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ArgusEye

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  1. This post is not strictly about CM:C, but it is about trying to do what its purpose was, by other means. If this is the wrong place to post, I apologise.

    When playing Medieval wargames, I have had some success with a multi-level game. 'Kings' build forces and move them around, and the resulting battles are then fought by their 'captains'. There's no reason why a King cannot be one (or all) of his captains, but this resolution system seems to have been the aim of CM:C. But with a referee, who will set up the different battles for the players and translate the results into a new operational situation, we could get there.

    It sounds like fun to me, who else is interested?

  2. The reason the Germans find the bailing from IS2's so peculiar is their experience with other tanks; Soviet crews were well known to stick around in knocked out tanks, hoping to slink back to enemy lines later. They would get into huge trouble for bailing prematurely. It was common procedure to check dead tanks for hiding crew.

    As to the Germans losing more crew than the Soviets, I confess myself incredulous. I don't have the numbers at my fingertips, are you sure about that?

    The IS2 was, indeed, a breakthrough tank, with much the same role as the Tiger. You need a machine that can attack the enemy defenses and survive long enough to effect a break in the line. The actual exploitation is done by lighter machines. But before that happens, there is some defense in depth to go through. The machine is not just an assault gun, it is a tank. It is not just meant to shell from the safe side of the infantry, it is supposed to take and hold positions, whilst the rest of the attack develops. It is the point of the spear, not just a support. This also means that it gets to suffer the counterthrusts and counterattacks, which is why Stavka specified that the IS2 should have a gun that enabled it to face of with kitties. The high HE load enabled it to kill PAK, making the way safe for its lighter brethren. The AP was to quell the inevitable counterattacks. Those are a very important part of its job, not the sign that the job is done.

    I haven't sat in many tanks, but the difference between a Pz III and a IS2 is palpable. The smaller tank has easier hatches, better placed viewing ports (that don't require wedging yourself between moving equipment), foldaway seats (nice if you're loading), turret basket, polstered edges to avoid getting cut open, better lighting, and generally space to work in. It's not a pleasant place to be, but it is better to work in.

  3. Idle hope to see the originals - unless your sources are better than mine.

    I've also been speculating what could have caused this odd measurement of the interior front plate. Has the tank burned, destroying the heat treatment? Was the machine always destined to have bolt-on armour, and therefore not hardened? Manufacturing error? Measurement error? Lies? Did they only measure the hardness of the inner face (because the outer plate was in the way)? Nothing is quite convincing.

    As for the values you mention, they could have come from any number of tests or methods. Mathematical interpolation is a possibility (would be a shame though), but interviews with gun crews are another, as is finding random positions and only measuring the distance afterwards. It's unclear until we can find the test protocols.

  4. Yes, opinions are easy to find, but facts are rare. At least the purported mechanism is clear now.

    Furthermore, in the T&TT I quoted above, it says that the only face hardened plate was the bolted-on plate, with the one behind it being machinable. I assumed earlier that they didn't check the face hardening of the second plate, but I've come to understand that they actually did. This suggests that the second face hardening doesn't actually make the difference (because it isn't there). That makes the situation stranger. I'll try to dig into that.

  5. As you can see, the gun took up much of the space in the turret, making it tricky to get into a pleasant position to ram the shell home:

    is2%20przekroj.jpg

    The IS2 was not an artillery piece, it was a tank, and therefore had other considerations for its gun reload rate than barrel life in sustained fire. It was an ergonomic disaster, especially with respect to loading. The loaders constantly had to overreach themselves whilst handling very heavy shells. The machine was not above knocking out loaders whilst slewing, and had problems letting the crew escape as well. I've stuck my head inside one example, and that was plenty claustrophobic. The NBdPzT states repeatedly that the IS2 crews are remarkably quick to bail. The Germans interpret this as lack of faith in their machine, I personally suspect it had more to do with the fact that the hatches were known to seize shut when the tank got hit.

    Given the (here we are again) bad ammunition quality, there are reports that attempts to load with the barrel elevated ran a risk of the projectile falling back out after loading into the breech, and before the charge was placed.

    If the low rate of fire was to spare the barrel, why then would the fire rate suddenly increase when the breech mechanism was changed? Why would the Russians adopt a field tactic shielding a reloading IS2 with another, for the first only to emerge when it had reloaded?

  6. Tricky business, isn't it?

    These tests were done on enemy armour. This is available only in limited amounts. You need to capture tanks, and if they've burned they're unsuitable for these tests. And then, when shooting them up, you want to use as many different weapons as possible. On each plate type. At multiple angles. And especially when penetrations happen below plasticizing velocities (which only a few guns in WWII got close to), it is important to note that any hole or crack resulting from a previous shot makes the armour around it suspect, out to a radius of at least one caliber. This rather limits the amount of shots one can take at such a machine.

    As such, I suspect the Brits never tried longer shots than 900 meters. This is already a distance that made a stationary tank hard to hit, given the British track record in gunnery accuracy. The round may very well be able to penetrate from up to 2000 meters, but they probably never tried it, because they had more relevant tests to expend the Kraut tank on.

    One other thing I think you're noticing is that there is rather a spectacular difference between the different qualities of plate. To just convert armour thicknesses by giving them a percentage bonus or malus does not do the tricky impact physics justice. Not all German (or Soviet, or Pom, or Yank) armour is equal. Quite apart from the rapid deterioration in the last year of the war due to alloying problems, there were advances (and other changes) in the fabrication methods, which resisted one kind of penetrator more, and yielded more to another. The 10% difference from listed values for the 37mm is nothing astonishing in this light.

    The 75mm SAP appears to have been designed with pre-war armour in mind, and was metallurgically dismally underdesigned. It was cheap, and against a 15mm front one only needs a bit of mass to just smash through. According to a report by the Italian RCA, it would shatter against the M11/39 front - even then, it would induce spalling. It is unfortunately not clear if this is incidental or structural.

    Finally, bear in mind that TBD was constructed from multiple sources, so the relevant test might well have been done against British FHA, which was notoriously bad and therefore not used much.

  7. Far be it from me to dismiss any test! It's just very unlikely that the 75mm (whether the 'French' or the later M3) would produce this effect. It is simply too large. It is a mediocre projectile, but it overmatches the first plate too much to just shatter outright. I'll believe it when I see the reports, but thus far I remain unconvinced.

    Let me ask you this: Given that 50+30 was made quicker and cheaper, why would the Krauts switch to singular 80 if it resisted less?

    Allow me to quote the september 24 1942 issue of Tactical and Technical Trends:

    [...]

    The 30-mm front armor of the original German Mark III tank (see this publication No. 3, page 12) is apparently a plate of machinable-quality silico manganese. The additional 30- or 32-mm plates which have been bolted onto the basic 30-mm armor are of the face-hardened type. This total thickness of 60 to 62 mm stops the British 2-pounder (40-mm) AP ammunition at all ranges, breaking it up so that it only dents the inner plate. The U.S. 37-mm projectile, however, with its armor-piercing cap, penetrates at 200 yards at 70°. Against the 6-pounder (57-mm) AP and the 75-mm SAP, this reinforced armor breaks up the projectile down to fairly short ranges, but the armor plate itself cracks and splits fairly easily, and the bolts securing it are ready to give way after one or two hits. If 75-mm capped shot is used, however, such as the U.S. M61 round, the armor can be pierced at 1,000 yards at 70°.

