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Yet

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Posts posted by Yet

  1. 1 hour ago, kraze said:

    It's possible if russians didn't expect AFU to burn through 3000 of their tanks with 300 of our own.

    I mean 10:1 on paper looked so easy they fully expected to win the war in 3 days.

    Why would russians needed to think about this with such an advantage and a guaranteed blitzkrieg?

    iiss comes to 2100 russian tanks lost and still 1800 operational. with additional 5000 not operational still in storage (bad shape). so revamping these doesnt sound so weird. to those RU losses they count 700 UA tanks lost. so i wonder what Krazes 10:1 comes from (except from wishfull thinking and info-war language)

    oryx counts to 1700 RU lost tanks

  2. british minister of defence claims 97% of RU troops have been deployed in UA

    https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-europe-64634760

     

    RU lost 50% of its MBTs according to iiss

    https://www.newsweek.com/russia-has-lost-more-half-its-tanks-ukraine-report-1781800

     

    if both of these are true... pfff

    though they keep playing games, trying to take/safe what can be taken.

    https://www.politico.eu/article/moldova-president-maia-sandu-russia-attack/ 

    the first thing that dies in a war is the truth, but this doesnt sound too far fetched.

    esp when RU ministry of foreign affairs states: "we do not interfere in the internal affairs of Moldova and other countries of the world," the ministry said.

  3. 27 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

    Maybe RU will try to overwhelm UKR AD.  Say they launch huge number of missiles & drones all timed to hit at same time, w aircraft coming in right on heels of this, while AD is already busy / reloading.  It's the kind of thing desperate team would do.  And this all gets to whether Putler is making decisions based on a feeling of desperation or out of clear sighted views to ongoing implications of his choices.  Plus there's the political part of Putler probably pounding on his air force commander to 'do something!'.

    most probable is that everywhere on RU there are typewriter notes to shoot the guns at exactly 22:00. due to different timezones, locations and speed of the aircraft, drones and missiles, they will neatly arrive 1 by 1 in time for UA AD to down most of them... now wouldn't that be a joke? even realistic though;)

  4. 1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

    Not sure I follow the logic.  If Russia loses Crimea will they still not be likely to "try it again" anyways?  I mean the only way that seems to work is to draw a NATO line somewhere and dare Russia to cross it overtly - this is why this all happened in Ukraine and not on the Baltics.  Russia will definitely still do dirty in the subversive space but has been deterred from stuff like sending in 200k troops and bombing the hell out of things.

    So Crimea does not really seem as pivotal as establishing collective deterrence mechanisms that encompass Ukraine.  The issue with Crimea and Donbass is that if they are retaken, but Ukraine winds up with a resistance or worse and insurgency in these areas it could cause problems with that that whole collective deterrence mechanisms part. For example, if Ukraine is seen as heavy handed or failing to enfranchise these populations - and insurgencies really are good at making this happen - that could insert some uncertainty into all this.

    Ukraine has every right to the Crimea as a sovereign state (Russia does not get to play "backsies"), however it is a potential open wound, along with the Donbas (which may be worse) that could act as a spoiler for what follows.  The aggression of Russia is a given no matter what unless there is a dramatic political and social change within that country.

    that makes sense. 

    though this triggers: 'if you have a strong neighbour, make sure the inhabitants near the border hate them or you'll end up losing that part to annexation' 

    I assumed we are (partial, at least for the crowds) helping UA because we dont like big bears playing with internationally recognised borders of a democratic country in our backyard (Europe). -and not just to poke around. 

    1 hour ago, Lethaface said:


    Factually Russia being forced back to their January 2022 borders would mean that the whole war didn't give them any inch of terrain. How is that a win? 🤪

    You assume the war started in 2022. Imo the war started 2014 and this is just the 2nd battle.

    since 2014 there was no peace declaration, no mutually (or internationally) agreed new borders and no leadership (system) change during the ceasefire with drastic different intentions.

    if after this battle (or any following battle) there are new recognised borders (incl Crimea with RU) and the war ends; you might argue that RU won the first battle (2014) lost the 2nd battle (2022/23) and walked away with a bone, (international recognised strategic territory expansion).

    this doesn't give an incentive not to do this again, just to play it different next time (with lower losses, if RU cares about that at all). 

  5. On 2/7/2023 at 8:31 PM, Battlefront.com said:
    On 2/7/2023 at 10:46 AM, Yet said:

    When in 2060 we are looking back  the RU army and industry are restored, we trade again and looking back, they institutionalised Crimea being part of RU. 

    on the long term; isnt this still a Russian win considering pre-2014?

