jasoncawley@ameritech.net

March 14, 2001

Incidentally, on the grog subject of TDs, they were usually employed in platoons of 4 vehicles, so that was quite accurate. Sometimes companies of 12. Units this size did sometimes work with still larger forces, like a company of tanks or infantry. But they usually did not split and mix with tanks in smaller packets than a platoon. (Occasionally a 2-TD "section"). And they had their own M-8s, plus M-20s or jeeps, as recon for the TDs - the 4th company of the TD battalion.

A 5th company had HMC-75mm SPA (the other kind of "M8" in CM terms, on the armor screen), which could be used for HE fire support of infantry, or fired indirect in a battery to take out enemy towed anti-tank guns. There was nothing in the least unhistorical about the force mix described earlier.

For those interested in such things, notice that the formation of the TD battalions and the cavalry battalions were in some respects similar, with inverse "roles". The cavalry had one company of Stuarts, as their heavier vehicles - the TD battalion had one company of armored cars and jeeps as their lighter vehicles. The TD battalion had 3 companies of the TDs themselves as their main force - the cavalry battalion had 3 troops of armored cars and jeeps as their main force. In both, there was a 5th company of 75mm SPA.

Both unit types were used independently in their own force mix at different levels, from battalion down to platoon. Those were then mixed with other force types for the task at hand. So a tank column (of Shermans and Stuarts) might have a TD platoon attached, or a TD company might support an infantry battalion, or a cavalry troop lead an armored infantry battalion task force.

Engineers were mixed and matched in the same way, as was light AA (which had 40mm Bofors and quad .50 cals, towed or half-track mounted in both cases). 1/5-1/4 of the battalions in typical U.S. divisions were these "support" weapon types, and they operated in groups of any size from platoon up, in support of the other arms. Another 1/5-1/4 were the artillery battalions. By formation type, only 60% of an infantry division was infantry, and armored divisions were 25% each armor and armored-infantry (in halftracks).

March 14, 2001

First, there is no "R" in my last name. Thank you.

Second, I think everyone knows that there are beer&pretzel CMers (whom I hereafter refer to, for no good reason, as "jocks", and there are grogs (whom I hereafter refer to, for no good reason, as "geeks").

But the impression that disputes about "gaminess" are between these factions is in error. It is a purely intermural sport of the geeks, which occasionally confuses the jock bystanders.

Some of whom may be vaguely offended, or at least amused, or occasionally even confused, by the geek habit of refering to typical jock behaviors as a form of insult to other geeks. That is from high school and if you haven't figured it out by now, you never will.

Usually, the jocks have merry fun with one another, and their drunken idea of a good CM game is just what the previous fellow said. They do not, however, taunt one another with cries of "gamey", and do not mind when so called. They prefer more direct disparagments of the abilities, anatomy, and ancestry of their opponents, and generally enjoy the alternate crowing over victories and self-deprecation over defeats at least as much as the beer and explosions.

And most geeks, in my experience, do not mind this in the least. And drink as heartily. The less said about their wives the better. Many jocks do not quite understand it, but true grog-hood is as drunken a revel as their own, just with someone else's twisted sense of such things. "This is your master's thesis on acid", if that registers at all.

A geek may occasionally slip and call a jock's play "gamey", but it is quite enough to hear a "eh, what?" instead of an impassioned defense of the historical nature of the practice involved, to realize the mistake. Then nuts or pretzels are poured into a bowl and a beer is opened, and all is right with the world. Both types generally find each other highly amusing, and the occasion perfectly enjoyable.

But the real use of such cries is in intermural disputes among the grog-geeks. The jocks have nothing to do with it, except for the high school habit hinted at above. You can always tell. Geeks always maintain that things happened the way this particular fellow thinks, not the way the *next geek* thinks.

And they always use as punctuation marks for such claims, epithets like "gamey".

Do not be misled. Nothing is being said to, or about, jocks and the beer-n-pretzels manner of playing, in these cases. They are just saying "and your mother smelled of elderberries" to the next geek they are arguing with. So much for sorting out the players.

