[Interested on what difficulty people play on.]

Real time, Iron. 

[A few Questions for CMBS]

The point is that ELINT sensors (and ARM's passive seakers) detect side lobes, as the main love is very thin. Because modern radars have considerable sidelobe reduction measures installed the power emitted via those side lobes is far less than via the main lobe.

As Gazetchik emulates the side lobes of a given radar, it provides the active signature that is exactly the same as of the radar it is set to emulate from the point of view of an ELINT sensor or ARM seaker. Morever Gazetchik could be connected to the parent radar to have a synchronised cycle of emition.

The operating cycle of the SAM system (shoot-move-shoot) does reduce the amount of time a given system works, that is true. However considering the fire productivity of modern SAM designs (multichannel architecture) and amount of HIMADS likely to be employed in such a conflict the amount of engagement channels available (at any given time) would be sufficient to engage all hostile platforms in the air (at the same given time).

jammers just have access to more power.

Recent intercept for the S300V4 test against low RCS target occurred at ~400km range.

 

Guys who design ELINT systems are not stupid, the system's is meant to be used against sidelobes but if radar illuminates you with it's main lobe (which it will since it must search for targets) you can then discriminate it from any decoys. 

 

How many systems do expect to be deployed?

 

It's not just about ERP. Other things need to be considered as well, like elevation angle of the radar, amount of standoff the jammer has from what it is protecting, etc.  

 

According to USN RIM-176 has the record for the longest surface-to-air engagement and RIM-176 is not capable of anywhere near a 400 km engagement (simply too small). 

[A few Questions for CMBS]

Ok, on the important points:

 

- Gazetchik does not emulate the main lobe of the radar (as it is narrow and is not used by the ESM systems of ARM seekers for that matter). Gazetchik emulates the side lobes (which are used by ESM systems and ARM seekers) and for those it has adequate power output.

 

- SAR type sensors (from long range ISR assets such as JSTARS) would be jammed from stand of range, simply because ground based jammer has a power availability advantage. You don't need to jam the IR sensor systems, as those imply that you are already in range of terminal defences.

 

- Those saturation attack weapons have low speed, arriving after the vehicle has finished it's engagement and left, if shot from stand of ranges. Otherwise the shooters come into the IADS range themselves. Morever those weapons do not provide a valid saturation capability against the current (Panzir in variants) and future (Morphey) CPGM systems.

 

- the -40 decibel/m2 figure is an empty number, as it was given to us in one article without the conditions it applies for. The (reflective) canopy alone would give you a larger average RCS in x-band/front aspect, in my opinion the -40 decibel/m2 figure refers to some sort of local minimum, not average values. Normal RCS value S300V2 (outdated version from 1987) was guaranteed to intercept is 0.01m2 class, which should be around where the frontal averages for the F22A are, the side aspect would be even better ofcourse (massive vertical fins).

However, should we assume that the RCS of the F22A does have an average x-band value of -40 decibel/m2, then it would still be engaged from 150km or so due to the energy potential of available radars.

 

The point is that since Gazetchik doesn't provide accurate simulation of the radar the real and false signals can be geolocated. 

 

I already posted about duty cycles. Since the SAM will never know exactly when the aircraft launch their weapons and since set up and tear down times are 5 min under the most ideal conditions most of the time the SAM site will be stationary, even if they are engaging moving targets the SAM wont have gone far. 

 

The effectiveness of SAR and jammers depends on the specifics of the systems and how they are used when you think about it. Papers I have seen on SAR jamming show good effectiveness over a limited area. 

 

I don't know how you figured this. Radars the size of the ones used in the S-300 series can not detect a -40 dBsm target at 150 km, maybe 50 km is more realistic and that is before EW. 

 

F35 has poor rear stealth, thus if it turns back it would be easier to engage (considering know interceptions for the S300V4 occurring at 400km range I think there would be sufficient energy reserve for those shots to happen). F22A is not affected as much, but it still suffers from the stealth performance decrease.

 

And the "stealth" aircraft (or any aircraft) were not used against a modern air defence system for a long, long time.

 

If you don't have the F-35's RCS plots then you can't say it's stealth is poor. It probably has a fairly spiky plot as many aircraft do, the difference between decent RCS and bad RCS may be a few degrees or less, pilots would know about the most unflattering angles and try to avoid them. Since we don't have the plots we can't know for sure. 

 

I have not seen any SAM missiles meant to be used against aircraft that have a claimed range of 400 km though I have seen a 250 km claimed range. As always range against a target that will be running away is a fraction of the claimed range. 

 

Stealth aircraft have been training against modern air defense systems a very long time.

