Artos

A pleasure Marlow. My post was a reply to yours on equal forces. (I was thinking of the western front as you were using Vosges and American v. German forces.) I offered a simple (and necessarily limited) reason for the difficulty in finding the examples like Vosges. Concur on Vosges. Concur on the early German victories. As for the operational defensiveness/offensiveness (in the west), my perspective is that operational defensive dominated German operations. There were exceptions, as you illustrated. No dispute over Hitler's intentions. The intentions, however did not match the reality. German generals in the west were handicapped by low priority for reinforcement and supply, compounded by air interdiction and morale problems, all of which grew in significance as the western campaing progressed. They made the most of the opportunites presented (and made), yet, to me, the operational defensive was the most common choice (necessity) at the time. I respect your knowledge and your presentation. Our lack of agreement is likely more a matter of degree and perspective. Thank you also for the heads-up on Bonn's book. I just read through a batch of reviews of the book. Looks good. Interesting how the reviewers can leave you wondering if they read the same book.

The Germans were on the strategic/operational defensive so the opportunit to find a test with equal numbers, equipment, supply is not bright. One thing I find interesting when people discuss this topic is that ground numbers get compared (or for the truly clueless, the number and level of formations), while excluding allied air superiority (almost complete supremacy) and the paralyzing effect this had on the Germans. Equal numbers on the ground aren't equal when the killing and boggling power of that many aircraft having virtual free reign above and behind the battlefield.

1) The Germans were OVER-RATED !!! I'm tired of hearing all the bull-crap about their generals, equipment, planning, engineering, pretty uniforms, etc. ANYBODY CAN DEFEAT UN-ARMED COUNTRIES. Poland, Low Countries, & Baltic States don't count. I don't know of any account from the people who fought the Germans who considered them underrated. While I work to avoid simple answers to complex questions, there is one certainty in WWII. It was a total war of attrition. The side with the most resources wins. The fact that the Germans withstood the combined industrial, technological, and poplulation power of the allies begs explanation. How does your statement advance this cause? Please also keep in mind, that the Germans did this with an army that was still horse based. This will strike many as fanciful. The German army was never even close to fully motorized in terms of supply. In most respects, their supply system was little different than that of the Franco-Prussian war and WWI (horses and trains). This could continue to a very long list, indeed. 2) The SS were OVER-RATED !!! Big-deal shooting women & children. They hid behind the lines, until a nice soft spot was available. I/O and Flash have done a good job of responding to this. 3) The Stukas were OVER-RATED !!! Anybody can bomb somebody who can't shoot back. At their time (all weapons have a time when they can shine) no opponent thought them over-rated. Precision tactical bombing starts with the Stuka (as does true combined arms capability). If it was so over-rated, the concept of and variations on the design have certainly stuck and been copied by every major military in the world. 4) The War @ Sea is UNDER-RATED: It took brass balls to go out in the middle of the Atlantic in some U-Boat. Over-rated, perhaps. The other replies about the courage to go to sea and do battle in a U-boat are on the mark. The courage to keep going out is something incomprehensible to most (perhaps all of us). The actual opportunity for Germany to win a decision at sea was very small and Germany was not prepared to make the most of the opportunity, even if the leadership had been fully supportive. To illustrate, I will risk upsetting some people. Victory against Japan was not accomplished by island hopping (I say this as the nephew of a courageous and beloved uncle who was in the fifth wave at Iwo Jima.), carrier warfare (even though the U.S. had more than 100 carriers of all sizes by war's end), or through strategic bombing (even the atom bombs). Japan was defeated by the use of submarines against an island nation. (The reason this is frequently overlooked in the U.S. is that the post-war navy was dominated by carrier admirals.) What was the difference between Germany's failure and American success? Primarily it was time, four years of the steadily increasing pressure to strangle Japan, aided by a reversal of relative technological superiority from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In this regard, I agree the war at sea is under-rated. 5) The French are weak: UNTRUE!!! Look at all the wars they had been involved in over history. Vietnam, Napolean, War of the Roses, Dark Ages crap, French & Indian, etc. Yes, the got their ass kick in WWII & are a little whimpy now, but over the big picture they have fought well. Big subject here. Prior to Napoleon, national armies, and the Empire, France had had periods of military success, even dominance. However, the Kingdom of France's primary weapon and reason for its success was diplomacy. The French, epitomized by Louis XIV were masters of manipulation. The fragmentation of Italy and Germany were triumphs of foresight and real politik. Of course there was a certain resentment to be expected, when their pawns got their act together. The 30-years war rings a bell here. As with any world power there are successes and failures. France has had a string of dramatic failures since that marvelous army of 1805 was destroyed. In these cases, national leadership has had an equal share of the responsibility as poor military leadership. 