    Similar results may be expected against the reinforced armor of the Mark IV.

    The new Mark III tank has a single thickness of 50-mm armor on the front, and this was found to be of the face-hardened type. The 2-pounder AP projectile penetrates by shattering the hardened face, but the projectile itself breaks up in the process and the fragments make a hole of about 45 mm. The 37-mm projectile does not shatter during penetration, which is secured at ranges up to 500 yards at 70°. The 50-mm plate is softer than the reinforced 32-mm plates being 530 Brinell on the face and 375 on the back. This plate is not particularly brittle and there is very little flaking.

    [...]

    This shows only the uncapped (obsolete) 75mm round shattering. A cap on the thing, and the double plate loses all its advantages.

    Finally: bear in mind that the double face advantage is most dominant in cases where the supporting armour is very thin, and 50+30 is quite a lot more meat than skin.

  8. Fair enough, but would a 76.2mm (i.e. 3 inch) AP shell be considered a "small penetrator" in the context of Pz III 50mm + 30mm armour?
    Short answer: no.

    Long answer: The mechanism described on the thread linked will only happen for plates that are slightly overmatched by the penetrator, are hardened for a large (more than, say, a quarter) part of their depth, and for projectiles that are shatter prone, pointed, and more or less solid. Cavities will quickly make the second layer hardening moot, because the breakup will be more dramatic.

    The F34 fires blunt nosed greatly overmatching projectiles with burster charge. This effect does not matter for the 76mm or 85mm guns. I conceded to URC that he was right in stating the effect exists. I don't expect to see it in anything else than ATR's, automatic FlaK guns, maybe the PAKs of 37mm and the 2pdr. Against selected targets, of course. With round X on target Y, the plates resist as more than the sum of their parts. With another combination, target Y will resist as usual, with less than the sum of the plates.

    JasonC, any luck in finding primary sources yet?

  9. Thank you for the pointer, URC. I will concede the point to you, because -as is discussed in the thread you linked- there is a penetrator mode I had not considered. In case of thin armour with a small penetrator, the penetrator can break up and penetrate the first armour plate, then be rejected by the hardened layer of the second. I was so focused on large projectiles that I completely missed that possibility. If there is any standoff between the two plates, also yield of the first may contribute - which is the case with some plates of the Pz IIIH.

    I doff my hat to you.

    I'm pretty much stuck as far as finding new information on the 85mm T34 guns goes. Where the evidence regarding the F34 seems pretty consistent and complete (to me at least), I can only find vague and contradictory statements regarding the 85mm.

    I have failed to get access to Red Army original publications, like reports and internal newspapers, which is annoying. The Russian scholars contradict each other about how much trouble the 85mm guns had with their targets. Some report a lot more gun and accuracy trouble than others, but most seem to agree that the gun had serious ammo problems.

    The Germans harp on about not dismissing the dangers from the gun on the basis of seemingly miraculous survival of an impact or two. But how much this happens, they do not report quantitatively.

    My impression is this: It seems that the 85mm AA guns were originally supplied with good quality prewar ammo, but the factory making it was overrun. (according to the Germans, before it was abandoned to the Soviets in retreat, it was "durch Sprengung völlig betriebsunfähig gemacht") Because the Soviets were burning through their ammo supply pretty quickly, they produced some quick and dirty ammunition, which was of pretty bad quality. It took until january '44 before this was alleviated, and then it went from craptacular to just bad. According to the Germans there was big variability between batches, and I can find no reason to doubt that.

    What tests I have been able to track down show a makeshift gun that doesn't perform like one would expect from its caliber and weight. The few comparison tests place its performance more or less on equal position with the 75L48. And those all used postwar ammunition. As for accuracy, that seems to have been dramatic because of a too-long powder burn. A strange choice, because what use is some extra penetration if you don't hit?

    In the game, penetration for the 85mm is uniformly bad until it turns uniformly good in early 1944. My -tentative- conclusion is that it is a pessimistic model pre-1944 and an optimistic model later. The accuracy of all guns in game is spastic monkey level, so I find it hard to judge. But it is able to load on the move, which should not be.

    I await any arguments to disabuse me of my conclusions! :)

  10. If there are trials, I'm more than interested. Any place I should start looking?

    This weekend I discovered that some WWII stuff in the library is still classified. We're 65 years after the fact, and secrecy is still upheld about some technical matters. Amazing.

    Even more amazing: they don't tell you when you order the report, but only when you come to pick it up. And they tell you they're obliged to inform the authorities. Messed up world. :mad:

  11. Bigduke, Samsonows credentials look about as solid as you can get. And I do not contest that the Soviets went for flank shots at close range against heavy armour.

    I think our main issue may lie in how we expect either the game or actual battle to go; I labour under the impression that the 76 guns were the best the Soviets had in enough numbers, so it fell to them to attack the heavy armour with it. Doctrinally, they would let the enemy tanks roll close before opening fire, preferably in the flank. With Tigers, this resulted in some kills, mostly due to a lot of shots. This is witnessed by the sheer amount of holes and dents in killed Tigers.

    I think this is hard to do in CMBB. Not because of any bias or technical penetration mismodeling, but because it is far too easy to spot an AT gun. Finding them, even when they were firing, was by all accounts quite tricky. Not so in CMBB. The Germans praise the Soviet camouflage and fieldworks, where in CMBB using fortified positions makes the gun easier to spot, not harder. Borg spotting also doesn't help one bit. Therefore, I think that the performance of the gun is not the problem, it's the spotting system.

    Regardless, when I play Soviet in CMBB I always use the Soviet doctrinal approach, because it works. It works better than any alternative I've tried, anyway.

    Also, it appears you contradict yourself. You say, you are unconvinced the Soviet 76mm is undermodeled in the game, yet when you respond to JasonC's post regarding Soviet tactics vs. the 80mm StuG (wait until the range is 400m - 600m, and better 200m or less) , you say "The former is logical. That's the range where you start beating up even the 80mm fronts. Doesn't guarantee you easy kills though."
    I should have been clearer. When I would have to write doctrine for the firing line, I'd do the same thing. Where panzers want to roll through the lines, giving me the opportunity to ambush in the flank, the StuGs will hang back behind the first line of infantry. They are, after all, the problemsolvers for the troops. If any resistance shows up, they will shoot up the position from a distance. But because the infantry is in front of the StuGs, you cannot allow them to come arbitrarily close. You have to start firing at extreme range. Even if you don't kill them (which can happen at 500 meters!) you will still beat them back. Drive failures, gun damage, sighting damage, spalling, armour failing under multiple hits, all can be achieved. The fire is not wasted.

