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panzersaurkrautwerfer

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Posts posted by panzersaurkrautwerfer

  1.  

     

    there are 59 Mi-28N in service with VVS

     

    Despite the fact it was selected to be the standard attack helicopter in 2008 or so?  Sure seems like there's a lot of Hinds still chugging around.

     

     

     

    Russian procurement has been the same since the start of the Cold War, old kit gets passed onto second echelon units, then third, then mothballed, sold or scrapped. As I have stated a few times before, one brigade will receive the new kit first, and its stuff will be passed on or mothballed. They will not equip the entire land forces all at once.

     

    Again, I've never argued for sure 100% Aramta will fail and none will ever enter service, but we've seen a model of the first tier units getting a few units, then few to none arriving for a while.  For many vehicles and platforms that are "Standard" quite a few of them simply never are, and remain limited purchases because surprise, Russia's economy is still about where it was when the Black Eagle was too expensive.

     

     

     

    You simply can't put Obj 640 (Black Eagle) in one list with Ka-50 and Mi-28. 

     

    One is an attempt to make the next Russian tank that failed because it did not match the Russian ability to field the platform.  The KA-50 is a Russian platform that was selected for service, had early models made for testing, then languished in development hell for lack of funding before becoming more or less obsolete in its original formation, and becoming the basis of a very limited procurement platform, MI-28 is, as I said "the" attack helicopter despite all them Hinds.

     

    They're all good models of where the Aramata could go  The lack of strategy is about the only real difference, but there's still a very weak Russian economy, and there's still a very high tech platform with a whole host of new issues to overcome.

  2. I never got my mitts on a Caiman to be honest, I just worked wtih MAXPROs and RG-31/33s.  For me maintenance nightmare they all were,  with their very limited mobility (you could go on the highway, and some of the larger roads, but we had a whole platoon get mobility killed by a field once (that our QRF in HMMWVs simply drove all over), and putting them into the muhallas was like watching a hippo crawl into a soupcan all made the "MRAP" as a tactical vehicle sort of marginal.  Also rollovers.  And recovery was a pain (like you needed a 10 ton wrecker, the MTV based ones we got downrange couldn't hack it).  Also getting out of one was a clownshow if you needed to do it quickly, we weren't in a "hot" spot by any stretch of the imagination, but a HMMWV convoy was spitting out dismounts like .5 seconds after it identified the need to do so.  MRAPs you just sort of sat there and waited 30 seconds before someone's boots hit the ground.

     

    Also within our organization at least, it only really added two to three dismounts to your total force (we either rolled in four HMMWVs with the VC and back passengers dismounting, or three MRAPs, which eliminated the need for one HMMWV crew).  Weapons mounted were same as HMMWVs etc.

     

    They're really good for taking people and small cargo up and down MSRs that are going to be seeded with IEDs, or for EOD type stuff were secondary devices are pretty likely.  But I'd go as far as to guess even the Caiman is simply really good at the previous tasks, and of less utility otherwise.  

  3.  

     

    That was then, now is now. Bringing Black Eagle up in a procurement discussion is as good as doing so for G11.

     

    The SGT York and MBT-70 are still well illustrative of the US procurement system because both are problems that might have change a bit, but have not really gone away.  The Black Eagle, KA-50, MI-28 etc, etc are all still really good examples of high end Soviet/Russian stuff that either does not come to fruition at all, or is accepted as the "standard" platform but still in practice amounts to a fraction of the fleet.

     

    If something had dramatically changed about Russian procurement, or the Russian economy then you'd have a point, but time and time alone does not render a point moot, and the same factors that made the Black Eagle fantasy strongly influence Russian procurement today.  

  4.  

     

    of course you wont take them in korea nobody wants more work when you dont actually need them, they are a pain in the ass to work on. just to change a filter you need to remove a 200bl plate(maybe more that thing is heavy as ****). you go to combat zones and they are all over but not as you see them in the states. they are uparmored with additional plates bracketed to the sides. also canvas hmmvs are undeployable according to the us army as they do not have frag 5 armor which is why they did not use them in iraq towards the end. if a hmmv gets hit by anything that makes a big boom (direct hit by 80mm+ mortar its toast along with everyone inside. the newer hmmvs that are in use today are the 1165's which are mostly the same with the exception of the cooling system and they have some hella good AC =D.

