michael kenny
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Posts posted by michael kenny
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Originally posted by JasonC:
As for the U of C WW II section, go there and look for yourself. Regenstein library, 5th floor, take a right after entering the stacks etc. It is not hard to find every bit covering any case of a German armor attack on US forces in the west, because there simply aren't that many of those to survey.
Ah..... so now you say there are only a few books on the subject in the 120ft of shelving.
So what was the point of saying it was 120ft?
I don't doubt the shelving exist only that you read 1500 books on this narrow subject.
Originally posted by JasonC:As for losses in the bulge, first the silly person has to learn to look at reality instead of his library
You of course get none of your data from books.................
You get your facts from 'reality'
Only an idiot would boast of his access to 120ft of book references and then denigrate somone else for using books for a reference!
You are absolutely priceless.........
Originally posted by JasonC:I have stated the approximate loss ratio because that is what it actually is, and he is free to try to show that it is incorrect if he likes.
Which confirms what I said, you are using ESTIMATES of German losses not the real figures.
Originally posted by JasonC:He won't find higher US than German losses because they aren't there.
'He' is a straw man because 'he' never said the US losses were greater. You must be desperate to try and say otherwise
Originally posted by JasonC:Depending on sources specific items and figures periods etc you might find 1.15 or 1.1 rather than 1.3 - you will still find 1.33 either way in the first week (pro German) and the rest of the campaign (pro US). You will only find any German outperformance if your narrowly focus on the first few days to the first week (depending on sector).
If, maybe, but. So many qualifiers....are you struggling here?
Are you refering to Generalfeldmarschall Gerd Von Rundstedt?Originally posted by JasonC:You could ask Rundstadt (by seance or whatever lol) and you'd get the same sort of answer.
Why do we need him when such an obvious genius as yourself deigns to share his knowledge with us!
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Originally posted by JasonC:
The silly person imagines "outright lies" because he is silly. I took the coverage of the fighting on the 22nd from Cole because Cavanagh's coverage after the 21st is thin, and Cole covers the role of the fresh TD unit better
Really? Here is Jason's original quote:
Cavanagh's book says:22nd attack renewed report says "once more, US tank destroyers of the 613th TD battalion stopped these attacks". Other reports say that attack was made by 20 tanks""Just after daybreak, on 22 December enemy patrols of the 26th SS Pz.Gr. Reg. 12th SS began to probe the 2nd Battalion lines. Just after 10:00 they attacked with a change in tactics. In place of a frontal assault they attacked the Battalions flanks and broke through on the right. Once more, US tank destroyers of the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion stopped these attacks"
Cole says:
Shortly after day broke on 22 December patrols from the 26th commenced to probe at the 2d Battalion lines. The fresh enemy regiment, however, set out to vary the unsuccessful headlong tactics previously employed by striking at the flanks of the Dom Butgenbach position. The first assault, shortly before 1000, carried an undetermined number of panzer grenadiers through a gap between Companies A and K, on the right of the 2d Battalion. Here there were about twenty Mark V's and tank destroyers, but the 90-mm. tank destroyers from the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion rushed in on the flank and Stopped the enemy.
I leave it for the reader to decide which book contributed the quote:
"once more, US tank destroyers of the 613th TD battalion stopped these attacks"
The duplicity was when Jason said nis original post was from taken from Cole and refered to an incident on Dec. 23rd instead of Dec. 22nd.
Here is how he tried to explain away where he got the quote from:
Originally posted by JasonC:Green book Bulge account (Cole), page 133. This is the day after the incident discussed in Cavanagh
If you read the two extracts then you will see they both clearly state the date December 22nd.
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Jason overclaims-again!!
Originally posted by JasonC:My TD assessment is based on reading every source I have found on every German armor attack against US forces from Kasserine to Remagen, in all the official histories, all the typical popular ones, and about 120 shelf-feet of the University of Chicago library section on WW II.
Now if you want to get into a d**k measuring contest about books then I am your man.
My personal book collection is well in excess of the length quoted by Jason. For those unfamiliar with the footage claimed as 'read' I should explain that using the dimensions of a fairly thick book ( the'After The Battle' volume on the Bulge is 1.75ins for example) you can fit some 820 substantial books into that space. I would say that in reality he is talking about some 1500 books in the 120 ft of shelving he mentions.
Jason says he has read all these PLUS every unit history and every popular title on the subject!
This is pure b******t. Even it is just the 120ft of shelving he is still is talking out of his ar**.
I personaly have some 50+ feet of shelving on NW Europe alone and I have a hard time keeping track of titles and information.
Care to do the usual Jason and 'revise' your
claim?
Originally posted by JasonC:And no, Cavanagh is not my "major source", I simply cited many cases out of him when the silly person pretended there is no evidence in the matter or that most kills in front of Elsenborn were by bazooka. .
Yes of course I said that. Here is my original quote where you can quite clearly see that I pretended the kills were 'not' made by Infantry or Artillery
"The majority of the German tanks lost in the Elsenborn area were destroyed at close range and mainly by Infantry/Artillery"
Oh and Cavanagh is your source. You also tried to say the incident I queried took place on the day after the date given in Cavanagh........or did you just get 'confused'?
Originally posted by JasonC:Overall German losses in the Bulge were 4/3rds those of the allies
Again Jason posts not a single source!
For this to be true (4/3rds?) you have to accept the Allied ESTIMATES of German casualties and ignore the Official German loss figures.
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Oh dear, I have mistakenly given a source that agrees with Jason........I am undone!!!!!!!!Originally posted by z-warfare:So someone else thinks the same thing. Doesn't that ADD credence to what JasonC is saying?
Sorry chaps but I know full well what I posted. I have no need to distort history in an attempt to bolster my case.
The linked author does indeed share several points with Jason But still has no trouble admitting that the TD's were lightly armoured and did not perform as they were expected.
