BobDennis

<<Goran noted that luck played a factor in his 0% casualties in Kincaid. Do miliartary planners factor luck into their plans? If so, how?>> As stated above by others, No planner (Battalion or above) would bring the word "luck" up in a plan. There is a hope and so forth, but "luck" is not planned for, "bad luck" may be planned for/compensated. We take 5 helicopters instead of only 4... "bad luck" is also compensated for by putting the company commander and executive officer or 1st sergeant in different vehicles. At the platoon, squad or team level, "luck" may be used in a spur of the moment plan. i.e. lay a base of fire and I'll (you'll?) cross the road and get behind the bad guys machine gun... This is a different kind of luck and it could mean that you are lying in the road and in a "football" analogy, you don't get to play the next down and perhaps your game playing career is over for good, meanwhile a new "leadership problem" has been presented to the survivors.

The Australians are blessed to have a turret on their M-113's. The American M-113, even the ACAV, had the M-2 .50s on a pintel mount. The Track Commander bracing himself and the gun and firing. There were requests that a traversing and Elevating mechanism be adapted but it was into the late '80s before that happened and then for the most part it was a unit modification. The M-113 and its varients can swim. Ever seen an M-577 swim, it is best done from a distance. We always had empty bleach bottles tied to the vehicle so we could find it later and we wore life preservers and everyone, except the driver was on the top deck, no one inside. War story alert: In 1979, around November, (that way if a vehicle sank no one would enjoy it) 1st Armored Divison was swimming the Main River near Bamberg. As I recall 1-46 Infantry had just gotten some rebuilt M-113s in. Everything went into the river and suddenly one of the drivers was hit in the face with a wad of fiberglass/tape and followed by a stream of water. The vehicle quickly filled with water and sank. M-113 swimming was stopped. The vehicle was recovered and inspected. By the driver's compartment was a nice round hole, there was one in the engine compartment and two (either side of the troop compartment). Everyone was scratching their head and one of the old Sergeants said they looked a lot like the holes they had in Viet Nam to hold the anti-RPG shields (sandbags and PSP). Sure enough these M-113s had been in Viet Nam, rebuilt and the Army Depot just filled the holes and painted over them. Most of the M-113s in Europe had always been in Europe and that conversion was never done. It is still a mystery to me why we are going for a wheeled vehicle (and I like the concept) when it is bigger and weighs more than a M-113. But someone Beltway Bandit must be getting something.

"The first rule of anti-tank is always hit them in the flank." The "reverse slope" defense is a classic defense. It was (and still is) the preferred defense of the former Soviet Army. The basic idea is you are sitting in a defensive position (and one the Russian Steppe or the NE German Plain) it is generally in the open and the only protection is what your or someone else's shovel provides. The idea is to be far enough down the slope (and it should not be a steep slope) that the enemy is only able to bring a small portion of his force to bear on you at a time. As each armored vehicle crests the top of the slope you shoot them before they are able to bring their guns to bear and the vehicles behind them aren't able to see where the rounds came from. Yes a lot of artillery can suppress/kill the defender but as the artillery forward observer can't see the defensive position (blocked by terrain) the barrage effectiveness is based on luck (or lack thereof). A Reverse slope defense is a "combined arms" affair and you have to have supporting positions on the flanks and a counter attack force to make it work. As for putting a defensive position on the near crest of a hill. It does work, (don't be on the forward side) and if you have to have positions there, tunnel through the top of the hill, like the North Koreans and the Chinese did in the Korean War. The Chinese and the North Koreans loved to station their mortars at the near crest of the hill because it did make counter fire difficult, approximately 20-50 feet in elevation below the crest (remember the mortar is an indirect fire weapon, unless you are firing at a very high hill or building). The observer would be in a place (dangerous of course) where he could see over the hill and still call in fire. [ 09-07-2001: Message edited by: BobDennis ]

The U.S. Army Chemical Corps was looking at fielding "Sodium" bombs during the last part of World War II. This weapon would be used against the docks, warehouses and other facilities in Japanese ports and harbors. The idea was to use 500 or larger bombs using a very thin metal that would shatter impact (one idea) or to use a "regular bomb" and have a burster crack the metal. This weapon was still considered into the 1980s as an anti-harbor device as it would provide blast and fire. I remember in college some one put some "sodium" in one of the dorm urinals. This was around 1 or 2 am, the sodium still covered with the oil was just "simmering" in the urinal until someone walked in and saw that the urinal was "on fire" and it got worse and worse as he valiently tried to flush it out. The urinal eventually cracked under the strain.

