Ammo management and other Q?

[C Colapietro]

Fionn:

My point about a tank platoon commander's influence was not that he would call out degree facings during combat, but that a good commander could influence his units behavior in the field. This of course would require this behavior to be defined prior to the engagement, and the Germans were particulary big on drilling combat situations during down time.

I do object to your presentation of conjecture as fact, however. Again, just because it was in the manuals and of importance to high command doesn't mean it was common practice, and just because you think it must have been so doesn't make it so. German tankers were forbidden to weld to the armor as it was believed to disrupt the characteristics of the steel, and yet it was common practice to do so for tool brackets etc.

And again my question is more along the line of would the facing thing come into play in a CS role as opposed to an Armor vs Armor engagement.

Please don't take my debate as antagonsitic (this is, after all, a discussion board is it not?). This topic has probably strayed from the realm of usefulness to BTS, but I still enjoy the discussion. I'm not saying anyone here is right or wrong until I can drum up some factual support one way or the other, and if someone presents some factual info that shoots holes in my agruments, I walk away with more knowledge than when I came - a good thing in my book.

[Ken Talley]

I have to agree with most of Fionn's statement. I am almost certain that I read a reference to German vehicles offsetting in the Sidi Rezeg battles of November 41. Unfortunatly I haven't been able to locate the passage so I may be incorrect.

Although I would disagree with general minimization of the tank platoon commanders role suggested in the following statement:

"""Colapietro, your understanding of what a tank platoon commander could influence is unfortunately grossly incorrect. A tank platoon commander in combat might, at best, be able to order his platoon to orient east,north, south or west or "towards where the road comes out of the village" but there's simply no way he would set facings with an accuracy in the degree level."

In part IV, Chapter 17 of "The United States Marine Corps in WWII" by S.E. Smith is a transcript of recordings taken by naval radiomen monitoring the dialogue of a Marine tank company fighting for the Orote Peninsula. The amount of radio communication and direction provided by company and platoon leaders was constant, very detailed and specific. Tank platoon commanders would instruct the platoon members on spacing, fire direction, specific guns to fire, enemy targets/threats, facing, etc. They would constantly correct as spacing was compromised or a unit fired at the wrong target or simply did something dumb. There was one interesting passage in which one tank was specifically directed by it's platoon leader to "run over a gun" as well as "run over a pillbox". The tank had to be reminded several times before he would do either because he didn't want to do it. My conclusion was that the tank platoon and company commanders didn't give individual tanks much initiative. Maybe it was just the Marines but I doubt it.

I suspect a veteran platoon or company commander would do his best to ensure that a green tanker is using his vehicles to its best ability. Of course, he can't always watch everyone. This almosts suggests a command and control role for platoon/company tanks. If w/i command control, less experienced tank crews may benefit from being w/i control of their more experienced leaders. Something to think about.

Ken

[This message has been edited by Ken Talley (edited 11-12-99).]

[Guest Scott Clinton]

CC : "...just because it was in the manuals and of importance to high command doesn't mean it was common practice..."

This is my point also. It will take a more than a pair of training bulletins (that is ALL they were) and a handful of accounts by veteran crews 'blowing their own horns' for me to accept that this was general practice for green, regular or veteran troops.

If it was so widespread (at least among vets) why is it such an obscure topic? Why is there is no note taken by US or British forces when EVERY little detail of German armor tactics were analyzed during and after the war in the most minute detail? Including EXTENSIVE interviews and use of veteran German officers after the war to gleam an edge over the Soviets…and they 'missed' this?

I have a book at home written by the #1 stuka pilot (sorry I forget his name) and he goes into GREAT detail about how the US and UK air forces tapped him for every single bit of information he could give them about how he was so successful in dive bombing enemy tanks. He is just one person. Are you saying the just forgot to do the same thing for every single German tanker?

BOTTOM LINE:

I firmly believe the burden of proof rests with those wanting to add this behavior to CM.

A pair of training booklets and a handful of accounts (3? 5? 15? engagements) is NOT sufficient to alter the behavior of every single German tank in CM, no not even if you limit it to just veteran crews or just Tiger/Panther crews, at least not IMO.

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The Grumbling Grognard

[Fionn]

CC said "I do object to your presentation of conjecture as fact, however"

CC, 2 manuals, numerous tactical summaries by German officers AND British staff analyses of actions are NOT conjecture they are fact. I was countering your argument with fact yet you MISREPRESENT it as conjecture. If you continue to misrepresent my points by labelling facts as conjecture there isn't much point in discussing this is there?