Two intermural geek affairs are, however, still outstanding. First, one fellow took a rival view of the high losses of CM fights, and suggested that slow daily attrition was the real war, not the brief intense smashes of CM. And that therefore, tactics that get small units killed could not be afforded. The implicit assumption is that the scale of opposition in CM fights is usually present, but the opposing sides are not smashing into each other as forcefully.

There are periods in the war when this is probably an accurate picture. Normany, Hurtgen and Metz, and parts of the Bulge fighting (in January in particular). But these are intense battle episodes.

My point was rather different. I trace the high losses in CM fights to the nearly even odds, not to players predisposed to get all their men killed, because they are just pixels and there is only one hour's fight. Some of both. But most one hour's fights in WW II did not result in anything like CM casualties, and it wasn't because the commanders didn't press. Often the defeated side's loss was total, through surrender. The reason was the fights were not close.

I've explained this before. You have to imagine the following CM "scenarios".

A German infantry battalion forms up for a "attack" through a wooded area, with a village at the other end. The U.S. is barely on the map yet. The Germans begin to move. Then 12 artillery batteries fire 2500 shells unto the Germans and into the ground between the two sides after the German pull back. Not much of a CM scenario.

Or, a U.S column of 50 AFVs and 50 halftracks runs into a blocking position with 10 StuG and an infantry company. Not satisfied with the local odds, they wait half an hour and 36 fighter-bombers plaster the German position.

Or, 65 German infantry are dug in on a hill outside a village. They have 8-10 fausts as AT weapons. 10 U.S. tanks pull up 400 yards away and blast away for 20 minutes. Then an infantry company rushes forward - and takes 40 prisoners, most of them wounded.

Or, a company of 15 U.S. tanks is trying to climb a muddy slope, with no opposition in sight. A battery of hidden PAK open fire on them from 2 miles away and KO half of the vehicles. A smoke barrage enables the rest to withdraw. The PAK are never found.

Or, to relieve a threatened bridge position, a company of U.S tanks drives along a narrow river road through a gorge, and tries to climb up out of it onto a plateau. They have a company of infantry in halftracks with them, total ~30 vehicles. Unknown to them, the ridgeline they are driving up onto is occupied by 30 Panther and 40 Pz IV tanks and a battalion of panzergrenadiers. The forward third of the U.S column is shot to pieces and the rest withdraw.

Those sorts of fights do not involve much danger to the side with the locally superior force. And most of the fighting in WW II was like that, for one side or the other. The match ups were not "fair" at all. One side won, and the other lost, for reasons having everything to do with what forces came to the fight, not how they were employed. But such occasions are of little tactical gaming interest.

The typical unit in WW II was in *close* fights, with high causalties to either or both sides, on a few occasions throughout the war. Many units - most in losing armies - also faced one occasion in which overwhelming force was arrayed against them. Most units were in many, many fights in which their side had all the cards - because a bigger portion of their army is in those, than the portion of the losing side's army present at the same fight.

But what this means is that the average or expected day's action, was a cakewalk compared to a CM game. Only light opposition was expected, because that is mostly what was encountered. It is a lot easier to arrange some light opposition. And often, it happens without being arranged, just collision style, when whole attacking units hit small portions of outnumbered defending ones.

Sometimes an attacking force would no beforehand this would not be the case, when a close battle occurred. Then it would be a so called "set-piece attack", with heavy support meant to approximate the lopsided case as much as possible. And care would be used in approaches in such cases.

But most close battles occurred without both sides, and often without either side, knowing beforehand the force match-up would be close. And in those situations, the dispositions and practices of e.g. the attacking side, would not be a model of great care. If great care were always used, the only effect would be no movement.

Attackers therefore used tactics that promised to quickly overwhelm *light* opposition, if possible without endangering large parts of the main force if something more serious was "hit". That was the point on my previous post about recon in force. Recon in force is not done with 4 men or a combat patrol. It is done with the forward elements of a column, kampgruppe-team-task force whatever it is called.