     

    The reason you see them in Iraq and Afghanistan has to do with the fact they're designed to handle IEDs and the like.  Korea is a good illustration because of all US Brigade Combat Teams, it's the only one that realistically could be in a shooting war within the span of hours.  In a conventional shooting war (like the one portrayed in CMBS), MRAP style vehicles are pretty bad.  They're big and heavy, do not like going off road, don't carry enough cargo, don't carry weapons much better than HMMWVs, and in terms of direct fire type weapons systems, they're not really much better armored than a uparmored HMMWV.

     

    So to that end the wheeled vehicles in Korea were a transitioning mix of the old unarmored HMMWVs, with the various uparmored models.  The MRAPs were again offered to replace some of the HMMWVs, but they're a really poor fit to someone who's not planning on fighting insurgents in Iraq/Afghanistan. 

  5.  

     

    The Army is mostly focusing on MRAP based chasis' such as the cougar (also seeing service in Afghanistan) RG33 and caimen (i dont know if they are used anymore but we had a bunch in iraq.

     

    It's keeping some for COIN type missions, but keeping the HMMWVs for many others.  There's supposed to be some sort of HMMWV replacement on the horizon, but for all the roles modeled in CMBS the uparmored HMMWV is correct, while MRAPs are not*  

     

     

     

    they can be used in a single fire capacity much like artillery. the main reason they are not used in the Geneva convention since we are not in the type of war that needs them(and i see their point but if you have ever seen an MLRS fire it gives you major wood. the danger close for artillery if i remember correctly in 600m (im not a FO or anything but have been to a little training) which is just barely in scope of the maps. really the kill range on an air burst is some 250-500 meters so nobody in their right mind unless in some serious **** wants or will take a mission that is any closer than 1000m. There are several other factors such as types of munitions but im not going to comment on those since i'm not that experienced.  

     

    Not quite.  As discussed in other threads, the salvo o' unguided rockets is usually retained for more important targets, or fired well ahead and outside of CMBS ranges.  The ATACMS type missiles, or guided rockets are also usually used on things that are higher level targets (artillery parks, C2 nodes, supply points) vs combat elements deployed forward.  Danger close is also dependent on round, so in actuality for rockets it's 2000 meters for planning purposes (which again, danger close is not a strict rule, but it is a good guide on the inherent danger of said weapons).  

     

    *When I was in Korea we received a shipment of them, more or less open for any unit that felt they could use them.  After several months passed with no such takers the MRAPs disappeared to artificial reefs or something.  

  6.  

     

    But what i really wanted to say is that i dont understand your comment, could you tell me what you mean by saying that about the T-72 turret?

     

    Turret ejection charge.  It refers to the tendency of T-72 turrets to pop off and fly some distance if the autoloader's rounds cook off.  

     

     

     

    Why are some people so trigger happy to post about and ridicule Russia(n media BS)? 

     

    Like, BBC, CNN etc get a lot of military stuff wrong, but that's because most of the time they're simply not at all educated in military matters outside having watched "The Longest Day" once.  They get it wrong because often they do not know better, and they're still capable of filtering blatent propoganda sometimes, or asking uncomfortable questions.  Russia's media is a wholly state owned and operated enterprise.  It's only purpose is to belt out Russia power supreme HATO dogs lust for intercourse with our mother soil Latvia wants to join Russia! at max volume.  It tends to dramatic stinkers like SU-24s shutting down the entire US fleet and half the dastardly HATO military resigning because Russia will kill all with microwave Putin-gun, while CNN simply cannot tell a tank from some brands of large SUVs, but will still raise the WTF flag if polite men in ACUs suddenly appear in British Columbia to prevent French Canadian Nazi-Racists from harming our Anglo-heritage brothers!

  7.  

     

    What I don´t understand is the "no export" comment, why? Russia can't keep dumping T-72/90s on the world forever, eventually some derivative of this things surely will be exported

     

    Purely in a "Modest Proposal" sense it's because they're not real tanks, it's just going to be hundreds of parade float quality vehicles driven around by folks who are sworn to secrecy to present the illusion of the Armata being successful.  Exporting them would let other folks in on the terrible truth.

     

     

     

    Backing up if crew is unresponsive.. Which means that the crew's biometrics will be monitored in real time.. Remote control.. Sounds like future warrior stuff 

     

    I think it's sort of a silly thing.  The sort of "crew is unconscious, but okay!" hits are rare, and given that all crewmen at in the same box now, seems like they'll all be okay or all be goo.

     

    The remote operation stuff makes more sense in terms of being able to operate the tank as sort of a defacto remote controlled turret, but it does not look extensive enough to support that (although that might just be the limitations of technology).

     

     

     

    You just dated yourself, sir  :D

     

    I missed the original Battle Cruiser 3000 fracas, but the follow on Smart behavior remains the gift that keeps giving.