6) Africa was a waste of time in WWII!!! Who gives a rats ass about Libya & Egypt. If Germany was some smart, why didn't they go for the oil instead of dicking around in the sand (kitty box)? They could have used those troops & resources in Russia. A phrase comes to mind that I can picture being said by Yogi Berra (if he had ever had to reply to a statement like this): You fights wheres you have to. The initial decision to deploy to North Africa was more a political decision than a military one. The Italians had screwed up by the numbers and Hitler decided to bail them out. Was there a potential there to do more than just help an ally (burdend by poor equipment and an abysmal officer corps)? Certainly there was. Coherent German planning for long-term goals (even support for attainable mid-term goals, was non-existent at the national level. Was the use of (and waste of in some opinions) of fine formations worthwhile, in the end? Having those units and their supply train available for Russia would have made a difference, but it seems unlikely they would have made enough of a difference. (If you care to discuss the realities on the ground of supply in Russia, I will participate.) In my opinion, the Germans did gain from the debacle in the desert. First, it tied down significantly more military and national political resources of the British, than the Germans invested. You may recall that Churchill once said, "I did not become Prime Minister to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire." This is a telling statement and also explains why he did not contest Norway or attempt to retake it, when both were very feasible. The German involvement also kept Italy in the war for 12-24 months longer than was likely to be the case if the Italians had collapsed in North Africa. Such a collaps would have provided the allies with free reign in the Med, the freedom of movement to attack anywhere along the axis Med coast, early, undisuputed sea access (via the Suez Canal and Iran) to the Soviet Union, and freed huge forces and a long supply tail to support a possible early landing in northern France. 7) Resistance Fighters are UNDER-RATED!!! Snipers, French Underground, Sabatours, etc. played a huge role screwing up the Germans. After the war, if you had polled the French, you would have found that a vast majority of Frenchmen and women had been part of the resistance. The reality is that no more than 50,000 French participated as part of the resistance at one time or another. Of this number a very small number were active regularly. When you look at their numbers, their accomplishments are without a doubt more impressive than we have been lead to believe by popular conception. They were very brave individuals. The story we do not get in more generalized readings of the history of the occupation and Vichy, is that far larger numbers of French were very, very active participants in supporting the German occupation and its policies. Compare .1% (.001) of the French population fought heroically, while somewhere between 5% and 10% were active collaborators. This number grows when we attempt to determine the number of French who supported the policies against the jews. There is another aspect of resistance fighting that applies to your post. The resistance fighting in the east was at least as much a product of Nazi policies and how the SS carried them out as a popular movement. Many in the Soviet Union welcomed the German army as liberators. In the Ukraine alone, Germany could easily have recruited more than 1,000,000 into its army, many of whom were of German ancestry and spoke German. In the rest of the Soviet Union (as we have seen since 1991) there were dozens of ethnic groups that just wanted to be free of Soviet domination (actually, any domination other than their own) and would have been at least quiescent to a light German hand. (The only hope Germany had of "conquering Russia, died stillborn due to Nazi policy.) On the heels of most Wehrmacht advances, came the SS. The terror began immediately with execution of leaders, teachers, etc. We might say that at least half of the partisan activity in the east was a self-inflicted wound. 8) Patton is the biggest STUD!!! Yes, the battlefield kill ratio & stats are questionable (do you believe everything you read), but this guy banged his way across France & opened up the front. He saved, or lets say "our blood, his guts" rescued alot of GI's at the Bulge. In the earlier thread, I posted some thoughts on Patton. The things that stand out with Patton, that we can reliably state as positives: He was an apt student of history. He focused harder on training than almost any allied combat general. He could get a hard fight out of his men. He built an exceptional staff. He was a better combat general than he would have been an administrative general. He was adaptable and inventive with amphibious operations. The negatives: He was a glory-hound and used lives to obtain it. He did order/condone the execution of thousands of German prisoners. He was the driving force in the shortcomings of allied armored forces thanks to his ironclad insistence as the senior tank officer that