give bief orders to his company commanders "A company this is your route of advance."

Company CO then tells his Platoons where he wants them to go.

Platoon sgts then decide how they will get there.

Long ramble....

basically you get a general objective, that gets broken down more and more levels. But it is up to each level to decide how they reach thier objective.

CMBO is pretty good in a lot of ways. but knowing where and what are your guys are doing is always something that will be unrealistic, but something every computer game needs to be playable.

Lorak

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"Do not wait to strike till the iron is hot; but make it hot by striking."--William Butler Yeats

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and for Kitty's sake

=^..^=

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Guest Michael emrys

Originally posted by Guy w/gun:

...in WWII how long did it take for orders to get around[?]

Answer: It depends. It depends on what kind of unit it is, how it is equiped (especially with communication devices), how experienced they are, how good their morale is, how tired and hungry and cold they are, whether or not they are under fire, what kind of terrain they are on, how much frontage they are covering, what the weather is, whether they are attacking or defending, how many people do the orders have to reach, how complicated the orders are, etc., etc., etc.

In short, anywhere from 5 seconds to days.

Michael

[This message has been edited by Michael emrys (edited 02-09-2001).]

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I'll give you some examples on the long end, from the unit histories and "lessons learned" reports afterwards.

A battalion commander (call him "HQ", his companies A-D, etc) is told that his battalion has to force a crossing of a defended river. The operation has to be done within 3 days.

HQ goes down to physically look over the river from an OP. He calls all his company commanders to his command post and discusses the operation with them. They decide the most important thing is not where it is easiest to cross, but where it will be least expected - therefore, where it looks hard.

HQ orders recon guys to look over the stream with this in mind. They scout out positions, and notice several easy crossing sites and probably enemy positions beyond them. The find some other places with steep banks and deeper water, and report these back.

HQ calls the company commanders in again. They've got a sand-table made up to reproduce the main features of the terrain. They talk it all over, and decide to try to cross during the night in a column only 1 platoon across, one after another. They also decide that they will need engineer help (especially for the heaviest weapons - mortars and machineguns etc), and prepare a special operation to help that out, which the HQ gives in a partial order to the relevant commanders.

Those include - the recon platoon CO, the weapons company CO, and the engineer CO. They meet at the weapons company's command post. They come up with a plan. The weapons company will move into position to cover the crossing site several hours before the rest of the battalion arrives. They will cover a group from the recon and engineers, mixed, with recon guys leading, who will swim the river that night, and set up ropes strung across the river. When the main force arrives, it will use these to help cross, with the weapons again covering if they are spotted and a firefight breaks out. Last, the engineers will help the weapons guys pulley their loads across using the guide ropes.

The battalion HQ, meanwhile, has coordinated with the divisional artillery, and will have them fire a prep barrage 15 minutes before the crossing. This will hit several areas, including ones where they aren't crossing, but where they ID enemy positions in the earlier recon. For distraction, and to keep the enemy from patroling, and such.

The day it happened, it mostly went like clockwork.

The same formation, having to cross another river, one time had only about 18 hours notice. They did not have as much time to prepare. They still made the crossing easily, but not having had time to recon the otehr side, they blundered into a wide AP minefield on the far side of the river, still in the middle of the night. At day break they didn't have much cover because they hadn't gone as far, up to higher ground. Some tanks helped them out of the jam after engineers found a way for them to cross - that was a short notice affair, of a hour or two.

Or, once, a small unit planned a single raid on a fortified house on a height that overlooked the Anzio beachhead. This house was covered by minefields and wire, had MGs mounted, and was believed to be an FO position to call down artillery on the U.S. Intel guys wanted a prisoner from this particular spot, not just to wipe it off the map with arty.

So a single infantry platoon was going to get the support of a whole platoon of tanks to "raid" this house and leave with German prisoners. They prepared for a week. They found a spot behind the lines with similar terrain, and practiced on it, over and over. How to ride on the tanks, which tank would go to which side of the house, a supporting squad in a ditch to cut off retreats, tanks covering the withdrawl, a red flare signal for the tanks to pull back out, a divisional smoke barrage behind the house to cut it off from fire support from other German positions.

The whole thing was less than 40 guys. They were in and out in less than 15 minutes, with 6 prisoners. They lost one tank, immobilized, to mines, and destroyed it with thermite grenades before withdrawing to prevent its capture and recovery. The attackers took no casualties.

The high end of planning time was high indeed. The low end was also low indeed - a group in the Ardennes offensive might here the enemy a minute before they came into sight and have to fight as they were, every decision made on the fly. You got everything in between.

Incidentally, I personally only address all of this out of historical curiousity, and to answer your question truthfully. I will always prefer We-go to RT, simply because to me RT and strategy are mutually incompatible, and RTS is a contradiction in terms.

As a *game*, strategy is not about simulating, but about putting all of the relevant variables within reach of the player's control, and then having the outcome be determined entirely by their matched wits. Chess is not a simulation. But it is a great strategy game.

Whereas, some designers forget their job description and become movie directors, putting the player in the position of moreor less passively watching the designer's "cut" of the movie of how said designer happens to think things actually and typically happened (whether they did that way, being an entirely different question, about which people just pretend, as though programming wargames and being an entire historical faculty are the somehow same).

The actual military decisions historical commanders, individually and not added together up and down several layers of command, made, that had any appreciable effect on real outcomes and that were not just a matter of doing what military art and experience dictated was the only right answer in some situations (real, critical *decisions* in other words, with real and viable alternatives), were few, simple, and uncommon. And a truly accurate simulation of them would mostly bore people to tears, especially since the outcome would rest on a million outside and larger factors, and precious little on the matched wits of platoon leader A vs company XO B.

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One very revealing example I've read of was the French supreme command in late '39.

The supreme commander lived some distance south of Paris, and set up the HQ (of the French armed forces) half way to Paris.

The main troop assembly was, as you know, on the Belgian border.

When asked how long it would take for an order from him to reach the front troops, he replied; "not long, it usually get there within 48 hrs".

No wonder it went as it did with the response to the German Blitzkrieg.

Cheers

Olle

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Strategy is the art of avoiding a fair fight...

Detta har kånntrollerats av Majkråsofft späll-tjäcker.

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