Did I say I Jason was the only one with such ideas?
A weapon system that was intended to be a heavily armed fast hit and run tank killer. A system which was found to be too lightly armoured to be able to survive in an attacking role against a prepared enemy and which was used mostly in small packets and mainly as Infantry fire support.Originally posted by z-warfare:And if TDs neither rocked nor were ineffective, what do you think they were?
Quote from
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/usarmy/doctrine.aspx
"Doctrine and Training
"U.S. Army doctrine, as developed during the prewar and early-war Army expansion, emphasized mobility and combined-arms in both attack and defense. Mobility was achieved by developing reliable, robust armored and soft-skin vehicles. Unfortunately, in the case of tanks and tank destroyers, thickness of armor was sacrificed in the interest of mobility to the detriment of U.S. Army armored vehicles in tank-versus-tank-combat. This flaw was exacerbated by one of General McNair's fundamental beliefs (later proved to have been fundamentally unsound) that the armored division would not be required to engage and destroy enemy armored formations since that would be the task of the tank destroyers. Rather he visualized the armor divisions as a cavalry force to exploit gaps opened in the enemy lines by the tank-supported infantry divisions. The major flaw in this concept was that the lightly armored tank destroyers proved regularly that they were unable to engage and destroy enemy armor when it attacked in mass, even when the tank destroyers were deployed in concealed defensive positions. While the tank destroyers on defense were often able to delay or blunt an armored attack, they could rarely defeat them. Thus, instead of operating in an independent antiarmor role, the tank destroyers were semi-permanently attached to infantry and armored divisions, while armored divisions were forced to take up defensive as well as offensive missions, a role for which they were not well designed (since they lacked sufficient infantry)."
Now as you said earlier(but with a slight alteration):
"So someone else thinks the same thing. Doesn't that ADD credence to what Michael Kenny is saying?
So then is my case now strengthened?
Originally posted by Corvidae:There are two kinds of arrogance,
1) EARNED arrogance,
2) UN-EARNED arrogance,
no, are you suggesting Jason is arrogant?
Originally posted by Corvidae:JasonC may be abraisive. He certainly does not suffer fools, or their pretentions. He ruthlessly applies caustic doses of common sense to people who usuly need it. And our oppinions and interpretations, sometimes clash.
But in the time I have been on these forums, I have never seen him be wrong about a statistic or fact.
So you are completely au-fait with all the subjects under discussion? You know enough to be able to speak up if you saw an error?
Here:If I missed such an event, someone please link me to it.Example 1:
Originally posted by JasonC:I cannot however agree with the remark that it "cannot be claimed that the US Army had ‘more than they needed’".
Replacement US Shermans were in short supply in the summer of 1944 and 500 of them had to be 'returned' from British stocks. There was a shortage at that time.
"Although it appears likely that the ‘excess’ of M-4 in the US probably amounted to over 6,000 (it is still possible that my original off the cuff estimate of 9,000 could be valid), it cannot be claimed that the US Army had ‘more than they needed’ since the end-users – the units in the field – were still experiencing shortages through VE-Day. 12th AG was at 89.3 percent of T/E and Seventh Army was at 96.8 percent of T/E – even after many of the bottlenecks had been eliminated and after massive shipments (note the number received by ETOUSA) to rebuild the losses suffered that December and January had been received. Shortages during earlier periods had been severe and had been masked in part by expedients such as the decision to delay the replacement of 9 M-8 HMC Assault Guns in the armored divisions in December and the elimination of the 'replacement' tank sections in 2nd and 3rd AD."
Example 2
Originally posted by JasonC:The US outscored the Germans in Normandy in tanks lost .
The actual numbers:
From 6 June to 1 July (26 days), First Army wrote off 187 M4-75mm and 44 M5.
From 2 to 29 July (28 days), First Army wrote off 208 M4-75mm, 12 M4-76mm, 4 M4-105mm, and 67 M5.
From 30 July to 2 September (35 days), First Army wrote off 237 M4-75mm, 38 M4-76mm, 6 M4-105mm, and 69 M5.
From 3 to 28 September (26 days), First Army wrote off 123 M4-75mm, 33 M4-76mm, 10 M4-105mm, and 34 M5.
From 1 August to 2 September (33 days), Third Army wrote off 221 M4-75mm and 94 M5.
From 3 to 30 September (28 days), Third Army wrote off 48 M4-75mm, 61 M4-76mm, 2 M4-105mm, and 37 M5.
From 9 September to 5 October (27 days), Ninth Army wrote off 2 M4-75mm.
Thus roughly:
‘June’ 231
‘July’ 291
‘August’ 665
‘September’ 350
Total = 1,537
Originally posted by JasonC:The Brits had higher armor odds longer, used their armor more in multiple breakout attempts, had superior Fireflies the US lacked - and were dramatically outscored by the Germans throughout the Normandy fighting, including in Goodwood.
The figures:
British losses are given as:
June – 146
July – 231
August – 834
September - ?
Total = 1,211 (est. 1,568)
German losses:
June – 1 Pz-IV(k), 124 Pz-IV(l), 80 Pz-V, 19 Pz-VI (L56) = 224
July – 149 Pz-IV(l), 125 Pz-V, 14 Pz-VI (L56) = 288
August – 49 Pz-IV(l), 41 Pz-V, 15 Pz-VI (L56) = 105
September – 12 Pz-IV(k), 581 Pz-IV, 540 Pz-V, 72 Pz-VI (L56), 23 Pz-VI (L70) = 1,228
Total = 1,845
Whichever way you divide up the losses there is simply no way Jason is right in either of his two conclusions on tank losses in Normandy.
Jason's defence was to say the German loss figures 'are wrong'!