On the subject of simulating small patrols, I point out to the fellow who thought of HQs for this, that they do not in fact have the ability to call for fire. Only FOs do. Advanced teams from infantry formations should use just that, teams = 1/2 squads walking head of the infantry. Their lack of morale "robustness" is quite accurate. It was not their job to do more than locate some enemy and then extricate themselves if possible.

The situation the other fellow is thinking of, is more like the LRRP (long range recon patrol or "lerp")- a penetration of enemy lines by a small group to gather info. That is *not* synonymous with "recon". When it was done, it was usually a small party from a recon platoon or intelligence officer's section. It doesn't really have any place in CM. They would be the only force on the map. Get a different game.

Combat patrols do, however, have a place in CM. Ordinary infantry sent them out regularly, and they ran into each other regularly, in what would be small CM meeting engagements. To make one, take a platoon and assign one of its squads to the company CO as his own ad-hoc platoon. (Sometimes 2). A sniper is optional. Use a commander with good morale and stealth. This is a common way of running a "point" platoon, which is really just a combat patrol that is closely supported by the rest of the company.

Next, one last grog insists that things can be done with a lone jeep that did not really happen in the real show. I do not doubt it. I do doubt that such antics have any point, or "work", in CM. And not because you can "all stay on hide", but because it costs nothing to burn the sucker without revealing anything of consequence. Just have a decent fire plan and use the appropriate weapon, and relocate it afterward, if you like.

Last, one more fellow noted that you can't have a decent fire plan in the full blown realistic sense, because the flanking units are missing. This is true to a point. You do not get direct fire coming into sector on the edges. You also do not have to dedicate your own assets to fire leaving your sector to help units on your flanks. This does marginally increase vunerability along the map edges. But attacks there, by infantry in at least, are risky, because anyone who panicks exits the map.

This is mostly a problem with front-armored tanks, turning inward from an edge and thus achieving more flank protection than they possibly could. But the same tactic is used behind buildings, hills, bocage, or bodies of woods. It is not like the effect the edges produce artificially, is not available perfectly honestly in he middle of the map, when such features are present.

In any event, it was a different point than my own. It is perfectly feasible to arrange a decent fire plan for your own sector in CM. Yes, that is less than the full blown real deal with sectors tied into one another tighter than a certain aquatic fowl's anatomy.

One point about such plans can still be mentioned here. It is better to take out a light vehicle on recon, with a shooter that is not right in front of it. That is, tell the scouting commander where some asset is, not in the place he was trying to look, but elsewhere. When he scouts over on the same side, use a reveal asset if it hasn't moved, or if it has (better), then take that one out from the first side again.

The reason this works better is two-fold. One, it denies the enemy the information he wanted, even if it does give him some. And two, the "point's" supporting overwatch is more likely to be able to see a shooter right in front of the point, than one off on the other flank at some crazy angle.

I hope this is useful.

March 13, 2001

"...but once the target area had been reached"

There wasn't one. The target area was all of France and Germany. They did not have neon signs that flashed "Danger Will Robinson! Probe mission! Heavy opposition expected with no better than 4:3 odds for the next 1200 yards! Danger! Dismount your vehicle Will Robinson!"

In the U.S. army, every armor division had an armored recon battalion, and independent groups parcelled out other such battalions to the infantry divisions. Which were not in the least leg formations by the way. (I know you know that, not everyone does). But the layering of recon-dedicated assets did not stop there.

In the early, "square" U.S. armored divisions, there were 2 armor regiments and each had a full battalion of light tanks. In the later, standard one, there was only one regiment, but every battalion had one company of light tanks. So the ratio of light to medium tanks was 1:2 in the first, 1:3 in the second type. What were the light tanks for? Recon. To find the things the fighting tanks would blow up.

In the tank destroyer battalions, each had 3 companies of 12 TDs, M-10s mostly, some of the better types. And every such battalion had another, 4th company, equipped with M-8s and M-20 armored cars, and jeeps. For what? Recon. To find the things the TDs would blow up.