    This thread seems to have two faces; on the one hand a technical discussion about what certain pieces of equipment could or could not do, and on the other hand whether or not the game is fair. Those two things seem to run together sometimes, and I personally find it very tricky to deal with any argument based on game fairness when we're discussing ammunition quality.

    I found an amusing paper about first-hand combat accounts. It shows the reports and reminiscences of the combatants in several small engagements, and it strikes one how different the stories are. I'm not going to reproduce it here in full, but a quick summary might be fun:

    There was a small air raid in november 1944 by the RAF, where they sent two Spitfire IX's to patrol along the Dutch coast near the Hague, to harass and attack any V1 or V2 launching attempts. This patrol was largely unsuccessful, and as dusk approached, the pilots decided to attack a target of opportunity: Ockenburgh airfield. This had been a Dutch military strip, but the Germans had found it unsuitable for modern planes and put down only fake buildings and two fake aircraft, together with realistic lights. The Germans were present with a heavy FlaK battery, which does not figure in the action, and one battery of three 20mm guns near the harbour and airstrip. The strafing attack on the airfield was inconsequential, and any damage was not reported. One of the Spitfires crashed into the sea later, killing the pilot. The other one made it home safely. No other Allied aircraft activity above this sector went on during these last two hours. Knowing this, it is instructive to see what the participants reported.

    The RAF pilot reported that they decided per radio to attack the airfield, and made a low level attack. They were then taken under fire from ten to fifteen light FlaK mounts, causing them to abort the run. Coming back from another angle, he claimed to have destroyed two fighter planes each. A third strafing run was aborted when German fighter planes were noticed, and one Spitfire was stricken by an unseen enemy fighter. After assuring over radio that he was going to be alright, the wingman suddenly lost power and tried to ditch in the sea. The flight leader made a beeline for home, and informed the authorities in Britain of the ditch, to initiate rescue.

    The FlaK boys report that they had spent most of the day near the guns, because pairs of Spitfires kept showing up near the coast, staying just out of range. Near dusk, two Spitfires were spotted coming in toward the airstrip. Firing orders were given. One gun could get a good shot, and expended 7 rounds. The Spitfires banked away, climbing. A second run was fired upon by two guns, one expending 34 rounds, the other 40. No hits were observed. Both aircraft then climbed away over the North Sea and were not seen again. Third gun crew never saw the enemy due to placing. A quarter of an hour later new aircraft alarm was given, but before firing these were identified as German fighters, despite the twilight.

    The Luftwaffe received a phonecall from Ockenburgh, about a Spitfire attack. Two flights of 3 and 4 ME109 respectively were scrambled from two airfields, and vectored towards the enemy. These flights reported engaging enemy fighters over the North Sea, expending most ammunition and claiming 3 and 2 fighters destroyed respectively. All returned.

    Very different stories, but about the same event. Gives one something to think about...

    As for the photo: I can't tell what gun made those holes. The two big obvious ones seem to be subcaliber hits (the spackle around the penetration shows what happened to the flanges), but I can't tell what caliber. It could be, as far as I know, from 85mm or 100mm guns. If there is no clear documentation, that picture doesn't tell me 'the how or what'.

    it has an effect that weakens resistance in every single case other than the one in which both plates are face hardened.
    No, face hardening only works once. It doesn't harm a projectile that has already defeated the first face, and glancing is prohibited by the projectile nose being embedded in the outer plate. What mechanism could help the second hardened layer to add so much as to offset the lack of shear support?

    As for optics, they should give a big advantage in long range shooting - more than now at least - and a huge spotting advantage. That is where the main difference lay. I once collected these things, I had a nice collection before I had to sell.

  12. My weekend was consumed by leafing through yellowing paper again; I managed to get something new, even! A report from the Heereswaffenamt (abteilung not denoted) dated november 1945 is quoted in a lengthy essay on the necessity of decentralization of ammunition industries, in which there is some discussion of the UBR-365 and UBR-365K rounds. A double translation (unfortunately the original was translated to Dutch for the essay) in part:

    [...] The relatively high quality of production and finishing achieved by the overrun plants before 1941 is still not seen in present specimens. The new projectiles show different processes of fabrication, which do not square with the original factories having been taken into use again. Rapid improvement of enemy 8,5 cm effect against armour should therefore not be expected.

    Not great, but interesting. Unfortunately, it proves nothing.

    Bigduke, I agree with you that the aggregate of memoirs of soldiers is a great resource. If nothing else, they can at least paint us a picture of actual practice and behaviour on the battlefield, which no test can. However, when it comes to these purely technical matters, a controlled test cannot be beaten. Neither the projectile nor the armour know that they are not really in battle, and will behave the same as in any battle. The circumstances are, however, controlled, and equipment can be used for truly objective observation. This is hardly possible in a combat situation.

    The leaflet I alluded to is not available under any link that I know of (which would have saved me a trip to the university library), but you should be able to find it easily, given that you have access to ex-Soviet libraries. It is issued under the name of Fedor Samsonow, apparently some big shot in the artillery branch, and is dated march 3, 1943.

    Potapov is rather spectacularly wrong about the German testing procedure, and I find it therefore tricky to trust what he has to say about the Soviet procedure. For those interested, I'll give a quick summary of the German procedure:

    Round is produced, and standard formulae are used to predict its performance.

    Projectile is shot over a long range, its velocity (and deceleration) measured by induction sensing devices, and a distance/velocity chart built.

    Separately, standardized plates are set up at a nominal 30 degree angle to be used for impact testing. The amount of propellant is varied to vary impact velocity.

    Velocities of impact are started out low, and increased until a 'satisfactory' penetration is achieved.

    To qualify as the penetration velocity, the projectile must make a satisfactory penetration in five out of five shots (small calibers require ten out of ten, larger calibers require three out of three).

    Satisfactory penetration is defined as the projectile completely arriving at the other side of the armour plate in a state which allows it to detonate.

    So:

    Partial penetrations: Fail.

    Projectile broken up, but fully penetrates: Fail.

    Fuse busted on penetration: Fail.

    Intact penetration, but at an angle which will not activate the fuse: Fail.

    And then, as the penetration table is complete, the longest-range shot is performed at the range (so no cheating with artificially lowered velocities) to identify any yaw problems. Gercke remarks that this is usually no problem.

    I'd say that's pretty rigourous.

    As for what should happen vs. StuGs, the Russian tactical doctrine documents that BTS used to sell on this site give the engagement ranges against them for the various Russian 76s, and they all say open at 400 to 600 meters. The German tactical documents say they are vulnerable at 500 meters.
    The former is logical. That's the range where you start beating up even the 80mm fronts. Doesn't guarantee you easy kills though. The latter is something you still will have to back up. What German tactical document?

    Jaeger8888, I have no illusions about convincing everyone. I'm in this discussion to see if other people can break my position with arguments I haven't found, and perhaps I'll even be swayed. But mostly, I post because the consensus on the forum seems to be that the portrayal of the Soviet hardware is somehow (intentionally) too bleak. I find that researching the primary sources does not support this consensus. Since people here are interested in the same as I, it is only civil to offer it. And it might provoke others to come with interesting stuff - even if it is meant to disprove my points. I gain either way.