Example 3:
.Originally posted by JasonC:First, US TDs were not lightly armored. ..........................................................The M10 and M36 were open topped, but about as armored as any medium tank. It took a full heavy PAK to KO them etc
Reality:
..................M4..............M10...........M3A3(StuartV)
HULL
Front.......2.0.............1.5/2.0............1.0/1.75
Side.........1.5.............1.0/0.75..........1.0
Rear........1.5.............1.0/0.75...........1.0
Top..........0.75/0.5.....0.75/0.375.......0.5
Floor.......1.0/0.5........0.5..................0.5/0.375
TURRET
Front......3.0.............2.25.................1.5
Side........2.0.............1.0..................1.25
Rear.......2.0.............1.0...................1.25
Top........1.0..............0.75(add-on)....0.5
An M10 really isn't much more armoured than a Stuart-which was a light tank.
Example 4:
Originally posted by JasonC:"The fresh enemy regiment, however, set out to vary the unsuccessful headlong tactics previously employed by striking at the flanks of the Dom Butgenbach position. The first assault, shortly before 1000, carried an undetermined number of panzer grenadiers through a gap between Companies A and K, on the right of the 2d Battalion. Here there were about twenty Mark V's and tank destroyers, but the 90-mm. tank destroyers from the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion rushed in on the flank and Stopped the enemy."
Green book Bulge account (Cole), page 133. This is the day after the incident discussed in Cavanagh.
The above is Jason's reply to my asking
"I can't find any reference to the attack being made up of '20 tanks'.
Where did that come from?
I had simply asked why he quoted Cavanagh in a previous reply but added a bit about '20 tanks' (it is not in the original book)
In the reply he says he used another book (not Cavanagh) and that the incident he was describing took place on another date (and thus was not from Cavanagh)
Unfortunately Jason was not telling it as it was. He did use Cavanagh but added in the reference to the 20 tanks made in the Green Book. To try and 'pretend' he did not use Cavanagh he had to attribute the full quote to another book. By doing so he blatantly lied and said he was talking about another German attack that took place THE NEXT DAY and thus not the one described in Cavenagh.
Rather than admit he used one book extensively he said he used 'several sources' (books) and tried to alter dates to cover his mistake. What sort of ego makes you do this sort of thing?
Look through Jason's post and you will find they are rather 'light' when it comes to listing sources. Only those familiar with the subject are able to work out what exactly he is using as a reference.
[ December 27, 2006, 10:40 AM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]
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Hmmm........where have I seen that theory advanced before? Surely it is Jason's original idea and not something he read but again forgot to source?Originally posted by JasonC:Corvidae - basically yes, that sums it up. The part left out is that when the separate TD doctrine was decided on, large German armor offensives were greatly feared. In the actual event, the Germans had armor so sporadically and used it so poorly when they did have it, the TDs were "underemployed". The role they specialized for simply turned out not to be as important as had been expected, because the enemy was weaker than expected.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOPTR=39
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Jason is ploughing a lonely furrow here.
I see he has again failed to list the sources he used to compile the German losses.........
Jason fails to explain why he tried to explain away an error is his 'report' by fabricating a bogus date for an account in a second source.......
Jason failed to give the source of his 'verbatim' quote by a British Officer..........
Jason fails to understand the TD doctrine
The TD was not meant to perform as a defensive weapon but was supposed to go looking for tanks to kill.
Perhaps a chapter from the book linked by John in an earlier thread. http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic;f=30;t=005090
I did not intend bringing it in as it is a rather specialised volume.
The Antitank Cabal: Armor Versus the Tank Destroyer.
The tank was introduced to protect against automatic small arms fire,which was developed so greatly during and since
the World War. Its answer is fire against which the tank does not protect—the antitank gun.
That this answer failed was primarily due to the pitifully inadequate number and power of French and British antitank
guns, as well as their incorrect organisation.
—Gen. Lesley J. McNair
The tank destroyer concept, "initiated by George C. Marshall, nurtured by Lesley J. McNair, and implemented by Andrew D.
Bruce, was the U.S. Army's response to the revolution in warfare known as the blitzkrieg."22 Marshall's patience had been sorely tried by both the infantry and cavalry chiefs, and in 1940 he directed that his G3 establish a small planning and research branch, primarily to consider antitank warfare. The foxes were in the doctrinal hen house. A series of antitank conferences were called in April 1941, with representatives from all branches. It was decided to create
first a "tank destroyer" (a 75mm gun mounted on a half-track) and form "divisional Antitank Battalions in each foot infantry division, motorised infantry division, and possibly, armored force division and secondly to
form GHQ Antitank battalions."23 An illustration of McNair's complete misunderstanding of operational armor is the advice he offered Marshall:
"In my view the essential element of armored action is a powerful blow delivered by surprise. While armored units may be broken up and attached to division and army corps, it is readily conceivable, and indeed probable, that the entire force, under a single command, may be thrown against a decisive point.24
The infantry branch, understandably, eagerly embraced McNair's doctrine:
" An increase in armor or gun power can have no purpose other than to engage in tank to tank action—which is unsound/Moreover, such a tank would be disadvantageous in carrying out the primary mission of armor—to defeat those elements of the enemy which are vulnerable to tanks. The answer to heavy tanks is the tank destroyer.25
The Louisiana maneuvers created an armored metier within the upper echelons of the Armored Force (Crittenberger wrote: "As we maneuver in Louisiana, so shall we fight"). Anointed graduates adjudicated tactical problems throughout the war by "quoting the Louisiana Exercise as others quoted the Bible." 26 However, proponents of Louisiana-based dogma were soon shunted to a doctrinal Avignon while the McNair group was encouraged by British experience in the Western Desert. In May 1941, the British
lost over 300 tanks in two days during Operation Battleaxe. U.S. Army tank destroyer (TD) theorists noted the effect of antitank fire and crowed in vindication of their doctrine. The fact that the very deadly 88mm gun had no readily available counterpart in either the U.S. or British arsenal was over looked.
