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MJY

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Everything posted by MJY

  1. Allowing the country representing the minor to set up its forces would work in the case of the "big minors" as it were (e.g., Spain and Turkey and perhaps one or two others), but it doesn't do much to help the smaller ones with only one or two units. In those cases, there may be only one or two logical placements for these units in the whole of the country (e.g., the capital and one other city or a piece of defensive terrain) and if the units are still understrength and unentrenched, they are goning to die quickly in any event. The problem is that mnor countries at present just sit around waiting to contribute resources to whichever major power gets there first! I would also worry about the historical accuracy of allowing radical redeployments in the context of the time frames available in SCII as these sorts of deployments were not very flexible for most countries (e.g., deplyments are typically associated with bases, fortifications -- even fortifications not significant enough to be indicated on the SCII map -- and the like). Take the example of a neutral Turkey eyed hungarly by both Russia and Germany. And imagine the kind of deployments you might prefer depending on which major attacked first. Obviously the preferred deployment would be raqdically different depending on which country attacked. And now imagine -- from a historical accuracy perspective -- how a neutral Turkey might deploy its forces in peacetime. I suspect as a neutral it would attempt to be ready for either attack -- not just one or another. But the bottom line is that it would not mirror the preferred deployment once the attack actually began. Moving forces around would take too long in real life (e.g., the infrastructure associated with modern armies). On the other hand, as I suggested in an earlier post, calling up Reservists (and other personnel) to pre-existing albeit understrength formations in real life could happen relatively quickly that is in a matter of days and/or weeks (i.e., within the context of even a short summer game turn). None of this is to say that FULL mobilization couldn't/wouldn't take longer than a turn or two. In that case, it might make sense to increase the strength and entrenchment of minors not only in the turn following an attack on a neighbour but even further in subsequent turns.
  2. ev, Yes, Moscow and Stalingrad had both fallen in both games (and not recently either). With regard to Russia, the Soviets had surrendered in the one game (i.e., the instant victory conditions) but not the other (i.e., where the Allies got to counter-attack). That may have been the reason, but it is not specified anywhere in the rulebook.
  3. Here's the situation. I recently completed a mirrored pair of games with my usual PBEM opponent. In this round, the Axis won both games, however the nature of the victories is somewhat controversial -- from my perspective anyway! In the first game, my opponent took London in late 1946 completing the "Axis Early Victory" requirements resulting in the software declaring an instantaneous "Axis Major Victory." In short, when his airwings, rockets, and paratroops cleared and then occupied London, my Allied forces were not given the opportunity to counter-attack. On the other hand, in our second game, I took London on the first turn of May 1947 completing the Axis Major Victory conditions as laid out on page 132 of the manual (i.e., control of specific cites after September 1939), but in this case the game did not end immediately. Instead, my opponent was given the opportunity to counter-attack (which he did). He re-took London and then an ill-timed bout of mud prevented one last attack on my part. Grrr. My question is this: Is this a glitch? Should I have been awarded a Major Victory without the Allies having the opportunity to counter-attack? The manual is unclear. Anyway, the input of the forum board would be appreciated. The question is important from my perspective as my regular opponent and I make our games a little "interesting" by putting a little cash on the line (wagers that vary according to the level of victory). By the way, I hope gambling doesn't violate the Battlefront good conduct policies!
  4. ev, With regard to increased size, I was not thinking so much in terms of conscripting more soldiers and training them (which would take FAR too long in game turns (i.e., months and months instead of weeks), but rather it could represent in the abstract the mobilization of Reserves and other previously training individuals and/or various militias and other paramilitary forces -- a process that most armed forces would have already have made plans for well before the war started. As for increasing levels of entrenchment, that could represent the deployment of forces from peacetime barracks (etc.) to frontline fortifications and/or other strategic locations on a war time footing. The bottom line is that it would stop minor neutrals from just sitting around waiting to be cannon fodder for major powers on the rampage in their neighbourhood. Certainly neutral nations mobilized at various points during the war as various crises occurred.