  8.  

     

    We left a lot of them in-country

     

    Thank god.  Terrible vehicles.

     

     

     

    I did some quick testing on the vulnerability of troops manning MGs in the Humvee, and I tend to agree that it looks like they are a bit too vulnerable to small arms currently. We'll look into it further, but it won't be done in time for the v1.03 patch. Just fair warning.

     

    Neat.  It was not game breaking but it did feel a bit off.  

  9.  

     

    So what exactly are you talking about?

     

    If you'll note I was talking about some more general families of vehicles.  As the case is Armata falls more into "sharing a lot of the same parts" but well into the "we're basically building a whole series of mostly different vehicles all at the same time."

     

     

     

    • Technological studies and prototyping of unmanned turret MBT started in 80-90s with Obj 195, which had 2 actual prototypes built; these studies were used for Armata creation
    • Actual Armata development took 3 years
    • Crew of 3
    • Armata has an option of backing up (20-50 meters) to safety on it's own if the crew is unresponsive (when being hit)
    • Armata can be remotely controlled from another vehicle
    • Armata's AI can't fire on it's own (when crew is unresponsive)
    • Main priority is crew safety
    • Vehicles that are already built will be sent to Armed Forces (to different regions) for field trials later this year
    • Pre-mass production (trials) numbers of Armata will be around 100 vehicles by 2016; did not specify if that's MBTs only or together with IFVs
    • All new gen vehicles will be "in service" by 2016, so that Armed Forces can test them extensively before mass production
    • Actual mass-production 2019-2020+
    • They do agree that "teething problems" are inevitable (hence few years for trials/improvements), but Armata is far from being "raw" at this point
    • It can already fire  :) (for those who have doubts)
    • Boomerang and Kurganets-25 IFV will have same turret (with 30mm + ATGMs, as planned, and already shown on photos)
    • Boomerang and Kurganets-25 have same engine (said to be very important for parts commonality and and repairs/maintenance)
    • Same field trials-feedback-improvements cycle for Boomerang and Kurganets vehicles in 2016+
    • Vehicles that have already been built are a part of a larger (ongoing) contract, which should give Armed Forces more vehicles up to 2016 for trials
    • Weapon module upgrade for IFVs in 2020 as planned (larger caliber, I guess 57mm)
    • When they had to swap HMG RWS and 30mm weapon module in the field for one of the new vehicles, it took just 3 hours
    • No export planned yet; possible export of downgraded export models, but not soon, main focus is internal market = Russian Armed Forces
    • Everything is home made, no parts shortage due to import problems

     

    It's a tank designed by Derek Smart!   WATCH OUT!

  10. When setting up in a defensive position prior to the game kicking off, use the target command to check your LOS.  If you're hull down (spotter is partial/hull down etc), then great! Also worth considering is placing your vehicles fully behind cover, and using another spotter (like an infantry team camped out in a building) to let you know when the enemy has entered your tank's fields of fire.  Then generously apply 3# from my next set of tips.  

     

    In terms of sneaky sneaky vehicles getting pot shots at you:

     

    1. Back up.  Aint no reason to go forward or stay in a fight you're having problems with.

     

    2. If you've got them, send a UAV to that area.  Even if you just know where the target is, vs the UAV seeing it, dropping a 2 salvo battery barrage on his hidey hole will make anything but an MBT a bit less functional, and it'll make a lot of the cover go away.

     

    3. Learn to love the "hunt" command.  If you're pretty sure where a target is, but not quite sure how far out of cover you need to be to waste him, use the "hunt" command to clear your cover, but then a reverse command back into cover.  For vehicles the thing will creep into engagement window, let fly, and then back right on up to safety.  Often that extra .5 meters that gets the target into LOS, but not the full meter that gets you fully into enemy LOS is what will save the day and let you red mist some things.  This can also be repeated many times, so you vehicle will advance to kill something/the end of the hunt command, and then reverse once one of the previous conditions are met.  Human players might get smart, but it's hard on the TAC AI, and often will cause all but the best used/Javelin type ATGMs to wiff.  

  11. All designs are inherently compromises.  Those compromises are usually best aligned against the task at hand for the platform you're designing.    A tank is heavy because it needs armor to do its job.  A scout vehicle is lightly armored to keep its weight and size down so it can move quickly around the battlefield, etc.  When you share a common fleet of vehicles you start making design comprises that overlap often to the detriment of the overall platform.  You have a hull that's trying to make the room you need for an SPG while it's also trying to keep a low profile for the tank model.  Your engine placement is optimal for SPGs and tanks, but it means the APC/IFV version either is modified enough to not really be part of the same vehicle family, or your troops are flopping out the top of the vehicle and over the sides.

