Paul Lakowski Posted March 12, 2001 Share Posted March 12, 2001 Originally posted by M Hofbauer: Paul Lakowski, those figures I gave are from official KTB and strength reports of Generalstab des Heeres and Oberkommando des Heeres, collected by Hahn who preserved them from his work at the Heereswaffenamt. Markus Hofbauer "....and with few exceptions,...." Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest wwb_99 Posted March 12, 2001 Share Posted March 12, 2001 Originally posted by Paul Lakowski: They could have solved both the fuel shortage and the truck shortage prior to Babarossa by not diverting the men and materials that were bound for the auto industry and oil industry in the first two years of the war in order to maintain staffing levels on infantry divisions they didn't need in the first place. Most of these decisions where Hitler's. The structure of the supply system was due to the 'cottage industry' nature of the German economy, something that Reich minister Todt tried to change through 1941 only to be blocked by Hitler and his power hungry gaultiers. What more people don't seem to recognize was that Germany produced 3 times as much steel as Russia and almost as much oil as Russia ...and yet with all this production the Russians produced 3 times as many weapons in all categories [ except trucks]....after there industrial base was shattered and relocated 1500km east into the ural mountains. If such a 'back ward' people could do that much , then any complaint about how the Germans couldn't produce enough of this or that war material is just making excuses! What was wrong with Germany was in the structure of there economy that inhibited its conversion to a total war economy....but instead keep the power base in the hands of Hitler's power hungry Nazi Cronies. The real problem in was not that there was a general lack of POL in German stocks, but the inability to transport enough of it to the front to satisfy all the POL needs of the existing Panzer divisions. Both the necessary motivational power (trucks, etc) and the infrastructure (roads and rails) were not avaliable. This problem was especially acute in 1941, before the Wehrmacht had rebuilt the rail system in western Russia. But they still suffered in subsequent offensive operations, as rapid advances moved forces well beyond the railheads and overstretched the weak German supply system. A very similar situation happened in 1944 on the western front. This time the victims were the British 1st Army and Patton's 3rd Army. They were halted not by enemy resistance, but by a lack of fuel at the front. Not that there were not huge stockpiles in the Atlantic ports. But there were huge traffic jams going west, and the Redball express could only carry so much. I highly reccomend reading Martin van Creveld's "Supplying War." He has an extensive section on logistics in World War II, as well as great sections on logistics in previous wars. WWB [This message has been edited by wwb_99 (edited 03-12-2001).] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
M Hofbauer Posted March 12, 2001 Share Posted March 12, 2001 Originally posted by Paul Lakowski: All due respect , but I don't see how you can make such a statement since OKH never keep any records of captured Russian Tanks never any... Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Paul Lakowski Posted March 12, 2001 Share Posted March 12, 2001 Originally posted by M Hofbauer: never any... OK you win, " Almost never any...." Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Paul Lakowski Posted March 15, 2001 Share Posted March 15, 2001 Originally posted by wwb_99: The real problem in was not that there was a general lack of POL in German stocks, but the inability to transport enough of it to the front to satisfy all the POL needs of the existing Panzer divisions. Both the necessary motivational power (trucks, etc) and the infrastructure (roads and rails) were not avaliable. This problem was especially acute in 1941, before the Wehrmacht had rebuilt the rail system in western Russia. But they still suffered in subsequent offensive operations, as rapid advances moved forces well beyond the railheads and overstretched the weak German supply system. A very similar situation happened in 1944 on the western front. This time the victims were the British 1st Army and Patton's 3rd Army. They were halted not by enemy resistance, but by a lack of fuel at the front. Not that there were not huge stockpiles in the Atlantic ports. But there were huge traffic jams going west, and the Redball express could only carry so much. I highly reccomend reading Martin van Creveld's "Supplying War." He has an extensive section on logistics in World War II, as well as great sections on logistics in previous wars. I will look for this book , in the meantime... OK I agree with this as I've read as much in the past ,but it doesn't bear close scrutiny when you start crunching