    When it comes to 50+30 having improved resistance in some cases, I have to protest. Face hardening is great to avoid deep gouging, and it can shatter rounds, but a second layer of face hardening isn't going to do that. The first layer of armour already surrounds the projectile, which will not glance nor break because of that simple fact. The only effect of the layering that remains, is that you have a layer of 30mm which is not shear supported by the layer of 50mm behind it. In a true 80mm plate, this shear support is present.

    As a parting shot, a comment about 'borked' behind armour effects vs. the Tiger: There are repeated exhortations to Tiger crews not to stow more ammo onboard than can be accomodated in the ammunition stowage areas. The 'loose' ammunition greatly increased the chance of brewing up in the event of a penetration. At one point, it is explained that the ammo stowage is carefully designed so that a deflagrating propellant charge will only vent in such a way, that it will not set off other rounds. Still, it seems not to have been uncommon for Tigers overloading themselves in this way.

    It is often mentioned to contrast the new Panthers catching fire and brewing up almost every time they suffer a flank penetration.

  13. I made a stupid mistake in my previous post: Where I wrote

    Would you explain the Soviets going to some lengths to gain short range sideshots on 'ArtShturms' with the 76 if they could just knock it out from longer range or the front?
    I mixed up two thoughts. I meant that the 76 went for side shots at the StuGs, and short range side shots at the Tiger I. I should know better than to write quicker than I think...
  14. Every time I post here, I try to have some fresh research to further the discussion. This in order to bring some more factual perspective to answer the original question. And I'm beginning to wonder why.

    When I arrange Tiger I's in CMBB to be ass-on to T34M43's, in ranges below 300 meters, with the Tigers dry, 10 out of 12 Tigers are killed before they can turn their heavy front armour toward the T34s. Immobilisations helped in three cases. The Tigers are -predictably- safe when the T34 is outside of the Kleeblatt, but their hide is pierced with a mix of three partial penetrations to one full penetration when the square-on aspects are attacked. When they cower it gets worse, because they tend to present flank and rear.

    Despite lengthy research since my latest post, I've failed to find any new evidence throwing more light on the issue. Some more of the same is the only stuff I could dig up.

    In answer to Bigduke6:

    1. How CMBB actually models the engagments:

    I've run a controlled CMBB test where I wound up firing 20+ 76mm AP rounds at the 50mm + 30mm front of a StuG, and 20+ 76mm AP rounds at the 82mm armor of a Tiger I. In my test, I obtained obtained zero penetrations, and zero partial penetrations. I say that's proof the game engine simulates 80mm or greater German armor as invulnerable to Soviet 76mm AP.

    The 50+30 is broken. You know that. And as to the Tiger, I posted my experiences above.
    2. The validity of historical armor penetration testing and computations:

    You say you trust them over eyewitness reports.

    I say, wars are not fought in ballistics laboratories, and further, using data generated by a ballistics laboratory at the exclusion of other information sources is a lousy way to evaluate history.

    Under your point 1, you did a controlled test. Isn't that a lousy way? Much better to ask somebody who played the game at some point in time how he remembers it. Sorry for being facetious, but I think that point is made.
    3. Does CMBB give Soviet ammo take a "crap quality" hit prior to 1944?

    You say it doesn't. I say it obviously does.

    I say it is not wronged by its modeling. The ammunition was, by all accounts, pretty bad historically. The game models this in a rather black and white way, perhaps; but I cannot altogether know whether this is correct or not from the information I have b been able to find.
    4. Are Soviet eyewitness accounts contradicting the effectiveness of Sovet 76mm as simulated in CMBB, specifically that the accounts are unanimous that the Soviets considered 76mm effective agains Tiger I at very close ranges, a valid criticism of the simulator?You say no because it is possible to find an anecdote supporting anything. I say yes, because when you get enough eyewitnesses saying the same thing, that counts as a very probable fact.
    They give far too little detail, far too little context, far too little substance, far too little certainty. Both fact and urban myths are commonly known, and the latter category makes a lot better story to most people.
    5. Are there German accounts supporting CMBB's simulation of German 80-82mm armor as absolutely invulnerable to Soviet 76mm AP, even in 1943, even down to 50m range? Is there anything out there to contradict the Soviet accounts?
    Yes. Read Jentz' books on the Panzerwaffe for many anecdotes, some of which state exactly that. They're very likely untrue. Read Carius' memoirs. He never says he's invulnerable to anything, but he speaks of point blank 76 fire bouncing off his flanks.
    I say, I've never heard of a such an account, I've looked for years, and I read German. You say such accounts exist.

    6. Do we accept a picture of a Tiger I turret with a 76mm holes in it as a valid criticism of CMBB's modeling of the 76mm AT round?

    I say a picture from the Kursk battlefield (check the link's source) of 76mm holes in the side of a Tiger turret, is proof positive that CMBB fails to model this particular engagement accurately, it can't happen in the game, and it did happen at Kursk.

    I don't know whether that attribution is correct. I don't know that was a 76mm. I don't know which 76mm. I don't know which ammo. I don't know anything about that picture. And they are notorious for misattribution. Proof positive, it is not.

    You maintain the fact that actual Soviets had to fire several rounds at the Tiger's side turret, is in fact replicated in CMBB when a CMBB 76mm fires on a CMBB Tiger I for, and I quote, "Partial penetrations and weak point penetrations kill. And I have yet to see any evidence that the 76mm is truly undermodeled."

    Is that a fair evaluation of our differences?

    Somewhat. Let me reciprocate:

    - Do you claim that the memory of old soldiers trumps intricate field and laboratory testing? By both sides?

    - Do you claim that the anecdotes you quote are proof positive? Because I have a (verified) anecdote of a Tiger I resisting a 122mm shot from an IS II at point blank range (35m). Would you take that as representative fact, or as proof positive of anything at all? I don't.

    - Are you suggesting that there weren't ammunition problems with the 85mm?

    - Are you suggesting that the ZIS-3 was able to handle 80mm at full combat range (according to Soviet AT doctrine)? And if so, why did the Soviets not just blast the Germans to bits so much earlier, given the concomitant tactical advantages?

    - Would you disdain Red Army leaflets, stating to the troopers manning these guns that to shoot at the armoured sides and rear of the Tiger I should be neglected in favour of the running gear, gun, and sight ports? I quoted such in an earlier post.

    - Would you explain the Soviets going to some lengths to gain short range sideshots on 'ArtShturms' with the 76 if they could just knock it out from longer range or the front?

    I will further answer a few questions you list:

    Do we know -

    - How much of the weapons performance data was the result of actual gun vs. metal tests at a firing range, and how much was mathematical extrapolation?

    Yes, in very many cases we know that in detail.

    - To what degree a sides' mathematically-extrapolated weapons performance numbers accurately reflected actual battlefield performance?