One year later, the American Grant tank surprised the Germans in
North Africa. Despite obvious shortcomings, its armor and firepower more than justified the tank's existence. The Grant's 75mm gun penetrated thenew face-hardened armor on the German tanks. At long range the Grant's armor withstood the long 50mm L/60 on German Mk Ills. Finally, when the new version of the German Mk IV, the Ausf F2 with a long 75mm Kwk
L/43 gun, appeared, it defeated the Grant with ease. Nonetheless, the TD lobby continued to dismiss armor-only engagements.
U.S. Army AGF doctrine stressed that tanks were to be held in armored divisions until a breakthrough was prepared by the infantry. The tanks would then perform as the Mongol hordes and run amuck in the enemy's rear. As late as 1943, McNair insisted that the "general concept of an armored force is that it is an instrument of exploitation, not very different in principle from horse cavalry of old. ... An armored division is of value only in pursuit and exploitation."27
This philosophy even crept into British doctrinal thinking, and, despite significant experience with tank conflicts in North Africa, the War Office prepared the 21st Army Group for Normandy by asserting:
It is this fact (mobility, rapid reinforcement of threatened areas) which causes armor to attract armor. Although in theory, tanks avoid tank vs tank battles, these frequently occur only when normal antitank measures are inadequate should tanks be used to provide a mobile reserve which can, when absolutely necessary, be used to deal with enemy armored fighting vehicles. 28
The first test for U.S. armor would be in Tunisia. Things did not work well; predictably, the action at Kasserine Pass demonstrated that the tank destroyer doctrine was "a fundamentally flawed set of principles."29
Marshall and McNair remained unconvinced, even after a December 1942 fact-finding tour returned from Tunisia and declared that "the Doctrine of having TDs chase tanks is absurd."30 This program continued despite theTDs' inability to survive armed action; more serious, however, was that it diverted efforts from the race to develop an American heavy tank. The Tank Destroyer doctrine was an old artillery response to cavalry: grouping gun battalions to defeat Cuirassiers with a grand batterie. McNair's pocket battleship solution—an armored fighting vehicle that could run away from
trouble—did not work because eventually, even the Graf Spee had to turn and fight.
Notes:
22.....C. R. Gabel, Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II (Fort Leavenworth: Leavenworth Papers No. 12. Combat
Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985), p. 67.
23..... AGF Study No. 29., The Tank Destroyer History, Historical Section, AGF 1946, pp. 2-3. The McNair case rested on a sure-fire argument to convince Congress: "It is poor economy to use a $35,000 medium tank to destroy another tank when the job can be done by a gun costing a fraction as much."
24....... K. R. Greenfield, The United States Army in World War II, The Army Ground Forces, Vol. 1, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947) p 66
25....... Bailey, p. 9.
26....... Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Armor (New York: Atlantic Books, 1960), p. 88.
27...... Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces) (Washington, D.C.: Historical Department U S Armv
1947), pp. 325,334.
' ' ' ''
28. The Cooperation of Tanks with Infantry Divisions, Military Training Pamphlet No. 63 (War Office, May 1944), pp. 77, 9. "There are two main roles for armored components in an army. These are: a. in conjunction with infantry to effect the 'breakin' or breaching of main enemy defensive position, b. exploit, strike deep in enemy's rear installations either through gaps or around the flank." Pamphlet
No. 63, p.6.
29...... Gabel, p. 67.
30...... Devers presented interesting conclusions: "The Sherman was the best tank on the battlefield; the tank destroyer was not a practical tactical concept; the warwas a war of gunpower and; American troops would have to acquire a higher stan-
dard of discipline." He was selectively ignored. Quoted by Maj. Gen. E N Harmon, commander, 1st U.S. Armored Division. Ernest N. Harmon Papers, MHI.
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Someone said 2. More detailed sources give 6.
Noitice that the German loss figure is for armoured vehicles and the US loss figure is for tanks/TD's. Further investigation will reveal the total vehicle loss for the US side and it is not '6'. The manpower losses for both sides were severe and to reduce it to vehicle casualties fails to give an idea of the intensity of the fighting.
I don't remember saying they were 'innefective' but if you can show me where I did say that I will happily correct it.
The fuss is over a claim that TD's 'rocked'(sic) and outscored German tanks every time they clashed. This is a part of a bigger claim that every time US armour met the Panzers they at least matched them or greatly outscored them. Now the actual loss figures show this is not the case but still we get the same old theory repeated.
No one is saying German tanks were always winners or racked up multiple scores but to go to the other extreme and try and claim the reverse is true is just as idiotic.
TD's were, despite attempts to suggest otherwise, lightly armoured and thus could not shrug of hits as a tank could. Yes 75mm/88mm could kill any Allied tank but light AA and small arms could take care of the TD's.
The fact that kits were made to up-armour TD's should give you an idea of their vulnerability.
True in close quarter point blank encounters they could hold their own but as a dedicated weapon for actively hunting down tanks they were not a succes.
Don't just take my word for it. Read any work on the subject and they nearly all have a final paragraph where the demise of the concept is explained.
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Originally posted by JasonC:
E.g. in front of Elsenborn. (In front of Dom Bugenbatch the US 1st ID counted 48 destroyed German AFVs - they lost 2 tanks).
If you consult 'Against The Panzers. United States Infantry Versus German Tanks, 1944-45.' Allan Vannoy and Jay Karamales 1996) you will find the US armour losses for the Dom Bugenbach (not 'Bugenbatch!)encounter are given as 3 SP TD's and 3 Shermans.
This book is even more detailed than Cavanagh's and would be ideal for those who like to impress others by a slight re-wording and calling the result 'a report'.
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Cavanagh's book
'Green Books'
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/CMH/Overview.htm
Specificaly The Ardennes Campaign; The Battle of the Bulge. 1965.
