Lincoln

Steve, <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Big Time Software: [QB]Lincoln, Yes, "shock" at the scale the Soviets practiced it is something that no other WWII force could match. Their doctrine, from top to bottom, was based on smashing the enemy's immediate zone as hard as possible, then push forward with a might lunge regardless of tactical losses. This did not work very well at first at the strategic sense, but often did at the operational sense (Yelnia and Moscow jump to mind right away). The aborted 1942 summer offensive in and around Kharkov was another example of failure. Failure in the sense that they had not quite got the "shock" thing down to a science and the Germans didn't fold up, but instead recoiled and struck back very hard. But at a tactical level they achieved success many times. German troops were still getting used to being hit hard in this way. Steve<hr></blockquote> I think it is important to separate intention from outcome, and from means. Through much of the Great Patriotic War the Soviets did not formulate their intention according to their own pre-war doctrine. My point was that Uranus/Saturn was the first operation explicitly formulated more or less in accordance with this doctrine, but this intention was modified within the first week. Kursk and the Dnepr battles reverted back to Zhukov's earlier type. Bagration remained more true to the concept, for most of the operation. It is also true that the Soviet's used mass and lives to effect their tactical ends, but this is not an essential part of the doctrine, simply the methods they chose at that time - you could argue due to little trust in their lower echelons. Someone on the list also pointed out that warfare is competitive. Consequently, the ultimate outcome of any operation - its success or failure - cannot be laid solely, or even substantially, at the feet of doctrine. To my mind doctrine impacts primarily on the character of success or failure, not its occurrence. Hence the modified Uranus/Saturn was a success, but it was an attritional success when it was conceived as an attempt at operational success. Bagration was also an attritional success, but it was also an operational success as well in the pre-war Soviet sense. <blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Big Time Software: Honestly, I think the specific nature of Soviet doctrine is rooted in cultural and institutional differences that make such a "shock" strategy not unpalatable to Western nations. But is such a doctrine either necessary or even best? I would counter that the examples of Desert Shield/Storm, Kosovo, and now Afganahstan perhaps demonstrate that there is no need for such a doctrine. The use of overwhelming and technologically advanced force, without offering the defending forces a chance to retaliate, is perhaps even more "shock" than what was practiced by the Soviets in WWII. The effects of infrastructure collapse, material losses, and death render the nation state as a whole (or at least a large part of it) from being capable of reacting to conventional military action when, and if, it ever comes. The demoralizing effect of being bled white by an attacker that can not be harmed or exhausted can even be seen as decisive. <hr></blockquote> Again, I would separate the means from the intention. In no way are heavy losses from frontal attacks part of the doctrine. They were just the methods employed by the Soviet command at that time. The term "shock" is problematic in English since it reminds one of the physical effect of a hard blow. Better to think in terms of "shock" in a medical sense: a systemic reaction to some trauma which in and of itself need not be physically massive or major. I agree that the Soviet doctrine is culturally informed. But really it is the willingness to articulate it which is cultural, not the doctrine itself. Soviet "historo-scientific-determinism" meant that they had no compunction in objectifying and talking about something (the system) which was distinct from the sum of its parts and worked according to a logic of its own, rather than the reductionist logic of its components. In the west such notions have long been discounted by a generally rationalist philosophy. Late 20th century western thinking is beginning to rengage with such notions. Re: Desert Storm/Kosovo/Afghanistan. In the western sense of the term "operation", Desert Storm was surely successful as it seems the current action in Afghanistan is likely to be. This is essentially my point. In the pre-WWII Soviet sense whether such battles have any significance depends on their ability to register at the operational level. In this sense Desert Storm failed. We (in the West) would say that the military were restricted by political strictures. This division is Western. The goals of the "operation" were set so as to ensure that a successful battle could be fought, but this had limited significance on the operational level. Depending on who the current conflict is considered to be against, there is a similar danger in Afghanistan. Focussing on complete physical destruction of the perceived enemy may appear to be a step forward over Desert Storm, but only in the attritional sense. The inability of the anti-Saddam coalition to execute subsequent strikes against Saddam illustrates the potential failure the anti-terrorist coalition may face. Likewise, the operational significance of the current battle is determined by the conditions it brings about for subsequent action, since single blows are not generally amplifiable to strategic success. Summary: look to the intentions of a so-called operation to discern its intended operational significance, not its outcomes. If those intentions are aimed at the enemy system rather than his body you will see the operational logic laid out in a series of strikes aimed at this system. These strikes may be carried out by many means including attritional battles or by individuals, but their significance lies in their place within the operational aim. Systems cannot be defeated by attrition only, distintegration from within is necessary. Shock is needed to bring on this disintegration. Application of this school of thought to lower echelons (armies, corps, divisions, etc.) can lead to elements of manouevre theory. The main problem is that at that level little of the enemy system bar the infrastructure and logistics are visible (i.e., as a boxer you could hit your opponents trainer I suppose rather than the man in the ring), and the means at your disposal limited to destructive elements. Hence the tendency to focus on bringing about attritional ends through manouevre means.