    Germany is stronger than than it was in 1939.  I still consider they lost WW2 pretty soundly.

    not comparable. 

    - Every inch of Germany was conquered 

    - WW2 Germany didnt get away with gaining land. 

    - Germany's leadership (system) didnt stay in place

    - Germany was rebuild (in different ways) by its conquerors to build a new culture/ way of thinking to prevent falling in the pit again.

     

    Crimea was in 2014 insitutionalised by RU, but not by the international community. 

    If RU gets away now with Crimea, it was an expensive few acres, but still it can be an incentive to Ru (or any other country) to try it again to invade, forced migrate inhabitants, wait, get agressive, negotiate, institutionalise. 

  6. 10 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

     

    All I know is this war will end with Russia's defeat.  When and exactly how is still up in the air.

    Steve

    If the RU army is destroyed, donbas liberated etc. but RU walks away with Crimea, they 'lost'. Is this a RU defeat in your terms?

    When in 2060 we are looking back  the RU army and industry are restored, we trade again and looking back, they institutionalised Crimea being part of RU. 

    on the long term; isnt this still a Russian win considering pre-2014?

    1 battle to take (2014), 1 battle to institutionalise(now).

    ----

    I believe Xi (and in lesser amount Putin) think in long timespans (something we partially de-learned possibly because our 4-year view democracies?). Because of this difference views on  shortterm wins and longterm wins, negotiations might be possible?

     

     

     

  7. 21 hours ago, Grossman said:

    US preparing $2.2bn package

    The US is readying a $2.2bn package of military aid for Ukraine that is expected to include longer-range rockets for the first time, and other munitions and weapons, two US officials briefed on the matter told Reuters on Tuesday.  

    150km GLSDB. smart. Double the range, and keep the other doubling up behind in case a 3th main offensive is needed. 24feb RU will start offence (in the mud?) and 2 months later you have trained tankees, destroyed ru logistics and are good to go. 

  8. Could this be an issue? 

    if we send 50 patriots, 100 HIMARS long distance, 1000 bradleys and 300 Leo2's , then Ukr gets an army that is even scary for the EU. They can start their own industry to supply. No stopping them if they march to Moskow, Belarus, Moldavia or any other direction. by keeping it scattered, Ukraine is and will stay dependant on NATO logistics, repairs, shells etc. 

    Actually i wonder if all this militairy aid is -give- or if it is partially -borrow as long as nessesairy-

  9. 3 hours ago, FancyCat said:

    On that note, are there any deeper analysis of how hard it would be to take Crimea? I remain unconvinced that Crimea isn’t militarily infeasible for invasion, I mean historically, it’s been common for Crimea to fall. 

     

    Im sure the Capt can do this better but heh. I'll give my view.

    there were many sources saying that the local pro Ukranian Crimeans:

    - fled Crimea

    - were sent to live their lives somewhere deep in Russia

    - were sent to the front 

    -is minority and severely supressed

    These activities dont need 21st century adaptation, so judging by the history I trust RU still posesses the qualities not to **** this up. Therefore i dont expect Ukr can count on much support from a broad, strong pro Ukr population in Crimea. 

    Next to that Ukr will need a combined attack to be successful taking Crimea. Perekop is the most logical target, but very easy defendable and expected. Other ways to get troops in are by riverboats/hoovercrofts in the north, by maritime assault in the west, or by paratroopers.  For that to be succesfull you need to OR accept very heavy losses, or need to have corroded the RU navy to nonexisting or to have aircontrol. Therefore its not impossible to take Crimea, but the question is how long it takes to wind the situation in such a state that the losses are acceptable to make it feasable. 

     

     

  10. icegrowth (no wind, no snow) is 0.3 mm per degree minus per hour. 5 cm is needed for a person to stand/skate/walk run without any trouble count 25 cm for large groups or small vehikels. 

    so example -6 deg x 10 hours = 60x0.3 mm is 1.8cm .

    that counts 3cm after sunday, 11 after monday, 20 after tuesday. ...

    ofc soil freezes easier soil than a pool. but i wouldnt expect a major offensive before thursday with this forecast 

  11. On 12/29/2022 at 1:45 PM, Bulletpoint said:

    Putin's feared gas weapon turned out to be a weak fart.

    But even after watching this video, I am not sure how it was possible to replace so much Russian gas so quickly.

     

    a lot of answers have been given. but add one more to the list: an actual 24% drop in EU gas demand. 

    https://www.ft.com/content/0ab21afc-d034-4279-8ce1-4469d0ce8489

    everywhere i come i see thermostates at 19 degrees, sofas shoved away from the radiatior, radiator foil, vents under the radiatior. Also industry takes its share, esp in gass-rich sectors like flower-farming, vegetable greenhouses, and heavy industry.