    Yes. Only the Germans tell this in detail, the Western allies are less verbose.
    - When shell performance was in fact tested on a firing range, was the steel plate similar in all instances?
    It wasn't. That makes some shoots difficult to judge, but most err on the side of safety.
    - To what degree shells used in the testing, differed from shells used in combat?
    In the German case, we know. They used experimental and production rounds, and always note which. In the British and American case, also. They use production rounds only. The Russians are less clear, but they seem to use specially fabricated testing rounds, but my sources for that are very vague.
    - To what degree subsequent shell strikes caused armor eventually to fail?
    Massaging armour works, as long as deep impacts are achieved. This is not modeled in CMBB.
    - To what degree the effect of subsequent shells strikes, was factored into the historical weapons performance data?
    I don't understand this question.
    - To what degree the metal plate used in the weapons performance testing, differed from the metal plate struck by shells in combat?
    Well known. The records are quite clear on this.
    - When weapons performance was either calculated or tested, to what degree did differing standards of "penetration" between German and Soviet testing (the Soviets had a more rigorous definition) skew weapons performance numbers as compared between German and Soviet weapons?

    Russians were not more rigorous. I don't know where this idea comes from. I can't tell if the Russian definitions bandied about are correct, I can't get the appropriate books. What is generally held about the German tests is untrue, that is easily verified from the Gercke and Kratz papers.
  15. Argueseye,

    Must I write the essay again? Suits me, every time I do this essay more Russian-language Internet evidence piles up to undermine the panzer fanboys.

    I'm no fanboy of anything. A bit sad to resort to such ad hominems.
    Second, I found part of your last remarks rather curious. You said:

    In the game, when I test StuGs against T34s, I find the StuGs tough opponents. They are killable, in extremis from 500 meters, but much better from closer ranges; but never do they become easy kills. A good amount of hits is necessary. This matches what I read about the measures taken against these things. The 50+30 should perform worse than it does, but I find it hard to say the same about the 80mm fronts.

    That is not my experience with CMBB. But then I am getting old, perhaps I have forgotten how these engagements play out when one tests them in an actual scenario.

    So for the umpteenth time, let's benchmark how CMBB simulates Soviet 76mm AP and German 82mm plate, and German 50mm + 30mm plate armor.

    For this test, I used CMBB with the 1.03 patch. I created a scenario with two Soviet ZiS-3 76mm cannon, regular, each loaded out with 20 rounds of AP. They were in a scattered woods line. The time of the scenario was June 1943, daylight, no precipitation.

    I picked June 1943 using the logic Soviet ammo would have been fairly reliable by that time. Lend Lease (the source of approximately half of the explosives used by the Soviets in the war) had been in operation for a year and a half. The Soviet munitions factories had been transported to the Urals, had been operating unhindered for 6 – 9 months.

    Don't worry, the 76mm ammunition problems are not even modeled in CMBB.
    Opposite one of the 76mm cannon, I set up a veteran Tiger I directly opposite, rear of the Tiger facing the ZiS-5, range 200 meters. I removed all ammo from the Tiger, and buttoned it.

    Opposite the other 76mm cannon, I set up a veteran StuG assault gun with the 50+30 front. The StuG was facing the ZiS-3, also at 200 meters.

    There's your problem: the 50+30 is mismodeled.

    [...]

    So it appears my memory hasn't failed yet. CMBB in fact does not allow the 76mm Soviet gun (assuming no sub-caliber munitions of course) to harm German armor 80mm armor or greater, at any range.

    I am now even more curious as to how you arrived at a very different conclusion, to wit and I quote you again: In the game, when I test StuGs against T34s, I find the StuGs tough opponents. They are killable, in extremis from 500 meters, but much better from closer ranges.

    What is your secret? I can't get my T-34s to do anything like that.

    I don't do anything special. I just allow the T34s to kill the StuGs. It might take more than ten shots sometimes, but they all die.

    Moving right along, let's just see if we can find some information on how the Soviet 76mm cannon performed against German 80 - 82mm armor. You said such evidence is in short supply, but like the test of the CMBB engine. My experience differs.

    First, here is another essay by Valery Potapov. I would suggest pay attention to the middle of the article, where he states clearly that Soviet standards of calculating armor penetration were more rigorous – not less, more – than German. I mention this because it means that, if one looks at a Soviet armor penetration calculation and the expected penetration is in the 70mm - 80mm range, then we might well expect the penetration to take place if that standard were transfered to the simulator.

    which is odd, because what he writes (here and elsewhere) is at odds with Krupps own test methods. Read up on the Krause papers, or the Gercke and Kratz reports. In excellent level of detail do they explain how German armour testing was performed.
    OK, next let's see if there is any primary evidence on the subject. You say that evidence is in short supply as well. Again, my experience differs.

    [...]

    http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/drabkin_ay4/01.html – Account of 76mm gunner Vitaly Ulianov. 92nd Rifle Division. Ulianov describes an April 1943 incident when generals prior battle check with crew to see if crew knows how to take out a Tiger, and they know the answer: wait until it gets very close, then hit it in the flank. Ulianov later describes destroying a “very large tank” at the tip of a panzerkeil, whose turret is undamaged from a frontal hit at close range (less than 500m) by his 76mm cannon, but is set on fire from a penetrating hit to the turret side.

    He talks of penetrating a Panther side from 50 meters. I can believe that. What does that prove? And The officers don't ask him how he can take out a Panther or Tiger, they ask him about its vulnerabilities. And of course he knows these; I quote the pamphlet in an earlier post.

    http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/drabkin_ay4/02.html - Account of Nikolai Markov, 76mm gunner, 163rd Separate Tank Destroyer Regiment. In July 1944 is in action near the Ukrainian town Kovel, fires on and destroys a German StuG SP gun at a range of approximately 600m. (The StuG is described in the account as a “Ferdinand”, which was Red Army slang for German SP gun.)

    He doesn't state the aspect, nor the range by the time he fires. And is this ammunition subcaliber?
    http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/drabkin_ay4/09.html - Account of Mikhail Chernomordik, 76mm battery commander, 640th Separate Tank Destroyer Regiment. Describes how Tiger is only vulnerable to 76mm at close range, and that the standard tactic to use against them was “with several guns at once from a range of 100 – 400 meters.” Further, he states a standard German tactic was to have Tigers stand off at 700 – 800m, attempt to draw fire, and then destroy whatever Soviet AT weapon that opened up.

    Chernomordik's “most frightening incident” of the entire war took place at the Sandomirz bridgehead (i.e., Poland July-August 1944) when a group of eight Tiger tanks advanced directly on his battery, and he had to hold fire until they exposed a flank, allowing the a 76mm fired by the battalion commander to destroy a single Tiger at 300 meters' range. During the ensuing firefight the remaining Tigers destroyed the battery, killed most of the crew, and put adjacent Red infantry to flight. A Red air strike them bombed the survivors, and the Tigers, indiscriminately. I have been reading accounts like this for years, and in my judgment Chernomordik's account has an absolute ring of truth.