Every infantry and armored infantry battalion had one platoon set aside from the line companies, that was instead part of the support company. In the same organization as the anti-tank guns, the mortars, the extra machineguns, in other words. What was its job? Recon. To find out who was in front of the line companies and the like. They usually reported directly to the battalion intelligence officer.

Did the line companies just rely on the information those provided, when moving out? No. One platoon had the "point" position. And it usually sent out 2 lone scouts a ways ahead of the platoon itself. Sometimes a team was used instead of 2 lone scouts, to give them some firepower if they encountered one sniper. There was a "lessons learned" report about it dating from the Italian campaign.

Was this some strange fascination of the Americans? No. See all those infantry types marked "fusilier"? That is what the Germans called their divisional recon battalions, in the infantry formations. They often did recon on bicycles. The typical late-war German infantry division had 6 infantry and 3 artillery battalions. Plus 1 anti-tank, 1 engineer, and 1 fusilier - that is, recon was 1/8th of the infantry type and 1/12th of the overall number of battalions. The mobile divisions had bigger recon battalions mounted in half-tracks and equipped with armored cars and gun-armed halftracks.

Does anybody think the recon performed by these big units with lots o' guns and vehicles amounted to 4 guys sneaking-into-the-movies before the first "Go!" button? No. They were all designed to recon in force. Including some fighting, if not perhaps the CM "marquis of queensbury" rules, nearly-even-odds arena combat fighting.

Why did they recon in force? Because thin forces and 12 man roadblocks are pennies in military terms. And any force that backs away from the mere prospect of getting shot at will therefore be stopped long before it finds out anything. Real war recon, not the snaker-eaters LLRP with 4 commandos but the kind of thing you need 1/8th of an infantry division for and 1/4th of your tanks for, involves blowing through the little stuff until you hit something more serious.

And nobody knows where that is, until they hit it. CM is about situations in which something is really hit. But the "point" is up there every day, and only a handful of time in the whole war, is he going to run into so close an overall fight. Usually, one side of the other holds all of the local aces.

"Oh that is ridiculous. Only a handful of times? But CM is 30 minutes of fighting, and the campaign lasted nearly a year." Yes, but in CM fights, ~50% of the engaged forces get wiped out. And if that happened more than a handful of times to the average unit, then nobody would have survived WW II. Plenty of people did.

The light armor or the jeeps are up there on "point", because they do not know this is the day. So set up some proper fire plan that will KO the little buggers before they find out too much, and stop bawling about it.

March 13, 2001

6 mortars. Both sides used mortar batteries of 6 mortars (Brits too). It is not obvious, incidentally, that CM is not depicting that already.

The rate of fire of light mortars is almost arbitrarily high. The real measure of the weight of support is therefore not the number of tubes, but the number of rounds fired. Which is 200 for the U.S. module and 150 for the German one, for example (a difference refected in their price).

A larger battery allows them to come down faster, and may therefore help to catch people before they get to cover, but it is mostly 6 of one, half a dozen of the other. Support by the battalion mortars, the most common for of indirect fire support by far incidentally, should be 1 module, not several.

Incidentally, the persistent confusion about German 81mm TOEs in Pz Gdr units, seems to reflect the fact that *armored* ones had only the company level mortars, while motorized ones had the same set up as leg infantry - 2 per company plus 6 for the battalion. And this is further confused by the units generally not being at full TOE strength.

When you look at the mortar strengths of units in a particular battle, you find battalions with 6, and 6, and 8, and 10, and 12, and 11 81mm mortars. They were trying to have 2 per company for direct fire, and a mortar battery at battalion level for the non-armored troops. (Why non-armored? Because the half-track mounted guys used more gun halftracks instead).

As for the 75mm indirect, their use varies a bit. For the Germans, that is the fire of the regimental gun company, using infantry guns. (Occasionally it might be captured Russian field pieces in a divisional artillery battalion, but that is relatively rare). The mountain troops also had 75mm howitzers.

For German "leg" infantry, this would be a relatively common form of supplimental artillery fire, but less common that divisional 105mm, and much less common that battalion 81mm mortars. The 75mm infantry guns were often used for direct fire as infantry heavy weapons, rather than "in battery" like this.