  5. I have been reading the forum discussions concerning the upcoming WAW expansion pack but I have not seen much regarding how WAW might treat diplomacy -- especially as it relates to the impact of DOWs on minor powers. I mention this because I include myself amongst the group of SCII players frustrated by the limited consequences that arise under the current system when players go around the board knocking off all the minor powers in a big resource grab! (I am specifically thinking of some of the posts made by Targul and others on this matter.) In many instances, attacking a minor power has little or no effect on the war preparedness levels of the major powers or neighbouring minor powers. Worse still are what I would argue are extremely unhistorical strategies where major powers are free to DOW friendly governments (Axis DOWs on Franco’s Spain being perhaps the most egregious example). I guess I have a question and some suggestions regarding these issues. In terms of the question, does anyone have any insights regarding any changes with respect to diplomacy in WAW? In terms of suggestions, I have a couple of ideas I would like to throw out. One would be to limit which countries can be attacked by a major power. In much the same way that “historical accuracy” is furthered by existing limitations whereby Germany cannot DOW Italy and the UK cannot DOW Russia or the United States and diplomacy cannot cause Italy, Russia, or the United States to switch sides (only delay their entry into the war), it might make sense to limit major power DOWs to those countries that are either leaning towards the other alliance (e.g., the Germans can DOW Greece or the British can DOW Sweden) or absolutely neutral (e.g., Ireland, Iran, and the Baltic States at the start of the game). Obviously, the list of eligible countries would change over the course of the game on account of diplomacy, other DOWs, and the like. But it would prevent current strategies wherein the Axis can attack a pro-Axis Spain and the Allies can invade a pro-British Iraq. Such a change might also add another dimension to the use of diplomacy. For example, imagine it is early in the game and Britain is considering whether or not to spend diplomacy on Spain. On the one hand, a successful diplomacy hit or two might lower the pro-Axis leaning of Spain to the point where Spain’s attitude negatively impacts the pro-Axis leanings of Hungary and Rumania. On the other hand, too much success might lower Spain’s political orientation to the point where Germany is free to attack Spain and (ultimately) Gibraltar. And the random diplomacy bonus makes everything even more dynamic – and interesting! Similar choices would face the Axis with regard to Iraq (e.g., change the orientation of Iraq by too much and you open Iraq to a British invasion). A second suggestion might be for minor neutrals to “mobilize” their forces should a neighbour country be attacked (e.g., a minor country’s 3-strength corps might grow – over the course of a turn or two -- to a 10-strength corps and become more heavily entrenched). With this sort of system in place, an Axis force that invades Spain might find Portugal a (somewhat) tougher nut to crack as a follow up. And the British might find Vichy Algeria tougher to crack after Tunisia is first attacked! I am interested in any feedback forum members might have. I would also be interested in playing a few PBEM games employing the first suggestion (i.e., the DOW limitations) as a “house rule.” (I don’t know the editor enough to know if you can repeatedly change the strength and entrenchment levels of minor powers once a game has started.) Anyone interested in trying this via PBEM can e-mail me directly. Depending on the response, I may not be able to accept all challenges (at least not immediately), but I will respond to all messages. Thanks!
  6. Normally I resist threads that are not directly related to SCII game play and strategy, but this time I just can't. On the question of who was worse -- Hitler or Stalin -- the answer is probably Mao! (See the Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression from Harvard University Press 1999.)
  7. Colin/Blashy, Thanks also for the quick response. As a member of the "historical realism" camp, I agree a shared border consisting of 300 miles of barren Arctic terrain is pretty useless for purposes of operating units, supply, and the like. At the same time, from a gaming/play balance perspective it is no less realistic than the current situation with regard to operating units from, say, Casablanca to Tehran across the vast reaches of very poorly developed North Africa or across vast regions of the old Soviet Union (many of which even today are essentially undeveloped with regard to infrastructure) and so on and so on. I suppose I will just have to wait and see how operating units is covered under the context of the new road and rail rules in the expansion pack.
  8. Thanks for the quick response, Iron Ranger. I assume this is a software issue as Norway and Finland shared (and obviously still have) a several hundred miles long border just off screen! Does anyone know if the expanded map of the expansion pack will go all the way to the top of Scandanavia? The press release refers to passing north of Iceland and alludes to new polar convoy routes, but does not define the extent of the new map.
  9. I am playing SCII as the Axis. My British opponent conquered Norway early in the game and I subsequently liberated it. I have occupied all the Norwegian cities and resource hexes and even sent a corp to the north edge of the board to convert all the hexes to "Axis." Finland is an active Axis ally and while Leningrad is still controlled by the Soviets I have a broad and continuous land connection to Finland to the east of Leningrad (i.e., direct operating ot Finland, Finnish resources max 10 and the like). My question is this. Shouldn't Norway not now have a "virtual" connection via Finland to Germany? And as such, shouldn't Norway's resources be max 10 (instead of max 5)? Souldn't I be able to operate overland to Norway? And shouldn't I be able to build German ground units -- and not just Norweigen units -- on Norway's cities (like I can in Finland)? If not, why not? Am I missing something? Thanks.
  10. P.S. Ooops. I guess I can't close a thread I started. I'm such a Luddite!
  11. Thanks to all who responded. I'm now going to close this topic/thread. When Normal Dude completes his statistical study w/o FOW I assume or, even more interesting, to demonstrate the statistical impact of FOW -- now there's a study -- I look forward to seeing a new thread. Thanks again!
  12. Thanks again, Pzgndr, for the quick response. But to what user manual are you referring? Page 40 of the manual that came with my disc refers to plunder and convoy raiders and the FOW section of my manual makes no reference at all to the expected loss indicators. I assume this means there is a 2nd edition of the user manual out there somewhere? On-line I presume?
  13. Pzgndr, Thanks! FOW may well be the explanation. It certainly makes sense. (I have never played SCI or SCII without FOW.) Is your conclusion based on looking at the code, game play experience, or something else? I will wait and see if other players support this conclusion and if they do I will consider this topic definitively settled and close the topic. Thanks!
  14. Normal Dude, thanks for the quick reply. I would be interested in seeing the results when available. (A good opportunity to put the stats I learned in grad school to good use.) For myself, I did track results for random periods of several SCI games. My results were insufficiently large-n to be statistically meaningful, but I felt I recorded enough results to discount selective memory/observer bias.
  15. Based on approximately 50-60 SCI/SCII campaigns, it appears to me that the computer-generated on screen expected combat loss indicators in both versions of the SC system under-estimate expected attacker casualties about twice as often as they under-estimate expected defender casualties. One would think that random probability would have the expected combat loss indicator right, say, 50% of the time with attacker and defender losses under-estimated about 25% of the time each. My questions are as follows. First, have other players noticed this (e.g., any hard data). Second, are these skewed probabilites deiberately programmed into the software as a means of encouraging agressive play and offensive strategies from players that would otherwise be risk-adverse? And, third, is there a patch for this/in the works for this? I look forward to hearing from the Forum.
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