CMBB OP - The Road to Minsk out the door

[Mark Gallear]

My Road to Minsk operation is oout the door at last and is on my Mod corner page plus hopefully the scenario depot in a couple of days.

Briefings Editing: Eden Smallwood and Brian Martuzas

Playtesting: Chris Martino and a very special thanks to Brian Martuzas, an SL/ASL scenario designer/researcher and playtester at Avalon Hill, who put in a lot of work and made many suggestions.

On 22 June 1944, three years to the day after Germany's 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, the Red Army launched a massive offensive in Byelorussia, which would take them to the gates of Warsaw in five short weeks. The operation was named after a Russian prince who fell at Borodino defending Russia against Napoleon. For Germany it was a worse defeat than Stalingrad and came at the same time as the victory in Normandy.

The German High Command knew that a major Russian offensive would be launched against them, but they believed it would come in the Ukraine. Their reasoning was that the terrain in the Ukraine was the most suitable for tank warfare.

If the Russians gained victory here it would give them a number of strategic possibilities including cutting off Army Group centre or an attack directly on Berlin. An attack in Byelorussia was dismissed because the terrain favoured the defender and the road network was poor, making logistical resupply difficult. The

Germans were also confident of been able to defend here as they had done so in the past with success.

The Soviet High Command saw things differently and picked Byelorussia for the scene of their offensive. They reasoned that the German armour remained concentrated in the Ukraine, there was

a strong partisan movement in this area to aid their offensive and once liberated it would leave Army Group North and Army Group North Ukraine out on a limb. It is unclear if the Russian High

command was aware from Enigma intercepts that the Germans expected and were preparing for the attack in the Ukraine.

A major Maskirovka (deception) campaign was put into operation to persuade the Germans that the attack was due in North Ukraine as they already believed. Steps were taken to hide reinforcements

sent to Byelorussia and persuade the Germans that a number of Tank Armies were still in the Ukraine. These included the creation of false positions and the heavy air patrols that only occasionally gave German Reconnaissance the opportunity to photograph them. The Soviets put out false radio traffic that reinforced the idea that their troops were arrayed against the Ukraine and actual communications were switched entirely to landlines.

Even so, by the eve of the offensive Army Group Centre's intelligence had correctly identified 140 of the 168 divisions arrayed against them. However, estimates of Soviet Armoured strength was less than half the real amount and the belief was still that the main thrust would come against Army Group North Ukraine.

Army Group Centre had been weakened and left with primarily an infantry force, weakly supported by armour and aircraft. The German infantry divisions were stretched beyond prudent limits.

Each division covered a front of 24-32km about double the norm. German infantry troops were now made up by a third of volsdeutsche – ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe who had little

enthusiasms for dying for Hitler.

The area of the Moscow-Minsk highway had been bitterly contested in the winter and autumn fighting of 1943-44 and it was the most

important objective in the beginning stages of the operation.

The heaviest concentration of Armour was at Orsha guarding the highway with 40 tanks including 29 Tiger 1s. The Germans had been able to prepare elaborate defensives with three to five trench lines at a depth of 5-6km. German strength was 52 divisions with about 800,000 men, compared to the 1700,000 Soviet men, who also had a six-fold advantage in armour and seven-fold in aircraft.

The offensive was timed for 19 June but congestion on the railway system prevented key units being deployed on time. A partisan

offensive on the German rail network timed for the 19th began anyway. The results were muted because of a German anti-Partisan operation that had begun in mid May, however the rail lines were totally disrupted for at least a day.

On June 22, the Red Army began reconnaissance in force with battalion raids into the German trench line to probe for weaknesses and ensure that these trenches were fully manned for a planned massive artillery strike on them the following day.

On the night of 22/23 June the first attempts to soften up the German defences with strategic bomber strikes on German troop concentrations. This was followed up at 0500 hours on June 23,

by a massive artillery preparation all along the front. The barrage lasted over two hours, and began with a period of intense shelling and was designed to destroy the forward trenches and

destroy the German infantry before they could withdraw to deeper defence lines. In some sectors this was followed by a rolling barrage along the forward trench lines for up to an hour, where the defences were dense a double rolling barrage was carried out. The German defenders agreed that it was the highest concentration of artillery fire that they had faced so far in the war.

- Players Notes –

The operation is meant to be played from the Soviet point of view. Both sides are set-up historically and the AI will not make a good job of placing the defensive line so you should stick

to Scenario Default.

I had problems recreating the initial artillery barrage. Any artillery units set for turn will reappear in the following games. In fact the heavy Russian artillery was left far behind

when the breakthrough took place. The solution was to give the Russian player some heavy artillery units so he has the satisfaction of a fireworks display but set the start of the game

at the end of the barrage with damage from it factored into the German defenders. (Another reason not to change the default scenario set-up.)

The forces are scaled down. The map was created from the 3d map in Steven Zaloga's Operation Bagration, Osprey. See also the Russian PKKA-CA site for a personal account of an unnamed Soviet

flame-thrower tank commander in the operation. The Historical Perspective Deception page on the US military site - Fort Leavenworth is a paper on the US military analysis of the

Maskirovka element in the success of Bagration.

[Brigadier]

Splendid work Mark! Good job