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Big Time Software: CMplayer wrote: I've read many accounts of this, including Manstein's "Lost Victories" ("Verlorene Siege"). It was a real threat. Huge, in fact. IIRC the main reason why the Soviets missed out on destroying both A and B segments of Army Group South was because they aimed too far west. In other words, they attempted to make too wide of an arc. If they had immediately gone for Rostov instead of the Dnepr River, it is unlikely the Germans could have successfully withdrawn 1st Panzer and 17th Armies as well as they subsequently did. In short, the Soviet plan was too grand for their operational and strategic capabilities. The Germans fought very well and with great creativity. The combination of the two resulted in minimizing the German catastrophe and making the Soviet forces pay a heavy price for their over ambitions. Thankfully, for the Germans, they had commanders who were willing to disobey Hitler/OKH directives or all would likely have been lost. Steve [ 12-15-2001: Message edited by: Big Time Software ]<hr></blockquote> I am new to the list and there is an awful lot of discussion to wade through on this topic. I have tried to do this and want to introduce a concept which is under-represented in the discussion and yet is, IMHO, central to operational thinking and therefore casts light on this attrition vs manouevre debate. The central concept which I have not seen referred to in this discussion is "shock". Yet "shock" is the main aim of operational action and serves to distinguish it from tactical and strategic action. The fact that it plays such little role in western military thinking (and therefore in this discussion) is due to a failure to embrace the systemic thinking of the Soviets (it may, after all, be flawed). The half-way operational thinking is called "manouevre" and it has characterised Western doctrine since Liddel Hart/Guderian. (This use of the term "half-way" is not intended to be pejorative, just descriptive.) Only systems suffer shock in this sense. Echelons are surrounded or destroyed or neutralised. The main reason why so called "attritionist" thinking has gained such a bad press is that it is focused on the effects of friendly action on the "body" of the enemy force. You measure attrition in terms of the degree of materielschlact. An attritionist doctrine seeks as its primary purpose to increase materialschlact. The observation of the Russian revolutionaries, and Soviet operational theorists subsequently, was that material success in battle could no longer be relied on to yeild strategic success due to the industrialisation and popularisation of armed conflict. The Soviets recognised that an armed force was now more than the sum of its parts. No matter how much damage the parts sustained, with proper management, the force could and would remain "in the field" resulting in no strategic decision. (This included complete enemy overrunning of the Motherland of the force and was why partisan activity and organisation was as much a central part of military planning as so-called "regular" armies - the distinction is only present in the non-revolutionary Western tactical-strategic mind.) In short, there is no distinction between front-oine troops and the body politic. Operational warfare is armed action aimed at the systemic aspects of the opponents force. The aim of operational action is to induce shock in that system so that it no longer functions. At that point the enemy is unable to build tactical action into strategic success and is unable to pursue its strategic aims. This concept is crudely translated in manouevrist doctrine as action against the logistical system of the opponent. (In a boxing analogy I saw on an earlier post this would equate to going after your opponents family, pets, mail, home, car, tailor, supermarket, etc. in order to defeat him in the ring. Your aim is for him never to enter the ring.) Modern US doctrine is closer to WWII German doctrine, than to pre-Stalinist Soviet doctrine. It elevates "manouevre" to a tool for achieving attrition. It is fair therefore to characterise current doctrine as attritionist despite its use of operational language. The limitations of such doctrine are obvious when confronting a non-industrialised enemy as the typical manouevrist targets are unavailable, or limited. Against an industrialised enemy apparent tactical success, even enormous, overwhelming tactical success is no guarantor of strategic victory. Operation Desert Storm is a classic example. The Western eye might be reminded of Dunkirk by the outcome of this "battle" and blame premature halt orders for strategic failure. The operationalist would be more reminded of Kiev or Stalingrad and observe that the bringing about of materialschlact was directly responsible yet again for operational failure, and hence ultimately strategic failure. The focus was on the body, rather than the system. It is a politico-philosophical point that the western industrialised mind equates "infrastructure" with "system". When fighting enemies with other philosophies this myopia can be fatal. The Soviet action against Army Group South in the Winter of 1942 was conceived as an operation, but reduced by Stalin's desperate need for a local success to a tactical action similar to the actions the Axis forces had inflicted on the Soviets up to that point. The reduction of Saturn to small Saturn ensured this. The attempt to raise the action after that was futile. Bagration is widely recognised as the first reasonable example of an operation in the original Soviet sense. The reason for this is that it was planned and executed as an action against the system that was Army Group Centre, rather than the body of that system. The wholesale distintegration of the Army Group was the result. (NB. The balance of forces in Bagration was much more favourable to the Germans than in Uranus. The movement of German operational reserves was an integral part of the Soviet operation.) The Soviets stressed the use of operational "strikes" to induce operational shock in their opponent. This is very different from the "envelopments" and "Kessel"-Logik that the German's employed. Notice the aim and direction of the "strikes" in Bagration. Very different in geometry, force and depth than the actions in Uranus or Barbarossa or Desert Storm. So I would suggest that it is the purpose and intention of an armed action that allows it to be classified within doctrinal schools, not, strictly speaking, its outcome. Defenders of attritionist thinking have much ammunition to throw at manoeuvrists because the latter tend to be playing the same game as the attritionists. Operational theory as articulated by revolutionary Soviet thinking steps outside this logic. This step, IMHO is still waiting to be taken by western doctrinal schools. Asymmetric warfare may provide the motivation to finally engage with this. [ 12-15-2001: Message edited by: Lincoln ]</p>