     

    Etc, etc, etc.  Stryker doesn't violate this too badly because at the end of the day, looking at all the different models the only really "weird" ones that are not conventional modified APC roles is the MGS (which is a bit of a dud because it's a cannon mounted on a wheeled APC, go figure).  The FCS failed dramatically because it was trying to leverage technology to bypass a lot of the stuff that traditionally made shared hulls and such problematic (namely in terms of "electronic" active armor and such allowing for a tank-like platform that could have IFV level passive arrays), with said technology either being immature, or simply unable to deliver on the sort of protection required.  

     

    Ultimately when it comes down to making the better mousetrap, on paper it sounds great if it can also be a badger trap, blender, and home entertainment system, but each step you make to turn the mousetrap into a better badger trap makes it less optimal as a mousetrap, while in turn the blender parts don't do much to help it be a home entertainment system. 

     

    Which isn't to say there is not a total lack of merit.  A "heavy" APC will share a lot with a tank in terms of everything but main gun and carrying troops, if you're willing to accept a massive turret you can use tank hulls to make an okay SPG.  At the same time if you built a HAPC or a SPG from the trackpads up, they'd likely be superior performers to the "swiss army hull" design.

     

    It might be worth pondering that the "everything new, and from Armata" design has less to do with Russian strength and more to do with Russian economic weakness.  They're not going to get an HAPC unless it has some huge parts commonality with other tanks.  There's no money for a distinct SPG, or improved hull for one, but there is if we design it to fit the new tank Russia desperately needs given the state of its fleet.  

     

    Basically it's a huge gamble that the core system pays off, or maybe even leveraging the real possibility that one platform may fail dramatically (unmanned tank turret will attempt to kill any red headed persons within FOV without crew input), but still leave some salvageable spin offs (but the IFV turret only aims at redheads, it doesn't shoot so that's okay).

  12. This is right up there with the battery drain ultimate defeat murderlasers.  

     

     

     

    “It means for the first time we have the objective of creating an operational capability to airlift a full-fledged army to any desired place on the planet,” the source said. This means delivering a task force the size of the former NATO and the US troops in Iraq, in a matter of hours to any continent. “In the context of the current military doctrine that defies comprehension,” the source said.

     

    I feel stupider just by knowing out there someone believe this is possible.  

  13. Again it's the difference between "turns T-90 crews into goo 95% of the time!" and "Turns T-90 crews into goo 80% of the time!"

     

    As pointed out, the newer model Leo 2s with the longer barrels are about on part with the later model US rounds in terms of penetration, just at the expense of a larger weapons system.  You won't get the same firey death effect as often but in so many words a T-90 struck by a Leo 2A6+ is going to be fairly dead vs ultra dead.  

  14.  

     

    Chieftain

     

    Think maybe you meant Centurion?  Chieftain is like fevered dreams fantasy for 1944, Centurion is just the Comet all growed up.  

     

     

     

    No. And past Soviet/Russian timelines don't contradict reason for doubt.

    It's like that old cliche definition of insanity.  Nothing has changed about Soviet/Russian arms procurement.  The process isn't fixed, the economy isn't better etc, etc.  Expecting the Armata program (and Afganit, and Boomerang, and PAK-FA, and the MI-28 etc, etc, etc) to somehow work better than the T-95, Black Eagle, etc etc just because this time it's got an unmanned turret and is a whole family of vehicles! is pretty out there.  We've been down this road before and I'm sure we'll go down it again.  

  15.  

     

    So if the Armata went ingame, what would its weapon stats be?  Armor thickness from various angles?  Amount of ammo carried, and proper ratio of ammo?  Reload time for the autoloader?  How fast would it pivot in place, or reverse?  Hell how fast would it go driving forward even?  

     

    I think that's why I really don't like the idea of it. There's the Russian claims that it is the ultimate tank that will destroy all other tanks 100%+2 and then there's not really much else on the matter.  The T-90s and BMP-3s in CMSF were no big deal because broadly we knew what they could do.  I'm leery of either having the mega Armata as a semi-fictional ultratank/IFV/whatever, or having constant whining on the forum because it can be destroyed in the first place with graphs and references in Russian showing how it is invincible to everything including smaller nuclear devices to support how unstoppable it is.   