Seeing as Jason won't link it I will have to do it. You can download it here.
A bit dated but still a useful work.
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_Cont.htm
The full page 133 partialy quoted by Jason:
"when it arrived to face the Germans, had been reduced by perhaps one quarter. Indeed, in midafternoon of the 21st, the battalion commander had planned withdrawing a thousand yards to the rear to compensate for the dwindling strength in the firing line. But when the 2d reorganized that evening its position was somewhat strengthened. Company C, with extra bazookas, had come up to man the denuded right flank, the 1st Engineer Combat Battalion laid a hasty field of about a thousand mines in front of the lines, and the regiment had attached the 4.2-inch mortars of the 2d Division chemical battalion to Daniel's command.
Meanwhile the enemy regrouped to continue the attack with new forces. The armored infantry reserve of the 12th SS Panzer Division, the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, finally had negotiated the poor roads and traffic jams along the German line of communications and arrived in Büllingen, ready for its first commitment in the offensive. Shortly after day broke on 22 December patrols from the 26th commenced to probe at the 2d Battalion lines. The fresh enemy regiment, however, set out to vary the unsuccessful headlong tactics previously employed by striking at the flanks of the Dom Butgenbach position. The first assault, shortly before 1000, carried an undetermined number of panzer grenadiers through a gap between Companies A and K, on the right of the 2d Battalion. Here there were about twenty Mark V's and tank destroyers, but the 90-mm. tank destroyers from the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion rushed in on the flank and Stopped the enemy. The continued threat, though serious, was countered by shifting local reserves from the 18th and 26th to close the gap, and by the end of the day the situation was well in hand. Again the American gunners had taken over a large share of the burden, firing over 300 missions. The cooperation between the artillery and infantry arms, it must be said, was reciprocal. The fact that the 26th Infantry had continued to hold its position on ground overlooking the German routes west had allowed the observers a grandstand seat and had caused the German columns taking the 1st SS Panzer Division detour through Schoppen to run a gantlet of accurate and continuous fire.
The successful withdrawal from the Krinkelt-Rocherath sector to the more favorable terrain of the Elsenborn ridge had resulted, by 20 December, in a fairly homogeneous and well-constructed defense with the 2d Division on the right and the 99th Division on the left. On the morning of this same day the 9th Infantry Division took over the Monschau-Höfen sector (its 47th Infantry had moved earlier into supporting position west of these two towns) and so covered the northern flank of the 99th.
The German attempt to crack the newly formed north-south line was handled in catch-as-catch-can and piecemeal fashion, for the primary mission was the flanking maneuver in the Butgenbach area. The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, which had relieved the 12th SS Panzer Division at the twin villages, went to work at once against the 99th Division portion of the Elsenborn line although the bulk of its rifle strength was not yet in hand. On the morning of 20 December German tanks and infantry made the first of three assaults. But the 99th, on a forward slope with perfect visibility and good fields of fire, checked this and
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[ December 24, 2006, 07:20 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]
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Originally posted by JasonC:
22nd attack renewed report says "once more, US tank destroyers of the 613th TD battalion stopped these attacks". Other reports say that attack was made by 20 tanks.
I replied with:
"This is from page 182 of Cavanagh's book and it is re-written to become a 'report'.
The original sentence reads:
"Once more US tank destroyers of the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion stopped these attacks"
the retort:
Originally posted by JasonC:"The fresh enemy regiment, however, set out to vary the unsuccessful headlong tactics previously employed by striking at the flanks of the Dom Butgenbach position. The first assault, shortly before 1000, carried an undetermined number of panzer grenadiers through a gap between Companies A and K, on the right of the 2d Battalion. Here there were about twenty Mark V's and tank destroyers, but the 90-mm. tank destroyers from the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion rushed in on the flank and Stopped the enemy."
Green book Bulge account (Cole), page 133. This is the day after the incident discussed in Cavanagh.
Sorry my friend but this is simply factualy incorrect. You clearly date the time as '22nd' in your original post and in Cavenagh's book he says:
"Just after daybreak, on 22 December enemy patrols of the 26th SS Pz.Gr. Reg. 12th SS began to probe the 2nd Battalion lines. Just after 10:00 they attacked with a change in tactics. In place of a frontal assault they attacked the Battalions flanks and broke through on the right. Once more, US tank destroyers of the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion stopped these attacks
You quote Cavanagh 'word perfect' and there is no other explaination other than you copied it fron his book. Now you say this came from another book.......yeah right. You could never have just made a simple mistake could you!
Originally posted by JasonC:On 644 claims, 19 is from green book, higher figure is Cavanagh page 174 - 23 by TD and 2 by zook.
And sources my eye, all you ever say is "if I haven't read it it must not be true". You've never shown the slightest analysis of anything you've read, being by all evidence to date a pure "ipsi dixit" scholastic. Which is useless to everyone, whether you realize it or not.
You fail to address the Battalion History which only claims 12-14.
There is one interesting fact.
The TD battalions claimed over 500 German tanks for the Bulge Battles.
German losses were between 7-800 tanks.
US losses were 730
Now this works out at roughly a 1-1 exchange rate.
Do you still think that it is possible that the TD claims are valid?
Originally posted by JasonC:I get operations research questions in my head, independently, and I doubt conventional wisdom I am presented with in summary paragraphs. When I have such a question I go read detailed operational accounts and unit histories, surveying incidents.................................................
I cross check claims with enemy own-side loss reports for scale and timing etc
And the German records you consulted to confirm all the claimed losses are..................?