Read my post again and realise I was talking about FACTUAL reports by German and UK officers who simply didn't get important things like the use of offset in battle wrong.

Scott,

Ok, I have 2 tank manuals, at least 3 German tactical appraisals and at least 3 or 4 British tactical analyses to back up my points. That's quite a bit of proof saying it WAS used by Pz IV crews etc also.

What PROOF do you have that it wasn't except for opinion? And don't say the burden of proof rests with me to prove my opinion because as we both know once I can present contemporary first person accounts, manuals AND tactical analyses saying it was used you MUST counter them in some way OTHER than saying "it is my opinion it wasn't used".

PROVE it wasn't used with some evidence and I'll go along with your point of view. Until then I'll believe the German military documents and battle reports of the time which I've read which state it WAS used. (a pretty reasonable stance IMO )

Also, I have to wonder if you even read my post because I CLEARLY stated that I've read it mentioned in UK tactical reports from North Africa and Italy and yet you say "why was it never mentioned in US or UK reports".. Well, previously I said it WAS mentioned..

Did you read my post Scott?

BTW his name is "Hans Ulrich Rudel" and he killed over 550 Soviet tanks and went to live in south America in the same community which sheltered Mengele. He was interviewed a few years ago and gave a very interesting view of a "true and still-loyal nazi".

Maybe if I know THOSE facts off the top of my head maybe you could admit I've READ the UK reports which TALK about how German crews used offset, reports you seemingly haven't read (and which, to be fair I only came across by accident during my readings).

Scott, to summarise, UK teams both during the war AND post-war did mention the use of offset. I've seen it mentioned in British-authored books on the war in North Africa, I've seen it mentioned by multiple German sources as a well-known and common tactic in battle AND I think Carius alluded to it in his book also IIRC.

End result I DID mention it's notice by Allied forces, something you seem not to have noticed which leads me to wonder if you even read my previous post.

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___________

Fionn Kelly

Manager of Historical Research,

The Gamers Net - Gaming for Gamers

[CoolColJ]

errr

I don't think just because its a Crack/elite/verteran unit they will automatically angle the frontage of the tank a certain amount, or a green units angle another amount. The heat of battle, the rush of adrenlin etc would influence that a bit. The fuzzy logic Tac AI should make that variable - ie better units would do this most of the time, and greener units would forget more often And I guess being pinned/suppressed/shcocked would definitely make them forget

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CCJ

aka BLITZ_Force

My Homepage -

www.geocities.com/TheTropics/Beach/4448

[Bastables]

Fionn Hertzer test.

1. Hmm bit of a trick question. The Germans based the design of the Hertzer from the Romanian Maresal MO-4 itself based upon the chassis of captured Russian T-60 design with the 7.5cm Resita gun which was based upon the Pak 40 and the Russian 7.62 cm gun (the one in the T34).

2. Hertzer was based on the Lt 38 or Pz 38t (in German service).

3. Bugger, I really whould not know.

[Guest Big Time Software]

Sorry Fionn and others, I am utterly UNCONVINCED that we should come up with some mathematically precise, right on the money, straight out of the training manual, do it right every single time, in every single instance behavior for the TacAI. It is utterly artificial and way, way, way too theoretical to say that this happened ALL the time, every time. You have GOT to remember that anecdotal evidence, and even training manuals, is not conclusive proof that something was done and/or worked more often than not.

Remember our big discussion about sandbags and PF protection? Here we had the opposite problem. There was incontrovertible evidence to support the facts that sandbags were piled up on tanks in at least one US armored division, and probably others. There was obviously a concerted effort within these formations to use sandbags, so I am sure we could have round manuals if we dug hard enough specifying how to secure the bags (these would have been field printed, so not likely to be found in any case). So why doesn't CM simulate sandbags? Because from all accounts they didn't work, so why bother?

What the sandbag thing shows is that science and frontline behavior don't necessarily go hand in hand. This angle thing is similar, but from the opposite way around. Some nerdy German scientist came up with the PERFECT mathematical equation and a tactic was created from it and printed up in the manual. I do not doubt that some tankers (veteran Tiger tankers in particular) followed this tactic in some cases. But I absolutely believe, with unshakeable faith, that this was not a tactic that was followed with robotic like precision in each and every case encountered on the battlefield. And that is what is being proposed here -> near perfect mathematical precision in all cases, all the time. Therefore, any suggestion that this should be built into the TacAI is falling on deaf ears. It is just too "lab room" perfect.