I hate to be a spoil sport, but the former Soviets (and the current Russian Army) does not use Hinds, Hokums or Havocs in the same way the US uses helicopters. I know this is just a game, but the Blue Creep that keeps getting into OPFOR tactics has been a pain to me ever since working with RED THRUST or working at the Battle Command Training Program. When you are using Soviet/Russian tactics, the Hinds are used in groups of 4-6, they generally stay behind the forward line of troops and are used to quickly eliminate a strong point or a counter attack force. They are flown by Soviet/Russain Air Force Pilots and are controlled by a ground based FAC that is riding with a Regimental Commander.

There is another aspect of Soviet Artillery use. The Regimental Artillery Battalion Commander and his Command/Observation Post travels with the Maneuver Regimental Commander. He is also the "Staff Artillery Officer" unlike the American Army where it could be a Captain from the Artillery Battalion Staff. The Fire Support Plan, including the positioning of the Anti-Tank units (a part of the Artillery Branch). The Regimental Artillery Battalion Commander also has a direct line back to the attached Artillery Battalions of the Regimental Artillery Group (RAG). He tells them where and when to fire. There is also none of the "Counterfire" stuff that American DS Artillery gets into. The Soviets restrict counterfires to the Divisional Artillery Groups (DAGs) and the Army Artillery Groups (AAGs). As I recall Tactika devoted almost 3 chapters to Soviet Artillery operations (I need to dig it out of my reference box) and the Sloan Studies devoted an entire book, complete with the mathmatical formulas for planning the Units of Fire and so on. The current OPFOR books have been too Americanized because the FA school (and others) had problems with Soviet Doctrine. The Battery Commanders and their Command/Observation Posts are with the Maneuver Battalion Commanders. Not a Junior Officer. The battery supporting say the 3d BN XXX MRR is talking directly back to his Executive Officer who is with the Guns. The practice of simple drills and reactions make a lot of sense in a conscript Army, where a lot of the Junior Officers are going to be leaving in a few years and there is essentially no Non Commissioned Officer Corps, but it make a lot of sense in the rapid movement of troops and the rapid reaction to changing events.

The OPFOR (based on Soviet Tactics) has the Artillery forward as part of their anti-tank and anti-ATGM options. While not present in TACOPS as a solitaire game, the Soviets would detach the artillery (Regimental Artillery Groups and probably more arty than the TACOPS gives them)at around +4 KMs. This artillery would fire from a direct aim at known and suspected ATGM battle positions. The suppressive fires would allow the Soviets to close quickly with the enemy. The SP Mortars would get in closer, but they would also be looking for ATGMs to kill/suppress. The Soviets got a different and more realistic lesson from the Yom Kippur War, ATGMs kill APCs, keeping in mind that you have to have your infantry in APCs if you want to survive nuclear war in Europe. Can this be done by a person. Yes and very easily. You have to make a plan, you have to designate places (phase lines) where you are going to transition the battle formations from Battalion/Regiment in column to Battalion on line, companies in column and eventually where everybody is on line. The Arty will have fallen out to provide suppressive fires at 4000 meters from the suspected/known enemy position. When the guns are in position, start firing at the places where you suspect the Blue ATGMs are. It will take time and practice, we didn't teach the NTC OPFOR to do this overnight, nor do we expect the people who run the OPFOR on the Battle Command Training Program to be able to do this overnight. (The same applies for people who run the OPFOR on BBS).