Originally posted by JasonC:Examples recently were - artillery utility stopping armor attacks, both operationally and actual field KOs. Air vs. armor claims. Effectiveness of TDs - the one here. Net kill ratios. Net casualty ratios. Fielded odds ratios and how they move. Apportioning AFV kills over causes. Lifetime average effectiveness of various weapon systems. Average hit chances achieved. Casualties per heavy artillery round expended, average and operations and variation. Timing of draw-down of operational tanks strengths. How illuminating or misleading is TWO accounting? Redeployment speeds of mobile formations on defense. Specific strengths of the Germans in the second half of 1944, infantry vs. mobile formations in the west. AT strength of Axis minor formations in Russia. Role of "reserve maneuver" and attrition, vs. operational counterattack, in stopping Kursk. Relative effectiveness of tanks in offensive and defense deployments. Doctrinal treatment of defense in armor doctrine during WW II and since, and its weaknesses. Role of logistic pacing in the fighting against NK and Chinese in Korea. Operational mobility of infantry arms compared to vehicle-mechanized formations in rugged terrain, and whether doctrine reflects realities experienced on the subject. Actual NK and Chinese tactics in their successful period vs. the human wave mythos largely stemming from later stalemate period. Attrition rates, production, and the prospects of an attrition strategy by the Germans in Russia in WW II. Maneuver vs. attrition doctrines, and the discrepancy between academic love for each and their actual combat record both as to predictions and as to successful use.
And yet you still get it all wrong!
This sort of thing really interests me and for some time I have been trying to find the actual tank losses for each side rather than unsubstantiated claims. Are you trying to tell me that you have solved this problem and are in possesion of information that allows you to claim, with absolute certainty, the loss rate for individual weapons types? Please share this amazing data with us because up to now all you seem to do is quote Unit claims. If you have the info you surely are not posting any of it here.
Originally posted by JasonC:Here is what I don't do - read one book and pretend anyone who disagrees with anything it says, however generalized or unsupported, must be an ignorant git making it up. Or look for 1-2 strained talking points for nationalist "spin" propaganda.
One book? Like Cavanagh's? 90% of the incidents you listed earlier come DIRECTLY from Cavanagh. He is your main source, you failed to say you used his book and now when called on an error in you account you try and say it is from another 'source'
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Artillery -bazooka incident - 5 German tanks with infantry attacking at night, US calls artillery fire, reportedly KOs the first tank. Bazooka then claims a second, but unclear this isn't finishing off the same one. Rest withdraw.
Probably the incident described on page 208 of Harry Yeides's book 'Tank Killer'. Though there the details of the losses differ.
644th TD (a single company actually, 12 TDs) - 19 to 25 kills (2 by zook by dismounts), 2 TWO losses.
Harry quotes the Unit History as claiming 12 tanks and 2 SP's (page 208 again)
If Jason could find the book he would see something on the page that might help his cause!
Danny Parker gets a total of 19 tanks/SP's in his Bulge book but notes that 'refined' estimates get as high as 27.
Parker ends with:
The TD mission has been superseded...TD's should be replaced by a tank which can outgun enemy tanks and which has sufficient armor to protect itself from normal anti-tank and tank weapons. In other words make killer tanks, not tank killers.
I like to give sources and quotes otherwise people might get the idea I did all the research myself...................!
[ December 24, 2006, 10:22 AM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]
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This is from page 182 of Cavanagh's book and it is re-written to become a 'report'.Originally posted by JasonC:22nd, attack renewed. report says "once more, US tank destroyers of the 613th TD battalion stopped these attacks". Other reports say that attack was made by 20 tanks.
The original sentence reads:
"Once more US tank destroyers of the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion stopped these attacks"
I can't find any reference to the attack being made up of '20 tanks'.
Where did that come from?
Which Mcdonald source?
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Jason please tell me what book you are using(Cavanagh?)
Then I can try and sort it all out.
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Well the accounts I read list the destruction of 11 German tanks and 1 SP gun.Originally posted by JasonC:E.g. in front of Elsenborn. (In front of Dom Bugenbatch the US 1st ID counted 48 destroyed German AFVs - they lost 2 tanks).
6 to 57mm guns.
3 to Artillery barrage
2 to TD's
1 SP by Bazooka
48 destroyed 'AFV's' is not 48 destroyed tanks by the way.
The majority of the German tanks lost in the Elsenborn atrea were destroyed at close range and mainly by Infantry/Artillery.
There is no information in Jasons posts that can be used to substantiate his TD claims. There is not enough hard data or even a detailed breakdown of the claims to allow a check to be made.
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Providing nobody happens to be firing at the TD!Originally posted by birdstrike:I'd say Allied TDs 'should' do better than German tanks in a pure armor duel, and certainly better than Allied tanks versus German armor.
Nothing happens in a vacuum and there are many other weapons that can kill a TD other than a tank. In a game though I suppose anything goes.
In real life the tanks won out and the TD was a dead end.
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Yes but as the armour on a TD was from .5 inch (turret front, hull was an inch less) to 1 inch less you could do it with less powerful weapons, and with mortars and small arms as Hunnicutt noted.Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:JasonC was saying that in order to KO a US TD, you needed to employ the same weapons you would use against a tank - a PaK, LATW, tank gun, etc.
Far from being 'beside the point' they show that the claim of matching armour is simply not correct. TD's had, by design, less armour than contemporary Shermans. That is why kits were made to uparmour them and a turret roof was added.Matters of millimetres of armour seem like minutia compared to the broad points he's making. Quotes of armour thickness from Hunnicut are beside the point.
The point is that the TD concept was considered a failure. A failure as to the concept and not in how they performed. Jason's 'broad point' is based on erroneous information.
I was aware that contradicting Jason would upset some and thus made sure I put the information I used in the post.