the M4 be the only tank. This effectively killed the M26 which could easily have been the main tank used by the western allies in Europe. Patton, the leading U.S. tank man did not believe that tanks should fight tanks! There are areas I have not addressed, that can't be addressed with certainty: How would Patton have fared in the political climate in the Wehrmacht that his opponents faced? How would Patton have fought if he had been thoroughly handicapped in material, air support, political support, ally's (Italian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian) officer corps, political considerations, equipment? How would Patton have fared after suffering a string of consecutive, crushing defeats? How would Patton have fared after loosing 80-90% of his army (his cadre of officers and NCOs disproportionately) and faced with the need to fight immediately? We can't answer these questions, and blanket statements seem unwise. Perhaps the most vexing question with Patton is, "Was his arrogance a positive or negative traint?". BTW: To illustrate the attrition nature of the war, the pressure all German forces faced for years, and the courage of the American M4 tank crews, consider that in one year in Europe, the American 3d Armored Division took 580% percent tank losses. 9) The fire bombing of Dresden is UNDER-RATED. Everybody talks about "The Nukes" which makes sense. But hell, fire-bombing people to death worked. I have been quoted as saying, "war crimes were invented by the winners so they can hang the losers." Not entirely accurate, but it contains some truth. By a very liberal definition, all war is a crime. By a very conservative definition, you can come to the same conclusion, with the caveat of "so what." Going back to the use of gas in WWI, many veterans of the fighting thought gas more humane than machine guns and massed artillery. At base, killing is killing for the most part. The offense many take of "weapons of mass destruction" is that they are easy and killing "shouldn't" be easy, and that attacking someone from inside their own body is deceitful. Please do not construe this as support or excuse for mass executions of civilians or surrendered enemies. 10) And, finally, I think the Allies could have save alot of lives if a different attack was used instead of D-Day. It seems like the history books (& movies) emphasize the whole battle revolved about the landing areas & keeping them secret. Alot of allied body bags were used. Could there have been a better plan than D-Day? Another big topic. The decision to go into Normandy had many reasons, all valid to at least some degree; in total they were decisive. The Free French, the resistance, and the French people had been promised that France would be liberated. The British had a certain desire to redeem being driven out of France at Dunkirk. The size of the operation demanded very large, very secure (safe from detection and attack) staging areas, training areas, supply bases, and air bases. (Attempting to stage anywhere else would have been a dead giveaway.) All these required very large, numerous, and smoothly functioning port facilities to handle the enormous volume of cargo. The staging and deployment had to occur from bases very close to their targets to minimize detection, travel time to target, and keep the absolute maximum amount of airpower available in the critical hours. When successful, the supply chain could naturally (if not without difficulty) extend into France. In the end, any allied invasion of France, whether on the Channel or the Med, was going to need the support and supplies that could be provided from bases in England. The supply infrastructure was in place. Any other base with half the capability would have to have been built from scratch. Then there is the issue of how do you get the civilian support force in place in Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, or North Africa. Normandy was a necessity. I have heard Normandy called the most planned military operation in history. I have seen nothing to dispute this. It was planned for 2 years with a marvelous (if sometimes comic) intensity. On the issue of surprise, surprise can be achieved in many ways. Did the Allies achieve surprise at Normandy, yes. Did the Germans make this easier for them, yes. Was it a challenge to achieve surprise when the enemy knew roughly where the attack would take place? Oh yeah. It was masterful deception and misdirection. B.H. Liddel-Hart has done some wonderful work on the nature of surprise. While his "Strategy of the Indirect Approach" is good, if dry, his WWI history, "The Real War, 1914-1918" provides a better discussion of the types of surprise, IMHO. Even if the German northern divisions had deployed immediately, it seems probable that as long as the allies had even one beach head, attrition and absolute air supremacy, would have been the deciding factor. (The Germans could move nothing safely in daylight with thousands of allied combat aircraft looking for anything that moved.) Let's not forget that one of the best combat generals the allies had was sitting on the sidelines (Patton) and that he had a certain skill with impromptu amphibious operations. Within days he could have organized and landed at any of perhaps a dozen sites along the channel and even Biscay coasts. (This flexibility also lends some credence to Hitler's fears that Normandy was a diversion.) The political reasons were strong, yet the military necessity justifies the decision. My apologies for the length of my response.