On the Allied side, the airborne both U.S. and U.K. used 75mm pack howitzers, because they are more easily landed by air. Along with 81mm or 3" mortars, it would be the most common for of fire support for them in air-landed situations, like early D-Day or Market-Garden. In addition, the U.S. cavalry forces would get 75mm indirect fire from their M8 HMC "assault guns", which were fired as a battery indirect, whenever the front was stable (screening, defense roles, etc). And last, every U.S. infantry regiment had a cannon company. Most of thes had already converted to 105mm pack howitzers, but some still had the older 75mm.

That is just who would have them stuff. In CM terms, the 75mm hits harder but with fewer shells; the mortars also "react" faster to calls for fire. The total hitting power is comparable for either type, with the 81mm more likely to effect every unit in the targeted area somewhat, but the 75mm more likely to mess one of two of them up badly. Both are meant to hurt infantry.

Both are primarily suppression weapons (meaning, keep someone from firing or pin them to allow infantry to rush them the moment the barrage stops). But can cut up troops in the open or in woods without foxhole cover, reasonably well.

These light arty types "don't do buildings" and are marginal against troops in wooded foxholes, able to pin them while the barrage lasts but not much else. They are fine defender's weapons because of this, less useful on the attack. But the mortars are a useful artillery type to lay smoke with, for attackers, because the quick response time and high ammo supply are key, and the payload mostly irrelevant, in that role.

March 13, 2001

Very nice picture.

For the Germans, you can just use 3x81mm to address the price. That will keep the cost in the same ballpark at the off-board module, and it gives half the number of rounds as the off-board module. The pattern is pretty dense already, so dropping e.g. the front-center one from your "diamond", will not reduce the effect much. You will still have more rounds per bit of area in the beaten zone. Even the standard 2x81mm per company fire a decent 2-minute mission, though they will tend to "x" across the target instead of making a nice blob.

March 13, 2001

To wwb_99

I play the allies at least as much as I play the Germans, so I am well aware of how they work. And that they will work, when used right, against someone who makes mistakes, etc. That does not change the fact that the German infantry gets nicer infantry toys without paying more for them.

On the subject of the 60mm mortar, and its dueling properties against a German HMG, I partially agree. The exact proper use of the things is to pair up, and shell an HMG from 200-400 yards away, out of LOS. But there are definite provisos -

1. It won't work at all if the HMG is in a building.

2. If won't work well if the HMG is in a foxhole. Especially not a single mortar.

3. With just 1 firing and the target in woods, you will on average put down 1 man in a turn of firing.

4. You have ammo for three such missions. Your maximum potential casualties are pretty well capped - at around 3 per mortar.

5. You will get "alerted" and "cautious" results only, shooting at regulars who are in command control, if you use only one mortar. Most of the time.

6. If you fire two mortars at once, you can expect to put down 2 men and pin regulars, with a good chance to panic or break them, especially if they are out of command control.

7. Against veterans, 1 mortar is not going to do diddly. It will partially suppress for the 3 minutes the fire can be kept up, and hurt a few men, without that reducing the HMG's firepower afterward, at all.

8. Working as a group (2-3), you can expect to suppress or break 2-3 point targets, and to fire 2 small smoke missions.

Now, a little comparison. An HMG team can expect to fire off 30 ammo in 10 minutes. It can keep this up for 20-30 minutes or until killed. It can roughly expect to hit a man a minute over that period, unless stopped. More in open ground, less against good cover. The casualty cap is around the size of a platoon, 30 men not 3.

Most HMGs will not do that much. Most will fire only 1/3 to 2/3rds of their ammo, much of it at long range, and against a wide mix of cover types. It can still expect to put down ~3 times as many men as the 60mm, unless the MG team breaks (moral wise), or is killed rapidly by tank HE.

Light mortars are useful for their role, which is on-call suppression of point targets. But they do not approach the overall firepower of regular infantry or MGs.

March 13, 2001