    This man seems to know what he's talking about, I agree. He doesn't say, however, that the Tiger is vulnerable to his gun at 400 meters: 'А «тигры» надо бить сразу из нескольких орудий с расстояния 100–150 метров.'
    I could go on, there are hundreds if not thousands of accounts of Red Army veterans accessible on the web, and that's not counting television recollections and books. World War Two is not forgotten in the former Soviet Union, it is a popular topic, and the literature is huge. Glasnost' ended propaganda-based WW2 history in the former Soviet Union by 1990 or so, it is now 20 years later. If one is interested in primary accounts from the Red Army side of the Second World War, it is readily available.
    The problem with eyewitness accounts is that they are not so reliable. I have personally read memoirs of pilots claiming to have blown up Tigers with .50 caliber machine guns, memoirs claiming blowing up T26s by throwing loose dirt into the air intakes, killing tanks with a bazooka by aiming by ear through thick mist, fighter pilots reporting kills on days the other side didn't have any losses in the entire sector, killing Shermans in 1941, and any number of silly claims. This is not meant to be a lie by the claimant, but a single subjective perspective is always skewed. That's why experiment and meaningful testing is an expensive, tiring chore.
    I would be delighted, I mean just thrilled to death, if you or any one else could for instance find me a first-hand recollection of a StuG or a Tiger I resisting Soviet 76mm fire as I managed to get those vehicles to do in my little test above. I am lucky enough to read German, but unfortunately so far I have never run across something like that.
    Such claims exist, but they are anecdotal. You could try to have a look at the Soviet actual firing tests of 20 april 1943. There a very clear picture emerges.
    Of course, there will always be some who denigrate first-hand accounts, particularly those of Soviet war veterans. Some believe that what the guys who were there recall, is less reliable as a basis for building a WW2 East Front combat simulator, than algorithms based on a perceived understanding of anti-tank shells and steel armor manufactured some 60-70 years ago.
    One does not need to denigrate to disbelieve anything. And I'll take well-performed tests of 50-70 years ago above any remembrance.
    For some interested in the subject of WW2 East Front warfare, it is possible to ignore the people who actually were there in favor of pleasant assumptions, like for instance that German 82mm armor had some kind of magic ability to resist Soviet 76mm AP shells, or perhaps that Soviet 76mm AP shells, although on paper possibly capable of punching through that armor, did not do so during the war because Soviet manufacturing standards were poor.
    That argument works equally well the other way around. The magic ability of the inspired Soviet shells to overcome crappy manufacture to lance through Fascist armour. It is not an argument.

    For people unwilling to accept the words of the first-hand accounts, I offer this small piece of visual evidence:

    88aff15d93be13dca7bba10145e.jpg

    That looks to me very much like the side of a Tiger I turret that took something like 6 – 8 hits from Soviet 76mm AP, and in real life, at least one of them punched right through, and about 3-4 more hammered the armor hard enough to crack it or partially punch through, meaning a fair chance of something unpleasant happening on the inside.

    Not really supportive of your point, is it? Many, many impacts, and it is unclear what, if anything, went through. It is clear however, that the Russian gunners didn't feel that the first round did the trick. I will believe that it is 76mm, I will even believe that the 76mm killed that Tiger, and even that it did so by hits on the turret. But it shows that it takes a lot of hits. Like in CMBB.
    Try doing that in CMBB. In the game, German armor 80mm and greater is impervious to Soviet 76mm AP. At any range. That ain't the way it was in real life.
    Partial penetrations and weak point penetrations kill. And I have yet to see any evidence that the 76mm is truly undermodeled.
  16. Bigduke - your first link is dead. The lists in the page you mean to link to are also on this page: http://www.battlefield.ru/en/tank-armaments/98-supplemental-information/355-specification-penetration-soviet-tank-guns.html , but here there is the added information that this is the theoretical performance. Other sources (I think even Potapov himself) repeatedly state that the Russians use the Krupp formulae. The Krupp formulae contain a constant (sometimes called the Krupp coefficient) which assumes certain metal qualities for penetrator and armour. By all accounts, the Soviets used the pre-war German Krupp coefficient in these calculations - which would have been a tad optimistic. Much more interesting are real tests, but these don't usually give easy results. I have not found a lot of reports from the Soviet side of doing this.

    By the way, Potapov warns us that real performance falls short for the F34 until 1943 due to poor ammunition. A secondary source, I am afraid; primary sources about Soviet ammunition quality have proven to be hard to find. If you are a reader of Russian, perhaps you could point me in the right direction?

    The second link does not give any performance data as far as I can find. Are you sure it is in there?

    In the game, when I test StuGs against T34s, I find the StuGs tough opponents. They are killable, in extremis from 500 meters, but much better from closer ranges; but never do they become easy kills. A good amount of hits is necessary. This matches what I read about the measures taken against these things. The 50+30 should perform worse than it does, but I find it hard to say the same about the 80mm fronts.

    Further study into the sparse source material about the 85mm ammunition issue has not given me anything conclusive. I have found one quote of Guderian, of which the essay only records that it is from 1944:

    Overconfidence due to the enemy's greatly variable ammunition quality must be actively suppressed. Twelve centimeter ammuntion failures have long not been reported anymore, and the 8,5 centimeter seems to be improving as well.

    which does not tell us anything other than the Germans being aware of ammunition trouble. But cast your eye on this dissection of a UBR-365K shell:

    5225232704_d90abddcf6_b.jpg

    The numbers denote local Rockwell hardness. This is horrible quality, and this is from 1953, in the Korean war! This is the improved round. It boggles the mind to think what the bad rounds must have been like.

  17. That is something infantry scouting is great for. The AT gun is usually well camouflaged, and will only be spotted at close range. Alternatively, you can pre-emptively blast any good AT gun location to bits if you're really worried. In the end, it's just one of the pitfalls of WWII warfare. Not everything can be countered.

  18. Refusal to take your statements as historical fact is not trolling. You can easily refute any of my arguments if you can come up with some sources. I'm not arguing anything intangible. If you can't, then what do you base your statements on?

    I see, by the way, that I made a bad formulation in my previous post. The D5-T was shorter than the D5 in its complete length including mounting and recuperator, not barrel length.

  19. lol - you are citing figures for L74 and L71 German guns and comparing them to the Russian 85.
    I'm glad I was able to make you laugh. Regardless, I listed the L71 models for comparison. The FlaK 36 is at the top of the German list, if you've missed it.
    The Flak 18 fired a 9.5 kg shell at 810 meters per second.

    The Flak 37 fired a 10.2 kg shell at 800 meters per second.

    The KwK 36 fired at 10.2 kg shell at 773 meters per second.

    The earlier Russian 85mms fired a 9.02 kg shell at 792 meters per second.

    The later D-5 fired at 9.2 kg shell at 785 meters per second.

