Which book is the best Hurtgen Forest history?

[Aacooper]

I'm interested in reading a book which covers the whole of the Hurtgen Forest fighting. I've read "The Battle of Hurtgen Forest" by Whiting, but I prefer something better-written like "Follow Me and Die" which only covers the 28th Division's Novmber 2-16 battle. In other words, something which coherently describes the battle with maps and descriptions of both German and US units and forces.

Is "A Dark and Bloody Ground : The Hurtgen Forest and the Roer River Dams, 1944-1945" by Miller any good?

[Airborne]

Yes, I liked "A Dark and Bloody Ground".

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Land Soft--Kill Quiet

[Shep]

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt by Charles B. MacDonald and Sidney T. Mathews. It's from the U.S. Army in World War II Special Studies. Although it only covers the action at Schmidt, it comes with both topographical maps and aerial photos.

Mark

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Scouts Out!

[Bobbaro]

Two books to consider, from J.B. Lippencott Co., The Battle of the Huertgen Forest by Charles McDonald; and Forest in Hell by Paul Boesch, Lib. of Con. Cat. card No. 85-70436.

The latter book is just the kind of first person book that personifies the generalities that are found in more comprehensive works. As it appears that it was published more or less by the author himself, it is likely difficult to get. McDonald does cite it and quote from it in his The Battle of the Huertgen Forest.

McDonald was critical of higher command for what I would call a lack focus concerning objectives, circumstances, and conducting disruptive micromanagement of the conduct of the battle in that these remotely placed commanders on numerous occasions drew lines on their maps, tasked regiments and battalions to multiple simultaneous objectives, and set attack schedules totally out of touch with the realities of the situation. These commanders did so with impunity. The commanders at corps, army and army group level were the main cause of incalculable suffering to little purpose. What responsibility went higher is a little less clear to me, but carelessness was the order of the day.

In defense it might be said that these people were entirely unprepared to find themselves sitting on the frontier of Germany at that early a date, (September was

when it started)victory disease was rampant among their staffs, confusion was likely great, and logistical problems loomed as a high priority item, higher the further back structures got. A flank attack out of the forest was the only operational concern that started the whole thing in the first place and only late in the process did an inkling that the Rhoer River dams were important occur. It seems that closing to the Rhine had been left to shift for it self in all the planning. This should have a concern at Supreme H.Q. Yeah, there were generalized plans, but apparently they had not been brought down to the detailed sort of planning appropriate to actually conducting the campaign as had been done for Normandy.

Given how the Germans actually had it in their power to stop the invasion had the deception plan not worked and that Allied Supreme H.Q. had an appreciation of that very possible scenario makes the concentration on Normandy to the exclusion of all else understandable. Perhaps another separate H.Q. planning task force would have helped solve that lack.

Sometime down the line the importance of the dams sank in and thus began the attack on Schmidt, but with the same mishandling as before. It was not until the 2nd Infantry Div. was launched on its attack at the dams in December that a rational approach appeared. Then it was by far too late. What would have happened to the German forces being gathered for the Bulge attack had the dams been taken in October and the Rhoer been crossed in that month or November? Likely the whole lot would have been forced into piecemeal commitment in an unfavorable series of stopgap measures before they were ready, getting whittled down while in a general retreat.

[This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 11-11-2000).]

[Aacooper]

It seems that in the case of the 28th Division, Gen. Gerow the V Corps commander set out different objectives for the three regiments. Gen. Cota initially objected, but he didn't press his case. Then, once the battle started, Cota apparently visited a battle zone once (in stark contrast to his hands-on style in Normandy with the 29th ID!), and his orders were more or less irrelevant. The 28th ID's Assistant Divisional Commander, Gen. Davis, was often on the battlefield. Unfortunately, his orders weren't always the best, but at least he put himself on the line to figure out what was going on. Another factor was that 28th ID reports were optimistic and misleading. So, it is hard to say what Cota knew once the battle started, and what Gerow knew was almost certainly inaccurate.