As for the older tanks (PzIV), yes, moving the hull DRASTICALLY improves targeting response time since the turret's rotation speed was so crappy. I have never seen a PzIV training manual, but I will bet that it is mentioned in there for sure. Prior to even Fionn seeing the game (which was June) we had tanks doing parade ground perfect counter rotations to keep the gun on target. It worked great, so great that we cut back on the TacAI's counter rotation ability because it was, like the proposed 11 oclock feature, too mathematically precise. I am sure that doctrine would have told them to be that percise, but it was FAR too perfect. We screwed that up a bit to make it much more realistic.

We also can not let a manual Rotate command override the TacAI. Rotate is not hull specific, and was not intended to being that way, so it isn't easy for us to seperate the user's desires here. Plus, since it is not a persistant order (like Hide/Ambush), there is no way for the player to tell that his tank is locked into a particular stance. So what are you going to do when something comes up from behind it and the tank doesn't rotate? Yell and scream at us for a stupid TacAI

And something you guys are missing out on here... tanks do not *always* rotate their hulls. There is a range of threat and traverse distance that is factored in to any realignment of the hull. Therefore there is already a chance that the 11 oclock position will happen. It is possible to tweak this value internally to make it more likely to happen for Tigers, and we might do that.

Steve

[MOS was 71331]

It seems there's another factor which will affect facing: uncertainty about where all the opponents are. If I see one Sherman 600 m away, I can use a protractor and angle my Tiger at 37.5 degrees from it. But what if I'm not sure exactly where it is or whether the Sherman I see is being covered by an AT gun?

[Kevin Peltz]

Well, I 've had a belly full of this whole forum- adios

[Fionn]

Steve,

Yes, lab perfect isn't good but I still think it happened quite a lot. We'll agree to differ

Kevin,

Ok, does anyone know why he posted that??? I sure as hell missed any explanation etc..

Anyone know what's up?

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___________

Fionn Kelly

Manager of Historical Research,

The Gamers Net - Gaming for Gamers

[Lee]

Steve, I agree that having the tank crews do this each and

every time at exactly the right angle is not the ideal way

to simulate this tactic. I would fully support having

it be a random chance heavily weighted towards more

experienced crews (thus green crews would rarely use it,

while elite crews would be pretty likely to use it). And

you might also want to have a variable for the amount of

offset that the tank commander decides to use, with the

more experienced crews much more likely to use heavy offsets

like 30 degrees. This variable number might be something

like anywhere between 5 deg. and 30 deg. or whatever you

think is a good idea. And, of course, you could also

limit it to the heavier german tanks if you so choose.

Just throwing out ideas here, Steve. But I think you're

on the right track with making the AI's thinking on

this a bit unpredictable.

[CoolColJ]

I think this sort of thing might be done, in a set piece battle or somthing like thta, but a meeting engagement, I would think that the tankers had other things on their mind

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CCJ

aka BLITZ_Force

My Homepage - Just updated, check out my MP3

www.geocities.com/coolcolj/

[Guest Scott Clinton]

Fionn:

Yes, of course I read your last post...I just must have MIS-read that portion of you 1,003 word essay! (literally)

And NO, I am NOT going back and reading it again!

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The Grumbling Grognard

[Guest R Cunningham]

I have read some accoutns of the Afrika Korps using the zig zag method while on the attack. I don't know how they would use this on defense, especially in prepared positions. When hull down this issue is moot since the turret has to be turned to face the target. I think the German tankers should have some way of benefitting from this, but I have no idea how to implement this in CM.

And a CM note from last defense: One time I had move the tiger forward to the scattered trees. He was parked at an odd angle with his nose pointed a little to the right presenting a perhaps a 20-25 degree angle to the Hellcat Transporter Room. When the Hellcats beamed in, he turned his turret but not his hull. This enabled him to shrug off several hits that otherwise would have killed him since he was within that range where the Hellcat can penetrate his hull. What I found remarkable was this happened this way and BTS had said that tanks will turn their hulls to face the threat. In this case he didn't and it saved his ass.