    If you'll do the computation, you will see that you end up with the energy amounts I listed above.
    There are only tiny differences in the performance of any of them. Those are the famous German 88s and the Tiger I.
    I wouldn't call it tiny. The D5-T and ZIS-S-53 are very different from the FlaK 36, especially when considering things like subcaliber ammunition.
    The Flak 41 (which is an L74 gun, not an L56) wasn't a standard item - less than 600 were made and after a brief failed trial run in Tunisia (not mobile enough) they were all kept in Germany for high altitude AA work. That compares to over 18000 88 Flak of the other types (18 and 37 etc).
    And therefore... ?
    The Russians went with the 85mm because they tested every gun they had on captured Tigers, and the already existing 85mm AA gun succeeded against it,
    Not as far as I've been able to find.
    as did the A-19 long 122mm that ended up in the JS series, and the 152mm gun-howizter that went into the Animal Killers.
    The SU-152 was nicknamed the zvierboi, the 'animal killer', exactly because it was remarkable in being able to bust the Panther and Tiger from any angle.
    The 85mm was the easiest to fit in a T-34 chassis - and it was initially easier to fit it in the SP way than into a redesigned, larger turret. That is why the SU-85 existed. After T-34/85s were available they were less essential, and after SU-100s became available a year later, they weren't needed at all.
    There was a lot more design and redesign going on before a pared-down 85mm gun could be fitted into a T34 turret. The D5 was what was used for the SU-85, but only a shorter version went into the T34/85
    But in the last third of 1943, the SU-85 and SU-152 were the only AFVs that could handle German heavies, and that outmatched the vanilla Panzer IVs and StuGs enough to kill them at range.
    Do you have any historical references of this? Because I looked, and I cannot find anything useful - at the very least nothing that would support such a categorical statement!
    In CM, the SU-85 is ammo nerfed for no good reason, and the SU-152 is given a rate of fire that I have personally exceeded by a factor of 2 in a gun of the same caliber.
    Same caliber - but also in a cramped SPG? (which got bitched about by its crews because of some poor layout choices?)
    Then the 57mm ATG that was present in twice the numbers of Tigers is given a +100% rariety rating and the Tiger is given a +10 or 20.
    The rarity system is devised to push players to choose force mixes that more closely resemble reality. Because there was a much smaller chance 57mm would be present compared to other, more common guns, it gets a higher rarity penalty. If this is an issue for you, you can turn it off in the parameter screen of the quick battle generator.
    In other words, every historical answer is closed off.
    Close assault teams? Mines? Hail fire? I agree that an enemy Tiger is a tough nut to crack, but that is historical.
    Then when German players are asked to adapt to this broken game state by driving Panzer IVs in 1943, they refused to consider it and tell me that the Panzer IV is a piece of crap.
    I don't understand people who stick to one side. They miss half the game.

    The game has its shortcomings, but restricting your opponent to make him more beatable is a bit odd. Especially when you rule out the single most produced unit in his arsenal from consideration. The game doesn't look that broken to me in this regard. There are many things to complain more about.

    Which is proof positive that they can't drive...
    Or that they don't like to be restricted by their opponent - for questionable reasons.
  20. T-34/85s routinely clobbered King Tigers.
    Inasfar as there were sufficient KT's to routinely do anything to them? The Königstiger was an automotive disaster, so many were lost to drive failures that it's quite tough to analyse how their tactical loss rates were. If you know a good one though, I remain interested.
    Claims that they couldn't penetrate 80mm armor are hogwash. The Germans themselves report 80mm front StuGs became vulnerable at ranges out of 1.5 km against 85mm.
    I know, I quoted that. However, it is becoming apparent that to speak of 'the' 85mm is similar to speaking of 'the' 75mm. There were many changes/advances in guns and projectiles in this caliber.
    As for the performance, it roughly matched not the 88L71 (absurd claim) but the 88L56.
    The Petrow or Grabin attempts at a BM version of this caliber never made it to large scale production, but they were a serious attempt. And they were shooting for a nominal 1000m/s shot.
    There is no appreciable difference in muzzle energy or anything else between the 88 Flak and the Russian 85mm.

    85mm AA: 3.6 MJ - 8200 Ns

    85mm D5-T: 2.9 MJ - 7300 Ns

    w/subcaliber: 3.6 MJ - 6000 Ns

    85mm ZIS-S-53: 2.7 MJ - 7000 Ns

    w/subcaliber: 3.5 MJ - 5900 Ns

    FlaK 36: 3.1 MJ - 7650 Ns

    w/subcaliber: 3.1 MJ - 6800 Ns

    FlaK 41: 4.9 MJ - 10000 Ns

    PaK 43: 5.1 MJ - 10200 Ns

    w/subcaliber: 4.7 MJ - 8250 Ns

    As we see there is quite a bit of variation in both calibers. The closest to the FlaK 36 is the D5-T, and the FlaK delivers 7% more energy with standard ammunition, but the D5-T delivers 17% more energy with subcaliber rounds. Hardly negligible.

    Energy is only one part of the equation. Accuracy of the German guns is reported to be better by both sides. Ammunition quality is a major difference, especially in 1943. It is not right to equate KT's getting holed by a T34/85 in late 1944 with a D5 shooting crappy 365 at a StuG front in mid 1943.

    That is not to say that the 85 would fail against the StuG front per sé; it just makes it harder to be categorical about anything at all. Until we can track down some primary sources about this matchup at this time, anything in the range is possible.

  21. Not even HE, it's the original UBR-365.

    A full weekend (miss)spent on researching another comment from the first post of this thread: the 85mm gun being nerfed until 1944, has brought me a heap of confusion.

    Where the German sources are usually quite consistent - although biased in their own way - the Russian sources contradict each other and the reports from the Western allies a great deal. It doesn't help any that I don't read Russian, either.

    There are very few original documents to be had about early 85mm performance, most of the information I have comes from secondary sources. Most of them Russian. The few primary sources I have tracked down are a Wa Prüf 1 test with captured SU85, which had most of its ammunition breaking up when shot at any surface hardened plate thicker than 80mm, and some UN tests of captured North Korean materiel in 1953. Oddly, even though the UBR-365 is listed by most lists as APBC and the UBR-365K as APCBC, the UN analysis shows both rounds to be uncapped solid steel AP.

    Inasfar as it is prudent to draw any conclusions at all from the material I've had access to, it seems that the 85mm AA gun had great AP effect against targets it overmatched greatly, but failed miserably against heavier armour. Its transformation into a tank gun failed (somehow, nobody is too clear about this), so that new models of 85mm caliber had to be developed. Several models were developed, but the first one to reach production was the D5-T.

    Then there are some confused statements in a few Russian books that there was a decision to build a gun to match the performance of the 8,8cm/L71, but this gun was either canceled, never attained the performance desired, or kicked ass and was inexplicably never heard from again. One source grumbles about the order to base the gun around the AA gun shell was ill-suited to a tank gun, but again there is no consistency between writers.

    There is mention of vague 'problems' with the first operational guns by most writers, but they don't specify - again. The anti-armour performance seems to have been problematic, gun longevity is mentioned by some scholars as being the bare minimum. Whether this applied to the prototypes only, or carried over into the production models is not clear.