 

And interesting plane to look into (not in 2017 time line probably, but in a longer haul) is the T50, it is better suited for SEAD than the JSF, if only because it could carry 4 ARM (Kh58UShK) rounds internally (plus 2 self defence AAMs internally).

 

SEAD is more than just weapons load, though I'm interested in seeing more details on the T-50 and it's weapons stores. 

[A few Questions for CMBS]

ESM would be confused by the false emitters (Gazetchik and the like), ground mapping radar would be defeated via the use of ground based jammers, decoy sites and hard kill measures (such as direct attacks against those assets). IR is very dependent on weather conditions and is not a useful long range tool, otherwise the aircraft would have to enter SHORAD ranges. Dummy sites would still be valid even with IR/visual ID at most conditions, as they replicate the relevant IR signatures.

 

They would, because decoy sites would emulate the full spectrum of the real site signatures (IR, radar and radio emition wise), considering that the overall performance of the recon/intel assets would be degraded (by hard kill attacks, comm and radar jamming), it would operate under the fog of war, thus precluding the useful historic analasys and allowing the dummy sites to retain their usefullness.

 

F22A and F35A/B stealth is commonly defeated by the high power X-band and mobile long wavelength radars (and other means), thus they do not present the "magic silver bullet" solution. New weapons (such as the new HARM variants) while being potent, do not solve the under lying issues (such as the decoy sites, recon/intel asset disruption and changing positions after engaging). SDB type weapons are slow to arrive and are fairly simple for the CPGM systems to defeat.

 

So over all I do not see how the Blue force would be capable of getting the decisive air superiority over the battle field (in the short term scenario anyway). In general the issue here (I think) is that you project the current and future capabilities of the Blue force against the past experience with the Red force, which is not really relevant, as not only is the Red force modern/extensive (something that US or anyone for that matter did not meet in the recent experience) but competent (again, that is a rare quality to find in an enemy those days).

 

Gazetchik is a 1.5 kW system, this system will not work at stand off ranges. To put this in perspective the 9S32M is around a 10 kW with a 1 degree beamwidth, furthermore you need to either make your decoy a phased array or use very restrictive anti-simulation techniques that will severely gimp your real radar. The decoy will need to have a similar bandwidth as well. Safe to say that any system that can fool ESM at stand off ranges will be large, expensive, and a worth target in and of itself. I wouldn't be surprised if making a decoy HIMADS radar that can fool modern ESM at stand off ranges is completely pointless due to cost. Weapons with multimode seekers will counter low power decoys since the decoys won't have the same spatial coordiantes (ESM+GPS/INS) as the real radar nor will the physically appear to be a real radar (MMW radar/ IR imagers).

 

Jamming SAR can work but is only effective over a limited area (unless we are deal with SAR satellites which are easier to jam). Since many of the new weapons have MMW seekers you need to build jammers for those and hope they don't burn through too early. Also how will you deal with imaging IR seekers? All of this sounds very expensive, these jammers probably wont be cheap enough to be expendable vs a weapon with 150,000 USD flyaway cost. 

 

Hard kill can be countered by saturation attacks of cheap weapons like the GBU-53, one F-22A can carry 8 in addition to AAMs and one F-15E can carry 16 in addition to AAMs and bags. 

 

Shutting down and relocating isn't a great solution either. 5 teardown, 10 min transit, 5 min setup, 10 min radiate... what a terrible duty cycle, and that is under ideal conditions. Oh and no guarantees that the second you stop radiating the guy who had you picked up with his ESM doesn't switch to his radar, well unless you keep your jammer on constantly in which case everyone knows where you are all the time. 

 

The an S-300/400/whatever series systems are very very expensive even without all the fancy countermeasures and accompanying Pantsirs, we are talking hundreds of millions of dollars here. These systems also have low ammo capacity even with their smallest sized missiles, ammo isn't cheap either. We are talking a limited amount of systems vs a very large amount of aircraft. 

 

The USAF's metal marble figure implies that the F-22A is somewhere between -30 to -40 dBSM but frequency and aspect isn't specified so lets assume its the X-band and frontal aspect (worse case for the Raptor really). Good luck detecting this aircraft at a tactically useful range with a road mobile X-Band radar. You'll be dead long before it ever shows up on the scope, doubly so if Blue is using EW. To my knowledge all the newest Russian SAMs use X-band ARH seekers which makes the situation even worse for them. Going to lower frequencies is only a halfway solution if Blue deploys stand off jammers targeting those frequencies specifically, longwave radars are not without their idiosyncrasies . An F-22 is a small, highly mobile, signature reduced target, it is much easier for it to hide in noise than a barely mobile ground based radar. "Stealth" really is "all that", that is why everyone and their mother wants it nowadays. 