However there is no information in the above that allows you to check if the claims are correct. At present we are asked to simply take it as given.I would like the information used to calculate the losses and the method used to verify the claims. Is that asking too much?Originally posted by JasonC:[QB] I've simply studied every instance in which the Germans actually attacked with armor in the west, against the US and how they were stopped. There aren't that many...................Every time the Germans actually attacked, the SP TDs gave better than they got and outscored the US tanks by large margins
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No Jason said:Originally posted by Kingfish:Jason did acknowledge that the US TDs were open topped, so I don't see a contradiction there. As for thin armor, which TD is Hunnicutt referring to? As I pointed out, both the M10 and M36 had comparable armor protection as the most common Sherman variant of the time.
"US TDs were not lightly armored. ..............The M10 and M36 were open topped, but about as armored as any medium tank."
This is not correct. The TD's had less armour than the tanks
90mm GUN MOTOR Carraige M36
Weight, Combat Loaded: ................ 63,000 pounds
Weight, Unstowed:...........................58,000 pounds
Power to Weight Ratio: Net.............14.3 hp/ton
Gross...............................................15.9 hp/ton
Ground Pressure: Zero penetration............12.9 psi
ARMOR
Type: Turret, rolled and cast homogeneous steel. Hull, rolled and cast homogeneous steel; Welded assembly
Hull Thickness:................Actual........................Angle w/Vertical
Front, Upper ....................1.5 inches.....................55 degrees-Lower........................4.25 to 2.0 inches.........0 to 56 degrees
Sides, Upper.................... 0.75 inches...................38 degrees
-----------Lower...................1.0 inches.......................0 degrees
Rear.................................0.75 inches ...................0 to 38 degrees
Top, Front........................0.75 inches....................90 degrees
--------Rear.........................0.375 inches..................90 degrees
Floor................................0.5 incheS......................90 degrees
Turret Thickness:
---Front (gun shield).........3.0 inches......................0 degrees
---Sides.............................1.25 inches....................5 degrees
---Rear...............................1.75 to 5.0 inches.........0 degrees
---ToP................................0.375 to 1.0 inches.......90 degrees
------------------------------------------------
MEDIUM TANK M4A3(75)W
Weight, Combat Loaded.............69,600 pounds-
Weight, Unstowed......................63,100 pounds*
Power to Weight Ratio: Net ...........12.9 hp/ton
Gross..............................................14.4 hp/ton
Ground Pressure: Zero penetration 14.3 psi
*A11 weights based on T48 or T51 tracks
ARMOR
Type: Turret, cast homogeneous steel.
Hull, rolled and cast homogeneous steel; Welded assembly
Hull Thickness.................... Actual............................Angle w/Vertical
Front, Upper..........................2.5 inches........................47 degrees
----------Lower.........................4.25 to 2.0 inches.............0 to 56 degrees
----------Sides...........................I.-5 inches........................0 degrees
----------Rear...........................1.5 inches.........................10 to 22 degrees
Top.......................................0.75 inches.......................83 to 90 degrees
Floor, Front..........................1.0 inches.........................90 degrees
----------Rear............................0.5 inches........................90 degrees
Turret Thickness:
--Gun Shield..........................3.5 inches...........................0 degrees
---Rotor Shield.......................2.0 inches..........................0 degrees
---Front..................................3.0 inches..........................30 degrees
---Sides..................................2.0 inches..........................5 degrees
---Rear...................................2.0 inches...........................0 degrees
---Top.....................................1.0 inches..........................90 degrees
------------------------------------------------
The subject is tricky because you have to be careful which model of M4 Sherman you compare to the M10/M36/M36B1/M36B2
An M4/M4A1/M4A3(mid) is not the same as an M4A1(76)W/M4A2/M4A2(76)W/M4A3(75)W.
Also the early M36 models were converted from the M10A1 and thus had the earlier spec for that chassis.
However the fact is the TD was created as a lighter answer to the tank. If not then why build them?
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This bit:
"Under these
conditions, it was vulnerable with its thin armor and
open top turret"
The tables in Hinnicutt show that the TD's had lighter armour on every aspect except the lower front hull. An inch less on the upper sides and about half on the sides. Half an inch on the turret front and 1.25 inches on the turret sides.
[ December 21, 2006, 05:17 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]
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Originally posted by JasonC:
[QB] First, US TDs were not lightly armored. The first halftrack mounted French 75s were, and ever since everyone has repeated it like a mantra, but it simply isn't so. The Hellcat was also lightly armored, deliberately (for speed). The M10 and M36 were open topped, but about as armored as any medium tank. It took a full heavy PAK to KO them etc.
Wrong. Why believe me when you can 'hear' what Hunnicutt had to say about the TD experiment.
" The first M36s arrived in Europe in August 1944
and were immediately committed to action in France.
Battle experience brought out the need for additional
changes. Because of its heavy firepower, the M36 was
frequently used as a tank rather than in its original role
as a tank destroyer or self-propelled gun. Under these
conditions, it was vulnerable with its thin armor and
open top turret. Because of the latter, artillery air
bursts and small arms fire often caused casualties to
the crew. In August, the Army Ground Forces directed
the development of an overhead cover kit to provide
protection for the turret crew. These covers were
folding armor tops designed to protect against small
arms fire and shell fragments without completely
sacrificing the all round vision of the open top turret.
Another problem arose from the new waterproof
steel containers being developed for the 90mm rounds.
Since they were too large to fit in the sponsons, new
ammunition racks were designed to permit stowage of
the bare rounds. The new racks were released to
production along with the armored turret tops for all
vehicles produced during 1945.
The continuing demand for 90mm gun motor
carriages resulted in additional production starting in
May 1945. Montreal Locomotive converted 200
MIOAls to M36s during the remainder of the year.
This exhausted the supply of MIOAls requiring the use
of the diesel powered M10. Originally designated as
the T71E1, it was classified as the Substitute Standard
90mm gun motor carriage M36B2 in March 1945.