    In the SU85, the Germans recognized a dangerous opponent, and the Soviets a strong asset, but German testing with a captured example show projectile shattering problems in December of 1943. The Soviets had already been redesigning the ammunition since August. This did not bear fruit until January of 1944. Given that the gun had been designed around the ammunition, the change in ammunition is remarkable.

    Likewise, there are multiple statements from scholars (again, I cannot find primary sources) that the 100mm gun was taken into development because the 85mm turned out to be 'unpromising' or 'obsolete' at this point.

    The D5-T and the later improved ZIS-S-53 (which traded some ballistic performance for a lot of ergonomics) are depicted by both sides as big improvements on the weak F34. Regardless, the gun did not come close to the German guns, as was originally hoped. It was the strongest gun the T34 frame could bear, so it was used.

    Problems with the gun start focused around its disappointing performance, but later these complaints disappear, and the general opinion shifts to the gun being the perfect mate for the T34. Things like inability to load on the move or failing recuperators are the new focus. This seems to support the CMBB case. The main praise for the gun by this time is its simplicity and firepower.

    Much is unclear or confused, but it seems like there were severe ammunition problems until January 1944, and according to German tests, the modeling in CMBB is not bad. In fact, compared to Soviet tests from April '43, it might be optimistic. Again, there is not enough primary material available to me to make a sound judgement on this. If anyone could supply me with some primary sources or consistent scholars, I would be grateful.

  22. Some more digging turned up the following:

    From Nachrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen, may 1944, the following exerpts of the section Erfahrungen mit Sturmgeschützen:

    1. Russian tanks are no problem for us! When the situation allows, wait and let them approach! Broken-through tanks are completely helpless. At night, only open fire after positive identification! Roll in quietly. Always camouflage paint when there is snow. Caution when a tank seems to have been killed! Immediately shoot until it's on fire, or get the Pioniere to blow it up.

    [...]

    10. With artillery and PAK-fire, often make little position changes to get out of the crosshairs of the enemy. N e v e r t u r n p e r p e n d i c u l a r , always show them the strong front.

    [...]

    12 When s h o o t i n g a t P A K alternately fire HE and AP grenades. When there are ricochets, cut the range by at least 50 meters.

    [...]

    Nice peppy tone, so it's not unlikely that it's stained with some unmerited optimism - but it's been approved by Guderian, so it can't be all that bad.

    In another Nachrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen, this one of april 1944, a translation is shown of a Russian publication:

    Russian Guidelines for Combating German Sturmgeschütze.

    In the Russian Artillery-magazine of may/june 1943, the essay of a lieutenant-colonel is published: "combating German Sturmgeschütze", in which the following guidelines are given:

    The peculiarities of StuGs and their great maneuverability on the battlefield make apparent that it is purposeful to deploy special batteries and sections, which fire from hidden positions, to combat StuGs. These batteries and sections need to have special observers at their disposal, who are to announce the arrival of StuGs in a timely manner, or immediately open fire upon them.

    In the defensive fight, the best results against StuGs are achieved by construction of a system of support points. These support points are erected behind artificial or natural obstacles, and deeply layered.

    [discussion about StuG assault forms and mine placement omitted - too much translation work.]

    With a system like this, the fire of our hidden positions needs to be directed onto all waves of the attack. In this case, the heaviest fire should be reserved for the second and third wave of StuGs. Mortars, and at closer range MG's, are to combat the accompanying engineers. This will allow our PAKs, in advantageous cases, to combat the StuGs of the first wave by direct fire. With this it is necessary to warn against the often-made mistake of opening fire at ranges beyond 1.5km, because this is less than effective and shows the enemy the disposition of our guns.

    [exposition about the exact form of artillery fire used to blind and tie down StuGs omitted - suffice it to say that artillery is used to allow PAKs to shoot without being immediately suppressed]

    In case of breakthrough the StuGs are to be taken under fire not only by artillery and ATR's, but also by small arms. The combined fire of machineguns and rifles at the crews of StuGs is already effective at a range of 400 meters, and can induce the crew to bail out. At short ranges, the hand grenade can be successfully deployed.

    When StuGs come under artillery fire, they usually stop and try to take cover in depressions. With this they don't turn around, but reverse whilst fire ready. Since they can only be successfully attacked from the sides and rear, it is necessary to deploy AT forces to be passed by. With regard to this, it is important to take care, since the StuGs take suspicious positions under fire from considerations of caution.

    [part about killing munition carriers omitted]

    Experience has taught thet the Germans apply StuGs together with infantry, tanks and artillery. [...] For these purposes, it is necessary that attacking forces are reinforced with special forces for the destruction of StuGs. Escort guns and ATRs have to be constantly on hand to repel StuGs.

    The Germans count the StuG as offensive weapons. Regardless, they have in the winter of this year widely used them as cover for retreats and rear guards. Leading element PAK and ATR's have, in cooperation with infantry and tanks, successfully attacked the rear and sides of the deployed StuGs.

    Shows a certain amount of trouble caused by the StuG. Guderian makes some comments, of which one is interesting:

    3. In combat, the sideways support of Sturmgeschütze must always be secured.

    The armour does not make invulnerable!

    Therefore: use the terrain, observe, when under direct fire don't "play bullseye", watch for enemy close assault teams!

    Fire and movement, quick understanding of each situation, joy of taking decision, gung-ho attitude, coupled with rational consideration must be the characteristics of the combat method of the Sturmgeschütz.

    A report to the command of 14. PzDiv (of which I have only snippets) of january 1944 by a company commander states that interrogation of captured T34 crews turned up that:

    the Sturmgeschütze are vulnerable from the flanks, but usually have PAK and other StuGs covering their flanks. If possible, one is to gain position to the flanks of the StuG. Otherwise, the StuG is to be blinded with HE, while approach is sought to a distance of 300 meters at which range the StuG front can be penetrated. Subcaliber ammunition is not to be used at ranges exceeding 500 meters.

    This one is German claims about claims made by a prisoner, which comes from a typed sheet from an auction website - not the greatest reference.

    Sideways relevant: a Russian publication about firing tests against a Tiger tank, of april 20 1943. Tiger armour might be of better quality than a StuG front, but I am not sure of this. Cutting to the chase, this list of vulnerable targets for each gun might be interesting:

    57mm:

    with AP: sides, rear from 600 meters

    with subcaliber AP: sides, rear from 700 meters, front from 100 meters

    76mm mod 1942

    with AP: running gear, turret ring, gun

    with subcaliber AP: sides, rear from 700 meters, front from 100 meters

    76mm AA gun

    with AP: sides and rear from 500 meters

    with subcaliber AP: front from 700 meters (no listing for sides or rear)

    85mm AA gun

    with AP: sides and rear from 100 meters

    From all I've been able to find thus far, it doesn't seem that the F34 is undermodeled at all. It does what it's supposed to do, as long as it doesn't go up against the faulty bolted-on armour. I find it a bit far-fetched to accuse the designers of bias against the Russians.

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