 

You can even sacrifice a relatively cheap drone (relative to the hundreds of millions a large SAM site costs) flying in at low altitude towards suspected emitters and reconnoitering them with it's IR imager at closeish range. 

 

In the past Red could hide it's SAMs by simply keeping them shut off and not coming out to play, but with all these new sensor technologies this is less and less of an option and since Red needs to keep Blue CAS away from it's forces it is not an option at all. 

 

Blue has a much greater technological, numerical, and training edge than ever before. Things are much less close than they were during the cold war. 

 

The quick glance shows that the datalink is intended to send the information from the missile to the shooter (for post strike damage assessment), but not from the shooter to the missile (for re-targeting).

 

 The company that builds it describes it as a "two-way data link transceiver" and sources specifically mention them being "re-tasked in-flight". 

[A few Questions for CMBS]

Ahh, the air war thread. Well a few thoughts on the matter:

 

*snip*

 

We mostly agree here, though forward deployed NATO aircraft won't need to fly that far, US naval aviation flying from the Aegean will need to tank though. 

 

This depends on the SEAD force available to the Blue side and the AD forces available to the Red side. In general it is fair to estimate that:

- HIMADS systems are highly mobile and employ shoot and scoot tactics.

- that the areas they operate in are covered by SHORAD/CPGM systems.

- that Red side utilises decoys/spoofers (such as Gazetchik) extensively.

- that Red side uses ECM equipment to support operations of it's AD network (for example to deny data links).

 

Current level of the HIMADS systems would be:

- strategic SAMs S300PM2/400.

- high end tactical S300V4, BukM1-2, BukM2.

 

In a 2017 scenario this changes to:

- strategic SAMs S350/300PM2/400.

- high end tactical S300V4, BukM1-2, BukM2, BukM3.

 

ESM combined with ground mapping radar and IR imaging will allow air forces to discover the location of emitters quickly. Even when switched off radars are quite large and may be found by SAR. The old radiate and the shut down trick doesn't work nearly as well these days (ESM, radar, and IR all working together to geolocate an emmiter then having the weapon use GPS/INS plus terminal guidance to destroy it).

 

 Decoys and spoofers won't work as well due to the stuff I previously mentioned, you would need to go to full on jammers and even those might not be effective unless used by a system that can fire on the move. 

 

Red's IADS may potentially have to deal with 5th aircraft like the F-22A and F-35A/B and new weapons like the AGM-88E and GBU-53B. I think blue will be able to suppress Red's IADS and maintain control of the skies with minimal losses though CAS will be very very limited while this is going on. 

 

For example, Blue's various ESM systems will locate a suspected radar, radars and imaging assets will search the location and find the rather large SAM battery, SEAD aircraft attack the site with standoff weapons. Once the SAM site is located to a reasonably precise area even something like the AGM-154A can be used, pretty much impossible to jam and the bomblets will damage anything in a large area so you don't need extreme precision. 

[Strategic and tactical realities in CMBS]

Tomahawks are too slow and can be intercepted with ease even with Osa SAM.

 

But turning back to my question - how NATO side will counter low altitude CAS? US dont have any AA for that, manpads are actualy the last chance weapon, not the main one. UA AA are old and not realy numerus.

 

Tomahawks fly low and can surprise a SAM by being under it's radar horizon depending on terrain. In reality the though the AGM-88E will probably be the primary SEAD weapon in a CMBS type scenario, the SDB II would also be effective if sufficient numbers are deployed in time. 

 

Red air would be countered by DCA efforts mostly, MANPADS work as well since Russia doesn't have as many PGMs as the US. 

[A few Questions for CMBS]

If you assume complete NATO air superiority you don't really have game,  because The Russian logistics would be toast.  The assumption leads to the best tactical game is that Russians SAMs if not the Russian air force are capable of a real fight.  I have no access whatever to the kind of classified information need too evaluate that assumption.   

 

I would argue that implies minimal fixed wing support for both sides as well.  

 

There was complete NATO air dominance in CMSF and we still had a game. You don't need to make an unrealistic assumption in order to still have a good tactical fight, just handwave some limit on Blue's OCA due to "politics" or some such. Simply reduce the amount of CAS Blue has available due to the need to run DCA and SEAD and make Red have CAS available only once in a blue moon. This may already be how the game is, I don't know I haven't played it.

 

What I'm actually questioning is the decision to have fast jets perform CAS inside SHORADS/MANPADS range, this makes no sense to me. How long do you really think forward deployed HIMADS will last in Ukraine once they start radiating, not very long.  

[Weapons of 2017- M1A3/T-99]

I'll believe it when I see it, the Russian arms industry has a long and storied history of vaporware. 

[Prepared positions?]