Starting in May, American Locomotive produced 672
M36B2s by the end of 1945. An additional 52 were
converted at the Montreal Locomotive Works by the
end of the year. This brought the total production of
the M36 series to 2324.
In April of 1945 the development of fording
equipment was completed for the M36 and in June
standardization was approved for the new M83 direct
sight telescope. Battle reports from Europe indicated
that the M36 was being employed more and more in
the role of a tank, a task for which it was not properly
designed. Requests were received for both a coaxial
and a bow machine gun. The latter was already
provided in the M36B1 since it used the standard tank
hull. Complaints about the high ground pressure
resulted in the application of the M4E9 spaced out
suspension and extended end connectors to the late
production vehicles. All of these factors foreshadowed
the demise of the tank destroyer in the postwar army. It
was too much to expect a vehicle originally designed as
a highly mobile self-propelled gun to perform the role
of a tank. All of the modifications such as the auxiliary
armor and folding turret top only served to underline
its deficiencies when compared to a properly designed
tank. Nevertheless, the M36s continued to serve during
the postwar period and were furnished as foreign aid to
a number of Allied nations. They were still in service in
Korea during the mid 1950s.
The passage is from Hunnicutt's legendary work on the Sherman.
Originally posted by JasonC:[QB] The highest scorers were essentially always the SP TDs, with indirect artillery, tanks, and infantry AT all effective supplements. Mines and towed ATGs and airstrikes got a few more but not in the same league as the previous.
I would love to see the data used to reach that conclusion
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Originally posted by JasonC:
One of his supposed flaws is that the gun traversed 30 degrees so you had to point the whole tank. Gee, it is a good thing the StuG, Jagdpanzer, Hetzer, Jadgpanther, Semovente, SU-76, 85, 100, 122, 152 etc didn't have that problem
One is a TANK the others are SP Guns...........'Gee', wonder why no one noticed?
It is too tall - true enough, at 10 foot 3 it is a whole 6 inches taller than a Panther or a Sherman.
Enemies of the Grant(119 inches and 29 tons)
Pz III = 99 inches and 22 tons .
Pz IV = 106 inches and 21-23 tons.
Thus the Grant is TOO HIGH relative to the opposition it faced.
Also as the main gun is low in the superstructure 'hull down' is not really an option.
Comparisons to the Panther are simply absurd.
The Sherman, depending on type, was 108-117 inches and 33 tons
Panther is 118 inches and 45 tons
Note that nothing in the above is a criticism of any aspect of the Grant or Sherman. Flag waving defenders of any particular nation go fight someone else!
Can I suggest another field trip to Barnes and Noble? This time take your daddy and he can lift you up to the top shelves where the technical works are stored. A notebook would be useful to jot down any quote you intend using in nexts weeks posts-you never know when you might be asked for a source!
[ December 20, 2006, 01:03 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]
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Excuse one:
Reasonable.Originally posted by JasonC:I don't have a working scanner
Excuse two:
Originally posted by JasonC:I read it, what, on Saturday, standing in the Barnes and Noble in Nashua New Hampshire if you care to know
So even if you had a scanner you could not scan it.....so why say you had no scanner?
Quote one:
so lets run down the quote..........Originally posted by JasonC:The comment about the Grant is taken verbatim from British officer's accounts of the desert war
Quote two:
Ah so now it is NOT a quote.Originally posted by JasonC:I call it verbatim simply to point out the expression used is not my own coinage, but his
I find it odd that someone who delights in obscure literary references and word games is unaware of the dictionary definition of 'verbatim'
Originally posted by JasonC:Now run along and look at a copy at your library or in a bookstore.
Sorry Jason but this book would not interest me. The subject is too lightly covered to be of any use to me. Look how it led you astray? I don't think I will be 'running' anywhere.
Originally posted by JasonC:If you are silly enough to doubt my report of so elementary an unexceptional a fact, then knock yourself out going and looking. I find it incredibly amusing that you should think it a matter requiring urgent investigation.
You mean apart from the fact it was not a verbatim report?
Perhaps instead of tying yourself in knots you should simply admit your mistake.
Here is a link that may prevent a repeat of this error
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=88007&dict=CALD
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We have no reason to believe that based on what you've presented here. </font>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by michael kenny:
I am quite well informed about all the late war tanks used by The Allies and The Axis.
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Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:
No, you're a waste of everyone's time if all you can do is commit ad hominem attacks and not bother discussing the things that are at issue here.
If someone says they are using a VERBATIM report and I ask the source of the quote what exactly is your problem? Is Jason just to be accepted at his word because 'you' like him?
It proves Jason has not got a VERBATIM reportWhat exactly was this post supposed to prove other than the fact you have reached intellectual bankrupcy?
Guns vs Armour
in Combat Mission: Afrika Korps
Posted
So far so good.........
Beg to differ. He puts forward specific examples where he is clearly using the wrong information. When challenged he simply stops responding.
References? What references. Oh you mean the "Cavanagh, McDonald,Dupuy and the Green books" he mentioned in passing in one post?
I did 'look' and do not agree.
Just in his last post he dismissed Dupuy:
Now this is an example where opinions do not matter. Either Jason is right or he is wrong. The M10 was simply not as well armoured as a Sherman. When you set out to 'comprehensively explode'something be careful it does not blow up in your face.
So then deliberately lying to try and cover the (unimportant-so why lie) fact your source is one single book 'isn't important'? Shows something about character at least.
A pattern of posting where you always use the maximum casualty figures for the Germans and the minimum for the enemy 'isn't important'?
I do appreciate Jasons points.He says that the US TD concept was a succes and that they performed their task to perfection.
Yet they never once were used in the way they were envisaged.
Jason says TD's were about as armoured as a Sherman tank. Even though they were substantialy thinner all around than a Sherman.
Jason thinks that everyone who differs from this view(the majority of all works written on the subject fall in this heading)are simpletons.
I, and many others, disagree.