On-Board Artillery

[Major Belles]

I've noticed that the OPFOR will take their artillery directly into battle, with suprisingly good effect. During the action phase, it will fire directly at a position, to very good effect. 2 questions. Firstly, is this a better tactic than leaving your art. behind the lines? Also, is it possible for the human player to do this?

[Guest MajorH]

>Firstly, is this a better tactic than leaving your art. behind the lines?

Depends on the terrain and situation and most importatnly on how effective the enemy's communications and counterbattery assets are.

U.S. military doctrine discourages use of arty in a forward/direct fire mode. OPFOR doctrine thinks its a great idea.

>Also, is it possible for the human player to do this?

Yes.

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Best regards, Major H

majorh@mac.com

[This message has been edited by MajorH (edited 09-28-2000).]

[Trooper]

There's a catch to the onboard artillery as well, of course.. it's easier to kill. I recall a CPX where I had LAVs rampaging around killing off howitzers with the 25mm cannon.

NTM

[Major Belles]

Great; thanks for both answers. I've killed OPFOR art. that way alot also, but not without taking alot of direct hits from it.

[BobDennis]

The OPFOR (based on Soviet Tactics) has the Artillery forward as part of their anti-tank and anti-ATGM options.

While not present in TACOPS as a solitaire game, the Soviets would detach the artillery (Regimental Artillery Groups and probably more arty than the TACOPS gives them)at around +4 KMs. This artillery would fire from a direct aim at known and suspected ATGM battle positions. The suppressive fires would allow the Soviets to close quickly with the enemy. The SP Mortars would get in closer, but they would also be looking for ATGMs to kill/suppress. The Soviets got a different and more realistic lesson from the Yom Kippur War, ATGMs kill APCs, keeping in mind that you have to have your infantry in APCs if you want to survive nuclear war in Europe.

Can this be done by a person. Yes and very easily. You have to make a plan, you have to designate places (phase lines) where you are going to transition the battle formations from Battalion/Regiment in column to Battalion on line, companies in column and eventually where everybody is on line. The Arty will have fallen out to provide suppressive fires at 4000 meters from the suspected/known enemy position. When the guns are in position, start firing at the places where you suspect the Blue ATGMs are. It will take time and practice, we didn't teach the NTC OPFOR to do this overnight, nor do we expect the people who run the OPFOR on the Battle Command Training Program to be able to do this overnight. (The same applies for people who run the OPFOR on BBS).

[rich4421972]

Is there any chance that the above info is included in the Military Reference Library sold at this site?

[Guest MajorH]

Yes. Its in FM-100-61 Armor and Mechanized Based OPFOR Operational Art, Chapter 9 - Artillery Support.

This FM is also included in the library folder in the TacOps CD package.

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Best regards, Major H

majorh@mac.com

[This message has been edited by MajorH (edited 10-04-2000).]

[Don Hill]

The differences in tactics used by the US and the former Soviet Union is a reflection of the differences in the resources they had available.

The Soviets had a greater pool of manpower available to them, but there were many different cultures and languages within this pool and their level of training across the board was generally lower than that of the west.

To compensate for that and to make sure that everyone within the Warsaw Pact could operate together, they used simple tactics and drilled these tactics repeatedly. They would mass men and firepower at the point of attack in an attempt to break through enemy defenses and then use speed to race through the breach to prevent the enemy from reacting effectively.

On board direct fire artillery is one example of massed firepower. This is not used to replace off board artillery, it is used to augment it. One advantage is that by spotting their own targets they don't have to rely on communications that can be disrupted and they don't suffer any delays while the spotter relays the results. A disadvantage of their massed attacks is that they are exposed more readily to both direct and indirect fire and are likely to suffer a higher attrition rate. The theory is that any casualties suffered in the breakthrough are more than made up for in the exploitation that follows as the enemy will be too confused and disrupted to mount an effective defense.

The US, with more effective materials and training and a smaller pool of manpower, has chosen to box with their opponent rather than slug it out toe to toe. They count on their communications to fire their artillery indirectly and then displacing them to a new location to avoid detection and counter battery fire. This preserves their fewer units and is in keeping with their attempts to do more with less.

[rich4421972]

A great example of the above theory is to use the Coyote Recce and ARV Taurus (and other small units) to register TRPs of the enemy's location. Off-map artillery then has an excellent chance of knocking out the OPFOR from a distance or, at the very least, delaying his advance. In my estimation this is how you can "win" a timed scenario even when OPFOR greatly outnumbers BLUFOR.

OPFOR's onboard artillery is thus a great strategic target for you if you wish to live long and prosper. These words are just my experience.

O Canada!

[This message has been edited by rich4421972 (edited 10-10-2000).]

[Trooper]

I am reminded of the frustration I felt as a Combined Arms commander (Playing NATO) against my Soviet opponent who just basically slowly marched across the map, stonking any likely ambush locations with lots of artillery.. Anything I had left was usually overwhelmed by the Opfor AFVs and troops.

NTM

[BobDennis]

There is another aspect of Soviet Artillery use. The Regimental Artillery Battalion Commander and his Command/Observation Post travels with the Maneuver Regimental Commander. He is also the "Staff Artillery Officer" unlike the American Army where it could be a Captain from the Artillery Battalion Staff. The Fire Support Plan, including the positioning of the Anti-Tank units (a part of the Artillery Branch). The Regimental Artillery Battalion Commander also has a direct line back to the attached Artillery Battalions of the Regimental Artillery Group (RAG). He tells them where and when to fire. There is also none of the "Counterfire" stuff that American DS Artillery gets into. The Soviets restrict counterfires to the Divisional Artillery Groups (DAGs) and the Army Artillery Groups (AAGs). As I recall Tactika devoted almost 3 chapters to Soviet Artillery operations (I need to dig it out of my reference box) and the Sloan Studies devoted an entire book, complete with the mathmatical formulas for planning the Units of Fire and so on. The current OPFOR books have been too Americanized because the FA school (and others) had problems with Soviet Doctrine.

The Battery Commanders and their Command/Observation Posts are with the Maneuver Battalion Commanders. Not a Junior Officer. The battery supporting say the 3d BN XXX MRR is talking directly back to his Executive Officer who is with the Guns.

The practice of simple drills and reactions make a lot of sense in a conscript Army, where a lot of the Junior Officers are going to be leaving in a few years and there is essentially no Non Commissioned Officer Corps, but it make a lot of sense in the rapid movement of troops and the rapid reaction to changing events.