some numbers, consider the following. Leg mobile infantry Korps can average 20 km per day and Motorized Korps can average about 50km per day. The distance from the Polish boarder to Moscow was 1500 km there for in a straight march, the motorized divisions could have been there in under a month and the leg mobile korps in just over two months. The invasion of France covered about 1500km of fighting and maneuvering and was completed in 5 weeks.There fore there was about 3-4 weeks of maneuver and 2-1 week of combat. If we see the invasion of France in two phases you have the race to the channel and the advance to the south. Each characterized by up to a weeks fighting followed by 1 to 3 weeks of pursuit. Yet Historically the advance on Moscow took 6 months, therefor the rate of advance was not determined by the level of motorization but by something else. Historically a quick look at Guderians Panzer Leader shows the Panzer Korps undergoing lighting advances for several days some times averaging 40-60km a day followed by days of waiting for the supplies to catch up repair and regroup . But you see a similar pattern in France, were the road net is not a problem.In fact in France you see days of fighting followed by a breakthrough and then days of advance which ends when objective is reached, then regroup for the next advance. So there is natural cycle of fight, advance and regroup and in Russia we see a similar pattern . If we look at the broad picture we have <PRE> Guderians Pz Korps Military Gas consumption *June 200 km advance 260,000 tons July 450 km advance 180,000 tons Aug 180 km advance 200,000 tons Sept 208 km advance 175,000 tons OCT 208 km advance 160,000 tons Nov 105 km advance 120,000 tons Dec 72 km advance 130,000 tons * Last week of July </PRE> The key is the fighting not the motorization. If you look at David Glantz 'Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front', the panzer spearheads are weeks ahead of the main army in only a matter of one month of fighting. When the Russian counter attacks strike they often out number the Germans 3:1 to 10:1 , thus taking a large toll of the panzer forces. What was needed was more motorization and mobile fire power for the Infantry korps. That way they could finish the encirclement battles sooner and catch up with the Panzer spearheads and take over the fight so the Panzer spearheads can flank the enemy line and continue the advance. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jarmo Posted March 16, 2001 Author Share Posted March 16, 2001 Just upping this in case someone has something to add.. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Paul Lakowski Posted March 18, 2001 Share Posted March 18, 2001 Originally posted by Jarmo: That was part of my original question. The problem is, I have no info whatsoever of this, but I doubt this was done in large enough quantities to warrant inclusion. The soviet's were not nearly as hard pressed for tanks as germans. Some captured german tanks were stripped of their turrets and used as basis for SP guns. But again, I have no idea if this was done to 5 or 500 tanks. A view from the other side "The Soviet Economy and the Red Army" Dunn Jr pp 133 " Over 1,200 German Mk -III Panzers and Sturmgesschutz III were converted into SU-76i at No 38 [Factory] in the fsll of 1943" 1,200 in the fall of 1943 , I had no idea that the Russians converted that many captured tanks...the chapter goes on the note that Factory 38 continued to produce SU-76s from their T-70 line and it seems the SU-76i was just a temporary expediance. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Michael emrys Posted March 18, 2001 Share Posted March 18, 2001 Originally posted by Paul Lakowski: If you look at David Glantz 'Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front', the panzer spearheads are weeks ahead of the main army in only a matter of one month of fighting. When the Russian counter attacks strike they often out number the Germans 3:1 to 10:1 , thus taking a large toll of the panzer forces. What was needed was more motorization and mobile fire power for the Infantry korps. That way they could finish the encirclement battles sooner and catch up with the Panzer spearheads and take over the fight so the Panzer spearheads can flank the enemy line and continue the advance. My own readings concur with this. But as much as the infantry needed motorization, the logistics support services probably needed it even more for an attack against the USSR to succeed. Not only did they need trucks by the tens of thousands, all branches needed vehicles that could operate in mud and snow. The transportation infrastructure of the USSR was approximately equivalent to that of the USA in the 1880s, lots of railroad track and dirt roads. A lot of river traffic too. Michael Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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