  12. 10 hours ago, LukeFF said:

    Well, since you went there, Steve...

    What I am outraged about is that we continue to spend billions upon billions on a foreign war and that our duly elected representatives "agreed" on a 4155 page spending bill in the middle of the night, right before the Christmas recess that no one outside of the few who drafted up the monstrosity are ever going to read. All this while the economy, infrastructure, etc., here at home has ongoing serious problems, to say nothing of the way our own vets continue to be shafted by the utterly idiotic way the VA administration is run.

    Yes, but let's get all riled up over what someone said on Fox News! The horror! You know what I do when I see the same sort of nonsense on MSNBC, CNN, the NYT, or WaPo? I laugh and move on. It's not worth the time.

    I admire everyone for his/her honest opinion. But imho its too easy to just cast away people with an audience that spread (dangerous) nonsense. These echo-rooms are what got us here in the first place. Its what got Russians believing in Putin, It is what got Putin believing in he could take Ukraine, its what got USA its severe political split, and i hope just hope that most other powerfull people and leaders (esp those with red buttons) have a wide view on reality and dont get caught in such an echo-environment.

  13. 12 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

    Sooo... let's talk some more about the concern (certain concern in his mind) that General Zaluzhny expressed about a Russian winter offensive.  The man is certainly an authority to take seriously, so I do.

    We've already theorized that a fairly large chunk of the partially mobilized men have not gone into Ukraine, but instead are in Belarus and other locations.  We've theorized that in part it's due to shortages of weaponry, which is what General Zaluzhny himself stated.  His thinking is that they've held back these guys to allow new production and scavenging (from Belarus, Iran, and elsewhere) to procure enough equipment to outfit these guys.  Then, in one move, they'll be committed to (probably) a single effort.  Taking on Kyiv again or trying to bust up Ukraine's positions in the south are his two guesses.

    If Russia tries for Kyiv again they are going to run exactly the same risks they ran the first time, but much worse because Ukraine has already done this once successfully and Russia hasn't changed the variables in its favor for a second go around.  Even if somewhat successful, it should be clear to Russia that taking Kyiv will not stop the war.  That might have been possible in February 2022, but it won't be in 2023.  It will distract Ukraine, for sure, but the likely end result is Russia gets slaughtered in the north and the lines remain largely the same elsewhere.

    On the other hand, Ukraine has made it clear that next year the emphasis will be on moving towards Crimea.  As General General Zaluzhny pointed out, they only need to get to Melitopol to effectively neutralize Russia's land bridge.  Pushing Ukraine further north along the Dnepr makes it less likely Ukraine will get within HIMARS range of Crimea in 2023.  Further, if things are wildly successful then the rest of Donetsk could be up for the taking.  This is not a realistic scenario, but I think it's more realistic than taking and holding Kyiv. 

    Trying to retake Luhansk is also possible, but... it's not a big prize.  However, it could be more doable and therefore more attractive.

    So if Russia is planning something (which they probably are), the rational bet is on an action in the south.  But this is Russia we're talking about, so if the last year is any indication of what is to come next, then it will be Kyiv again.  Because it is that stupid.

    Steve

    Id assume RA would go for Charkov-Dnipro. Short lines from RU, cutting off UA supply lines, encircle UA, and shortest route to Dnjepr river.

  14. 17 minutes ago, Huba said:

    The rather infuriating thought is that IF we started in May or April, given 6-12 months minimum needed for new armored/mech unit to be actually useful, as outlined by The_Capt, we'd be almost there now. Reactive vs. proactive approach, with all the benefits of the latter.

    It will be even more infuriating when we'll be repeating exactly the same regret 6 months from now.

    So your idea is to take all capable tank drivers and maintainance and support crew out of the war for 9 months to get Leopard training?

    best case you dont need them because the war is over.

    I'm afraid you might need the crew then to liberate Poltava.

    Worst case is always worse.

  15. 10 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

    Unfortunately, Russia finds an opportunity to replenish its losses and import high-tech spare parts for new equipment and ammunition into the country.

    As the history of this war shows, the appearance on the battlefield of weapons with an increased range (as was the case with HIMARS, for example) can drastically worsen the position of Russian troops and lead to defeat on an operational-tactical scale

    This suggests that just out of Himars range are a lot! of targets which (when destroyed) very drastically increases the situation on the battlefield.  Ofcourse there are nice targets out there, but I dont see how it drastically changes the type of warfare. otherwise, enlighten us what these targets are that is not just an incremental change. 

    there must be other realistic (out of the box) options to get out of the trench-warfare.

     

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