Two other subjects raised in this post I would like to offer my perspective on, German chances of success and German tactical competence. I'll get this out of the way at the start; the Germans could not have won. There are so many reasons and I expect most of the people who post here are familiar with: Hitler, the SS terror that undermined segments of the officer corps and the initially strong support in occupied territories like the Ukraine, poor decisions on technology development, not placing the German economy on a wartime footing (degree can be debated) for more than a year, the decision to repeat Tirpitz's mistake and build a capital fleet (see Z-plan), the shortage of U-boats when the war started, the failure to pursue the submarine war agressively from the start (please see the number of U-boats in September 1939 and compare to the number of U-boats in September 1940, the declaration of war on the United States that, had it not happened, Roosevelt would have been put in a hell of a bind (the game doesn't replicate this), Hitler's castration of the officer corps in the Army by diluting competence with mass promotions of more politically oriented officers, Goering, the resource lost in creating three separate ground armies (army, waffen SS, and luftwaffe units,) and the resources wasted on the holocaust, to name a few. I have two other theories that play into this (one I won't advance here.) In addressing the other, what I can provide is a question that is rarely asked by historians, but is tantalizing when considered. When we ask, "Could the Germans have won?," something is left out of consideration when the answers are presented. What does "won" mean? The conquest and subjugation of the Soviet Union? The conquest and permanent subjugation of Europe and the Soviet Union? Conquest of the U.S.? Forcing the U.S. out of the war? Uniting the Arab world and keeping them cooperative? The fact is that Hitler had no end game. Eternal war can not be considered an end state. I grew up as an American who's grandfather fought in the German army in WWI (in which 2 of his brothers died) and saw the strong post-WWII prejudice first hand as parents would refuse to allow their kids to play with Germans (even 2d generation Americans). This prompted me to dig deep. I wanted to find that the Germans (not the Nazis) could have won. I was doing "what if" scenarios when I was 10 and haven't stopped. The reality is, the Germans could not have won. A fact that I am actually grateful for as I am convinced there is no way to separate the Germany of the 1940's from nation controlled by Nazis. On the subject of tactical differences between the armies of the powers, I will have to be more circumspect to protect my research. In the 1980's US Army, there was some emphasis (not nearly enough) placed on war game models for past wars that might be built upon to model future wars. Please note, that this is not a study of tactics, only battles and wars. There were 2 primary contending models proposed and officers lined up on each side of the debate (the very few officers who thought it a worthwhile subject). The bottom line was that both models were terribly flawed. One model included "racial factors" for the mathematical formulas. While for 2 decades I have beleived, taught, and sometimes preached that it is impossible to study military history without studying cultural history, (military history IS cultural history) the notion of cultural factors that could be quantified and plugged into a formula is ludicrous. The tactical differences, frequently striking, between the armies of the major powers are one of the few areas of WWII European/American history that doesn't seem to be hotly debated. We can say that a concesus of understanding, on the basics at least, has been reached. The remaining debate in this area focuses on how to apply it to simulations/games and to a lesser extent on the causes for the differences. (My research has focused on these two areas and I find them inseperable. Further, I have found that the impact of tactics can be factored into simulations, even at the operational and strategic levels. As I still have hope of publishing my thoughts in an article or game, I apologize for leaving you hanging.) These are my opinions. Thank you.

Hi All. I am new to the boards. Generally, I avoid posting unless necessary. Having read the first three pages of posts on the board, I now have some feel for the discussions. First, I complement you and the moderators for keeping a very civil board. Second, the general quality of historical knowledge is well above average. I disagree on points, but that is to be expected. I do want to comment on the topic of generalship and German possibilities of success. (Please forgive me in advance for 2 areas I can allude to, but not explain fully, as they involve topics you won't find in any secondary sources and I am protecting them while I continue to research.) The comparison of generals is as old as war and fraught with difficulties. The 2 areas in which I have enough knowledge to feel confident in discussing this are the American civil war and WWII. Patton is perhaps the best example of how we can miss important points. Patton is widely regarded as prescient about the role of tanks, going back to the '30s, yet he was the architect of failure in US tank design, the M4 Sherman and was the person most influential in limiting the US to "medium" tanks, for nearly the entirety of the war. Patton was, without doubt, the hard-ass, combat general he is depicted to be. He fought hard, trained is men hard, demanded a lot from them. All strong positive traits. Please consider what we have no evidence of in evaluating Patton. Patton was not on the short end of the stick that generals like Rommel overcame time and time again. The chronic shortage of supply, lack of air superiority/air supremacy, the bumbling high command, incompent direction at the national level (Hitler), and the Italian officer corps to name a few. In my experience of real generals and study of Patton, I can honestly say that Patton would have had a hard time coping with these limitations. In fact, if he had been in the German army, I believe a convenient aircraft accident would have been arranged for him. When considering generalship, there are more factors than even the majority of historians consider. To give balance, Rommel had significant problems as a general. Two well documented examples I can provide. Rommel had a habit of fighting too far forward. He never shook the tactical perspective of a platoon leader. This is something that is a strong positive in very good generals, yet in Rommel, there seems to be gap in perspective. He could think well operationally and strategically within a theatre, as well as at platoon level. Above the platoon and below corps level, we might be justified in saying he lost perspective during combat. Rommel would routinely place himself with his lead platoon/company in a major attack and remain there for days. He would ignore the rest of the Afrika Korps operations while he would pull more and more Korps assets into that platoon's fight. Certainly Korps assets existed to be used and at his discretion, yet the loss of focus was nearly fatal of a couple of ocassions. That they were not fatal, was due primarily to the stellar staff the Korps had. The second area where Rommel can be faulted is field sanitation. A significant percentage of the German and Italian soldiers were ill with dysentery at any given time. British soldiers who fought their way into Korps defensive positions were often overwhelmed with the reek of feeces from the trenches and the surrounding area. To be sure, in battle, time for a toilet break doesn't exist, and when you have to go, you have to go. However, the rates of illness in the British forces were much, much lower. Further comparison could easily show that Alexander was a better general than commonly believed and Montgomery was worse. Continued in next post. Thank you.