While you can create defensive works through various methods in the editor, there are other issues that will likely negate their effectiveness. Any vehicle that gets lased is going to react, there is no separate TAC AI for dug in vehicles. They are going to pop smoke and backup. The effort of creating those positions will likely be wasted.

 

 

Some basic Tac AI customization would be an awesome addition. The player could edit basic AI settings in real time/his turn to suit the situation and would provide more realistic game play. 

[A few Questions for CMBS]

 

 

4. Videos of air support from Iraq (other than parts of the ground war itself) and Afghanistan are very misleading. Those aircraft are operating in practically perfect conditions with little threat to them. In Black Sea the airspace is considered to be hotly contested and aircraft are flying low and fast, trying to hit their targets and then get the heck out. That's the assumption by which the aircraft performance is modeled.

 

 

 

I'm curious as to why these assumptions were chosen. This seems counter to NATO doctrine and capability. The big question is if OCA strikes are allowed into Russian territory, the VVS wouldn't last long against a NATO offensive air campaign. 

 

I'm sure it the game will probably play fine though. 

[Weapons of 2017- M1A3/T-99]

 

 

1. Replacing the engine with a diesel.  It has been discussed, and would be more cost effective.  However the gas turbine still offers excellent performance, and we have the advantage of having a lot of them on hand right now.

 

 

I don't think this is a good idea, a modern gas turbine would provide a better specific power and volumetric power than a modern diesel. The efficiency of a gas turbine is worse under normal operating conditions but it is not that bad, especially if you have an under armor APU. 

 

Gas turbines also offer superior IR signature than diesels. Exhaust radiates primarily at wavelengths that can not be used by terrestrial IR imagers (MWIR and LWIR in this case) due to atmospheric attenuation concerns, diesels only reject approximately half their heat into exhaust and the other half into heat exchangers that are very visible to IR imagers. Furthermore diesels tend to have more sooty exhaust which is approximately grey body radiator and can be detected by IR imagers. 

 

The problem with the M1's engine is not that it is a gas turbine but that it is an old gas turbine. 

[Long Rod Penetrator Site]

I think Willi Odermatt goes by the handle "arrow" on tanknet. 

[Map size and lethality]

It's not that simple. M829A3 can penetrate around 900mm RHA at point blank I believe and 825mm at 1000 meters, 770mm at 2000 meters. Latest russian sabot can penetrate around 900mm at point blank too but performance decreases faster with range (around 675-700mm at 2000 meters). Those are very rough estimates I admit.

Which new Russian ammo would that be? I don't think they have any ammo that matches the M829A3 in momentum and aspect ratio, those 2 figures of merit are not the end all be all in armor perforation but they are critical.

Unless there is some super secret new Russian APFSDS that is closer to the M829A3 in dimensions I doubt they can match the M829A3's perforation ability at any range.

[M1A2 (SEP) Abrams Active Protection System]

The US is looking at a system called Quick kill (Raytheon) which is a trophy variant for what I can gather.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quick_Kill

Quick Kill operates differently from Trophy. The US Army is unlikely to procure Trophy for their M1 fleet preferring a domestically developed solution.

[russian sabot rounds]

Problem with sabot in Russian tanks is that because of the autoloader the length of the sabot is limited. The larger autoloader in the T-90 and T-80 allowed for longer sabots. The T-72B3 will highly likely be using 1989-1991 era sabot rounds, whereas the T-90 will highly likely be using 3BM44M or something.

Also don't completely disregard HEAT rounds. Don't forget that 3BK-31 is triple warhead HEAT round, that will hurt an M1.

Even with the autoloader mod the Russian ammo still seems to have a shorter max length than the NATO ammo, because of this it probably doesn't perform as well.

[Air Support NATO]

For what, the fourth or fifth time? Well, it looks like it might stick this time, which is a pity as I suspect that the F-35 is not going to pan out as a satisfactory replacement. The Air Force needs to learn that multi-role aircraft are dangerously unlikely to fulfill all roles really well. This is okay as long as they don't have to go up against an air force with lots of mission specific planes. But against the Russian air force...?

Michael

The CAS mission is going to be done by a variety of assets.

The VVS's missions specific planes are still going to get OCAed regardless.

[Campaign Problems]

Ive had this issue many times. I found that it was caused by a corrupted saved game file. I just delete the most recent save that I did and reload the one prior. It should resolve the issue of crashing

I tried replaying the Night Stalkers mission 3 times, always the same problem. I then surrendered the Night Stalkers mission and beat the Dagger Fight mission and got the same crash. Unfortunately if I surrender the Dagger Fight mission the campaign immediately ends.

[Campaign Problems]

I can manage to load and win "Night Stalkers" but I can't load the next mission. Crashes at 15%. Should I just surrender at the start of night stalkers or maybe upload my save and see if someone else can load it?