     

    If there's more data, which doubtless will emerge if it gets closer to service it ought to be not as much fiction, but right now it's like all those 90's simulators that inserted the T-95 based on some drunken drawings, or to give a high tier threat rather than have an accurate representation of Russian military hardware.  

  16.  

     

    Is two years really such a short time from prototype to introduction?

     

    Yes.  Oh f'ing god yes.  Especially on a totally new AFV.  If this was a T-90AM2 or something I wouldn't be so doubtful, but the Armata is a whole host of systems that have never been used together, or in the real world.  Then you toss in an unconventional design, then you add on a not so great Russian economy, then you add on all the usual operational hiccups that go with fielding even fairly modest new equipment (even the M1A2 SEP V2 suffered a lower than desired maintenance readiness rate simply because the number of spare parts for the new systems hadn't caught up to the demand quite yet during the initial fielding), it just all makes the "HERE ARE SOME FOR PARADE!" a dubious milestone.  Once we see mechanic training get started, or crews get pulled from the rest of the Russian tank fleet to learn how to operate the Armata so they can become Armata instructors, then we can start thinking in terms of being 1-2 years out from having an operational unit.

     

    But two years from vehicles that might or might not be operational prototypes?  Little bit loco.  

  17. I've never understood the lack of ATGMs on IFVs.  Even something simple like a Milan strapped to one of the hatches goes a long ways.

     

    Same deal with Strykers, wouldn't be a stretch to strap Javelins to the RWS, the allocation of TOW-Strykers to BDE level always struck me as weird (especially considering the historical M113 formations which kept its AT assets as a Company sized element allocation to the Battalion vs Company sized element for the Brigade).  

  18. Re: Fantasy

     

    I think it's just a matter of definitions, but the point is likely for 2017, fully operational Armatas, Boomerang etc in combat ready units is pretty fantasy.  It's more real than an E-100 but just as real as the MBT-70, SGT York, and many other similar programs ever were.  In the future it might become not-fantasy, but operational and in service by 2017 is by most accounts quite fantasy.  

  19. I'd be happier with an "upgun" ICV in every platoon with a 20/30 MM on a RWS type mount, then a 40 MM variant with a larger full on unmanned turret basically replacing the MGS one for one at the Company.  The sort of airburst thing Bofors has done with their 40 MM makes it look attractive, and it ought to make anything short of a tank pretty swiss cheese pretty fast.

  20.  

     

    Personally I don't find many 19K's with nice things to say about those cans

     

    19Ks coming off of MGSes were the worst.  We were a M1A2 SEP v2 company, and received a wide range of folks from different backgrounds, but receiving guys who'd never been off of M1A1s, guys who hadn't seen a tank since basic training all were uniformly easier to work with than trying to deprogram all the stupid stuff the MGS teaches you to do wrong.  RUMMIT last time I heard about it was they were taking tankers off of the platform for just that reason.

     

     

     

    30mm Stryker in CMBS when?

     

    Think it's the same answer as with the Armata.  If it's in service shortly then I imagine it'd sneak in with the "future thingy" module that's been rumored and hinted about.  

  21. Re: Javelin Operator

     

    It's what's known as an "ASI" or additional skill identifier. It's a short class anyone can take usually offered at the various training installations (although mobile trainer teams are pretty common). In practice slots are usually reserved to ensure jav equipped units are at or above MTOE.  It's not a hard weapon to operate however and plenty of "Javelin Operators" downrange have the twenty minute version of the class before using it effectively.  

  22.  

     

    I don't understand why the army didn't just buy the LAV-25.  Won't the Stryker then just be an upgraded LAV after all that development money was spent?

     

    LAV-25 is based on a earlier iteration of the vehicle, a lot smaller, less armor, less room for everything.  From the get go the Stryker was always intended to be primarily a "carrier" vehicle and to that end, the need to fit a complete squad into the infantry version was viewed as essential.  To that end the LAV-25 can carry about 6 "cold war" soldiers (no body armor and somesuch, basically rifle and Kpot with LBE, more practically it can cram in fourish), which made it a bit of a non-starter.

     

    The need for some sort of direct fire support platform for the Strkyer formations was always known, and the MGS was supposed to provide that at a Company level.  In practice it has had some success, but always the following problems:

     

    1. In many COIN missions, 105 MM is just too much gun

    2. A very limited ammo supply (a whole platoon of MGS carries about 1.5 Abrams in ammo)

    3. In conventional missions, it has neither the armor, or firepower to serve as a real maneuver platform.  

     

    The autocannon armed version will likely be a better choice for direct fire support, both as a dedicated platform, and as a "upgun" Stryker modification.

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